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PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
MM~AYs JW2IA3Y 24, 1958
SURCOXMI7=E

UNITED STATE SENATE,
ON CONUTIUT ONAL AjmNDMENTh
OF THE COMxMME ON THE JUDICIARY

The -subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8': 10 p. In., in room 424,
Senate Office Building, lion. Estes Kefauiver (chairman of the subcomnmit tee)'d
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'Si~vriiv. 1. The P'resident fort tetliore oftit 'k N'eiteti lue Speaikeriruflhip
House of Reprxesentatives, the inajority leader o~f lilt, &n'antp, the inhiiorit3 leader
tle~ I'llof Ithe Senate, tho majityI leader of tile hlonse oft Rlimsellntivs 1111s1
notrity lIciier of the Ilouse of Reprk,.!enItativejsiluli constittute' a conmtuilti't for
the ctideratloit of tlin question which may trise its to thle inbilIty of tlt-r
Prvesldent to dtsehAnnt.tiae powers andI duties of hts ('hike §rtcl coutnit ite sheath
be convened (M whenever the Vice President, by letter transmaatted to the i'resident pro temixore of the Senate and to the SpeAker of the House of lteitreseaatate.-%way suggest that doubt exists as to the aiity of the President to dliicharge the powers and sluties, of his office. or (2) upon request malde by tiny
four of the members of such committee. Four netbers thereof shall consdtitte
a quorum. Whenever such committee Is convened under this Nection, the committee shall determine whether there Is probable cause for belief that the 1'restdent Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. If the committee
determines, by affirmative vote of not less than four member, that such probable
cause exists, the majority leader of the Senate shall introduce In the Senate,
-smd the majority leader of the House shall Introduce In the House, @iconcurrent resolution stating hn substance that It has been determined by the Congress
that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Upon the adoption by both Houses of the Congress, by the affirmative vote of
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dties(until the illmibliily (of flip irftllf
INreniioied, or 1111111
It flow 1'i'Ahtlit
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trnimiilled toi (lit' I'reslont p.ro feipore of file Heliato and to t1,1414*1nker of
thiu hlotie (fitejriiiit s ndvises flint lit hkq ojdton film fiilliy to, dischlirgo tlie owerm and 41111191
of film ofhlec no longfer e'xlst, 1111(.1miinltti esal)i
IIIIIEdI by s-0tion 1 14111111111
recoINveNed V11 i th baiNs Of Affch letter (110mnaJority leader of tho Ijennte shatll Initroduce lin the Menete, tilit Me fiijitety leader
of than louse Fhlt Initrodtiive lit tile Muse, a (olledtrpit resoltionI Ptiitlng fit
suiee flint It hap bien detertmined loy (ie~ C"ongress [flat thle Inability of file
P'remhilu'nit to discha1trge fle poIwers and11
duIdem of ism
(Jliv 11 longer MAINs. tlpon
tile iuoptloii by buit I ouses of thai. Coiigremm boy majority vote of all JAemuberx
poresen noduvoting lit each litin, (of tiny concurrent resolution introduced In
e.onintiae
i tti [film see ilon, ifie I'resufent sholl reaine tile discharge oif the
Dowersii n dilem fit him~ offlc anlit(e Vice I're"ddent mlitll resume the dischatrge of tile Ipowerio anid dties of tho 6o1111ce
of Vice P'resident,
"Mrw. 0. Any votivorretit resolution iuitr'slcepit tder seclti I fir xmNtI(At 2 of
[[its article lin either iltim of the Con~ros Alil be, jilced linmedictely uon
tile prullf't' cailendar of much flouse w~tritf
eeec to eCliflfitN' InI deubate
oliont nny suceh voncurrent reolticion lit flipi nae no Henator may speak In all
itiure thrittitle hour, finud Ito dlatory inOtIon sthall I* lil ordlt.r It iqfhall I*. the
shuily of the I1'rV14ldlng Officer of the Heinto to, keejs fte t~me (if e'uh *4cqintor who
ipnkm Iit such ulebloi, midu Pmiftilm of order and flgjlas fromn the dlllidwi (of (ie
l'reichiig Officvr W'hnlh fie ulevidle without debate.
'ifrki. 41.Itfithe coninIittee established by setlonj I of tIP nrilele di-teinineg,
lit "fly 1(l110 lt whlli the Con01grexs lit not in session1, tlint there IMpreoable eiftige
for belief flint tlie l'resllet is wunble to diptehatrge lihe pjsverm uAnd lutt of
his offle, the Couagress maly be eonvenicu lit spec1il session, 1upoh lte (*ll ci4 the
l'tishdiit pro, teffl0r9 oft Ilmt W-infte and filo Hpeaker Of the hnseOf Utepre.
menintlven etiu Jointly, for the consideration oif nra, coneurrent tesoltitllts.
I rouluceul in t-oanillitaco with (ho j'roylidirn of tMIX artle.e
"N1rA'. ro.This airtice slmnli tbo Iiopefrative wilexs It hall have biven tatlile-d Ax
on niendllenat to (te (Constituition toy [too ehgliqattircs (of three-fouirthoo of the
itoveral Hitnteg ilithiit seven years from tlie larte of Itx suhifnn"
(M.J. Rlep. 14#. h5th Conor.. 24 me'.ej
JM)N'r n;uottIMOmTIN lroltoplug an amptidmiat to the eC',njsts~tton of the Ucitol Klites
14, iake 1irovildoti fr th' coninu o.x dlischarweofn the powers n64 intt- of the oUPA 4f
the 1reoldcnt of the Uitelid Miates

Iu'cavolrfd by lite Scnilc and lotic (if Repfirca'nlalfr,* of the United SIlite
o/ Alnacrlca In Conpgrca. ascmbled (two-thirds of each H~ouse toncurrfng therein),
'Llat tlie following article Ig proposed as an amendment to the Coiniltiton of
lte United States, which shall lie vallul to nlt intent and purlwosca as part of the
Conslitittlon when ratified by tice IegllAntures4 tof three-fourthis (if the Severai
States:
"Ar ne.r 18rcTios 1. In the cape of the removal of the President front offi'-e. or his
death or restgnation, the Vice 1'resldent shall become Presdent. and Phall .serve
as such for the remainder of the term for which his predecteswor was eteeted.
In the case of the abilityy of the I'resldenf to) discharge the powers and dutll".
of his office, ituch powers anti datlex shall devolve upon the Vice Presidnt,
and shall be dilscharged by him during the continuance of the inability of the
I'resident.
"S~x. 2. The Congress way provide by law for the case of the remval, deAth,
resignation, or Inability of both the President and the Vice Preaident. declaring
what officer shall. then discharge the powers and duties of the office of the
President, and sunch officer shall discharge such powers and duties until the
disability Is removed, or A new P'resident Is elected and has taken office.
"Sze. 3. The Congress shall provide by law for the determination of all qv*e-.
tions'of fact arising under section 1 and section 2 of this article. lf theCongres
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determines, by concurrent resolution adopted In each Ilouse with the concurrence
of two-thirds of the Members thereof present nnd voting, that there is no person
cbo3en In accorditnce with this Constitutioni to be President, or qualified In
aecordance with section I or setlon 2 of this article to dislnrgi the powers and
duties of the office of the 'resident, who is able tO discharge the powers and
duties of such office, the Congress by concurrent resolution so ndoptel may
designate, or provide for the designation of, a person who shall discharge such
powers and dutlie until n person do chosen or qualified is available' for the
discharge of such powers and duties.
1'8. 4. If, at any time at which the Congress Is not in session, the President
pro temper. of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
should determine that there is probable cause for belief that there Is no person
chosen In accordance with this Constitution to be President, or qualified In
accordance with section 1 or section 2 of this article to discharge the powers
and duties of the office of the President, who Inable to discharge the powers
and duties of such office, the Congress may be convened In special session, upon
the call of the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Represntatives acting jointly, for the consideration of any concurrent relution which may be Introduced pursuant to section 8 of this article.
"Sco. 6. The sixth paragraph of section 1 atticlo II of this onstitution is
reeled.
So 0. This artileo shall be in~peratitvo unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourthm of the soveral States within seven years from the date of its submission,"
IL 118. N8th Cong., 2d ses.|

A BILL To provide for the determination of the ability of the President to discharge the
powers and duties of his omee, and for other purpo.e.
Be it eseted ybV
the Senate and House of Representatliee of the Untied Slates
of Americ i Oongress assembled, That (a) chapter 1 of title 8 of the United
States Code Is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
Of 21. Determination of ability of the President to discharge the powers and
duties of his office
"(a) The President pro tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leader of the
Senate, the majority leader of the House of Representatives, and the minority
leader of the House of Representatives shall constitute a committee for the consideration of any question which may arise as to the inability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of his offie. Such committee shall be convened
(1) whenever the Vice President, by letter transmitted to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, may
suggest that doubt exists as to the ability of the President to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, or (2) upon request made by any four of the members of
such committee. Four members thereof shall constitute a quorum.
"(b) Whenever such committee Is convened pursuant to subsection (a), the
committee shall determine whether there Is probable cause for belief that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. If the
committee determines, by affirmative vote of not less than four members, that
such probable cause exists, the majority leader of the Senate shall introduce in
the Senate, and the majority leader of the House shall Introduce In the House,
a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it hae been determined by the
Congress that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
ofile.
"(e) Upon the adoption by both Houses of the Congress, by the afflrmatlve
vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members present and voting In each House,
of any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to subsection (b), the powers
and duties of the office of President shall devolve upon the Vice President, who
shall then discharge such powers and duties until the disability of the President
Is removed, or until a new President Is elected and takes office, whichever occurs
earlier.
"(d) Whenever the Vice President has ssumed the powers and duties of the
oilee of President, and the President thereafter, by letter transmitted to the
President pro temporal of the Senate and to the Speker of the House of Reproimetatives, advises that in his opinion his Inability to discharge the powers and
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titles of his oMce no longer exists, the committee established by subsection (a)
shall be reconvened. Upon the basis of such letter, the majority leader of the
Senate shall introduce In the Renate, and the majority leder of the blouse shall
Introduce In the house, a concurrent resolution stating In substance that It has
been determined by the Congress that the Inability of the President to discharge
the powers and duties of his office no longer exists.
"(e) Upon the adoption by both llouses of the Congress, by majority vote of
all Members present and voting In each house, of any concurrent resolution
introduced pursuant to subsection (d), the President.shall resume the discharge
of the powers and duties of his office, and the Vice President shall resume the
dlcharge of the powers and duties of the office of Vice President."
(b) The sectional analysis of chapter 1 of title 3 of the United States Code Is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
"21. Deteiminatlon of ability of the President to discharge the powers and duties
of his office"
Ow. 2. (a) The following provisions of this section are enacted by the Congreus:
(1) As an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House
of
Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the
rules of that llouse to which they specflcally apply; and such rules shall supr
sede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) With full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change
such rules (so far as relating to t(ie procedure in such Houso) at any time, in the
same manner and to the same extent as In the case of any other rule of such
(b)tRl, XIV o the Standing flules of the kienate is amended by adding at
the end thereof the followIng new paragraph:
". Any oneurrent resolution Introduced pursuant to the provisions of section
21 of title 8 of the United States Code shall upon introduction be placed upon
the Calendar without reference to committee. No such concurrent resolution
shall be subject to amendment. In debate upon any such concurrent resolution"(a) no Senator shall be entitled to speak In all more than one hour, and
It shall be the duty of the Presiding Officer to keep the time of each Senator
who speaks; and
"(b) no dilatory motion shall be In order, and points of order and appeals
tom the decision of the Presiding Offlcer shall be decided without debate."
. (e) Ilule XXII of the fules of the House of representatives is amended by
,adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

Introduced pursuant (o the provisions of setion
resolution Cqde
Any 3concurrent
21 "0.
of title
of the United'States
shall upon Introduction be placed upon the

House Calendar without reference to committee."

IS. Y. Ret. 100, 85th Cong., 1.1.tso.]
-JO V RFSOLUTION Relating to the Inablilty of the Preddent to dschargs the powe

and duties of his office
Resolved by the Semte and Ifoftse of Represefdlfree 6f tke Ufted Stae
-o America in Ooagress assembled (two-IA frde of each Howe-ooscvrimp Merei) That the following ariele i proposed as An amendment to the Contitutlon
of the United Stale*, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
'the Constitution vhen ratified by the legislatures of thte-fourthe of thbeseveral
States:
"ArrcL"Sioriox 1. Whenever the two House of Congress shall adopt a resolution
-declaring that the Congreft believes that the Presideht Is unable, by reason of
physical or mental- disability, to discharge the powers and duties of his ofem,
-sUch resolution shall bb tftdsmltted to the Supreme CoArt of the United States,
and the Court shall decide whether or not such inability exis.
If tie, Cot
,decides, by a maJorlty vote of.the authorized memblerahlp, that sueb an inabllty
exists, the powers and duties of President shill devolve upon the Vice Presidenk
or if there be no Vice President, upon the person next in line of successor to tie
offlqe of Presltm.t, as provided by law.
".TheVice' Preedent or other person upon .whomthe powes and duUep VC
the President have developed pursuant to proceedings under
1otqrW*.
t
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amendment stall cmUnue to exorcise muth powers and dulle until the end of
the prosidenlial term then in effect, unless It ham previously been detornklned
that the liability of the President no longer exists, In which event 1ho l'rml.
dent @halt rearuloo the powers and duties of his oMee, Such a determinatio
shall be made [it the ame manner as herein rovided for de(termlIln 1 the quest.
tiontof the President's Inability to perform tri powers sid duties o his of11,c.
"'orthe purposes of this article of amentdinet, a quorum In each ousa of
Oongress shall consist of two-thirda of the total numtber of members thereof.
"Am I In the event the Oongrei I not lit session, nod In the opinion of the
Vice Predent, or it there be no Vice residentt, the President pro temiporo of
the Senate, and the Speiker of the House of Itepresentinttive eireninutnntcs exlt
which ereate a doubt as to the ability of the t resident to discharge, the powers
and duties of his offce they may by Joint nation call the (Vmirme Into special
seion for the purpose of considering witethar the President Is unable to dis.
charge the powers and duties of his office.
"lit the event the Congrm Is not in session, and It the opinion of the Presi.
dent pro teimporo of the Senate and the peakor of the House of Representatives
circumstances exist which Indicate that the Inabill which occasioned -ation
purslant to section I no longer exists, they may by Joint action call the Congreos
Into spweial seion for the purpose of considering whether or not such in.

ability still exist

"Sin & The provisions of this article of amendment shall apply to aly parson
upon whom the powers and duties of the office of president have devolved In
the same manner such provisions apply to the President.
ftSo. 4. This article shall not apply to nny i*rson holding the offle of Presldent
when this arUclo was proposed by the Congress.
ftSto, &,This article shall be Inoporative unless It shall have been ratiflod as
an amendment to the Constitution by the l sltatures of threetfoutthn of the so,.
ersl States within seven years from the date of Ite subinlilon."
(a. J. Hes. 183, 85th Congs" 2d ies,)
JOl.'r R.1P0LUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United Slates
to make provision for the Congress to determine the nabllity of the resldtat of the
United States to discharge the powers and duties of hise ole

Rolt'ed by the Senate aMsd louse of Reprceritatlre of the UNICtd State
of Ame-tie in Qotgreae aawerbled, (two-thfids ol eaoh House conouruinr
therein), That the following article ts proposed as an amendment to the Con.
sitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all ltenti and purposes
as a part of the Constitution wien ratified by the legislatures (of three-fourths
of the several States:
"AnrrceLin
"Sxvtrox 1. The Congress may provide by law for the procedure for (1) de.
termining the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, and (2) determining when the Inability of the President to discharge
the powers and duties of his office has ceased to exist Upon a determination
that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
such powers and duties shall devolve upon the Vice President, and shall be
discharged by him during the continuance of the disability of the President.
"Sum. 2. This article shall be Inoperative unless It shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States within seven years from the date of Its submission."
(8. J. les. 184, 85th Cons., 2d sees
JOIr R.SOLU'TION Propostat an amendment to the Constitution of the United Stitee
to estabil b a committee to determine the inability of the President to discarge the
powers AM dutes of his oMfe

Reve~d bys the Semoe and6 Howse Of Representatfive of the Unite States ol
Arte
in (Jo&gee. ewmnble (two-thirds of each House donourrim therein),
7%at the following article Is proposed aS an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part
of the 0o.aUtution when ratified by the legislaturft of tbree-fonrths of the
Teveril state:
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"H r"ox I.It the cage of the removal of tie Presilent from oice, or his
dtnth or resignation, the Vice Pretltent slil become 1'resldent and shall serve
elid of the
currentthePresidential
cse
of the
ofintil
thethe
Presidlent
to then
discharge
powers antdterm,
dutiesInofthebig
office
theInability
powers
anti dnlt(e Phit devolve upon (he Vice lPresldentl and shall be dischArged bi"
him during the conilnuntlom of the inability of the Prosidenl.
rinting an).
such period the compensution of the Vice President shall be at tho rate #hen
provided by law In the ease of the President.
"Sxv. 2. The Uongress nay provide by law for the case of the removal, death,
re-mignittiol, or Ifninllily of oth the President nd the Vice Premident, declaring
what ollker shall the discharge the powers and duties of the office of Prek[.
dent, no titich offer shall discharge such powers Aijd duih untill the disabilitk
is reinnvtl, or atPreldefnt Is plect(4L
"Mm'. 3, FoloI lte
purpose of determining the Inability of the President to diselirge the powers nnd ditties of the office of Presldont, there Is hereby eutab.
liihed n committee consisting of the Chief Justlce of the Uited States, who shall
servo an ehalrinni of such coinmittee and who shall ianv no vote In any of Its
proceedings, the lender In the Renate of the political party having the greatest
number of Members of the Senate the lender in the Senate of the political larty
having the second greatest number of Members of the Renate, the leader In
the 1ouse of ltepresentatIves of the political party having the greatest number
of Mehibers of the Houxe of Itepreoentatives, the lender In the house of Reprosentntives of the political party having the second greatest number of Members
Of the House of ltepresentntives, nl the heads of the executive departments
of the O(lvernment.
"&, 4. Whenever the Vice President proclaims that in his opinion circumstancen exist which establish a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the Presi.
dent Is sble to discharge the powers and duties of his offce, or whenever the
(Mie Justice of the Unite
states receives eommunliations in writing from
any six members of the committee established by action 8 of this article stating
that they have reasonable cause to believe that the President Isunable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, the Chief Justice
of the United States shall forthwith call together the member. of the committee
established by setlon 8 of this article In order that they may determine whether
or not the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office
aind to vote on the question 'Is the President unable to discharge the powers
and ditties of his officer'
Ifa majority of the authorized membership of sueb
committee decides that question in the affirnatire, the President and the Vice
President shall be notified by written communication and the Vice President
shall discharge the powers and duties of the office of President,
"Six),. 5.The Vice President shall discharge the powers and duties of the
office of President under. this article until (1) the end of the then current presi.
denUal term, or (2) the Inability of the President Isdetermined In accordance
with section 6 no longer to exist, ,hichever first occurs.
"8w. 6. Whenever, during any period in which the Vice President Is discharg.
lag the powers and duties of the oce of President under this article, the Vie
President proclaims that the Inability of the President to discharge the powers
and duties of his office no longer exist or the Chief Justice of the United States
receives communications in writing rorn any six members of the committee
established by section 8 of this article stating that they have reasonable cause
to believe that the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties
of his office no long exists, the Chief justice of the United States shall forth
with call together the members of the committee esablished by section 3 of this
article in order that they may determine whether or not the inablty of the
President to discharge the powers and duties of his offce continues to exist.
Such committee shall vote on the question 'Does the Inability of the President
to discharge the powers and duties of his office continue to exist'. If a majoritY
of the authorized membership of such committee decides that question In the
negative, the committee shall notify the President and Vice President by.writ.
ten comauuncation and the President shall then reassume the powers and duties
of his ofle. >..
"Smo 7. Tte sixth paragraph of section 1 of article II of this Constitution Is
repealed.
"8wca. & This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified a
an amendment to the Constlthtlon b thi leglsatihresof three-fourths of the
I
atveral States within seven years from the date of It. nb~lim-
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A BItIl To sserd title 3 of the United States Code to provide for the ascertainment of

the physical Inability of the 1'rvsldent to perform the duties of his omee and for other
purpose

lie It enacted by to Smateo an4d houRO of lepresentatlW of the United
Rates of America Ia Oonorcee asemblcd, That (n) the analysis of chapter 1 of
title 8 of the United States Code (entitled "Tho President") Is amended by
Inserting at the end thereof the following new Item:
"|

21. Ascertainment of the physical Inability of the President to discharge his duties."

(b) Such chapter Is amended by Inserting at the end thereof the following
new section:
"1 21. Ascertainment of the physical Inability of the President to discharge his duties

"(a) In case of the physical Inability of the President to discharge the powers
and duties of the office of President, he shall so notify the Congress by written
connuniation made to the Speaker of the l1ouse of representatives and to
the President pro tempore of the Senate. Upon the transmission of such communkeation, the powers and duties of such office shall devolve upon the Vice
President who shall discharge them until the President notifies the Congress,
by written communication made to the Speaker of the House and to the President pro tempore of the Senate, of his ability to reassume the powers and duties
of his office, or until a new President is Inaugurated.
"(b) If, at the time of any notification to the Congress by the President of
his physical Inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, there is no
Vice President, such powers and duties shall devolve, for the duration of such
physical Inability, upon the appropriate officer In line of succession, as determined pursuant to section 1O of this chapter.
"(e) In case of the death, resignation, removal from office, or physical Inability of the Vice President while discharging the powers and duties of the
office of the President, suchpowers and duties shall devolve upon the appropriate officer In line of succession, as determined pursuant to section 10 of this
chapter, until the President, or the Vice President in the case of his temporary
Inability to discharge the powers and duties of such office, notifies the Congress
by written communication to the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate of his ability to reassume the powers and duties of such
offle, or until a new President is Inaugurated.
"(d) If the Vice President has sufficient cause to believe that the President
Is suffering from a physical Inability to discharge the powers and duties of his
office and by reason thereof is unable to so notify the Congress pursuant to
subsection (a), the Vice President shall so notify the Chief Justice of the
United States. Upon receipt of any such notice, the Chief Justice shall establish
a panel of not less than three or more than five members appointed by him from
qualified medical specialists in civil life. Each member of such panel shall
examine the President and shall submit Individually his report to the Chief
Justice, specifying his findigs as to the physical condition of the President
and his conclusion on the question whether the President is suffering from any
physical Inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office. If all menbers of such panel concur in the conclusion that the President is suffering from
such physical Inability, the Chief Justice shall so notify Congress by written
communication made to the Speaker of the House and to the President pro
tempore of the Senate. Any such notification shall have the same effect as a
notification transmitted by the President to the Congre s under subsection (a).
"(e) If, at any time at which there Is no Vice President, the appropriate
officer In line of succession, as determined pursuant to section 19 of this chapter,
has sufficient cause to believe that the President fs suffering from a physical
Inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office and by reason thereof
Is unable to so notify the Congress pursuant to subsection (a), such officer shall
so notify the Chief JusHce. of the United States. Any such notification shall
have the same effect as a notification transmitted to the Chief Justice by the
Vice President under subsetilon (d)."
Awrc z II, Swxor0N 1, Ciausz 6 or TRZ CONsMTuvoN
in
e of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said offce, the same shall

P11K8II)MNTJALj INABILITY
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the
case of removal, death, resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer
shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.
SEcrIoN 19 00 TITLn 3 OF 7i15 UNITED STAES CODE ENrTITLED "VACANOY IN
OFFICF8 OV BOTHt PaIrmirENT AND VICE PRr.s1DENT ; OFrIcFRs FLOInLE TO AoT"
(a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, Inability, or
failure to qualify, there Is neither a President nor Vice ['resident to discharge
the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the Ilouse
of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representalive In Congress, act as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply In the case of the death, resignation, removal
from office, or Inability of an Individual acting as President under this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section, a Speaker Is to
begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there Is
no Speaker, or the Speaker falls to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro
tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(e) An Individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b)
of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then current
Presidential term, except that(1) If his discharge of the powers and duties of the office Is founded in
whole or In part on the failure of both the President-elect and the Vice
President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice
President qualifies; and
(2) If his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded on
whole or In part on the Inability of the President or Vice President, then he
shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such Individuals.
(d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under
subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States who Is high.
est on the following list, and who Is not under disability to discharge the powers
and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Postmaster
General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor.
(2) An Individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue so
to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after a
qualified and prior-entitled Individual is able to act, except that the removal of
the disability of an Individual higher on the list contained In paragraph (1) of
this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual higher on such
list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the orsih of office by an Individual specified In the list In
paragraph (1) of this subsetlon shall be held to constitute his resignation from
the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as President
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation,
removal from office, Inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore,
and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at
the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them.
(f) During the period that any Individual acts as President under this section,
his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law In the case of the
President (June 25, 1948. ch. 044, see. 1, 62 Stat. 672).
Senator LANoER. We will consider them all at one time, will we, Mr.

ChairmanI
Senator KEFAUVER. We will consider these all at one time, and
anymore that may be introduced during the time we are having our
hearings
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have- served to assure the undisturbed operation of our highest, office
not only for out-selves but for all the peoples of tho world whor look to
this Nation for leadlevshiI) i dhe lpreserl'ntioll of tlemioci'atic. insi(t tiolus.
(The statements refet i-d to above are as follows:)
Timn Kx:r

TAWso

Axal-.ss Comos,

H~omeeaid, Fla., January20, 1951E.

11on. ESTF~s KIEFAUVER,
Chaimatt, Stanading Su~bcoinnil11cc on ContfittsIlonaI Ainendnienho,
I''ited states ,,knate, W9aslinaglon, D. 0.
MY DEARu SENATOR: I have received your kind note requesting my views on the

proposed bills you sendi me.
I assume that the question it; solely the method of-deterrnining the "Inabiity"'
of the President "tlo discharge the powers and duties of his office," and contained
In It also the method of' determining the "removal of disability."
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(t'OPY11gt fly Harty C.'trrealan, 107)l
Th'lere, linto been tin understandable reluntance to deal with thee delicate awld
soncilUvo firoblorn of what we are to do when any Presidenit becomaw hwneaietated hnd In unable to tierform him duties.
Our *'oundIlti Fathers did not provide for such an eventuality. During the
108 years of ou~r history under the Constitution, there have been only two eesmlone when the quest Ion arose of a Presideni's ability to serve. I refer to Jamm
A. (Jarfield and W~ood row Wilson. We have been fortnate, indeed, that we have
not had to face such a crisis more ofte~n.
But the Job of the President Is getting to be an almoiost unendurabile mettl
antd pehyuleal burden, and we ought not to go on trusting to luck to am u' throsvjh.
We meay find that we have waited too long to provide a way of meeting the
situation In the event a President becomes Incapacitate&. Ther have bees saggeatlons to deal with the matter through legislation. Other have proixieed
amending the Constitution.
However we deal with It eventually, this Is too vital a matter to be meted o
hastily without the widest discussion and "tuy.I hare felt that thee is always
great danger In writing too much into the Constitntion. We mmt have cerain
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flexibility to meet changing conditions. We have. already experienced the consequences of hastily amending the Constitution without adequate public discusson, as in the cases of the 18th and the 22d anmendments.
In response to the many letters I have received on the subject from all parts
of the country, and the world, I am taking the liberty of suggesting a way to
meet this problem.
I would like to make it perfectly clear that it Is not iny Intention to cast reflections on anyone, or to raise any doubts about the health or condition of the
President. Along with all of our citizens, I wish him good health and a long
life.
But there is a growing concern about our needs to provide against the danger
of a lapse in the functioning of the Presidency and the crises that might ensue.
The power of the President of the United States and his Influence on the world
today have grown so great this his well-being is of paramount Interest to people
everywhere. It Is no longer a matter to be decided by political leaders and
constitutional authority.
Even a minor Indisposition of the President will set Into motion unexpected
and often unreasoning fears, such as we have recently witnessed.
The framers of our Constitution drafted a brilliant and Inspired document in
which they anticipated and provided for nearly all of the basic developments of
our democracy. But who could fully foresee the role of the American Presidency
in the kind of a world in which we now live-a role which also requires the
President to be available in person at any hour to make decisions which he alone
can make and which cannot be put off?
As Vice President, I found myself acutely conscious of this problem in a perUp to
sonal way when I met President Roosevelt upon his return from Yalta.
that time I regarded the circumstances of an Incapacitated President as an
academic problem in history, such as was posed by Presidents Garfield and
Wilson.
After the first shock of seeing President Roosevelt, I tried to dismiss from my
mind the ominous thoughts of a possible breakdown, counting on his ability to
bounce back from the strains and stress of office. After Yalta, President
Rooevelt continued to carry on with sustained energy and alertness-until
suddenly called by death.
From the day I succeeded to the Presidency, I have been thinking about the
needs of an act of legislation to provide machinery to meet the emergency of a
President's disability.
Shortly after taking office, I considered setting up a commission to study the
problem and make recommendations. But In the midst of war and during
the period of postwar reconstruction we were preoccupied with more Immediate
and urgent matters.
I therefore chose Instead to recommend to the Congress a change by statute
of succession to the Presidency from the Cabinet to the Congress In the event
the Nation was without a Vice President. Up to that time the Secretary of'
State was next In order of succession. I did not think that a Cabinet officerwho Is not elected by the people-should succeed to the Presidency, which is
an elective office. The Speaker of the House, who is, in fact, the top-ranking
elected public official after the President and the Vice President, Is now under
the new law next In succession.
This, however, does not meet the problem when a President is unable to perform the duties of his office.
I suggest, therefore, that the following proposal may provide us with a workable solution:
1. When a President is stricken with an illness, raising the question of his
ability to carry out the duties of his office, there should come into being a
Committee of Seven composed of representatives of the three branches of theGovernment. This Committee should consist of the Vice President, the Chief*
Justice of the United States, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and*
minority leaders of both the House of Representaties and the Senate. This
Committee would select a board of leading medical authorities drawn from top
medical schools of the Nation. This medical board, thus chosen, would then
make the necessary examinations presenting their findings to the Committee.
of Seven. Should the findings of the medical board Indicate that the President
Is unable to perform his duties, and that he Is, In fact, truly Incapacitated and*
not merely stricken with a transitory Illness, then the Committee of Seven
would so Inform the Congress. Congress then would have the right to act, and,
by a two-thirds vote of the full membership declare the Vice President as Presl.dent.
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Tle Vice President, designated as President, would thereupon serve out the
full terni of his predecessor. Should the stricken President, thus relieved, experlence during this termn a complete recovery, he would not be entitled to repossess the office.
Should tile Congress he In adjournment or recess when a President is Incapacitated, the Vice President, the Speaker, and Chief Justice should call a
meeting of the Committee of Seven. This Committee, after receiving the medlcal fin(iings, would have authority to call Congress into special session for the
purpose (if declaring the Vice President as Presildnt.
2. When a Vice President succeeds to the 'resdency and leaves the office of
the Vice President vacant, the Inst electoral college should be called into scualon
by the new President for the purpose of selecting and declaring a new Vice
President. I would recommend that In every instance where a Vice IPresldent
succeeds to nn unexpired term of a President the electoral college be convened
to choose a new Vice 1'resIdent.
By this procedure I think we would be able to ensure the proper continuance
of tl:e functioning of the Prcsidency and, at the same tite, protect the Nation's
paramount interests through the full exercise of the checks and balances of our
free democratic institutions.
I suggest procedure along these broad general lines could be enacted Into law
by statute. If necessary, these provisions could be framed Into a constitutional
amendment.

Senator ICEPAUVER . Senator rLanger, do you wish to make any comment on the subject at the present time?
Senator LANUoII. I do not, except to say I think we ought to go into
the matter very completely and clearly. It is a matter of great importance and It think we ought to take all the time necessary to do d
good job.
Senator KE.FAxjvER. I know the Senator's feelings about it, and I
know his contribution to the thinking on this subject will be most
valuable.
Senator Dirksen, do you wish to make any comments or observations?
Senator DiRKSEN. Mr. Chairman, I think my comments would be
rather in the nature of questions, and my first question is this: Is it
your judgment that if tls matter were to be handled by statute rather
than constitutional amendment, this particular subcommittee should
proceed with the statutory application or statutory remedy for this
condition, on the theory that we might very likely decide that we
could handle it by statute rather than by amendment? That is a
jurisdictional question.

Senator

KFFAUVFR.

Yes.

Senator DInKSrEN. And I do. not know whether or not this subcommittee would have authority to go ahead with it.
Senator KErAuvT. Of course, on the question of whether the problem can be handled by legislati6n or whether it will require a constitutional amendment, that is one of the subjects that we will have to
have hearings on and thrash out. It is a serious subject.
I have spoken to Senator Eastland with reference to this very
problem, and I feel that he wants this subcommittee to have hearings
and make recommendations or reports either in the field of a joint
resolution for a constitutional amendment or legislation, in other
words, to handle the whole subject.
Senator DimsrK
. Now my second question is this: In view of the
statement made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that it
was their desire, after conferring on the matter, that the Court not
be considered in this as an agency or as individuals that should share
22324-58-----2
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iii this responsibility, do we proceed from the outset oil the theory that
we eliminate the Court lit
once in any
1 consideration of tile bills that

are before us, because I thought the Court was pretty explicit that
they wanted to prservre that separatiol) of pwors and therefore felt

among themselves that they should inot be included?
Seniator ICKi-'uv'R. I think it would be well at this point tolace
in the record the letter from the Chief Justice of the Uited States
of Jainry 20, 1958, to Coigres m anitit Kenneth 1. Keatinjg. Also
following that, a statement by RepreselItative Keating as to his attitilde, and I think this is important because he has been onie of the leading member-s of the House Judiciary Committee which has been very
interested ill
this i)ropo41l. As Selator l)irhin says, the Chief Justice
appamrelltly feels that the (ourt should iiot be brought into this matter
it,
all. I w would say that if we, as a committee, felt, 1111d if tile Congress
agreed with us, thit the Court should be given Fome responsibility, then
I think we should act accordingly, but I am certain this committee and
the Senate also will take into conusiderationi, ini making that determine.
tion, tile feeling of the Chief Justice and of the umelibe rs of the Court
Ihat they should not actively participate. But I am certain, of course,
thuit. if in the logic of our legislative body or ini a conistitutional amendmelnt they were given .ml responsibility, they would fulfill it. That
is m idea.
(i'he letter amid statement referred to above aireai follows:)
StPrF.%[ COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
lvashlngton, n. C., January 20, 1958.
Ilo1i. KENNETIt B. KEATINO,
.liemtiber of Vongreas,
Washiigton, D. 0.
MY DEAR MR. Co.U'REsU.IAN: During the thue the subject of Inability of a
President to discharge the duties of his office has been under discussion, the
members of the Court have discussed generally, but without reference to any
particular bill, the proposal that a member or members of the Court be Included
In the membership of a Commission to determine the fact of Presidential Inability to act.
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the Separation of powers
in our Government, the nature of the Judicial process, the possibility of a con.
troversy of this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disqualification
which might result in lack of a quorum, It would be inadvisable for any member
of the Court to serve on such a Commission.
I realize that Congress Is confronted with a very difficult problem, and if it
were only a matter of personal willingness to serve that anyone in the Government, if requested to do so, should make himself available for service. However,
I do believe that the reasons above mentioned for nonpartlclpation of the Court
are insurmountable.
With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,
EARL WARREN,
Oh il .IaIsf cc.
STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE KENNETji B. KEATINO

(REPUBLI AN, NEW YORK)
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN OPPOSES

MEMBERS OF COURT ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

COMMISSION IN LETTER TO REPRESENTATIVE KEATIN

Representative Kenneth B. Keating (Republican, New York), senior Republican member of the House Judiciary Committee and of its Special Subcommittee
on Presidential Inability, today released the text of a letter from Chief Justice
Earl Warren commenting on the inclusion of Supreme Court Justices on a proposed 'residential Inability Commission. In his letter, the Chief Justice said
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that all nuinbers of the Court believe, for a number of "Insurwountable" reasons, that it would be "Inadvisable" for any member of the Iligh Court to srve
4n Ruch a group.
Said Mr. Keating: "In the light (of the Chief Justice's letter, It is apparent
we should not press for Inclusion of members of the Hupreme Court on such a
Commission, as I have proposed. I regret this, but certainly respect the wisdom
nud reasoning of the Chief Justice's views.
"All hands now agree that the Commission plan Is best. 1Up to now that has
Icen the main hurdle. All other proposals have been abandoned or are not being
The only problem left to be surmounted is the speelfle makeup of such
pressed.
a group. I believe we will be able to iron out this deitil and have a lirol~sal
ready for conslderation ,oon by the IIouse."

Senator KtvAtrvzt. I might ask the Senator from Illinois what he

thinks about it
Senator DIHKSEN. I always respect the opinions and judgments,
certainly the personal opinions of members of the Court, with reference to a matter of this kind, since it does involve bringing a coordinate branch of govermnent into the picture, exercising some responsibility. I believe I can understand rather fully how the members of
the Supreme Court come to the conclusion which they reached.
It does not mean, of course, that Congress cannot legislate and
bring the Court into the picture if it so desires, but a number of
these bills do, of course embrace the Supreme Court and give it some
responsibility. It would minimize the number of bills and also the
ground to be covered if the subcommittee agreed at the outset that
they would respect the Court's wishes and decide that they would
follow along in another di action.
Senator
' tVuER. Do you wish to express an opinion aboutt the
matter at this time, Senator Langer?
Senator LANOER. I have a very firm opinion. I think the Court
should be included, especially the Chief Justice. le is a man who
gets a lifetime appointment. ie could not possibly have any personal interest in the selection of the President. I think lie ought to
he in it.
Senator KPFAUVvER. Then your feeling is that while we think deeply
and give very serious consideration to the attitude of the Chief Justice
and of the other members of the Court, that we should go on with outhearings, and taking that into consideration, still legislate according
to how we feel about the matter.
Senator LAX-oFR. Let the Chief Justice testify if he feels strongly
about it.
Senator KEFrAUVER. I think it might be well to read his letter to Mr.
l(eating.
('lhe letter referred to above was read at this pointL)
Senator DIRKSE.N. Actually, Mr. Chairman if the country were
confronted with the real question of disability, the ultimate determinatioi would essentially be a political one. I do not believe that you
-could disassociatte it from its political character as such, and I think
the Court must certainly have had that in mind when it undertook to
render this informal opinion to Congressman Keating.
Senator KEIPAUVER. Yes.
Senator DimwN. Now, I have another question, Mr. Chairman,
and that is this: I am sure you are quite familiar with the rumors
and the speculations in the press over a considerable period of time
that their was no disposition on the' part of this session of Con-
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gres to actually (10 anything About this dl8ability problem, Cerf lily no member of I ho leadenlhip on either tlo of the 1id8e, iud inaofaur ts I know, no Member of the o1ato hati over mald0 ii st1temoi1t

of that kind, bit I am suro you aim familiar with lho
t fhle.tlint th(o

speculations have 1"ln very rife. The ronseo I bring It ul) Isthis.
As one who sita in ol lie ''umday morning conforencos, I know of
the active and lively interest that tho PixA1(?t hmias
In it. Hlo is com.
I)IOlOly liliilhibitlel ill diswiuming it, and diseissing himself in r,ation,
Io thl question of disalIlly, antid he Is mixlims hnt. soni,,thimlg be done
lwil. it, Now wIr
vi'idiht go though
il
(tll
(le1otiot lind lhear itlot of
witlne\sse and lhen let out' elorls die ol the ville. Obviously, we caitnot control the action of the entire Senate or tle lluse but I limit

my inquiry only to the miukomnittee, whether or uot it, imomr Ittotion to earl'(, tly and diligently go through with this mintfor, try

to tindoan aeeptablo proposal and stibmit ft. to the full committee

with a rweomneidation that, it. go on the Sonate catedar for net ion.
SOUnator l'
MCrAUY1.
I CMl A&SUtit the Seiiatoir from Illinois thaitt insofar a.sI la conterinel and having talked with other members of
the sll.oinmittee, I feel tt tie saile is true with the other members,
that. we want. to go into this natter thoroughly and conwient'Iolsly
try to report a resolution or bill or both to ineet the problem ani dehl
with it in this smesion of Congress. I have heard the rumnorg that
no action was going to be taken inthis session of Con grem,..
I think
they %,nianatedlargely from the Muse of lleprese'nl fves, hlt, I (to
ullt.,taald from Congrsm n Celler nnd also front (ongre,,.-imno
Keating that they eXlect action ill
the HouIsO of IOpI)sttAtive.a too,
It. should be pointed out that the work of this committee will be
considerably expedited if the very volumninou.s horings, and letters
and opinions confaillved in those hearingM in the 1lonse of Represontatives were considered by this committee, and we will get copies nd
see that they are made available. They have had lengthy hearinsig,
as wre all know, on the subject-.
Sentor DiRxs.N. Mr. hnirmnn, I have nothing moie except to
say I know of your lively interest in this matter. I think I can lespeak
my own. I know that Senator IAlnger has a iistaied interest, and I
know from the observations that our disinlpished friend from Wyoming has made on the floor and elsewhere fmom time to time that it
has not only an acute, but a very sustained interest in the matter so
that that would add up to the determination of this subcommittee that
we try to find the proper proposal and move it on to the full committee
in the hope that we can also move it to the Senate floor for action
during the present session.
Senator OMAMIoNEY. That is the general sentiment that I find in
dealing with the matter.
Senator KFA^ERis. Before we start with Senator O'Mahoney and
Dr. William Y. Elliott-Dr. Elliott is the head of the Department of
History at Harvard University.
Senator LANoEL. Mr. Chairman before we startN my ideas on this
matter are that I believe we should leave this entire matter of succession to the Supreme Court. You take, for example, a short time
ago in the State of Rhode Island the question of who was to be Governor was left to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, and to the supreme court alone. Here are nine men appointed for life. I think
they would be entirely disinterested. In my opinion at least it would
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be ti lItont, ndvisable way to handle the entiro situation, ind I just
thiow It'before tl a oipiufi tee for whittit may be worth,
801ii11or I(MVAUIt,. Yes, sil'. We nro glad at this time to (tet your
Opinino 1litout it, SwMntor IMuger. Since we have many bilis here
atl nlany opinion, I know we will listen to ll of theh! with oln
nminds and try to arrive at the one that we feel will ineet the situation
best, taking .nto consilorntion also the fact that the Chief Justice
ani the ifustices fool they houl i1ot lmrtici)atO. ]lit that should
1
not. ho CltlllsiVC ii 111n
Opt
4111011.
Now IKIrt we sait, with our first wi itess, I have already put in the

remorl a hdter fioi for'|er President '1runinn to me dated-January
10, in which lie ntttclieh a copy of a brief article that, lhs written
()Ith atubhjeL ,,-hih hats WoIi printed which sets forth his views. Also
a loiter of Jiiunry 20, from the Iorner Prtoident of tie United

Stntes, I leibtrt IHoover, inwhich to sets forth his views on how this
intor should he hiaundlndl. Would you like to limve them reaid I
ltr ^IANU'.i. Coulhl we have I loover's letter read I
8enitlor (mvuV.l, Air. Sinitliey, will you rend his letter I
8enntor LANo', 1. I anm familiar with former President Trumn's
letter. I min not familiar with President 1Hoover's letter.
Mr. SMIr~t1i. The letter is addressed to tie chairman, Senator
Kefauvor.
MY I)FAsR HIKAToR: I have rcceied your kind note requesting my views on
tilt,
proposed 1illsyou sent me.
I assunO that the question Is solely the method of determining the "lnabllity"
of the President "to discharge the owners and duties of hisdisability."
ofice," and contnmed itlIt also the nethod of deteriniing the "removal of
All quesiolis of succession seem covered by article II,xion 1, paragraph
5 of the Cionstitution, and therefore legislation on this subject seems to me
itlecrssn ry.

1. There seems to be some question as to whether remedy can be found by
statutory law or must be through constitutional amendmenL The Congress will
need to decide whether the above-mentioned section in the Constitution would
be sumclent authority for a statutory solution.
2, Itseems to me that the method of determining "Inability" or "recovery"
requires consideration of the spirit of the separation of powers in the Govern.
ment and.certain traditional practices which have become fixed In our national
life during the past 150years.
8. The President and Vice l'realdent are elected as the chosen leaders of a
Sltical party with declared mandates, principles, solutions of Issues, and proms to the people.
4. The Congress. In one or both trouses, Is often controlled by an opposition
political party, and thus by those who are, Inpractice, mostly opposed to the
mandates or promises upon which the President and Vice President are elected by
the people.
5; All of which leads me to the generalization that a President's inability to
serve or his possible restoration to office should be determined by the leading
officiAls In the executive branch, as they, are of the party having the responsibilities determined by the election.
(. I believe that a simple amendment to the Constitution (or possibly statutory
law) could provide for a.commisslon made up from the eZeutive btauch to Make
the determinations required. I do not suggest that the Individual persons be
named but that the departments or agencies be enumerated, whose chief official
or head should be a member of such a commission. The number 'could well be
limited to not lee'than 7 and not more than 16 such heads of departments or
agencies. There could be a further provision that they should seek the advice
of a panel of e;perlenced physicians.or surgeons. - ,
I cannot conceive of any eirctimstance when such a defined body of leaderip
from the executive branch would act In these circunistances othe-wlse than i
the national interedt.-

.Yor faithfully.
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Senator K]v:rAIvNR. W'e had asked the Attorney General of the

United States to be the list. witness, but because of other conunittee

hearings fnd the fact that, he was up here yesterday for conllrmnation,
he has askeo to have his appearance put off until next. week. We are
very fortunate today to have two distinguished witiie.,es, First, one
of Ole great constitiltional lawyers of the Congre.-4 and of the country,
for whom we all have the highest, respect, Setntor ,Joseph O'Mahoney,
and, second, l)r. Williani Y. lliott, whom I will introduce and give
more background on later on.
Senator-Q'MAhoney, you are the fli.st wit ness.
Senator O',MA,,oNXY". Mr. (hnirmna,
when you started that introduction Tstarted to lean back comfortably to listen to Professor Elliol t.
Tdid not recognize ny.elf.
Mr. Ev.jo'rr. Sit, I am not entitled to senatorial courtey, bht-T am
much gratified that you are the leadoff inan.
Senator O'MAtONF.Y. rhis was not senatorial courtesy at all, sir.
Senator KIFRAU,,R. I am certain that all the members of the conimiittee will value very highly your deep thinking about. this problem.
STATEMENT OF HON. IOSEPH 0. O'MAHONEY, UNITED STATES
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING
Senator ()'VuoNt :y. Mr. (hairinan, first, let, me say I l)resented my
amendment yesterday and discussed it,
on the floor of the Senate. I
ask that the remarks; which were made yesterday, and which appear
in the Congressional Record as avnilalfle this morning be made a
part of this record. I do not lro.oe to read, them into the record of
this subcommittee.
Senator l(r.AIUr. Without objection, they will Ix.lWinlted following your testinlony here.
Senator O'MlMo,-F. I will try"to slillilnarize brieflV the considerations which have tuoved me in "this matter. First, I ant pronipted
to refer to the statement of former President hloover. Of cour.se',. one
must give a great deal of weight and consideration to the exl)ressions
of those who- have held these po.itions.. Mr. Hoover. wvas President.
He was not Vice President. Mr. Truman was l)th Vice President
and President. I have givenl this consideration for a long time, and
I find myself in dismgreemient with the I)rincil)nl thought. expressed
by Mr. IHoover, that the choice should be made by a political party.
I think it. is in error to say that the President and*Vice President are
actually the choices of a political party. We have of course developed
the bipartisan system in the United States, but whlen the constitution was drafted, the thought was that. both the. Pivsident and the
Vice President should be selected by presidential electors in the several States, voting separately in the several States, so that. the choice
would fall not upon anybody nominated by a party but. l)oni the
man whom the electors felt was best qualified to lead the Nation. As
you all know, of course, as the Constitution was first.written the man
who had fliseoiid 'Iaxget..vote in the electoral.o.ele .
IJ.tl1e
r
Vice President, though he was originally a candid -6.
trid~nt.
If there were not a majority, then the election was thrown into the
House of Representatives.
The first order of succession has been removed 6y amendments.
Now the nominees for President and Vice President nm separately,
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and IX)th are, of
hy the electoral college, bit it still
bourse,'hosen
reinhi tile constitutioial law that if there is a lack of i majority ill
the electoral college, the choice falls into the 1ouse of Repl sentative.q, so tiat tie constitutionn as it. iiow reads rwognizes the right
of the elected reires.,tfatives of the people in their States nd ill
their districts to make this very rep,qonsilile choice for the executive
leader of the country, the Chief 1,,xecutive Ofleer. I see no reason
to deviate from liht
h
rit. il)le. I halve il the nlclli(nilient I)y ('ong reslnlan Keating, which P think carries out (lie thotghlt of corner
I'rdent Hoover. It, wouhl have lhe ,ieiuibe.i of the ('ohinet make

the selection.

Now, the nelibers of the (C'Abiit lt,having Ien 1l)J))iuted 1)1' the
President, tre tin(er obligation to the I'reskdent, and cannot 1 expeted to exercise a free thought in a matter of suece.sion. If the
President Ahold decide that despite his disability lie did not, walt to
retire, the membeN of the Cabinet, woiud not be likely to go against
his thinking. I was here in Washington a a secretary of a Senator
when Woodrow Wilson became ill.
I remember distinctly how his illness came About. It was in the
State of Colorado. I t went to Pueblo. There the people had
gathered in great numbers to greet him, but lie had planned to make
only a very brief statement because he wais suffering very severe
nervous strain as a result of his labors in Paris and of the at pressures that were upon him, and he entered the meeting. The ovation
which lie received was so great that he decided to abandon the plan to
make only a brief statement. lie delivered the very best effort that he
could. It wasia strikingly important and eloquent message, but lie
suffered a stroke thereafter, and for months he was unable to hold
any meeting with his Cabinet members.
The Vice P1resident then was Thomas 1R. Marshall; and, like Chester
Alan Arthur, who was Vice president under Garfield Marshall made
no attempt to take over the duties because of the disability of the
IPliwideiit. lie was very modest about it, *ust like Chester Alan
Arthur under Garfield. But Wilson was filled with the determination
to bring about the League of Nations. That is why lie was engaged on
that trip. I remember the words of his speech in Pueblo that night
when lie spoke of the fact that he, as President of the United States,
had sent the fighting men of America into the war, and many of them
had died. Ile said:
Yet the mothers of many of these American soAdiers who perished IR that war,
because I asked the Congress to declare war, have rallied to my support now.
It Is because of the great desire of the people and of my desire to bring peace to
the whole world.

Now that determination was so strong that he would not himself
give any concept to anybody succeeding him. Theprecedent had been
set that the Vice President would succeed as President though there
is nothing about that in the Constitution. And so Wilson, believing
that he-could recover, and not wanting to tep aside lest he would not
be able to carry on this great objective, would not tolerate that thought.
And this was evidence by the, fact that when the Secretary of
State, Mr. Lansing, called the Cabinet without consulting Wilson, he
was requested to resign. That is, I think, evidence of the pressures of
which -1 speak that would be bearing down upon mem ers of the

PRFAlEDNT'ALi INAIILI'P
Cabinet. They are t personal choices of .theoresiding officer, the
Chief Executive, the President. They would not be free, in my
opinion, to render n, decision that night be essential in the public
interest. It might easily be absolutely necessary to tihe life of the
Nation that the Office of President be filled by an Acting President
so that we could be protected in some great international crisis. It
should not, in my opinion, be left to the decision of tile members of the
Cabinet.
Now the suggestion has been made by another amendment that has
,een presented here that the choice be made by the United States
Hupremne Court. As I recall, in one of the very earliest Congresses of
the count ry, a bill was passed, a pension bill, to pension veterans of the
Revolutionary War. It provided that the members of the Supreme
Court. should decide(le facs as to whether or not the pensioner was
entitled. The Supreme Court said they would not obey the law
because theirs was the judicial function of tile Government to pass
upon cases, and it must be remembered that the Constitution says that
tile function of tile courts is to deal with cases. That means litigated
cases. It does not mean that Congress can push off on the Supreme
Court the determination of some legislative duty.
. Now, the issue here I agree wit I Mr. Hoover, is solely one of the
disability of the President. Yet the article of tile Constitution, article
Iorarticle IIISenator KEPAumth. Article II, section 1, clause 0.
Senator O'MAnioNY. Clause o, that is right. This clause provides
in very simple language that when any of these four occasions develop,
the resignation the death, the removal, or the disability of the President, and the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of the office "the same shall devolve upon the Vice President."
Senator IErAuvrR. I think it would be a very good Idea to print
following the printing of tile bills, and I will so order in the record,
article 1I, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution to which Senator
O'Mahoney has referred, and also the present succession bill passed
in 1948. 1 think they should be printed there for reference.
(Nomr.-The material referred to is printed on pp. 8, 9 of the
hearing.)
Senator Kr.,%uvr. Will you proceed Senator O'Mahoneyl
Senator O'MAHONBY. The clause areas like this:
AiRTicis II, Swonox 1, CLAUSE 0

In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation,

or Inability to discharge tMe powers and duties of the said office, the same shall

devolve on the Vice President and the Congress may by law provide for the case

of removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice Presi-

dent, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and even such officer
shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President shall be
elected.

. Now it is clear that the authors of that clause were thinking solely
of an Acting President. There is no provision in the Constitution
anywhere for the Vice President to take a second oath of office. He
takes his oath of office when he is inaugurated as Vice President, and
when he does so, then he is qualified as Vice President. Then"one of
the duties he is to perform is to assume th" duties and powers of the
office of the Presidency.
Senator KEFAuvER. And yet, Senator O'Mahoney, have not all of
our Vice Presidents taken the oath of office of President-
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Senator

O'MAIlIONEY.

I was going to come to that in a moment.

I wanted to show first that this clause which we now read was tie

work of the Committeo on Style of the Constitutional Convention.
When the Convention was finished with its work and satisfied that it
was about to adopt a Constitution, there was appointed this Committee
on Style, the purpose of which was to dress it up in the beat language
possible, hut they had no authority whatsoever to change any of the
provisions of the Constitution. Their duty only was to make it a
btter literary document. So we must refer to the provisions of the
Constitution as it went to the Committee on Style. This was proposed by the delegate Pinckney.
It reads as follows, speaking of the President:
In case of removal as noresaid, death, absence, resignation, or inability to
discharge the powers and dlties of his office, the Vice I'resident shall exercise
those powers and duties until another President be chosen or until the Inability
of the President be removed * *.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act
as President In case of the death, resignation, or inability of the President and
Vice President, and such officer salinli act accordingly until such disability be
removed or a President shall be elected.

So it was clear that as the provision went to the Committee on
Style it was designed to make an Acting President in the case of
disability of the President, and an Acting President in the case of
the disability of both the President and the Vice President.
Now (lid the Committee on Style order that My interp rettion
is "No." The reason that I say "No" is not only because the Pinckney
resolution is couched in the language in which it appears, but because
at that time in the Colonies the lieutenant governor or the official next
in line did not become governor. He became acting governor. And
it is still the case in the States so far as I krow. Certainly it is the
case in Wyoming and in other States with which I have been familiar.
Bitt the strange precedent came about by reason of one of the odd
historical facts that occur from time to time. In the year 1840 Van
Buren had been the successor of Andrew Jackson. The Whig Party
resisted the election of Van Buren, and they sought to obtain a candidate whom they could nominate to capture the imagination of the
people. They selected William Henry Harrison. lie won a great
victory over the Indians in the Battle of Tippecanoe. lie was county
clerk in a county in Indiana at the time of the nomination, but he did
win; lie had won the victory. They did not draw up any political
platform. They made no pledges. They pointed out no policy.
The Whigs were running on the accumulated dissidence and disapproval let me say, or disaffection that had arisen with respect to some
of Andrew Jackson's policies and personality and some of the activities
of Van Buren.
So in order to gather in all of these dissident factors, the Whig
Convention went to John Tyler, a Democrat of the State of Virginia,
who did not agree with everything that Andrew Jackson stood for or
everything that Van Buren stood for. He ran on the ticket and they
were both elected.
You all know that Harrison died within a month, precisely a month
I think after he was inaugurated. History recor that a message
was sent to John Tyler by the Cabinet. N6w I am talking about the
Cabinet again, and this was a Cabinet headed by Daniel Webster.
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the rvesolution of ailondmilont. by tho reqiste number of votes through
boII throl114i of Conigrs, anld It 11110t, be th0 people of the staltcs wit 0
wvilt dtvde.
And sx), Mr. (iriuan, I think thint Thave presented inI brief-It In
moro lengthy than) I expected to bo-.n situmary of tMe Rmanenft I
Lot mne rd, however, at. this point, the full text of theo nilleflinflt
thlitt I hla"e introduced.
Senator INF~AUMr~. You IIw'In of Senate Joint reslIon 1411
Senator O'NA111NNY. Yes.
Senator KPRIFA1VER. We have ordered it prIntod III the weord.
Senator OMIAuIONIC'. Very well, thiat will be suifliolet, except for
this pointt, I would like to aubinlt to questioning If there Isany with
respct to the direct provisions
SWTIOX 1. W~heneover the Presidont proclaims that he Is unoblo to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, or whenover the Rennte and the House of

Ueou'eecntatim e ss a. reolution declaring that the 1'reoldent In utblo to
dtscharge the powers and duties of his oft%, the Vice 1)j%ident, or It there be
no Vic* President, the officer next In line of succession to the offie of President
as provided by law, sthall be Acting I'reldent.
Smx. '2. Ani AMing President shall exercise the powers and~ duties of the of1i0e
of President under thbi article until (1) the end of the then current presidential
temn. (2) such Actintg Presdent finds and proclatis that thle inability of tho
President no longer exists. (3) the Inability of the President Is determined In
am~fttance with Sectioni 3 of thim article, no longer to exist, whichever first
OC~ICUM.
Sme &.Whenever, during any period In which an Acting President fiv diachargIng the powers and duties of the office of President under thin article, tho Senate
and) the House of Representat Ives pass n resolution declaring that the innblity
of the Preident to discharge the powers find duties of his Once no longer exists,
the Acting President shall cease to exercise the powers and duties of the offie
of President and the President shall exercise such powers find dties.
There is a provision which makes it clear that Congress, when the
President has recoveredl, can p~revenlt an amblitious Vice President from

holding on when hie Eliould yield to the President, having recovered.
Section 4 is the ordinary section about the submission of ratification.

Senator KErAUVER. Sen ator O'Mfahoney, you have made a very good

background statement and a forceful statement in support of your
resolution.
May we ask you some questionsI
Senator OMfAiioNF.. Certainly.
Senator KPEFAuvERP. I will ask two brief questions and then yield
quickly to-my colleagues.
One of the principal objections to the idea contained in your resolution- and to others that leave the decision to either Congress as a
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S01u1,101OM
)NAHOmnnY. Y401,
M01u11101r I(P,10AllUVI. 'I11i1t, INaitiF.ICiNIII I1li1t, INfr(~IuIIIntly Imadfe,
H111111101 O'&fAzurnm. I kliww, I linve hienru of ft' MY answer to
It Iii Iliii iitimwe 4 Ilialt Alixiiiiiler Ilininilloin gisvo whIOI Anra IIurr
Houiighlt, g(*-141'
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11O
li)Of I10 l144)IItt
nfN ele
(1a1,
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li e hand I-11 fol. 1P1ies Idout Willi 01lie1ijderstitniling that Ile Wag to be
I ho V'Iee J'iideiit, biftta It happened, flie 11r eufilift oloetorx, voting
Ili the severnl Hfttes, dili uaolaske ,tot'o of flint, Act., wid thoy both 1ha1
Oxexaty I Ile fiminVto. So I Ire exjlccloui to I le '(0,4'I
Now If there wan oniie an iII thoc Whole eotIItry who find no contl.
(10110 or fidlth or tiny liking for Attron Mirr, it. wnis Alexander Ha4millong the lender of the iVeuernlimt P'arty. l1is perundled film FederalIst
inninborm of the0 Mumis to vote for o1elfrrwmnn rather than for Burr,
Now I think ftt a atter of iiiieli great, Irn pone will weigh an
heavily tuponi the Memiberm oif Cong1 remn now and In the future as it did
then. Tihin Ito a inatter of troineniuowo mignificanco and respioniiblity,
andI .1woiild may frankly, Mfr. (3iairinan, flint I have nroticed-I have
beemn ihre for alongtfine now asitnsecret ary and am a Heiator-A have
noticed flint mien grow tinder responsibility, and I have sen instance:
after Insptanco of the preference of Meimbers ofCongress for the good
of thle country ratlier Itn for their own election.
I think I might, well give you another ibitfration that I know very
well,
You wvi r eallI that there wag a Seintor from Texas by the name of
Joe, Biley, at very great orator. Ills son was litter elected to the
M[umo of Ylepresentatlvem and wao Rerving In the House of Representatives8 just after F. 1).RI. becano President, The younger Mr. Baile
sponsored legislntlon to pay a bonus; to the veteran.
Mt was during
the period when Roosevelt wits trying to -conomnizo in Government,
believe itor not.
Senator K(FrAUVJit. That was in 1933 and 1934 as I remember it.

Senator OMAJIONF.Y. That ifs right, when the effort was being made

to balance the budget. You have heard that frequently But in any
event, the House passed the bill, it came over to the enate and the
Senate passed the bill, but the President vetoed it. I remember as well
as though it were yesterday when our former colleague, Tom Connally
of Texas, the Senator, against whom Bailey had been announced as a
candidate in the Texas primary for the vacancy in the Senate that was
about to take place, the lace was to be filled again, Tom Connally
voted to sustain the veto ofth e President. As he walked off the Senate
floor that day I was the first person, I think, to see him as he came off
the floor and he said to me: "Joe, I think I have just voted myself out
of the Senate."
Well, he did not. He was renominated and reelected. I1have no
fear of Congress rising to its responsibility when the responsibility is
as great as it is in a matter of this kind.
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uFt. I have forgotten the numbn;rbf days involved,
Senator KzEAU%
but in 1824 in the contest, in the House over who should be selected when
the election was thrown into the House between Andrew Jackson,

Crawford, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay, when Clay finally
resigned and Adams, the third man, was selected, it took quite a lot of
time and created a great deal of acrimony.
Of course, in 1870 during the Hayes-Tilden controversy they finally
had to refer it to a special commission.
Senator OMAHONEY. One of these extra-constitutional coinmissions.
Senator KrFAUvER. But what is your answer to the proposition that

this might'result in one of those kind of controversies that would make
it very difficult for the Congress to settle.
Senator O'MAiroNzy, Well, I really do not think so. I think Congress can settle the controversy more judicially than the Commission
which settled the Tilden imbroglio, may I say to the chairman. We
are not dealing with perfection. The Constitution itself is one of the
most perfect documents ever written, but it. has been frequently
.plea, Mr,Chairman, for this amendment is based upon
amended.
the fact that it is in harmony with the basic principle of popular governmenti not with delegated powers.
Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Langer, do you have soine questions to
ask?
Senator LANoER.. I have no questions.
Senator' KYAUVER. I know Senator Dirksen has some questions,
but one further question.
Your proposal is of course in the form of a joint resolution to propose a constitutional amendment, Many students of the Constitution seem to feel that article II, section 1, clause 6 gives Congress the
right to legislate by statute on the subject of the determination of
disability and determination when the disability no longer exists. I
would like to get yotr view about that, Senator O'Mahoney.
Senator OMAHoNY. Which section of the Constitution des thatI
Senator KrAUVER. It is contended by some that article II, wectioli 1Senator O'MAHONEY. Article II, section 1,-clause 6?
SenatorKf, PAUVER. Clause 6, would give the Congress the right to
do, for instance, what your proposed constitutional amendment
would do.
Senator O'MAHONEY. Well, the vesting of power on C0ngre ss there
is contained in this language:
And the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, reslgna-tion, or inability both of the President and Vice President.

It does not say "inability of the President or Vice President." Itsays "both of the President and Vice President," and it seen s to me
therefore, that this clause gvecifically refers to the fact. when both of
these officials at the same time are unable to discharge, it might be
that the President was unable to discharge the duties-because he htad
been removed or because he had died or-because he had resigned or
because Of his disability. I think that the joining of those two provisions there is an argument rather in'support of my contention, which
is that the constitutional fathers believed that they were providing,
for inAetin'g President in both cases.
Senator KEPAUVE. In other words, you think that. the word "both'"
there means that,-
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Senator O'MnoxrY.. It has got to be done by constitutional amendment.
Senator KEPAUVER. Means that when there is neither a President
no- a Vice President, Congress then may provide for the succesion
it has done.
tas
Senator O'MATrox.V. As it has done.
Senator KEPAUVER. Senator Dirksen.
Senator DIRKSEN. I have only one question. This lboks a little farfetched. You could however, conceive of a situation where you might
prefer a Vice Prosidefit to an Acting Vice President, find if there was
some indication of i disability, not. too marked, perhasSexiatot, 0'MA6o flr. You said ; "might p relta Vice President to

an Acting President"?

Senatot Dmrkso.. To the incumbent President.
Senator!O'fAUO2ESI. Yes.
Senator DiRKsEN. That while the disability might not be too
want to piut him on the shelf, aiid you would
yet you might
marked,
get a resolution
thittgh jboth brancls of Congress. NoW if you
had topheavy majorities, it. would not be too aiffiedlt to do it. I recall
serving in the Houjs back in the 74th Congress when we had, I thiik,
sted as rather unbilA totddof 87 Members on ieji
Well know.
anced Congress for q . a number of, years, as,
en Senator McNary was the iilo~ity leader
On one occasion
licans in thS iAte.
iii the Snhte thpX were only 17 Re
\
o-Y. That i right
Senator 0,11
question i his: You
soni raise
0
Senator Di sB-. Theoo
would
b'bo branches."
simply say, enactinen I a ilutio
infer from atthati isbyasinile maQ ri0.
Senator 'MAHNoEtYs/

Senator

1BK5FN

Would y-

th branches?
Iod
1~. I'
Seat E='MI N
Senakte:
. B yt
uii
Senate

vote in

f.lcy
6nato 0'MAIno FY. It ,ght

will have o gat

AiT*i do

ve. no

by

qui, *iga two- hirds

section o that.
ye evident

you

evident.. It ought 0 be
to ended disab i ty or
)0 tlca disabjty
real disa- lity, not
trying o ride
n mig
Iay Am tious
a 'disabilit over w
a twoeefel that it would
rtainly. If the com
to power,
ectio . In eed, I ist give y wife
thiirds vote, would have n
r g
that to me hisirn
credit for hav ig suggest
eased th
Senator DIR M. Your w
. That is rig .
Senator O'MA0
x. think she deserves to be elev d to the realm
Senator D.
of statesmanship.
Senator O'NMfAONEY. 0I sO iasme n. M mind, for a long time.
Senator DIRKSE,-. Overriding veti does require a two-thirds vote.
Senator O'MAno1NE. Yes, there is a lot of force to that suggestion,
Senator.
Senator DIRKSEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAuvER. It should be soniewhat difficult to declare disability or define disability.
enhtor O'lfAio1oNY. Oh, yes. It certainly should not be decided
perhaps by a majority of one; so, as I 9Ay,. would have no objection
to the will of the committee in a matter of that kind. -.
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Mr. 011mmuu~im. Mr. l'l~teut, I introduce it Joit resolution ,'ropoalg nn
vintuenhut to tho (Nimatiltion it the Un0ted States to provide for A method
of ~t'trtuinltig dItablIly of the President tit the United1 Hintes.
The VICE~ 1"t"1ittN. Tho Joint resolution will I*o remcet andt aiprvoprinteiy
Wrmlrr\.
The joint resoilution (S. J1.fles. 141) praxing an amendment to the Consti.
tutton of tho United'4 States relating to the determination of the lunhlilty of
the President to disicharge the jxowers and dtiie of his offie, introditeed by
Mr. O'Mahoney, was
miele,
ed tWe by Its title, andi referred to the Comrat tee*on the Judiciary.
Mr. O'MAIINixt% . l'olr the third tlime In the history of thin Nntion, we Oro
confronted with a situation which graphically demonstrates the Ambiguity
created by lin'cedent In the Pre-sidential succession provisionis of our Conatitu.
then.When, after having Won sho't down by R disappointed officesceker, President
G~arfield lay Ill ffor R) days and his sole act as President was his signature on
an extradition paper, the country wondered It It would be constitutionally
prtqer for tbe%'ice President to assume the powers and duties of the President.
Even the members of the Cabinet debated whether, if he did so, the President,
upin reeoery. could resume the duties of his office.
When President Wilson lay seriously Ill, the victim of a severe stroke, the
'Nation again pondered these issues.
Now President Eisenhower. himself the unfortunate victim of heart attack,
iltis, and cerebral spasm, has called upon the Congress to settle once and for
anl the perplexing Issues arising out of the Presidential succession In times
when the President is Incapaeltated.
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linto Allen tit Ohio, Vice I'romsldont Tyler had him Wily, sndl wnx thietexfter known
not the l'rembhtent.
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It Inny limitif lilleltm 11)jmnInt "tit thAt tinlA tm was the revolt of the fset
flint Wllli Ifleeiry linrrisoi wn# A Whig Ad Tyler A Pinrnoxtmt, 1litliof

was IaraIInelil fly file Whigs AN their eantlddAt, for Preidotnt in 11*10 'Th
coljilietm witl10o1u, a Isilitival plaiformn UPou the part &f th
(%Inatiiitl WANs
WhIt s
Johnt Tyler, whor find been at lonxt R dioxidr'ft Ifeerm?t, so far am wAuno of
flim(llIeiPA tit Atidrew Jnvlo'on and Marlin Van liuren wore concerned, was
geermolhtod by the WhIgs to 11"'J4 the nomintrion for Vice PrtefdenL I&inr.
over, when 114 ri Ison clue, the 0ine headed by Daniql Websftr, #*at a tiesmAge to Mr. Tyier, itt hFs home in VIrVinia, to the ~fee (batI owing t6 the
reitrettnhle tlonth of the t1'rexIderat of the nfeAftsWlimlarlrlo,
he peruaded Chie1f j"Idg Wllllnm Crlmh of the Oircrult Coart elf the D)Is
Inmtemail of respondingr to this eeaae, Tyler eamm hurryfng to Waululnstm, anid
he poratuaded Mhef I udKeo Withacm (~rAnch of the (1reaft Court of the rttstriet of (lolunabla to administer to him the oath of Ptftident of tWe U~nited
HIates
the Prealent yea that
The reasoon behind his Insistence unpon bet i known Roo
he wNs feurful that the CAbinet, appotnte by (Jenerl MIfs"o. vonld Attempt to direct hin Activities In the offie of Prewldevat and in discharging his
duties and powers of that office.
go, rofuslins to he subject to the Orders of the Cabinet be took the oath as
preoident.
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Tho language of article It, section 1, clause 8 of the COmltifution forced tbo
bstls of the arguents both pto and con with respeet to (be right of Vice f'rest(tent Tyler to bcme more than Acting President. That tart of the Coatltu(ion reads an follows:

"Article 11, Section 1, Clause 6, the Constitution of the United &&aUs of America
"In Case of tho Removal of the Preident from Office, or of his Death. Re~dgnation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the sold Offie, the
Samne shall devolve on the Vice Presidlent, and the Congress may by JAw pro-.
vide for the Case of Removal, Death, Reslgnattoa, or Inab~lity, bot of the PvtodIdent and Vice President, declaring what 01fficer smHa then sW as Prekd,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected."
The matter of Presidential succession first appeared In the Conmottual (6vention In the draft submitted by Charles Pinckney. When the original draft of
the Consti1tution went to the Committee on tyle It coutatned tvrosewratecla es
22324-58-3-

30

PIMIDEXTrlA

INABILITY

dealing with Presidential succession. Altlhough the inner of tlie election of
the President ud the status of his succesmr liid not been ileded upon by
the eollveitoll at that point, it is Itereitilg to note the language of thesp two
vlauises.
ThiR Is the lnguage which went, to the Conuiilttee on Style, and which was
roviset solely for the liurpose of oittining what the members it hit coinliilttee deemed to be better literary quality lit tie great document which was being
prepared. I now rtad lie l'luckney provisloun:
"li case of [tile president's) removal as foresaid, detli, nbsenie, resignatioi,
or Inability to discharge the powers or duties of his otlice, the '%v l'resIdent
shall exercise those powers and dutles ul
another l'resdeit be chosen, or
until the Inability of the President be removed.
"The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United Htatex shull
net as President, i case of the death. resigninlon, or disalillIly of tile l'resl.
dent, lnd 'ice President ; and such officer sihill act arcordingly, until such dilsability be removed, or n President shall be elected."
Please note that in this draft the Vic, IPresildent was to exercise tile powers
and dutties of the Office of the Presidency as distilCt froln the tpfitce Itself. Also
note that lie was to serve until tsie innillty of the president lie reiioved.
uirthier, tile delegation of power to Congre s was to eslablish what lieron should
act li the event hoth the Presidemnt nud h'ie Iresldent were dillabled. 'i'he :l( ilmniltee on Style changed this language so thai It be iiC
clise Iilistein of 2,
and lit so dolig brought muich of lie confushlo which now exists.
However, I believe that the pritiary cauSe Of the0 cniIon was tile nctlctill of
Vice President Tyler, as I have already described It, ecallse tile cln1s1 of th0
Constitution a it reads refers to tlie 'powers and duties of the said Olice," 11ill
then adds : "The same shall devolve on the Vice President."
DRAFTFR8 OF CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT VIMt lIDEllIINT 8llOllli ASSrMEt l11lTIF.

Oe' Til

OFICF, NOT Till OFIiCF 1TSLl."

It IS clear from the language of tie Constitution Itself anl(d from wint wias Kaid
in the Pinckney draft that the intention of Ile draflers of lie Constitutllon was,,
not that the Office should devolve Upil tile Vice Presilent, but that the powers and
duties threof should so devolve UlhKllihil.
The wisdoin of the Foounding 'athers is certainly legendary, hut Ills ohvlous
that In this area at least, It was not infallible so far as tlhe co mimllttee on 8Htyle
was concerned. W\'hei Join Tyler established his precedent and the others (of
hle day acceded to It, they rested their arguient UlOil tliat lmrt of the claus 6
which state that In case of removal of the President from lis Office, or of him
death or Inability to dl.charge tile duties of his Office, time snme shall devolve
upon the Vice President. It was their position as I have said. that tile words
"the samie" referred to "the said Office" rather than to tile powers and 'duties
of the said Office. Their argument may be disputed today In theory but It Is
established in precedent for, since the assumption of tile Office of the 'resleney
by Vice President Tyler, six other Vice Presidents have assumief that Office upon
the death of the Presideit. '1,'e Presidents Fillniore. Arthur, Theodore ltoosevelt, Coolidge, and Truman gained Offce in this manner.
It Is Important to note that there are four Instances in which the words "the
same" apply with equal logic. First there Is removal frola office; secondly,
there Is death; thirdly, there Is resignation; and fourthly, there Is Inability.
What devolves upon the Vice President by virtue of this clause devolves in each
of these cases and the pattern having been established that It Is the office which
devolres upon the Vice President upon tie death of the President, It i itlif lt to
malniqln today, if the Vice President were to act in the President's stead during
the President's incapacity, that the Vice President had not become President.
This, of course, would exclude the possibility that the President could, upon
recovery, resume the powers and duties of the office of President.
This very difficulty has twice before used conscientious Vice Presidents to
refrain from assuming the powers and duties of the Presidency, although the
situation then existing: certainly demanded It.
AMENDMENT

WOI"L

ENABLE PRESIDENT TO BESUJE DUTIES UPON RECOVERY FROM
DISABSrY

The purpose of my amendment, Mr. President, Is to remove this nmbigulty
completely, and to provide that when the disability exists, particularly in days
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of great crisis, the Vice President shall, by virtue of his office and by reason of
the Constitution, become the acting President, not the President. This would
enable thie president, who was III und disabled, to resume his office upon recovery,
und there would be no question or doubt about It.
NATION HAS SUV

Rl-.nDFROM LACK O LVADERSIIP DURINo INCAPAOITY OF IREBIDFNTS

Tht this Nation suffered by reason of the failure of Vice President Arthur
and VIce President Marshall to assume the office of President may be Inferred
from the inactivity of the 1'resldenis during their periods of Incapacity. AlluIlon has already been nade to the fact that during his 80 days of Illness, l'resi.
dent (larleld signed by one official document, that being an extradition paper.
In l'reshlent Wllson's (lay fie was not able to meet with the Cabinet for 8 months.
More than a score of bills became law without his signature. The Democratic
Members of Congress sought unsuccestsfully to get his advice on certain matters
then pending before the Congress. Leadership nnd direction were obviously
Invkiing.
NATIONAL IAIIEIlMIII' ny TIe FIXECUTIVE IS 58SENTIAL
While, It was Important to have leadersliipo and direction In 1881 and In
t2, It Im doubly inriporlant to have such cliaracteristmcs today. It Is fool.
Ia roly to sull rose Ihnt this countryy irjay Indulge in the supposition that since
the Nnflun. haIrit suffered greater trilulalion during these jperlods of PresidenlIhtl IlaintlMelty, It May expect to escape unucathed In a siniliar crisis in the
It Is not sufficient to consider tbis matter In the light of what the office
Ieanils to the united Htates alone. We inust consider what the Office of the
l'rshihinvy of the l'nilled l ites irnns to the world as well, for this Nation
i we (1u0t jiaItill llinorder that the free
,I 'itle- S a Psition Of h,adershlip huh
Ilnstltutlons we revere nay continue to exist.
I'rHIDEN'r FISENIOW(;1

lIAR .ASXED ClARIFICATION
P10E$I:rFNTIAL DISAMIIATY

OF DLIERMINATION

or

We are eonfroitel, then, both by an opportunity and by a challenge. The oplrnrtunily has been iadt possible hy the candor ann frankness of President
Eisenhower, who ins stated that when you are ,onflned to your bed you think
tibout a lot of things nn1(1 that one of the things lie thought about was the
determination of the Inability of the President. Ills reflection caused him to request the Department of Justice to submit a proposed solution of the Issue we
are discussing today. Such a proposal has been submitted In the House of
Representatives by Congressman Keating. It must be obvious to all that in-

lierent in the tissuniptlon of such a proposal by the I'resident Is the idea that
the present provisions of the Constitution are Inadequate In this regard. If

they are Inadequate, the paramount question Is what new remedy shall be Invoked by which to determine the Inability of a President.
This, then. Is our challenge. We must determine the critical question of who,
or better yet, what body, shall determine when a President is Incapacitated. and
when he has recovered sufficiently to perform the duties of his office.
SEVERAL METHODS HiAVs BEEN PROPOSEO

The President has suggested that the Cabinet be the agency to determine the
ability of the President to discharge the functions of his office.
Senator Fulbright has submitted another proposal under which the Supreme
Court would make such a determination after submission of the Issue to the
Congress.
Tihe chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Conltitutlonal Amendments.
the distinguished! senior Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Kefanurr, has authored
two proposals, one of which would require the appointment of a commission to
determine the issue. The other proposal of the chairman would leave deterruination of that question to await the enactment of a statute following
authoritAtion for such procedure.
While I do not desire in any manner to deprecate the efforts of any other
person who has seriously considered this matter, I am convinced that each of
them represent certain difficulties which I shall specify In a moment. I believe
that the proper approach to this problem would be to vest the determination of
this Issue In the Congress of the United States. The President is the only Federal
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offer elexted by all the 1)0pl of all tho0 Sttes. The Atellibcrs of Congro." ore
elected IV the Ipoe of the uoveral Stat&.4 aud cougres.ilo||al dtItrico.
('ONOMS-t1S CAN

MLST
RK

,tUa:NT TIM1 WILL OF THEbiVOLI,.

IN THIS MAflT.R

We arm. of course, dealing with the lighest elective otilee which li it tho
power of the people of the United Statea to Istow on any 1nnit. To InterpOo the Supremo Cotirt, or the nmiblerv of the Cnblixot IKtweeu the peuqolo
of the uulied St tea anti the OMc of President would seem~ to wo to vi,.
late the spirit tif the Coustitutio|| as we know it. The determination of the
Inability of the President of the U1nled .icrtes inumt be publicly aece-ied iud
the vehicle calculated to gain public ucxeetance most rteauily, it seeuuta to
time
is tie elile to be adopted. Thers is no group, nor could tMere be any
individual, who reprtseitts a better cms st'lloni of public oplidite thn the
Congress of the hlted States. Their decIsioll would be less apt to be mnotivated
by temporary gain than any other agency for uny such temptations would be
tempered by the knuwl, dge that they would soon have to stand actcountable
before the teoplo of the United States in free and open electiom. There Im no
such check existent so far as the members of the Supreme Court or the Cabinet
are concerned, and while I would not Initate bad faith to nyono who might
occupy thoso offies , I am deeply consclous. of the fact that we are dealing with
the Constitution and that we must, therefore, examine all contingenc"e.
It ham
been argued that the members of the Supreme Court, or the 1,embers of the
President's C4lbIlet, could be removed by Impeachment iit the event that they
were unfaithful lit the task which they would be called upon to perform, should
the President be incaptacitated. Impeachment it a difficult proposition, rot
lightly to be considered, and often fettered with political imllieations of the
greatest magnitnde. The check which Impeachment affords, therefore, IA hardly
as formidable as the check represented by tht ballot box.
With this In mind, I would like to review ,ronio of the provisions which I have
written into the amendment which I now offer.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Joint resolution may be printed
at length at this point in the Record.
There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed In the
Record, as follows:
"Reaolvod by the Smeaate and House o Represent#aile of the t1ited stale* of
Astc,* in Cogress assembled (two.thirda of €ch louse concurring therein),
that the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part ot the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
1AlrrzcL--

"Snenrox 1. Whenever the President proclaims that he Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of hit office, or whenever the Senate and the House of Representatives pass a resolution declaring that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President, or if there be no Vice President, the officer next In line of succession to the office of President as provided by
IeT , shall be Acting President.
"So. 2. An Acting President shall evercise the powers and duties of the office
of President under this article until (1) the end of the then current presidential
term, (2) such Acting President finds and proclaims that the Inability of the
President no longer exists, (3) the inability of the President Is determined, In
accordance with section 3 of this article, no longer to exist, whichever first occurs.
"8mc. 3. Whenever, during any period in which an Acting President is discharging the powers and duties of the office of President under this article, the
Senate and the House of Representatives pass a resolution declaring that the
Inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office no
longer exist, the Acting President shall cease to exercise the powers and duties
of the omke of President and the President shall exercise such powers and duties.
"So.4. The Congress may by law provide for the case where either or both
Houses of Congress are not in session, declaring what officer or officers shall convene such House or Houses for the purpose of enabling them to perform the duties
conferred upon them by this article.
"Sm 5. This article shall be Inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within 7 years from the date of its submission."
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Mr. )las
I N. ar. President will tho Senator yield?
Mr. O'MAIONICY. I yield.
Mr. I)IRxs.rN. I certainly would not be offensive to my friend from Wyoming.
I share his concern about former President Tyler's confusion. But I am wonw-minuto rule. lIne It become a casualty
dering what ham happened to the
this afternoon? We are In the morniIng hour, I admonish my colleague.
Mr. OMAnos4Y. Mr. 'resident, I regret that I was not close enough to
hear what my friend front Illinois said.
Mr. I)IRKSEN. Wo are In (lie morning hour, and I wondered whether the
8-minute rule had become a casualty.
Mr. O'MAION PY. The 8.nilnute rule has frequently been a casualty In the
progress of these matters. Senators have been very Indulgent, the Senator
front Illinois pnrtlicularly. lie Is always kind and indulgent toward me. I expres my public appreciation to him now, as I have done on many occasions before.
I now come to the analysis of the proposeJ amendment, and then I shall be
flinhlied.
oLY Mr,ATDXXTJAL DISABILITY 1S MDALr wMI IN AUENDM 3n1T
My Joint resolution, I should explain, deals only with the question of the Inability of the President. I does not attempt to repeal article II, section 1,
clause 0, Insofar ns that article relates to the death, resignation or removal of
the President. My resolution provides that the President may bhmself proclaim that he Is unable to dlscharge the powers and duties of his office and
that when he does so, the Vice President shall succeed him as Acting Preddent. It also provides that In the event the President does not, or cannot,
make such a proclamation, the Senate and the House of Represuttatives may
pass a resolution declaring that lie Is unable to discharge the duties and
powers of his offke, and the Vice President may thereupon assume those
duties. I have required In my resolution that the President proclaim, rather
than announce, his disability, for a proclamation Is a more formal act which
Is widely publicized and disseminated and which would elie to fix the date,
the time, and the place of such action so as to avoid, as near as possible, IlUption
which nay result.
CONORKes

OOULD DrrrIaMINr PRrEsIDENT'8 ARILITT TO

ELZSUM DUTIES

Under the terms of my Joint resolution the Acting President Is permitted to
exercise the powers and duties of the Office of the President until the end of the
current presidential term, If the President does not recover sufficiently to assume
those duties himself. If the President does recover, the Acting President may
so declare and the Vice President will then cease to exercise the funcUons of
the Presidency. In the event that neither of these two eontingencles occur, my
resolution would permit the Senate and the House of Representatives to determine whether the President had sufficiently recovered to again resume his duties.
Since I realize that the Congress is not always In session, and Its function under
my resolution is of extreme Importance, I have taken the precaution to provide
authority for the Oongress to pass a statute declaring what officer or officers
may convene either or both Houses of Congress to determine the Issue of Inability. These basically are the provisions of the amendment.
OONORFSSIONAL

RESOLUTION

KEOARDING PRVIDF.ITIAL DISAMfLITY WOULD
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I should touch on one other matter In discussing my proposal. When the
proposal states that the Senate and the House of Representatives may pass a
resolution declaring inability, or declaring that the inability has been removed,
I am referring to the type of resolution which Is popularly known as a concurrent resolution. This is a resolution which, as all Members know, does not require the signature of the President. A concurrent resolution, as such, Is not
mentioned In the Constitution. It has been used for so long, however, without
serious question that I believe it forms a proper vehicle to be utilized in this
Instance.

Senator KE'AUVF.R. Following Senator O'Mahoney's presentation
we have statements, in support of their legislative proposals which
I will order printed in the record, by Senator Bridges, by Senator

WttHWlDrA
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Fulbright, togeoier with sbino attachinioits, and by Senator Ilayliot
and also a stateeiit which I made on the floor of the Senate on t Alulary 13 In stAjpport of my proposal.
(The documents roferrel to ae as follows:)
STATEiJmix niy FaIEuxRIi
TO TiN CONSTITUT1o9An

Comautrit

0. IAYNK ONrPRuSIDENTIiAL INCAPACITATION 8U31l11T.
AMzNDMNTr8 8011COMMrr1.

O11Tr1r. ENATFh JUDICIARv

It is a real pleasure for tue to submit this statement on the question of Preldentlal Incapacitation. The chairman and every member of this subcommittee
deserve a great deal of praise for going forward with consideration of this
controversial, but tremendously Inportant problem and I want to take this op.
portunhty to particularly commend the chairman for the very great Interest he
personally has shown In this matter.

As you gentlemen know the reason that presidential Incapacitation Is a prob.

lks today Is the vague wording of article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitulion. In other words the problem has existed since tho Constitution was
adopted, which immediately suggests the question, "Why hasn't It been resolved
before this?" There have been several attempts throughout our history to clarify
the constitutional language but as you know, no action has ever been taken.
After considerable study, the record of the treatment of this question has led
me to thO conclusion that proposals for resolving the doubt which now exists
which originate within the Congress will not in all probability ever receive
final approval. The reasoning behind liy concasion Is as follows: Presidential
disability Is a question that can best be described as politically loaded. The
Congress of the United States is quite properly the forum of partisan politics,
but unfortunately this very desirable characteristic makes any proposal dealing
with the problem of disability Immediately suspect. Proponents of proposals
dealing with the problem are likely to be suspected of being motivated by par.
tisan or regional considerations while opponents are likely, to be suspected of
being motivated by similar factors. Obviously any solution of this problem, If
It Is to be adopted, will have to be very carefully conceived and thoughtfully bal.
anced to avoid conveying a seeming advantage or (lisadvantago to any one group.
In the final analysis any such proposal must be weighed and tested by the men
who properly represent partisan and sectional interest-the Members of Con.
gre..
But on the basis of past experience, I firmly believe that no proposal
relating to this problem can get to first base without having broad national
support.
Because of this T Inlroduced a hill iM the Senate last year to create a high
level, nonpartisan Hoover-type commission to study the problem of I'residential
Incapacitation and make recommendations to the Congremm. Under that bill
(5. 924), which Is now pending before the Committee on Rules and Adminis.
tration, the Commsslon would also be empowered to study the future of the
electoral college and the role of the Vice President in the Federal Covernuent.
While I resli e that 5.. 924 is not before this subcommittee, it offers an approach
to this problem which I believe the subcommittee might well consider. The
ommission proposed by S. 924 was patterned very closely after the 2 Hoover
Commi.sslons. The very real success enjoyed by the 2 Hoover Commissions
is In large part due, I believe, to the very great prestige of the members of the
2 Commissions. In view of the fact that the disability problem is of such
gravity and of such a controversial nature, It seems to me that the best hope
for Its ultimate resolution lies In a high level, nonpartisan commission whose
recommendations will receive wide national support. It is my hope that the
living former Presidents of the United States would be Invited to serve on the
Commission and the remaining members would be selected in the same manner
as were the members of the Hoover Commission. Recommendations from a
group Including such eminent Americans as President Hoover and President
Truman would not be under political suspicion. They would come before
Congress for approval or disapproval with a prestige that would enable congressional consideration on a plane above mutual suspicion or party politics.
This question of the approach to be taken in resolving the problem of Pre.qidential incapacitation is, in essence, a preliminary matter for your subcommnittee to decide. I am confident that the decision reached will be a sound one
and in the best interests of the American people. The important thing here is
not the method but the result, and whatever method will achieve a wise result is
the right method.
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Now let me turn to my own thoughts on l'rpsIlentlal Incapacitatio

and the

bill which I Introduced last jeat (8. 238) which In identical with one (S.2703)

which I Introduced In the 84th Congress.
There Is no inore Interesting constitutional question today than the problems
ftssointei will the present provisions of the Constitution with regard to Just
what happens when a President Is not removed, has not resigned, and has uot
died, but Is unable to perform the ditties of his office. As you know from the
study you have already given this subject, the problem Is far from new. In
fnct It has exlsted since the Constitution was adopted. While the question of
just what was meant by "Iabilily" was raised at the ConOlltilonal Convontion, Itwas given very little attention and nIo coneltisions were reached. Until
the assasnation of President James (nrfleld the problem received practlkally

no attention by anyone, nnd none by Congress.

During the perlod while President Garfleld Iny mortally woiinred, considerable
discussion took place as to whether the Vice President should exercise the dulles
of the I'residency but it was finally decided, apparently contrary to fact, that
President Gflrield was not constitutionally unable to discharge hils dtles of

the OMce. Ills death put an end to the urgency of a solution to the problem and
the matter lay dormant until President Woodrow Wilson's Illness. Although
Congress then gave the question some conslderatlon It took no final action and
In retrospect It appears that the White House Itself had determined that President
Wilson was not constltuttonally disabled.
After Wilson's Illness the matter again receded from public attention And
cohgresslonal awareness and was not revived until the fall of 1955 when Presdent Eisenhower suffered a heart attack. Fortunately the President's Illness dlid
not prevent him from carrying on the dutles of hls office, but ftdid serve to focus
attention once again on the need for establishing some definite procedure to be
followed In the event of Presidential Inability. 'he President's subsequent Illnesses have served to underline the need for a solution to this problem.
Today it Is patently obvious that executive leadership of the United States
must be a continuing thing and that we cannot afford to have any possibility of
A lapse. Any such lap.se could well be disastrous, not only the United States
alone, but to the entire free world. Therefore, Congress has a very grave responsiblilty to the Nation to resolve, once and for all, the doubt that surrounds this
aspect of the succession clause of the Constitution.
President Elsenhower at a press conference In January 10)5 firmly expressed
his belief that steps should be taken now to clarify the j rocedures to be followed
In the event of Presidential Inability, and properly placed the responsibility to
take such action on the Congress. The President made the following statement:
"Well, when you are as closely confined to your bed as I was for some time,
you think about lots of things, and this was one of the foremost in my mind.
"I do believe that there should be some'agreement on the exact meaning of
the Constitution, who has the authority to act.
"The Constitution seems to be clear the Congress cannot only make the laws
of succession, but it can determine what Is to be done, and It says, 'In the case of
So-and-So and So-and-So,' but It does not say who is to determine the disability
of the President. And we could well Imagine a case where the President would
be unable to determine his own disability.
"I think It Is a subject that, in its broadest aspects, every phase of it should
be carefully studied by the Congress, advised with the Attorney General, and
any kind of advice they want from the executive department, and some kind of
resolution of doubt reached. I think it would be good for the country."
On the basis of my own study of the matter it seems to me that the arguments
holding that the framers of the Constitution did not, In the event of Presidential
inability, Intend the Vice President to succeed to the title of President, but only
to exercise the powers and duties Is the most compelling, for many reasons.
First, the whole history of the Constitutional Convention points in this direction.
Secondly, I believe that the rule followed by the courts to the effect that where
words admit different meaning, the one consonant with the object In view Is to be
selected, Is entirely reasonable and logical, and particularly applicable to the
problem at band. If we assume that the succession clause means that a Vice
President succeed to the title of President in the event of inability of the President It raises almost Insurmountable problems. On the other hand, if we assume
that the Vice President does not acquire the title, but only the powers and duties,
the problem becomes relatively simple, and Involves only spelling out adequate
procedures by legislation.
What then does It really boil down to? In general terms it Is a question of
determining Presidential inability. This necessarily Involves who should initlate
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proceedings, who should make the determination, bow the determination should
be made, aud finally how such an inability ie to be terminated, The first question,
who should initiate proceedlngs, I probably the siuploetone to answer. Here
we must recognize that Inability can be of varying kinds. For Instance there
could be just plain physical Inability. In this event the President, himself,
should make the determination and notify the Congress. Such a notification
should servo to autoitatically give the Vice President the responsibility to exercise the powers and duties of the residentt, but should not give him the title.
On the other hand Inability could be of such a nature that the President could
iot inake the decision, such as paralysis, coma, or mental incapacitation. In
this event someone else would have to initiate proceedings and to my mind there
Is only one logical person to do this. lie Is the Vice President. The courts have
a well-established rule that In contingent grants of power the one to whom the
power Is granted should determine when the emergency has arisen. The Vice
President Is charged by the Constitution to exercise the powers and duties of
the Preident when the letter Is unable to do so, and therefore It is the Vice
President's responsibility to raise the question when he has good cause to believe
the President Is Incapacitated.
It might be said that the Vice President should determtne when Inability exists,
but experience has shown that this protedure cannot be relied on. In effect, it
would require the Vice President to act at his peril and In the two Instances
when the occasion hits arisen, the Vice President has refused to act. History, as
well as considerations of human nature, require that the Vice President be given
some degree of clear legal sanction and protection in the event of Presidential
Inability. In order to avoid the dangers of partisan accusations and the undeslrable consequences of a possible struggle for power, It would appear that the
Vice President should only raise the question and that the determination should
be made by some other agency.
Now we come to the heart and the most troublesome part of the problem.
Who should make the determination and how should It be made? Many proposals have been advanced on this subject, all of which have merit, and all of
which appear to raise some rather serious problems. It would seem to come
down to deciding which system would be the most feasible and at the same
time Involve the smallest degree of hazard. At this point It should be noted
that the whole reason for needing any system at all Is because of the recognized necessity for having continuing executive leadership. Therefore, any
system must be one that will permit reasonably expeditious determination, with.
out sacrificing the ability to make a correct decision to considerations of speed.
A system that Is time consuming would be too cumbersome and and unwleldly
and would not meet the requirements of the problem. It has Ieen suggested that
It is the responsibility of Congress to make the decision, but I believe that experience has shown that on such an important question Congress could never act
with the required degree of promptitude. In all probability it would take Congress weeks or even months to reach such a decision, if Indeed it could reach
one at all. For largely the same reasons I believe that a select committee of
Congress would prove unworkable.
With regard to Congress there is another Important consideration which
should be taken into account. Congress is the forum for partisan politics, and
properly so. However, the determination of Presidential Inability should be
free of political considerations, and should be Insofar as possible a question of
fact. Whether or not the President has the support of any groups or party
should not play any part in the question of the Inability of a President to perform his duti . To allow such a stuation to arise would be to permit the party
or parties which lost the presidential election to override the decision of the
people. Therefore, I believe that Congress should at most play a very limited
part In determining Presldential Inability.
It has been suggested that the decision of a President's possible Incapacita.
tion should be made by the Cabinet since It Is the closest group to the President
and In the best position to know. It is probably true that the Cabinet, due to
Its close personal contact with the Predlent, would have access to Information
bearing directly on the question, but I believe that there are other considerations which would make It undesirable to have the Cabinet perform this Important function. Obviously there Is a great possiblty that political considerations might influence the Cabinet, either Individually, or collectively.- Personal
loyalty, while It Is a commendable trait, should not play part In a decision of
this nature, and of all the agencies of Government the Cabinet w6uld most
strongly be Influenced by personal loyalty. During the Illness of President Oar-
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field It was personal loyalty that restrained the Cabinet from declaring the
President Incapacitated. Wilson summarily dismissed a member of his Cabinet
for disloyalty because he advocated such a decision. From this It would seem
reasonable that any Cabinet decision, In all probability, would be Influenced by
factors which should not enter into a question of such Importance.
We come then to a question of what agency of the Government Is reasonably
free of the Influences that should be avoided. The obvious ansiver IF,the Supreme
Court. A proposal has been made that the Court should make the decision on a
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the Vice President to exercise the
functions of the President. This proposal In Itself involves serious constitutional
questions which I will not go Into since I feel there Is ntolher reason why It
should be rejected. I have already pointed out that any system which would be
time consuming would be too cumbersome to meet the demands of the situation.
It should go without saying that the judicial process is necessarily slow and it
seems to me that It could not be expected to move with rapidity on such a weighty
question as Presidential Inability.
On the other hand, as I have Indicated, the Court is the only branch of the
Government that Is removed from political Influence and would not be affected
by questions of loyalty. Tils was the factor that caused me to prepare and Introduce S. 238. I am not Irrevocably committed to the provisions of this bill, but
It seems to ine that it meets many of the problems Involved better than most of
the other proposals that have been advanced so far. Briefly, the bill would provide that the President notify the Congress In writing of his inability, If able to
do so, and such notification would automatically give the Vice President the
responsibility of exercising the powers and duties of the President, but would not
give him the title. When the President felt he was recovered he would resume his
duties by notifying Congress. With regard to disability of a nature that prevented the President from notifying Congress, the bill provides that If the Vice
President had good cause to believe that such an Inability existed he would notify
the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice would then appoint a panel of qualified,
civilian, medical specialists who would examine the President. Each member
would Individually submit a report of his findings, stating the physical condition
of the President, and lis conclusion of whether the President was able to exercise
the powers and duties of his office. If all the members of the panel agreed In the
conclusion that the President was suffering an inability, the Chief Justice would
notify the Congress in writing. Such notification would have the effect of placing
the powers and dutY,-s, but not the title, of President on the Vice President.
The bill has beeit objected to principally on the basis that It enlarges the
judicial functions of the Court. To my mind this objection is not well founded
since the duty placed on the Chief Justice is strictly ministerial In character
and Is not essentially different from other duties imposed on the Chief Justice
by statute. The question has also been raised as to how would the Inability determined by the medical panel be terminated. It Is my feeling that this should
be accomplished simply by the President notifying the Congress in writing that
he was resuming the responsibilities of his office. At first glance It might seem
that this could well result in a struggle for power, but I believe that when carefully considered such would not be the case. A President would necessarily be
hesitant to resume his office after being found incapacitated until lie was sure
of his condition, because he would not want to run the risk of the process being
repeated. Second, the President is the President unless he vacates the office
by death or resignation, or is removed by the Congress. The decision as to
ability or inability Is his and his alone, except in those situations which prevent
him from making the decision.
Since Introducing S.238 1 have continued to study this problem and would like
to suggest a modification which I think would improve the procedures proposed
in my bill as presently written. This modification would in several ways be very
similar to the proposal of the distinguished chairman of this subcommittee in
Senate Joint Resolution 134. Although I have not worked it out in complete
detail the idea basically would be to set up a permanent commission which would
decide the question of Presidential disability whenever requested by the Vice
President. In short the Commission would be the deciding agency In lieu of the
Chief Justice and panel of doctors as presently provided in 8. 238. Though I
would not recommend that doctors actually be members of the Commission it
would seem to me that the Commission should seek such medical advice.
Thouhenubetshlp
e
of the Commission is something that in itself is highly controversial, However, in view of the nature of the problem it would seem to me
that the Chief Justice should be the Chairman, but sboul4 not have a vote. The
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other members should probably be the majority and minority leaders of each
House of Congress, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney generall. In this manner the problem of
having either the Congress or the Cablnet decide the question would be avoided,
while at the same tine the advantages of each of these bodies Inirelation to this
problem could be realized.
In this statement I have not attempted to cover all of the many ramifications
of the question of Presidential Inability, but only to point up what appears to me
to be the principal controlling considerations, and to test some of the proposals
that have been made against those considerations. I am sure that as the subcommittee continues Its study of this mal'ter It will continue to develop valuable
Information on all aspects of the problem. The arguments, pro and con, for any
specific proposal or on any given Interpretation will be multitudinous and weighty
and the ultimate decision with which this subcommittee will be faced will be a
very difficult one. I want to take this opportunity to assure the subcommittee
of my lasting Interest In this matter and to express my willingness to be of assistance in any way that I can.
STATENI3N?
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Mr. Chairnan. I appreciate being given this opportunity to present my views
on Senate Joint Rtesolution 100, a proposed anendnent to the Constitution
relating to the Inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties
of is office. I introduced this rsolutlon in the Senate of the United States on
June 10, 117, and I Introduce for the record a copy of Senate Joint Resolution
100, and ask that It be printed titthis point in my remarks.
The applicable part of the Constitution which Senate Jolnt'Resolution 100 Is
designed to clarify Is contained in article 11, section 1, clause 0, which provides
"In case of the removal of the President front office, or of his death, resignation,
or Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shah
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the
case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer
shall then act as I'resident, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
This provision of the Constitution thus takes Into account four possibilities
regarding succession during the Presldential tern: Removal (Impeachment),
death, resignation, and Inability.
A study of the history of successions which have occurred under authority
of article 1I, section 1, clause. 6, reveals that sucesslon by reason of death of
the President has occurred upon seven occasions; that removal (impeachment)
was attempted once, but the attempted impeachment of President Johnson failed
by a single vote: that no President has ever resigned; that no President has
ever been determined to be unable, by reason of a disability, to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, although prior to the present administration
there have been at least two Presidents whose abilities to discharge the powers
and duties of the office have been seriously questioned by students of constitutional government (Garfield and Wilson).
I propose to confine this statement to the problems presented by the Inability
clause. The prime problems raised but unanswered by this provision of the
clause are as follows:
What kind of disability Is Included?
In what atLnuer and by whom Is the disatility to be determined?
What period of time Is Involved?
How may te status quo be restored if disability Is eliminated?
Many take the position that any problems arising by reason of the Inability
clause can be resolved by appropriate legislation, and that a constitutional
amendment is unr.ecssary. Authority, if any exists for such legislation, must
be found in article I, section 1, the pertinent part of which is "* * 0 and the.
Congress may by law provide for the ease of * * * Inability both of the President
and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President and such
officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President ball
be elected."
Analysis of this clause indicates that It is not applicable to the problem of
establishing procedures for determining Inability but rather it Is applicable only
and is directed to the problem of determining the line of succession when those
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elected to the office of President and Vice President are no longer capable of dis.
charging the powers and duties of the Presidency. The clause does not give
authority to the Cong-ess to make laws establishing or determining that inability does In fact exist. Many constitutional experts are of the opinion that
only by means of a constitutional amendment can procedures be established
whereby a President can be declared incapable of performing the duties of his
office because of physical or mental disability. The Important point to be made,
however, is that to allow any doubt as to the constitutionality of legislation In
this area is much too hazardous to leave to chance. The only absolutely safe
procedure Is to enact a constitutional amendment, thereby eliminating the possibllty of unconstitutional legislation.
For over 75 years, the problems relating to the disability of a President have
received some attention by the Congress, but nothing has ever been done with
regard to them. It has been said that we have existed as a Nation for nearly
175 years without providing a solution to the problems Inherent In the "inability" clause and in all that time no serious detriment to the Nation has
occurred. But the mere fact that we as a Nation have been fortunate thus fnr is
no reason to tempt providence in so important a matter as the Presidency.
Prudence and commonsense dictate that serious detriment may occur If we
neglect to remedy the situation.
The amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 100 Is nonpolitical in
nature. It is not a Democratic or a Republican amendment. It is not a liberal
or a conservative amendment. It Is a necessary amendment in view of the
serious problems raised by the failure of the Constitution to provide for a continuity in the adequate performa-ce of the pow'brs and duties of the President
In the event of disability. This proposed amendment properly meets the demands
of the situation. It removes aty uncertainty about the legality of any action
taken during the incapacity of the President.
The proposed amendment provides that whenever the Congress believes the
President Is unable, by reason of physical or mental disability, to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, it shall request the Supreme Court to decide
whether such disability exists and if the Court so decides, then the powers and
duties of the President shall devolve upon the Vice President or upon the person
next in line of succession.
The proposal provides for succession only after due consideration by the two
Houses of Congress and by the Supreme Court. The action thus taken has an
impact on all three branches of the Government; yet no unilateral action by
any single branch of the Government can be conclusive. I am convinced that
It I.absolutely vital that the system of checks and balances, America's unique
contribution to government, be maintained, and Senate Joint Resolution 100 does
not violate this time-honored system.
The requirement that the Congress should be directly Involved In proceedings
Involving succession to the Presidency Is absolutely necessary. The President is
elected by all the people-so Is the Congress. What other body under our Constitution is the alter ego of all our citizenry? It Is, therefore, fitting and proper
that no possibility of succession because of Inability take place until the Congress
has expressed Its belief that the President is disabled.
The proposed amendment requires a majority of a quorum of two-thirds of
the total number of the Members of each House for adoption of a resolution.
Hence, It precludes the possibility of a small clique In either House achieving a
political coup. At the same time it does not require so great a preponderance as
to allow a small clique to prevent, for political advantage, a necessary change in
the Executive.
There has been some comment that the Supreme Court should be kept out of
this problem, since It is contrary to the traditional constitutional purposes for
which the Court was established. There is little substance to such an argument.
The Constitution already provides that the Chief Justice of the Unitel States
shall preside over proceedings for the removal of a President for cause, through
impeachment. The problem herein is not a political problem. It is a national
governmental problem. The matter can only be resolved by facing up to the
responsibilities required under constitutional government. Accordingly, the
participation by the Supreme Court In matters involving succession to the Presidency Is not only already required by our own Constitution, but nothing required
of the Supreme Court under the proposed amendment can In any way be deemed
to Impair the dignity of the Court, demean It, or cause it to become Involved In
partisan politics. The proposed amendment provides that upon a referral by
the Congress, the final responsibility for determining whether disability eistas
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rests upon those of Judicial temperament, appointed for life and, insofar as con.
stitutional government can provide, beyond the I.;mptations of political advantage.
Yet, the Court cannot act unless first requested to do so by the separate and
independent legislative branch of the Government.
Senate Joint resolution 100 allows for due consideration by both elected and
appointed ofliciais. It requires action by officials already provided for in the
Constitution, and It does not necessitate the creation of a new body of officials,
commission, or agency.
It provides that the succemston shall continue to the end of the current term,
unless the disability Is sooner relieved, in which event the President will again
assume his office, This is consistent with the Intention of the Founding Fathers
who intended that succession by reason of disability should continue "* * *
until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Further, logic
decrees that this should be so, for the people having elected a President intended
that he should serve in that office for all of the ensuing term except for such
periods ai he may be disabled, or unless the office becomes vacant for the other
reasons set forth in article 1i, section 1, clause 0.
The proposal provides for resumption by the President of his office in the
same manner as Is provided for relieving him of his burden when he is disabled;
that is, by concerted action of the Congress and by the Supreme Court.
It provides for the possibility of succession by reason of inability even during
periods when there Is no Vice President by assumption of the office by those
next in line of succession as provided by law.
And finally, it provides for succession even during possible periods when the
Congress is not In session by establishing a procedure for reconvening the Congress upon the Joint call of the presiding officers of both Chambers for the specific
purpose only of considering whether it Is the belief of the Congre.s that the
President is unable, by reason of physical or mental disability, to discharge the
powers and duties of his office.
I take this opportunity to point out to the committee that certain weaknesses
are inherent In various proposals which have been suggested from time to time.
For example, some say the President himself has the authority to declare himself disabled. While the Constitution is silent on whether the President Is the
appropriate one to mzke a determination of inability, such solution, even if
constitutionally proper, is inadequate In the circumstances. What, for example,
if the President Is in a coma and unable to make any declaration, or is sufferIng from a mental disability, or supposing the President Is in fact disabled and
refuses to so declare? There are those who say that In such a situation resort
can be had to Impeachment proceedings. This Is either ridiculous or unconstitutional since disability is not a high crime or misdemeanor.
Some say that the Constitution already provides that the Vice Pro dent has
the authority to determine that a vacancy by reason of inability exists. No
such grant of authority to the Vice President can be found anywhere in the Constitution. Further, no such grant of power ought to be placed in the hands of
any one man, let alone the hands of the man who has the most to gain by the
exercise of such a grant of power. Indeed, the impeachment proceedings are
already so designed as to prevent the Vice President from being in a position
to determine his own succession by providing that the Chief Justice of the
United States and not the Vice President shall preside over such proceedings.
Proposals embodying the view that the Cabinet is the appropriate body to de,
termlne disability suffer from the obvious disadvantage that cabinet officers have
a direct interest In the continuance in office of the President who appointed
them. Cabinet officers are-the personal choice of a President, and serve at his
pleasure.- Their vested interest may color their Judgment., Further, being non.
elected offieiis they are not reflective of the will of the electorate.
Proposals for a Joint determination by the Cabinet and certain legislative
officials suffer from the obvious disadvantage that they give the Cabinet a veto
power In any determination of Inabllity.
. Some would propose a special comlttee be appointed for determining Prel.
dental, disability. Ouch a committee necessitates the creation of an additional
body outside the contemplation of the Conotitution and would create a duplication
of officials presently available to make a determination. Further, such committee
would either, not have final authrity and hence would serve only, to complicate
the procedure and create addItlon,1l delays in re~chtng a final determination; or
such committee would have final authority, and the placing of such power in
the banda of a few might weli lead to undesirable consequences.
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Senate Joint Resolution 100 has the advantage of simplicity, yet it allows for
deliberate reflection upon a grave constitutional change. It can be elected In
as relatively short a time as circumstances may require; at the same time it pro.
vides a broad base of participation by responsible officials so that none can ma.
nipulate it for personal or partisan political advantage.
I believe It appropriate to bring to the attention of the committee an article
appearing in the New York Thnes on January 23, 1958 relating to a letter from
Chief Justice of the United States Warren addressed to Itepreaentative Kenneth
B. Keating of the House Judiciary Committee. The Chief Justice stated that It
was the unanimous belief of the Supreme Court that no nemiber of the Court
should be a member of any commission created to determine whether a President
was disabled. The basis for this belief being that there Is a "possibility of a
controversy of this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disquallfica.
tion which might result In lack of a quorum, It would be inadvisable for any mem.
ber of the Court to serve on such a commission."
In light of the foregoing, the advisablllty of adopting the amendment proposed
by Senate Joint Resolution 100 becomes readily apparent. Under it, the Supreme
Court would be acting as a judicial body without having been Involved in any
prior proceeding. The constitutionality of the procedure and their determination thereunder could not be challenged. Further. the Court itself recognizes the
probability, under any procedure, of the matter coining before the Court for a
final determination. Since this Is so, the most appropriate and direct ptocedure
Is outlined in Senate Joint Resolution 100. Further, tire Court voices no objection to making a final determination, it merely objects to having one or more membtrs involved In any prior proceeding, the propriety of ;vhlch would ultimately
be placed before the Court.
(The text of tho Now York Times article follows:)
(The New York Times, Thurtday, January 23, 10581
"lIua

COURT JusTIcE8 AGAINST DIBABIliTY ROLE

"WASHINOON, January 22 (AP).-Chlef Justice Earl Warren said today that
he and the other Supreme Court Justices felt they should not be members of any
commission to determine whether a President was disabled.

"Various proposals before Congress to provide by law for the Vice President
to take over the Presidency temporarily in csse of need call for a commission to
determine whether a President Is in fact disabled. Several of these bills would
provil for one or more members of the Supreme Court to be on the commission.
"Chief Justice Warren expressed his views In a letter to Representative
Kenneth B. Keating of upstate New York, senior Republican member of the House
Judiciary Committee. Ile wrote:
. "'It has been the belief of all of us (the Justices) that becau" of the separation
of powers in our Government, the nature of the judildal pr6ce& the possibility
of a controversy of this character coming to the Court, and the danger of
disqunallfleatlon which might result in lack of a quorum, it would be Inadvisable
for any member of the Court to serve on such a commission.'"
I again, Mr. Chairman, in closing, recommend for the thoughtful cons deration
of this committee the merits of Senate Joint Resolution 100.
I Introduce at this pOint,'for the benefit of the committee, a bibliography of
selected material on PresidentilAl Inability.
BELLTED MATERIAL ON PRESIDENTIAL INARIFIIt'

Administration asks constitutional rules for replacing A disabled President.
- luc W., April 0, 1957. P. 151.
Butler, Benjamin: Presidential inability. 1881. 13 N. Am. R., p. 428.
Cooley, Thomas M.: Presidential Inability. 1881. 133 N. Am. It, p. 422.
(Corwln;. Ddward S.: The President: Office and Powers, New York, New York
University Press, 1041.
Ciirtist, George 'T.: Presidential inability. 1881. 25 Harpers Weekly, p. r83.
Dlmbility of the President. 1919. 2,3 Law Notes, p, 141.
Dwight, Theodore W.: Presidential inability. 1881. 183 N. Am. R.. p. 43.,
For emergency use only: substitute President. April 19, 1057. 70 8cholastlc pp.
14--10.,.

,

.:

Frelinghuysen. Peter, Jr.: Presidential disability. September 1950. 807 Annals
of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. SO., pp. 144-155.
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January 94, 1958.

flon. Esirc KErAuNr-,

Chairmn, Subcommittee on Constftutiona! Amendncnts,
Senate Judicliar Committee, Waehington, D. (.
DE.a Ma. CnAIRmIAN: I do not anticipate that I will be able to personally attend the hearing being conducted by your subcommittee this afternoon on
legislation covering the subject of Presidential Inability or disability.
Yesterday, I Introduced one bill, S. 3113, and two proposed constitutional
amendments, Senate Joint Resolutions 143 and 144 on this subject and have
furnished Mr. Wayne H. Smithey of your subcommittee professional staff with
a detailed explanation of them. I will be very appreciative if you can arrange
to have this material made a part of the hearings.
Sincerely yours
STYLES BarrerA.
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The bill Is based upon the assulmptlon that conlltutloial authority now exists
under which the Congress by legislation may provide for the determination
af the ability of the I'resIdent to disiarge the powers and duties of his office.
Slub.,etio (a) of the first section of the bill creates a committee for the
coislderatloti of any question which may arise as to the Inability of the l'resl(lent to discharge tho.eo powers anrl dilix. It Is composed of the I'resident
ipro temlore of the Senate, the Hpeaker of the HJouse, and the majority and
minority leaders of both itouse. "thecommittee would be convened whenever
thie
h%'ke
lremhleilt, by letter transmitted to the President pro tempore of the
ennte and to the Speaker of the House, might suggest doubt as to the ability of
the Plreuldeit to discharge his powers and duties. It could also be convened, In
the absence of any such letter, upon request made by any four members of the
committee, that number being prescribed as a quorum of the committee.
Subsection (b) of the first section makes It the duty of the committee, when
convened for that purpose, to determine whether there Is probable cause for belief that the President Is unable for any cause to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. If a determination Is made, by the affirmative vote of at
least four members, that such Inability exists It Is then the duty of the majority
leader of each House to Introduce In his House a concurrent resolution stating
In substance that It has been determined by the Congress that the President
Is unable to discharge his powers and duties.
Subsection (c) of the first section provides that if such a resolution in adopted
by both Ilouses, by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members present and voting in each House, the powers and duties of the President
shall then devolve upon the Vice hreideant, who shall discharge them until
the disability of the president Is removed or until a new President Is elected and
takes office.
Subsections (d) and (e) of the first wion of the bill deal with the restoration to the President of his powers and duties upon the termination of his Inability to discharge them.
Subs;ectlan (d) requires the committee described above to be convened upon
receipt, by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House, of a letter from the President advising that in his opinion his Inability
has ceased to exist. Upon the basis (of such a letter, the majority leader of
each House would be required to Introduce In his House a concurrent resolution
stating In substance that the Congress has determined that the Inability of the
President no longer exists.
Subsection (e) provides that upon the adoption of such a concurrent resolution by both Hou.es, by majority vote of all Members present and voting In
each lfouse, the President shrll resume the discharge of the powers and duties
of his offl:e, ad that the Vice Poresident shall then resume the discharge of
the powers and duties of the office of Vice President.
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provIsion i lalido by the first section of the 1I1ll
Section 3 of the proposed comsttllttlfnll nllllerildflletit wolld provilo, in n
manner comparable to that precrIbed by sectIlon 2 of the Ilt deserlbed above.
for the exipellixous considerallolu by tile ('olgress of tiny concurrent resolulltin
rectllng n delerlnlmltlo u by the Collgre.q.4 thnt flie President Is unable to discharge the lowerg aid dulles of hlis office, or that any iprevliotsly determilned
di.abillty of the President has ce(ased to exist.
Se('tion 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment would authorize the
President pro temlpore of the Senate nl the Speaker of tile House of Representatives, acting jointly, to cell the Congress Into special session for the conulderatton of any concurrent resolitlon for a determination thnt the President
is unable to discharge hls powers and dutles If the committee established by
section I of the amendment should determine, at any time at which the Congroes.s i,not in session, that there Is probable cause for belief that the President
is unable to (iseharge those powers and duties.
Section 5 of the proposed constitutional amendment provides that It shall
be Inoiwrative m1|lessq ratified by legislature" of three-fourths of the several
States within 7 years from the date of its submission.
ALTFMNATIVP, JOINT RES5OLTION~

The alternative joint resolution also rests upon the as.sumptlon 'that the
Constitution does not provide authority under which the Congresq may provide
for the determination of the ability of the President to discharge his powers
and duties, It differs from the joint resolution described above In that It proposes a constitutional amendment which would grant to the Congress tonsi-l
tutional authority to provide for the making of such determinations, hut would
not Incorporate into the Constitution itself a detailed prescription of the method
to be used in making such determinations. The amendment proposed by the
alternative joint resolution is based upon the theory that (1) the Constitution
should provide a means for the solution of any problem of Presidential inability which may arise in the future, but (2) the fallibility of human foresight may render Impracticable any undertaking to place In the Constitution
itself detailed provisions regulating the disposition of every contingency which
might conceivably occur at any time during the future life of the Nation.
Sections 1 and 2 of the alternative amendment proposed by this joint resolution would replace the present provisions of the sixth iAragraph of section I of
article II of the Oonstitution, which would then be repealed by section 5 of the
amendment.
Section 1 of the alternative amendment deals with the situation in which
(he President is rendered Incapable of performing his duties because of his
removal, death, resignation, or Inability occurring at a time at which there Is a
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Vice I'resident who can discharge those duties. It would restate the first
clause of the sixth paragraph of section 1 of article If of the Constitution in a
manner which would expressly confirin the historical Interpretation given thereto by providing that In tite camp of Ihe reuno~al, death, or resignation of the
President, tho Vice l'resilent shall become Preilent, and shall -n,'e as such
for the remainder of the term for %htich his predecessor was elvtel. It would
amdd
a new provision to the effect that In tie event of the Inability of ihe Preslde]it to dschargo film lowers and duties, such poers and duties would be
discharged by tle Vice I'resilent only liuring the contlnuance of the inability
of the Presidcnt. Thus, It would be made clear that in the event of incapacity
of the l'reldent arising from vtau ,s otLer than removal, death, or resignation,
the Vice 'reshIlent would not succeed to the offi e of residentt or bec.ome
Preshlent.
action 2 of the alternative amendment deals with the siluatlon in which
til Presdleint Is rendered incapable of performing iis duties because of his
removal, deahi, resignations, or Inability occurring at a time at which there is
no Vice Plresident who can discharge those duties. It restates, without change
in effect, the present provisions tof the second clause of the sixth l'arngralih of
section I of article II of the Constitution. Like the present constitutional
provision which It would replace, it would confer authority under which the
(ongress may provide by law for such a situation.
'rue first seiitence of section 3 of the alternative amendment provides new
express authority under which the Congress shall provide by law for the determhntilou of all questions of fact arising under sections I and 2. The second
sentence provides new authority under which the Congress Is authorized by
No'ncurrent resolution, adopted with the concurrence of two-thirds of all Menmlirs
lpresnt and voting In each House, to provide for the discharge of the powers
and duties of the Presildent at any time of emergency at which there may be
no person who Is qualified, under time Constitution or under any statute previoutsly enacted, to discharge those powers and duties. That sentence Is Intended
to enable the Congress to supply an officer to dieharge the powers and duties
of the office of President If (1) no person can qualify therefor under any existing
comnstlhtlonal or statutory authority, and (2) the Congress Is precluded front
making provision by statute for the designation of any such person because of
the ab.ence of any person who Is qualified to sign any lill which It might enact
for that lmrPose.
Section 4 of the alternate amendment contains a provision (comparable to
thtit of section 4 of the principal proposed amendment described above) anthoriz.
ing the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Iepresentatives acting Jointly, to convene the Cngrs.s In special sessMon If
th,,y should determine, at any time at which the Congresq Is not in session.
that there is probable cause for the Invocation of the provisions of the second
sentence of section 8. Thus, provision Is made for the solution of any unusual
situation which has not been foreseen, and for which no provision has been made
by statute.
Section (I of the alternative amendment provides that the propoMed Amend.
nent shall be Inoperative unless ratified by legislatiurs of three-fourths of the
several 9ttes within 7 years from the date of Its submission.

PRAMDENTJAL, DsssnzrnYY

'Mr. KrrAtvER. Mr. President, It Is generally conceded that the Offlce of Presi-

dent of the United States Is one of the most-it not the most-important offices
in the free world. In addition to the awesome responsibilities originally conferred by the Constitution upon the President, practice and precedent hare
Increased both the powers and the responsibilities of this office so that the
occupant of that office now possesses tremendous Influence not only In domestic
but also In International affairs. Anything which affects an Institution as
Important as this it, therefore, a matter of grave concern to the people of the
United States And certainly to their elected representatives.
ho recent Illness of the President, telescoped as It was upon two prior Illnesses,
has served to focus attention again upon the exercise of the powers and duties
of this extremely Important office during periods when the President may be
incapacitated. While there might have been some question of propriety to mentioning this subject at one time, the President's coendable lnItlatlre in
22-321--38 -4
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submittihg at constitutlonal amendment on the matter has served to dispel that
oncrn. The President, In conference with congressional leaders and publicly,
has strongly urged that Congress act to clear up this area of doubt In our
Constitution. The concern today is not, and should not be, obscured by the
persontilitles of thmo who temporarily occupy the offices of President and Vice
I'resident. The question which must constantly be uppermost In all winds in
the consideration of this subject Is the question of the successful operation of
sleinworatie Institutions and their survival at all times, but particularly In time
of peril.
The Constitution, of course, provides that In the event of the inability of the
President to discharge the Iowers and duties of his office "the sanme shall devolve
on the Vice 'resident, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of
removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice Presi.
dent, declaring what officer shall then net as President, and such officer shall act
accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
It Is difficult to know what the authors of the Constitution Intended by the
term "inability" since inability or disability was never defined and was mentioned
only oneo tii the debates of the Constitutional Convention. According to Madison's notes, Mr. Dickinson expressed the thought that the section under discussion
was too vaguo and wanted to know the extent of the term 'disability" and who
was to be the judge of It. So far as is known, no one answered the questions
and there was no further discussion bearing upon this point.
The questions asked by Mr. Dickinson at the Constitutional Convention might
not now be so important had It not been for the pretedent mtabllshed by Vice
President John Tyler who when he assumed the office of President in 1841 after
the death of President 11arrison, took the oath of President and contended that
he was In fact the President and contended that he was in favt the President and
not Acting President of the United States. This contention rests ipon an Interpretation that the words "the same" have reference to tie office of the Iresildency, as distinguished from the powers and duties of the office. The precelent
established by Vice President Tyler has since been confirmed six times, by Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Coolidge, anti Truman, and Is, therefore, well established by custom. The practice, however, of a Vice residentt
assuming the office of President, rather than assuming the powers and duties of
the office, has served to inject doubt concerning the power of a temporarily disabled President to resume the powers and duties of his office upon recovery from
his disability after having relinquished such powers and duties to the Vice
President. As a matter of fact, the doubt so created has been afforded such
weight that In two instances in the history of the United States, Vice Presidents

hare refused to assume the powers and duties of the office of President of the
United States. although the situation, in retrospect, would certainly seem to have
warranted such action.
In 1881, for example, during the 80 days of President Garfield's fatal illnessq,
he performed but one single act-the signing of an extradition paper. The CabInet at one time met and discussed the Inability question. All agreed upon the
desirability of Vice President Arthur's acting as President during President
Garfield's illness; but 4 of the 7 Cabinet members, including the Attorney General, thought that the powers and duties of the Office could not temporarily devolve upon the Vice President. As a result, the Cabinet decided that they would
not advise the President to encourage the Vice President to act as President,
since it might be construed that they were asking the President to vacate his
Office for the remainder of his term.
The second instance In which the Nation stood in peril for lack of resolution
of this question occurred during the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson's Illness was of a more prolonged duration than that of
President Garfield, lasting from September 25, 1919, until almost the end of his
term in March of 1921. During this period, because of his inability, 28 acts of
Congress became law without the President's signature. The President did not
meet with his Cabinet for 8 months. The British Ambassador spent 4 months
in Washington without being received by the President. Leaders in the Senate
sought to discuss the terms of the Versailles Treaty with the President, but were
refused permission to see him by the President's physician. The affairs of
Government were largely disposed of by decisions of the President's wife, his
aides In the White House, and certain members of his Cabinet. The Cabinet
considered asking the Vice President to act as President, but the White House
contingent fought the move. A prominent Cabinet member, Secretary of State
Lansing. who approached the President's secretary with a suggestion of this
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nature, was rebuked and litter forced to submit film resignithlon Uplon the recovery
of (he1'rc hielit.
Even froin (lie viintnge poInt of hilstrlal persipectlve, no one can accurately
assess today Just whnt dalnillge was (dloie to (lie Uillied States and the world by
thils Iilpakuse. The League of Notions was then up ini the air. M1aniry t(ay believe
ilt greater Ulled Htate. partlipatlion e uld ive N0)changed the International
clinaite that World War [I night iive been nveri~. The league was President
WIlson's brichild. imd lie Ibton sueveded by VI.e l'residenit ,Mlirshall, who
thln would huzve bo)rn1e tie reslisillilllty for ilslon anuIdleadershillp, would the
,nitonirt have been different ?
N one really knows--iio one can really say. All we o know is that such
ev
itmore costly, ind thus It I;
n period of hInetion In today's wirid might b1w,
well that we pay hed to tile maxiiii that the wise prepiure, while others postlIolte. The lessons of the past, combined with the ecneern of th. present, have
Impelhlvl me to explore the ndeitne'y of the ('o1st1tlo1 ufid (he laws of the
1nIlted States resieting tills question wnd, In my judgment, they are In iteed of
reloi I r.
When these matters were previously considered by the Congress, solution was
rendered Impo ble by the failure of those who desired a solution to agree
ulon the inechnnl.si of that solution. Soine have contended that the lproblein
ought to be dealt with by act of Congress. Others have felt that a constitutional
aniendinent was necessary. All seem to have recognized that a critical question
to be resolvedl Is, fly who n shall the Inability be deterilned' At present the
Constitution seems to place the determination of inability In the hands of the
Vice. tPresident, who must, of necessity, act at hls peril. lie must depend, of
course, upon popular acceptance of him decision and he must face the possibility
that (he legality of his assumption of the powers and duties of the office may be
challenged In the courts of the United States. As former Senator Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois, pointed out In a symposium printed In the North American Review In November 1881, Just a few months after President Garfield was fatally
wonnded"Any Vice President who should assume those duties in a doubtful case, when
the exigency didi not unmistakably require it, would be treated as a ursuper by
all patriotic citizens."
The Vice President must also reckon with the fact that In any court test
the Constitution may be interpreted In such a way as to prevent the resumption
of the powers and duties of the Presidency by the President himself upon recovery. This has, in the two instances cited, proved to be such an obstacle that the
Vice Presidents of the United States have refused to accept the powers and duties
of the office, although had they done so, history could not have been critical of
them.
The role of the Vice President as the sole constitutional agent for the determination of the question of Presidential inability has been criticized, since the
Vice President Is, In a very real sense, a party in Interest. This has led to suggestions that his discretion should be conditioned upon, or replaced by, a determination by, first, the Supreme Court; second, the Congress; third, the Cabinet; or
fourth, a Presidential commission.
In 1920, Representative Fess, of Ohio, proposed a constitutional amendment
which would have utilized the services 6f the Supreme Court, the Congress, the
Cabinet, and the Vice President. He proposed that disability be determined by
the Supreme Court when authorized by concurrent resolution of Congress. If
Congress was not in session, the Vice President was authorized to call Congress
into special session for the purpose of considering such a resolution upon recommendation of the Cabinet.
Currently, there are proposals before the House of Representatives which
would make the Supreme Court, the Cabinet, or a Presidential Commission the
agency for determining or recommending Presidential inability. The proposal
which the administration has indicated it favors, casts the Cabinet in the decisive role. At the outset of this session, there were only two proposals on this
subject pending in the Senate. One Is proposed as a constituUonal amendment
and the other as a straight bill.
Senator Fulbright has submitted a proposed constitutional amendment which
would provide that the Supreme Court, by majority vote, could determine the
question of Presidential capacity to erve, after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the Congress stating that the Congress believed the President unable
to perform the powers and duties of his office. Under the proposal of the junior
Senator from Arkansas, the same procedure would have to be followed in order
for the President to resume his constitutional functions.
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Senator Payne has Introduced proposed legislation which would permit the
Chief Justice, after receiving notification from the Vice President that the Vice
President believed the president Incapacitated, to Impanel a board of from 3 to
5 medical specialists from civilian life. Each specialist would examine the
President andl, If all concurred that the President was physically unable to
perform his duties, the Chief Justice would so notify the Lougress In writing
snd the Vice President would assume the powers end duties of the Presideney.
Ills amendment reflects the view of those who believe that Congress now has the
constitutional power to legislate In this fleld.
Last Thursday I introduced two additional proposals, which were In due course
referred to the ('oAnidttee on the Judiciary where the Fulbright and Payne proposals were already pendiig. I submitted these two prooxaIs, not Ini anywise
to preJudice consideration of the two pending proposals, but rather to lay Iefore
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary alternative procedures for conslderation. As elmirmnan of the Jiidielary Committee's Standing Subomrnittee on
Constitutional Amenduiets, I nm aware of the nee! for a thorough and dispassionate study of this whole area of the law. It seemed to mtie that a suhmimisslon
of these prolpsals would contribute to such consideration. Of the two proposals
which I have submitted, one would merely confer uhpon the Congress authority to
prescribe by law the procedure for deternilutg the inability of the President of
the litled States and the sluestion of his titnf; to resume the powers and duties
of that office. This proposal has the benefit of brevity, which most persons are
willing to concede Is a commendable consideration In the drafting of constitutional amendments.
The other aniendmnent. however, Is more dtalled. This amendment would
create a commission or committee composed of the heads of the executive departments of the (lovernment of the United States and the majority mid minority
leaders of both Houses. The commission would be chaired by the Chief Justice
of the United States, who would have no vote In the proceedings. It could be
called Into sssion by either the Vice President or upon written application of
six of the memtbors of the conlisLion, addressed to the Chief Justice. The commission would call for such medical and other testimony as it desired and would
be required to determine the question: Is the President able to discharge the powers and duties of his office? If a majority of the comnmlion found that he was
not able to perform the duties of his office, such powers and duties would then
devolve upon the Vicm President, who would continue to assume those powers and
duties until the conimission determined that the President was able to resume the
powers and duties of his office.
The subcormmittce, therefore, will have before It what I believe are four basic
approaches to a solution of this problem, namely:
lmirst. A simple anmendnient, granting Congress the authority to provide the
detailed solution by statute, which Is mcre easily changed or adjusted to meet
future contingencies, but which by that vory fact also lacks the Stability of constitutional amendment.
Second. A constitutional amendment, conferring the power of decision In the
matter upon the Supreme Court, following reference of the question to the Court
by congresQ.
Third. A constitutional amendment 60tting up a commission which Includes
representatives of all three branches of Government, hut which adnilttedly Is
weighted In favor of the executive branch.
Fourth. A statutory approach.
I have not undertaken to discuss the Lsue of whether remedial legislation in
thls field mnt take the form of a constitutional amendment or may be accomplished by a simple statute. The former Attorney General, Iferbert Brownell,
has endorsed the view that the change should be made by constitutiQnal amendment. Certainly such a method would present no opportunity for challenge at
some future critical perl6d on constitutional grounds. On the other hand, a
statute on the subject might Invite such a challenge which could serve as a
severe hindrance to essential action. 'I expect, however, that this question will
be fully explored at hearings which, as chairman of the Standing Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary, I have schednled to begin on January 23, 1958. I have discussed this problem and make
this announcement at this time not by way of suggesting that the subcommittee
intends to consider this Important subject In baste, but rather to alert those who
are Interested and knowledgeable on this subject that the subeimmitte6 desires
and Intends to take Information and testimony looking to a solution of what Is

surely a difficult and vexatious problem.

Whether, after the subcommittee has
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completed this initial task It will prove more able to reach agreement on a
solution than its predece.sors have been, 1 cannot predict. I would suggest, that
It we are not willing, In the light of our present knowledge, to undertake such
a task, we will deserve the condemnation of those who must live with the uncertainties which our Inaction will have served to perpetuate.
I hope that any Serhators or citizens who have any suggestions, Ideas, or
proposals in thits connection will see that they are sent to the Judiciary subcon.
rittee.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The I'awsso,o Ovijcr:e. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KFFAUMIE.
Mr. President, I ask unaminous consent that the order for the
quoruin call he rescinded.
The Pns:simxo OpFicF.R. Without objection, It Is so ordered.

Senator KEFAUvvii. The committee, is highly honored to have as our
next witimse, Prof. William Yandell Elliott, a native and distinguished
son of '1ennessce who is professor of history at 'arvard University,
has taught and lectured in many of our principal universities, has

served the Government in many important positions such as consultant to the President's Committee on Administrative Management,

National Advisory Defense Committee, Office of Production Manage.
ment, 1House Specia) Council Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, the War Pro(luctionl Board, and the Business Advisory Council.
Dr. Elliott, both by experience and education and study is well qualified to give us the benefit of his views on this subject. Without objection, I will order the short biographical sketch of William Yandell
Elliott, taken from Who's Vio, printed at this place in the record.
(The biographical sketch referred to above is as follows:)
Elliott, William Yandeil, univ. prof.; b. Murfreesboro, Tenn., May 12, 1896; a.
William Yandell and Annie Mary (Bullock) E.; A. B., Vanderbilt U., 1917, A. M.,
1920; certificate Sorbonne, Paris, France, 1019; D. Phil., Coll., Oxford U., 1923;
LL.D. in. Barbara Foster, June 28, 1923; children-William Yandeil, Paul Pinkerton Foster, Charles James Fox Wharton; in. 2d, Mary Loinlse Ward, Aug. 26,
1030; children-Ward Edward, David William Penn. Instr. Vanderbilt U., 191920; Instr. U. of Calif., 1923-24, ast. prof., 1924-25; lecturer and tutor dept. of
govt., Harvard, 1925-20, asst. prof., 1926-29, aso. professor, 1029-31, professor
since 1031, Williams professor of government 1912, dir. of the Harvard summer
school since 19.50. Consultant to President's Committee on Adminlstrn. Management 1030, Nat. Advisory Defense Comm., 1940, Office of Prodn. Management
1041, House Special Com. Postwar Econ. Policy and Planning, 1945-46; mer.
Senator Tydinga mission to PhIllippInes 195; dir. Stockpile and Transportation
Div., W. P. ., vice chin. Civilian Requirements; staff (Mr.House Select Con). on
Fgn. Aid. 1047-48: staff dir. House Committee on Fgn. Affairs, 1917-49; asst.
dir. 0. D. M. 1M1-3; mein. planning lid. Nat. Security Council since 19.53:
Served with 114th Field Artillery 30th Division, A. E. F.; st lieut. at close of
World War 1. Grad. mer. Business Advisory Council. Dept. of Commerce, dir.
Foreign Service Edn. Found. Mere. Disciples of Christ. Editor: the British
Commonwealth at War, 1913. Author: several books in political scl. 1928-40;
Western Political Heritage (with N. A. McDonald), 1049; American Foreign
Policy; Organization and Control, 1952. Home 660 Concord Avenue, Belmont.
Office: Littauer M-26, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass.
Member Sigma Chi, Phi Beta Kappa. Democrat.

Senator KEPAUVER. We certainly appreciate your coming here and
being with us, Mr. Elliott.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT, PROFESSOR OF
HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Mr. ELLTorr. Mr. Chairman, I am of course very much honored
to be here as a witness before this committee and I appreciate your

kind introduction.
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If I could add a word to your own, I have also been a servant of
the servants of the people in both Houses of Congress, as you well
know, sir, in preparing staff reports for both the Senate and the
House, and as a staff d director of the committee with which Senator
Dirksen was then connected. I say this to recall to you these proofs
of the respect, that.I habve for the Congress.
Senator KFFAUVER. Yes, inmany capacities in both the House and
the Senate.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. ELLTorr. The subject. that you are attacking, as Senator Dirksen remarked, is fraught with such great national importance that
it might today affect our very survival as a free nation. But it is
not simply a matter of the immediate moment that we are concerned
with. It is as John Marshall said, "a Constitution that we are construing," and a Constitution that we are contemplating amending.
We are approaching our second century under that Constitution, the
foundation of our firm union.
The Constitution is a document hammered out of compromises by
perhaps the greatest feat. of statesmanship that, has been achieved
by any system in bringing into being something that has survived
as well as it has, basically the same in its grand ddesign. But it attempted to provide, sir, for things that I think we had better bear
in mind: not simply for the current situation with which the men of
that time were confronted, but for the future.
Aristotle remarks in The Politics somewhere that what seem small
amendments of constitutional systems (what lie calls "basic laws")
sometimes have unsuspected possibilities for destroying the whole
st nicture. In other words what are apparently harmless innovations
can have large and dangerous consequences. Therefore one must approach a constitutional amendment I hope in the spirit of seriousness,
even reverence, which is shown by this committee; and at the same
time not be frightened of having to deal by amendment with a situation that is not adequately covered, as I think it is a matter of common agreement this situation of who declares Presidential inability,
and how, is not adequately covered. You can, if you choose, act under the doctrine of, not the "silence of Congress", in this instance,
but under the silence of the Constitution, and try to torture out of it
through the implied powers clause or the implied powers doctrine as
it has become a part of our constitutional interpretation, some power
of Congress to act through statute alone in this matter. I think that
Senator O'Mahoney has given us a very brilliant and soundly reasoned statement groundedon his evident historical knowledge, as to
the limits intended by this provision in the Constitution on congressional ability to determine inability by its own act, alone. He gave
some very good reasons for thinking that on the ground alone of the
history of article II, section 1, clause 6, it would be unwise to proceed
by statute and probably unconstitutional. It would certainly involve
us in doubts and ambiguities which had better be clarified once and
for all in a way that only constitutional amendment can do with
finality.
But were it perfectly legal to act by statute only, and constitutional
beyond a doubt-as it is not, in spite of some authority to the contrary,
I should suggest, sir, that the seriousness of this problem requires that
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the people of the United States not only understand it, thoroughly but
act upon it with a speed worthy of the need for settling this issue once
and for all and in our time today. I think you do go back to the
people ultimately for your source of authority on a matter of this
importance. It is to prevent their confusion and division of counsels
and leaders that we have a Constitution.
Now I would like if I may, having paid homage to Senator
O'Mahoney's remarkable constitutional exegesis, to differ somewhat
with him in his conclusions. I would like further to lay groundwork
for that difference as to method by reminding you of what I think is
the basic nature of the separation of powers in our system.
The danger, I think to the separation of powers in our system does
not come, certainly not at the present time, from any desire on the
part of the Congress to usurp the prerogatives or the influence and

lessen the prestige and the powers of the Executive of the United
States. I think no one could have any doubts as to the patriotic attitude completely transcending partisanship that Congress has so far
displayed in this matter. But we are concerned with something that
may not be merely meeting the current situation of a current crisis,
but with something that deals with the future of our whole constitutional system. In that respect., I would like to remind you, sir, of
the logic of the separation of powers and some dangers that it seems
to me we run if we tamper with it by encroachment on the Executive
powers, unintentional though it may be, by putting it in the hands of
Congress to remove a President wit hout impeachment.
In the first place, our system is unlike either the French or the
British. Be reassured that I do not intend to lecture you on that
difference but just to remind you of a couple of matters that I think
need bearing in mind.
The French system creates inevitably and infallibly and alas, very
painfully, a weak executive, by having a legislature that can at any
time upset a government. This makes the temptation of blocks and
groups within the legislature so strong to reshuffle ministries even at
the cost of bringing financial and defense policies into confusion, that
we have had a history since the Third Republic, written in the most
painful type; the red of inflation and the black of national pessimism
and loss of confidence.
We certainly do not want to follow that path in any way whatever,
and I think we are, under our present system of balance, in no danger
of doing it. The British system, on the contrary, has a system in
which the right to call a general election is the protection of an executive which is responsible to Parliament, i. e., to the House of Commons under existing practices. Therefore the Cabinet, headed by a
real Prime Minister, is in a very strong disciplinary position to protect itself against encroachments and undermining by parliamentary
maneuvers, not by ground swells of changes in real public support,
It can and does exercise a discipline over unnecessary elections
through snap votes of no confidence, a discipline so great that it has
been almost unheard of to have a vote of no confidence in the British
Parliament, since World War I. The one instance since that time
where this withdrawal of support in effect took place was not inside
the halls of Parliament or the House of Commons, but outside1 in a
political club, by what was in effect a caucus vote to end a coalition.
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Now we are in neither position,' the weak French executive or the
tightly disciplined British. The President of the United States is
unable to call a general election to test the sentiment of the country.
He is, as Senator O'Mahoney has reminded us, elected by all the people. Along with the Vice President, he Is the only nationally elected
figure. Congressmen, even Senators, do not represent the Nation at
large. He can and sometimes does run well ahead of his party in
terms 6f national confidence and the voters' expression of party sup.
port in the legislative halls.'
The legislature is not infrequently, as President Hoover's 'letter
reminds us, I believe, of a different party complexion. -This happens
frequently with both parties.' I remember serving as staff director
for the Hoise Foreign Affairs Committee in a Republican Congress
when President Truman was President of the United States, the 80th
Congrem, and surely we have seen more recent evidences of it. President -Hoover'lost his Congress, President Wilson did from 1918, so
did Cleveland, and so on. This is far from being abnormal, if we
consider the frequency with which our 2-year elections bring it
aboilt.
Now, gven the fact that we have had very few instances (through
"inability" or, better, "disability') what was, in'effect, having "no
President, lin our history-and these have already been adequAtely
alluded to and developed by Senator O'Maloney and others--it, nev,
ertheless, is a very necessary thing to cure any such possibility at this
period where quick decisions must be had, but cure it without at the
same time running the risk that at some future time we may find a
Congress removing a President from partisan motives because they
were expressing a wave of national hysteria like that after the reconstruction period when the impeachment of Johnson narrowly failed,
even protected by the two-thid provision for the Senate's judgment
by votes. Such a risk should mike the power of the Congress to act
alone on this matter of determining succession by statute, or by joint
resolution sanctioned by statute, a real danger by permitting a fundamental but unintended change in our separation of powers. Leaving
the decision to action by Congress alone, I think, is unwise on two
counts, sir. It'is unwise, first; because, as your'questions to Senator
O'Mnloney indicated, there is a great deal of well-grounded opinion
that in th6 circumstances that one might be confronted With, the ormof wranbrous 'action of &legislative body with all the possibilities
gling, tactics of delay by blocks, filibusters, and -so on; it would be
exceedingly diffiult to get quick and certain decision from Congress
This alone would make congressional action not the appropriate remi
edy for that kind of decision.,
Furthermore, any. such debates, and the inevitable changes of par.
tisan motivesin any doubtful cases, would cause a great deal of hard
feelings. It would exacerbate many situations if there were real
divisions on this point. To delay and debate would probably be an
unnecessary thing in trms df the other available alternatives that I
think are preknted in some of the resolutions before this conimitte6
thatmay well be preferable.-"
But were it possible for Cobgress in all cases to act With thb utmost
expedition and dpeed, and to act either through the som6whatlrchaio
device of having- the House vote by States wigt one vote to each State
(the method that would be used if the electoral college has failed to
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come to a solution), or by joint resolution of both Houses, Senate and
House, both acting in either case, were this perfectly possible, were
Congress capable of being called rapidly into session and acting on
24 hours' notice or some such thing as that, without real inquiry and
debate--and I think this unlikely and, perhaps, unwise-it would,
nevertheless, be very questionable in my mind as to whether this
would be the right method of determining either the disability or the
return to ability of the President of the Uiited States.
I want to treat my reasons for that conclusion very briefly under
two points The first is the danger that an unintentional upset in
the balance that has been set up in our Constitution by the separation
of powers would be achieved. I say "unintentional" because I think
no one would expect Congress to operate in this kind of an atmosphere in that kind of a way, but as I reminded you in the beginning,
this is the Constitution we are talking of, that governs the future
behavior of all sorts of Congresses One of the strong points of the
men at the Constitutional Convention was that they showed a very
accurate view of the failings of human nature, the fact that in times
of high passions and, perhaps, a very grave crisis where a decision
might be fatal in one way or the other or where division in the country could be even more painful, n~n action like that in the impeachment of Johnson would-be possible through this device, and would
b much easier, because it might, under some of the proposed amendments or statutes, be done by a bare majority vote.
Now the Senator from Wyoming, graciously, with the statesmanlike help of his wife (this morning) said a two-thirds majority in
each House would be all right on this point of congressional action,
to meet his ideas. I would say this would be a far less objectionable
method of dealing with the thing, except for its cumbersomeness. If
swift action is also a requisite, the two-thirds protection can increase
the delay. You would remove at least the hair-trigger character of
the act; you would make it possible to protect against partisan passions in some degree. But, even so, I think it.is not the way in which
to be expeditious.
There is yet another point to remember. Congress is not the best
atlare and as a whole, to have knowledge of the
equipe
Presi ent~s real 'ondition.
Let me start out, sir, by saying that I am convinced that the present
President, like any President who confronts this problem of possible
illness in such times of perpetual crisis, sees the necessity of action,
prefers that it be as far as r can make out from his words, done in an
unambiguous and clear way. He has made some recommendations of
,as I understand it I
his own for the consideration of the Co
have not followed those-closely) but I gther that they are somewhat
parallel to Piesident HoovIer's suggestion here, although would prerer an amendment t6 a statute. MThPresident probably has worked
out understandings with the Vice President to deal, with emergencies
not covered by his own free decision mos mentis;,
action, and the-ability to
- 'In'atinie of~ntional peril, where quick
respond immediately must be known bytthe enemy as the most valuable
,tartof our deterrent to,aggressiohi, it is obvious that we, do have to
have a situation that prevents us from having a President in a coma,
a President who cannot operate,.,President Who could not make decisions of that sort, yet a President whom the Vice President would
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feel reluctant to relieve of all his duties decisively and at once. If we
-took no other example than that of Wilson, the painful period described by Senator O'Mahoney, with the insight into the workings of
,what passed for Presidential decisions in the White House, ought to
remind us of that danger forever..
We were, in effect governed for a considerable period of time by
the President's personal physician and the second Mrs. Woodrow
Wilson, as a transmission belt for all executive policies from a man
really
tooill to make decisions. What harm was done by that to the
P.ssibilit, that we mig'lit have had a League of Nations with compromises which Abbott Lawrence Lowell to4 me lie had almost gotten
the President to agree to. before lie became too ill, and became so entrenched in -his advocey that lie would make no concessions to the
Senators' amnendments, and so on. One can only speculate on that.,
but it is obvious that such a history could be repeated at some time,
if not today. Therefore, we do need, let us agree, a method that is
sound, foolproof, constitutionally clear and unambiguous, and capable
of being put through, I hope, with some speed, because it seems reasonable to all sides.
Now' I know reasonable men can disagree as to methods.. I hope
they will, because you often bring out some of the weaknesses of solutions by pointing to the difficulties that they raise. But in ' e resolutions that you have kindly furnished me in the day or two that I had
to prepare for this I have looked them through with a good deal of
care, and I think tfiey each have a good deal of merit.
For instance, Senator Payne's.resolutioh here, which would leave
it ip tO the President, effectively contains at least.one item that, it
seems to me, is missing in Some of the other resolutions, not Senate
Joint Resolution 141, by Senator O'Mahoney, or the recommendations
from Mr. Hoover, and, I think Mr. Trunian; iamely, that there should
be some recognition that the President himself may well initiate, close,
and finally determine his inability, not by resignation, necessarily,
from his office, but by saying that lie is unable to discharge his constitutional duties and that the Vice President must take over as Acting

President.

In that case, the language that Senator Payne's resolution uses,
though it. is addressed to a statute and not to constitutional amendment, would seem to me to be appropriate to incorporate in any of the
constitutional amendments.
I think that is one of the few things, Mr. Chairman, that I noticed,
perhaps, is not entirely covered in your own resolutions, particularly
Senate Joint Resolution 134.
; This may be taken for granted in your resolution, and the others.
One may say that there is no necessity of covering voluntary action
by. the President: But it surely ought to be recognized as clear. law
that the determination of the President himself as to his inability
ought to be conclusive, ought to be a definitive matter and should
merely be communicated to Congress as a fact.
I Senator KFAuvxR. For the record, you were talking about S. 238
....
I
in discussing Senator Payne's language?
Mr. ELLoTr. I was talking about Senate Joint Resolution 238,
I.
yes .
-Senator KRFAuVF.. Subsection-(b)?
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Mr. ELLIo'rr. Subsection, (a) sir, at the top of page 2: "In case
of the physical inability of the President to discharge the powers and
duties of office as President, he shall so notify the Congress by written communication" and so on.
Now, then the only thing that I am not quite clear about in Mr.
Paynes language here, and I think this is raised in a very interesting
way by former President Truman's views as expressed in his letter
is whether the President is his own best judge of whether he should
resume his powers. There I think it is very much more questionable
as to whether once having turned over his powers to the Vice President, there should not be at least some check on his resuming his
powers. There would be no question of a man who is really in possession of his faculties and his conscience not taking over powers when
he felt ready to resume them. But on the other hand, a President
sometime in the future, looking at this in lon>run terms, who was
subject to some aberrations or something of that sort, might well
plunge the country into an extremely difficult situation if he asserted
powers which he was manifestly not capable of holding, at some
time in which he had been allowed to do this by unchecked decision
of his own. So I would not be equally clear on that point and I
merely flag it for your attention as something that deserves careful
consideration when you are dealing with the resumption of his office.
Now on the question of the other resolutions, I fifid myself in some
minor disagreement or perhaps it could be a major disagreement with
that great friend of mine, Senator Fulbright. Senator, Fulbright
has done two things in his resolution:.
Senator KFAUVER. You are now referring to Senate Joint Resolution 100?,
..
Mr. ELL!Orr. I am now referring to Senate Joint Resolution 100.
In effect, Senator Fulbright's resolution suggests that whenever the
two Houses of Congress shall adopt a, resolution declaring that the
Congress believes the President is unableby reason of physical or
mentl disability to' discharge the powers -and duties of his office,
such resolution shall be transmitted to the Supreme Courtof the
United States' and the Court shall decide whether or not such inability
exis's. If the Court decides by a majority vote of the authorized
membership that such inability exists the powers' and duties shall
devolve upon the Vice President or if there be no Vice President, and

so on.

Now this has at least the advantage that thei e is a check on Congress and there is, in that sense, in the tradition of checks and balances, a protection against some 'future ,usurpation of power by
pressure of Con rem , It may not be that the actual decision itself
would ever need to take place But the capacity of Congress
declare disability by its own action alone could be a strong coercive
factor in the dealings of Congress with the Executive. That is why
I so much agree witl Senator O'Mahoney that th oormittee on
style' in drafting this being true to the resolution that it had before
it, really did nbt intend to convey that power on Congress.' That is
my own feeling aboit it, and I believe that is also your expressed
view, Mr., Chairman.

'

'

I would think that at' least a very efeisonable view which-wotild
make more solemn and difficult process than, are contemplated by
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Senate Joint Resolution 100 unless backed by amendment. Reasonable men can. differ on the interpretation of something like this, and
people would argue possibly that havhig gone to the country without a full explanation in the Federalist papers nd since the debates
in the constitutional convention in the States did not establish anything definite as to meaning in ratifying, a broad latitude mi ht be
justified under the "implied powers" of Congress. Prof. fdwin
Crorwin, one of our most vigorous and authoritative writers on the
Constitution, does make the argument for implied powers-but to
my mind for one, with more authority than persuasion.
But for reasons that I have urged, I would prefer the constitutional amendment route for decisive clarity, even were there a much
clearer case for the possible validity of statutory action.
Now Senator Fulbright's resolution, coming back to his main point
here, associates the Court as the check but it does put the initiation
in the Congress, subject to all the disabilities from my point of view
of debates, length of time, stirring up the country by an unnecessary wrangling on a point of this sort, and perhaps not being close
enough to the realities of the situation to be the best judges of it.
The Court is no closer to this side of the problem-the political-if
I understood the language that was read from the Court as I came in.
The Court has itself expressed its opinion on the impropriety of
being drawn in, and I would fully concur with the wisdom of the
learned Justices in refusing to do something that savors more of a
political act under the doctrine that the Court has always used as you
will recall avoiding decisions that called for political choice rather
than judicial decision, by a judicial finding of law.
Nor would I be very much encouraged to bring in another element
of judgment of fitet by associating medical advice as a conclusive
factor, as is so often proposed, on which to base the finding either
of a court or any other type of quasi-judicial committee. I think
any committee in its right mind would want to have medical advice,
but I am, I think, sufficiently acquainted with the medical profession
to know that they differ very radically in their diagnoses and their
political opinions often seem to have a very considerable bearing on
their medical findings.
I am reminded, if I may say so, of the opinion of one of my own
very learned medical colleagues, a man of the highest reputation at
Harvard, who found that President Truman, by one of these dangerous in absentia diagnoses, was suffering from some obscure form
of ailment that made him, what shall I say, not quite non compos
mentis, but temporarily aberrational over periods of time and subJect to rages, Which mV medical friend thought could be treated by
drnis. He cited Successful preventive treatment of several of lis
patients. I am glad to say he was not allowed to prescribe for President Truman on that basis or he might not, have' had the reaction
that the President did have in a fit of justified wrath in taking up
the Communist challenge in Korea that I think was very useful.
And drugs used perhaps in another instance in Mr.IEden's case
may well have been responsible for a certain ,lack of responsibility
in at least taking the preparations to carry out whit he .Was.committing his country to., Ido :not know but that is'quite a usual
view today in informed British circles.
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Diagnosis, medical prescription, has to be taken as all other things
do, and as the Court takes them, In terms of reasonable interpretation.
The ultimate evaluation has to be by people who are really close to
t-e situation.
Now I may say, sir, you know we have differed on the wisdom of
question periods for the Cabinet members by the Houses of Congress.
So it is without any flattery to you, Mr. Chairman, that having read
these resolutions, I am more attracted, after analysis, to the resolutions
that bear your name than to any of the others. But I have 1 or 2
suggestions to make which might alter some language, if you are
oing to keep the whole of the executive heads of the executive
departments in there. That is like Sanhedrin. Lloyd George said
you cannot win a war with a Sanhedrin. I do not know Who the
heads of the executive departments are, but the languageSenator KEPAuvwR. Mr. Elliott does me the favor of referring to
Senate Joint Resolution 134.
Mr. ELLtO'r. Yes, that is the long form rather than the short form.
Senator KFAUv"R. The resolution that I introduced.
Mr. Etiiorr. I may say I prefer it to your short form, Senate Joint
Resolution 133, for the reason that I am going to develop.
This resolution, the Kefauver Senate Joint -Resolution 134, says,
in effect, thatFor the purpose of determining inability of the President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President, there Is hereby established a
committee consisting of the Chief Justice of the Unitewl States, who shall serve
as chairman of such committee, and who shall have no vote in any of Its
proceedings.

I think that meets the Chief Justice's objection to judicial participation by the Court. Here he is only a symbolic figure, symbolic of
the majesty of the law, but taking no voting part in the proceeding.
He serves as something like the British Crown, which is there to
remind all officials in Bitain of the fact that they do have a common
symbol of the law. This role for the Chief Justice would, I think,
have a very salutary effect in whatever group has to make a decision
of this kind.
Therefore, I would myself warmly support this language. This
is not the full Court. Ilia is not addressing itself to the problem
as a CourL This'ia simply having the Chief Justice preside, if I
understand it, at such a meeting.
Senator KF AUv R. That is the intention, to just have him preside,
to see that there was a fair committee hearing. I thought the precedent for this was the Chief Justice presiding in impeachment proceedings in the United States Senate.
Mr.
mELIoTr. It seems to me to be a very sound precedent and one
that reminds all concerned of the fact that this is a constitutional
issue of the gravest importance fraught with the safety of the Nation.
The presence of the Chief Justice I think could not but be beneficial
underthose conditions.
The leader In the Senate of the political party having the greatest number of
Members, the leader of the party having the second greatest number of Members
In the Senate, the leader ili the House and minority leader and heads of the
executive departments of Government.
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Now accepting your views on) this ils I (It, is it~not rather strange
flint thero is nto mention of "oficers shall also act, as Vice Presiuent.1"
'Thero is nio inention of Vice P1resident, in here, and so far ns I know,
there is110 really diet handling of this lack in any of tile rmsoltions,
When Air. Trunian became Pi(ident, we did not have a Vice President, and this has happened over and over flgain.
Now is this not a loophole that should be plugged?

Senator O'MI]IoN,.x. I think it is; not strange if I may interjea

at this point., D)r. Elliott, thant the nirafters of the Nonstittition dlii not
Inko thnt. matter into consideration, because obviously they were as-,
suing that in most cases the Vice President would act as President
for only a~short time, and one of the elements that convinces me that it
was their intention always that thle Vice President should only be an
Acting 'President is the provisi6n with respect to the election of the
Presiden
'MAr. Er~io'rr. Yes, but the election of the President can e-quallv well
be interpreted as a regular election, and there is nothing thatf1knowof in the debates to suggestthat that. was not in their minds. In other
words, there was no provision for a special election in their minds-b that
I know of.
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Senior OMAIONNY. Yes I agree with you in that respect.

Mr. Euto'rr. And uatls they expected the electoral college to function in some way retrospectively as is suggested again I think, is it
not, in the loover or the Truman letter ?
Senator l)niwKsy. President Truman's letter, "reconvene the electoral college."
Mr. Eaorrr. Yes, here it is.
I wold recommend that In every Instance whore a Vice President succeeds
to an unexpired term of President (ho electoral college be convened to choose
a new Vice President.

Well, I (1o not really know whether that is the right way to (to it,
but I have considered this with some care and I am hanged if I do
know how to get a Vice President under this kind of situation. If
,ou let Congress choose him, as would seem a simple method of doing
it, by either both Houses or something, you inve got a terrific
wrangle on.
In the smcond place, you do not have as a result of congressional
action a Vice President who necessarily shares in any way the views
of the President. It is imperative in our system today, more than
ever that the Vice President should assume very wide duties, and
should be in line of succession, should be in the National Security
Council, and so forth. Again I refer to President Truman. You will
remember how handicapped h'e felt he was in assuming his duties in
the National Security Council without having really been schooled in
them. He obviously did not want to let that happen a in.
So I think he has a very important point in his letter wh ich I would
hope that this subcommittee would take seriously. I really do not
know a better way of handling it than the one he has proposed.
Yet I admit that it seems to me to be not a very good way.
One possible suggestion which people have sometimes canvassed is
that the President should propose to the Congress, someone for Vice
President. But suppose Congress does not accept the President's
nominee? Well, then you possibly would have to have a national
election. But it is not always very easy to call a national election to
elect one man and to get a real response from the country. So perhaps President Truman's advice is as sound as any on this point that
the electoral college was elected by the same party that elected presumably the President, and reflects the majorities of that time. You
are not trying to reflect a new situation in the mandate from the people
because the 4-year term is a part of our system. And you cannot
really reflect a total picture of the country s feelings without a national general election on the issues.
We do not remove the President simply because he has lost his parliamentary majority, so to speak, and for the very good reason that
I tried to point out at the beginning. He has no protection. He cannot call a general election to find out whether the country supports
him or the Congress.
Our system is not geared to that. You know, sir, I have made some
proposals in other times and other places which I regard as out of
bounds here, which I think might deal with that more fundamental
problem. But this type of radical reform of our whole system of
2-year elections is so far afield that I do not regard that as a practical
suggestion to intrude my ideas about constitutional reform or even
the possibility of having the President's family represented in both
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lmes in order to take care of tihe chaiiinan's, Semator Kefauver,
l~l)Olt iiswerig questions. I think tgaini if the (Cabiiet:
imebelrs are going to 1iiSWe' (lUesltions, they had better have votes,
and( b enl itlled(to tho full privileges of debate and membership. This
is a very fitr-reaclain4 business, III1d it, might have relI dangers. I amn
awire of those, too, in getting the back up of (lie re)reseC)ltatives of
the people by having a block of official ilitl'lidlrs. You know parliiimeittlly blies (to hlatve this reaction about official majorities and
'Olivcel'l

S11i1 not lllaware0 of it.

Therefore, I aIm just raising this narrower issue with you of taking
ctre that there slit I also always be a Vice Plsidelit. 1 (o not have,
for oice, ally kilnd of pet sollitto, al( 1 really ain stlllp)ed on it, but
I tlliilk th osggest ion is well worth considera i"on.
to
tryimgo onofand
could
things that
Now,
such
matter
with Ione
to conclude
likeother
woulmany
but I are
a;)bo,sir, thtre
talk
partaulict tiat I would like to (all it to your attention and again say
that I have io particular remedy for it.
We live il tallies wheel it is possible fnd I lope never probable aild
if we take the nece.,,s;ary action in time i d with suflicient vigor it
would niot be probable, to have a surprise attack delivered on this
city which would wi)e ot, the entire (,overmnitent. I would not like
to go ihto this except in executive session, but I think you tire all weil
awlie fromi ylour several dlt jC in other parts of the Semlte alld from
your general lac(tlainilaice 115 Se1ators with all that. has beeni (liSCII.Su
1ow, that this is not an1inpossibility, though it is a Ibad dream.
Now lulder those conditions, is the act of successioli that we are flow
oliei ithg tinder adequate? Might it not, be tlie case that in order to
have no ambiguity about, the government, we shloul have not only the
Coutgress covered by it, because the Colngles might be in session, hot
only the Cabinet, covered by ,this act of succe.ssiomi, but some provision for State governors in Some forlml to get together and try to
choose one of their number, if there were nobody else available for
this? I think that this could be coverl by statute, because it is
within-I (to not know what your view would be, sir, but I should
think it would be covered by the Succession Act under article II, section 1, clause 6. It is a p~rovisioni which we would pray an(1 hope
would never of course occur, but in any such time of extreme disaster
and peril as that, if this Nation is to survive as a people, it, would be
important to have met any possible contingency in advance. '1o do
this helps to l)rvent temptation.
What is more important perhaps is to leave no loophole to a prospective enemy who thinks by a surprise blow at the heart of the Nation he could cripple us. This is something I think the SenateSenator LAXOER. The Senate has had a bill before it to take care
of that situation.
Mr. ELOvT. Good, sir. I an very relieved to hear it. I do not
know the bill and would not of course therefore express an opinion,
but it is very gratifying to me to know that in your deliberations you
have considered that also.
Mr. KFAVVER. Suppose for the record we print the bill in the appendix so that we can have reference to iL
(The bill S. J. Res. 8, 84th Cong., 1st sets., as passed the Senate is
printed on p. 241.)
22324--59---5
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Senator O'MfAHoNEY. Such a bill might normally go to the com-

mittee having jurisdiction over civil defense.

The Civil-Defense Act was written to prepare for defense against
just such a contingency, but it never included the destruction of the
Government.
Senator INoER. Oh, yes- it included the-destruction not only of
the President and Vice President but a majority of the Congress.
Senator O'MAfLoNr. That is right, it does.
Mr. SMrrHYz. Senator, do you have in mind the resolution which
the chairman of this subcommittee proposed in the last Congress, by
which State governors could have appointed Representatives in time
of emergency or disaster f
Senator LANOER. That is right. That is the bill.
Mr.. SMirIEY. That, sir, was the resolution of the chairman of this
subcommittee which was reported by the committee and passed by the
Senate in the last Congress.
Mr. E
mor. If that is the case, I am simply in ignorance of it
and. I hope that something of that sort will deserve the attention of
the Congress because it seems to me to be of great importance.
Senator DIRKSEN. Dr. Elliott, conceivably a majority could be
wiped out of both bodies and you could not do business without the
I
necessary quorum.
Mr. ELLIorr. Legally we would be in a very curious situation.
Senator DIRKSY.N. So if you had to wait on a special electionMr. Exmoarr. That is precisely the point. I did not think it necessary to develop that very much further because I was sure you
would recognize the importance of it.
Now one final and concluding remark, if I may, Mr. Chairman. I
have said in general that I support your resolution, which seems to
me to be quite carefully drawn, as against the other resolutions. However, I just saY that it seems to me there is nothing inherently illogical
in the following proposition.
I would favor eliminating the Vice President completely from this
business of determining the inability of the President or having
a voting part in it. That is not because the Vice President would
be "ambitious" or anything of that sort. On the contrary, I think
he might lean over backward against declaring the, President unable,
in order not to be accused of being ambitious. I do not refer to this
Vice President. I make no reference to that. His conscience and his
sense of national duty is, I think, as good as any man's that I know,
and sometimes a little better. But the point is that any Vice President might take this attitude, and if he did vote, he'would undoubtedly be traduced by people who w6uld say something about his
motives. Therefore, I wOuld think it would be 'useful not to expose
him to this kind of thing. This is a matter of course that you will
exercise, your own judgment on completely as you 'do on all other
matters. But I think in terms of just the impact on the opinion of
the country and the position of freeing the Vice President of any
leaning over backward on the one hand or of the accusation of
ambition on the other -it would be useful to oelimihatg him.
If that were done sir, as you cut down the number of the exectitive
departments, I really raise a questior about whether you need to' put
in the leaders of both Houses and so on, more than to sy that tis
committee should consult with them, you see, to get their views to
be sure that they have taken the temper of Congress in this thing,
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because to mix up voting in this way, this selected group of them is I
think unnecessary and egds to a certain amount of mixing of
eunctions, and would be much simpler if you would put it in in some form
of that kind.
Senator KFAU.vER. Senator Langer, do you wish to ask Dr. Elliott
some questions I
Senator LANGER. ;I have no questions.

Senator KPFAMER. SenatorDirksen?

Senator DIRKSEN. No; but I think Dr. Elliott has been a very good
witness this afternoon. I have just one observation to make. I quite
agree with your observations with respect to the Vice President,
because inherently he would be confronted with this old conflict-ofinterests idea.
Mr. ELLIOTrr. And he might lean over backward and he probably
would. That js the thing that frightens me about this. -He really
would not be willing to say the man was unable to perform the duties
of his office. He would the
ider himself of accusations of
self-interest and he m.glirJI- st do the wrF61g hing through trying to
a vo id it.
"ing
g,
Senator K,
vF.. I might at that point explaiq my thinking of
how the Vice resident is brougltH in the resolut b, Senate Joint
Resolution , 4, which I filed It as thi mention to 'ey the power
of the Vic President ,Ota
ove as it is now in the institution,
but also
have a i6ehod of estab 'shing committee to
ide upon
the inab' ity of the resident.
It pr vides that"Whe-4I
ce1
C
sident 'sk. for the evening
of The ommittee, or a maj
5- the em rs oA the comnttee ask
for thconvenin of the
nittee, the ,hfJustice should convene
them.
I th ught th t the
t-h fee1heat
shoId take
over, Iut becau ofthe\ hictanqLt, hey always have,
would
rather
iave
a
cor
mit-tee
.
•
y
d
M r. LLIOmTr. Xou 1-_.e dovere_0i/s,,b-u you do gve alternative a proach toit. Tha"
y ou have-i so that si:k members or hatever it is of tha rup-cotId act ipdepende tly of the
I
Vice Pre 'dent.
Senator IEFAUVER. You would mot eli i
the p
nt constitutional right f the ViceP sid
t take over, ho, er.
Mr. ELLuo * Oh, no; I do not eliminate that at 1, but I do not
think he should
his own judge of when the
sident is disabled.
That is tie point. I-Jtkes over in any Case.
Senator tANGER. Mr.
man.J...
to,ai
toexpress
my thanks to
Dr,Elliott'for his very fine presentation here.
Senator KEFAUJVER. Yes; we are all certainly very grateful to Dr.
Elliott who has given of his time to come to Washington by his own
means to inform this committee. It has certainly been a very excellent
dissertation and discussion that he has presented.
Senator DiRKsEN. Well,it is an urgent matter now.
Senator KEFAuvwR. No quet 0n about it.Senator DIRKsm;. And 'it is'a rather wonderful thlik that the
President is so oipletely uninhibitMd in discusstn' the matter. HO
is the very essence of candor and lays itall out in ill the dikussions
we, have had.; .
"
Mr. ELLoTr. May I make one observation on that,'"sirt A President might feel very reluctant to resign on his own initiative for
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(iliblity,'uiilet,-i li lind thl ljikiiig ot this kiiid of lindiig. l)()
youi se- what. I am talk Ing niboit ?
SMIntr O'AITON V' Yvlll i urely.
Mr. 1.oiv. )'oil know~ it, looks like quitling. Th'lis fill lit lx%11
1150O Of iltity. IM10110 i14It
iill'
li01it j~0tQ~ti~hi tui 010' 11111111.S 'P~i'
night will I lit1m,
olifilet ilk it Certain $t'1i84 tiit, filycolWCeiit i011.9 1111111
this (eelmioi
tako
"Shlil
isioin,
dec
of
ind101
tis
with
con~fronted
(Iliit " the 1first titlei ill lilstori t(lint. it i'IOomidlit, ever
up~on IW1,elf itiild
(lent. I'Vehi, if lie had
lot this N-residen1t alone, hut., a1lly 111V9
Wuit.
the protection of this kind of it method of determination, it. wodd
make, it, very muchf easier fot' huim to be guided by his real consience.
Sena1tor' (rMAHONEY. Mr. (11rluilmi, IIIRY- I SJ-1Y 1 11111111- WO~ Itre
li very mu11ch in twessed, ats 1 allways Iiiive b44e1, w~lieieer I liiivi 1111d1
beel atsti II IIthe tie opporititul It3' of listltilg 14o Ib.. MlliolI. It has1.
latiiig Statemnt W1nell he lit.-, iniukd anid 1 1111siure it will priovokei
thought oil till of o111 pailIs.
t did, however, wa to make, this Comuilteut. I waxs not hpel-side
by the doctor's Ilrgmlieut ibolt. the se parit ioll of powers. Wle tire
dealing hei'e with ile deteriiat ionl of Ii ie,dusaiiity of t~ns President.
It has nothing to (do wNith the legislative power' noaI. with tho excliltiuve
with 1huidinig thil
lowerli to enforce) the laws. We tire Coiweril'(4116 %Vjl
Ilet forkiml to deteriiiue whetherl or. not tilt Chlief l1"Neet ive is 1tiunide
to perform tile dui es of I hi' office. ''hnat is thle only (fulestil t hat
is here.
tlint are presented to yol tire of goilig ito)bodies
olternatives
"he 111V
soiiiehiow, So01l10wMAN' SelniI'lt('( froni tile people. IThe (CabiNvlicl.
people, llot elected. Thel
net. is appointed by the Presidlent, inot. byl tlit
Suprelle Court anid till the .1tistie". (if the Supreme Court tire iippointed by the lProsi(Ient amnd conmllrined by t(lie Senate. The Presidemit
mnd the Vice Presidenit, its I hav,%e auuiiah id~4(, alre tile only otficer.,
of thie peotllo, 1111(thle SIggestioni 4f having
who are elcited1 by till
Coilgress make thi's deteriii on is bawed ii p0m thle adumiil filet, tlhnt
the congress is tile only existing b)ody wie 1comiei with authority
from the peog)IQ.

tutW
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i~i(

the executive power nor doei it touch tile legislattivo power. rLhe conmstituition left a gal). There, wats no method lproNide for determining
whether or not a disability actually existed, and I still feel that thle
method suggested in S. J1 Res. 141 is the better method.
As a matter of fact, I would tmy that leaving tue power, or-vesting
the power, of determining the disability of the President or- the
Acting President in the hands of the Clibiet or in the hands of a
people.
would itself be a violation of the powers of the
political
even be a violation of the doctrine of the separation of
,t nightparty

Powers.

Now let me say just another word with respect to the comment that
Dr. Elliott made on President Truman's suggestion. I agree with
him.
One must. remember in considering this matter that when the Collstitutional Convention created the office of Vice President, they were
singularly at a loss to know what to give him to do.
Mr. Euar That is right.
Senator O'MAHIONEY. And finally they decided that hie would preside over the Senate.
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Mr. Eltnrr. 'l'it iN4Ight,.
e11to' O'WAIoNY.

to i11
tlot1, WORMI1S

to bo 0on(lu04VO OVyildnco

that t1y wore creating an office which should assume temporarily
the dhilies of tile Chief Execultive wlhen aly of thesA contingencies
aro.,e, in an timing capacity. I do not, feel that it in nece.wry for
us to provide for the election of another Vice President by the electoral collvgo which has already Ibeen roblbwd of practically all of its
14&,ectilug powers.

SOliator lKvrA, vinj. 1)o 'Ou wish to make some fuirlher comment$?
Mr. EWyxy'r. I woid like to, miko ft very shot coinifent on that,
becalise it is w0 imporlitnt, an observation.
In tho first. place, taking u) the hlst one first, it. seenus to ie tht
tho health of the ie President is normally nssmnrd to be better
Ihan that of the I'esidont, but, there 44 no guaranty of this whatever.
Senator ()'MaI1ONEYr. NOne WhatOVer.
Mr. ELLIrrr,

There might, be a disability of the Vice President

without, anybody to step into bill sh(e, yoll eei, and I would like

never to leave that, gap, tht is all. I think iPresident 'I'r man, conFAiols of this things, hi1s, it,seeiuis to me, madh a nuost useful suggestion
about it, which I wold like to leave there.
Senator KEICFAUVER. While you are on that subject, about having
a second Vice President when the Vice President takes over tl,
powers anid tiles of the President, 1'remident Truman suggests the
reconvening of the electoral college which yol think is as good plan
as has been suggested although yoll ae1.ulot satisfied with it. flow
about the Plresident or the Acting President proposing, nominating a

Vice President to be ratified eit her by the Senate or b~y the electoral
college.
Mr. E'LT.10 1r. I did suggest that, sir, .us a hasty thought on my part.,
but I have not thought it out. enough to be at all confident about it.
If they turned him town, is I suggested, then he would be in a rather
curious position. You would have another stalemate. Maybe the
President would have to come to an accommodation with them and
work out somebody they could agree on. I would myself either lean
to that, but I do not. want to rule out. President ''ru nan's ideas.
The reason I do not want to rule out the use of the last electoral
college rests )recisely on the point that Senator O'Mahoney raised
about my first suggestion: The electorate that elected first the Hfouse
of Representatives and then the Senate of the United States both
houses, may not be at all the same electorate that elected the President of the United States. The difference of votes between the two
parties in Congress and for the Presidency in terms of partisanship
might be quite different even in a presidential election year. You

are dealing with the parties in Congress just as much as in the executive department and perhaps more so. I personally would like a 4year term for the House and 8 for the Senate. Actually, the people
whon the President appoints to his official family for these high
offices are, in some sense the inheritors of his policies more than anybody else could be, an(i they represent that Presidential mandate from
the Nation at large, though indirectly, in a way that I dare say is at
least the equal of anything that. you would find in the reflection of a
Congress elected quiie often on local issues, Smenator.
Senator O'MNoxrv.. Oh, I think that is a very sound theory.
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Mr. ELLIT. No,. Senator. It is a fact that this Nation was deprived of your services on what I regard as one of the most unfortunate local issues that I can think of-wool-and I'm a woolgrower
myself-but I don't vote lust on wool.
Senator O'MA)o.NEYN.
Jonot disarm me.
ir. ELLIorr, There was a case manifestly where something local
supervened over national interest.
Senator O'MAIONEY. There are occasions, may I say, when the
President runs ahead of his party and I have known other occasions
when the Congress has run ahead of the candidate for President.
Mr. ELLIOrr. That is true.
Senator O'MAIONny. There have been some such cases.
Mr. Ei.Liorr. That is all I am saying, that in a sense there is a
slightly different mandate on a nationwide basis, and it seems to me
that that should be borne in mind when you consider this, but I am
sure, sir,'this question will be debated with all your vigor and usual
persuasiveness on the floor of the Senate.
Senator KFAUVr.R. I do want to again express our very deep
appreciation to you, Dr. Elliott. You have made an outstading
contribution to this subject. We thank you, Senator O'Mahoney, for
leading off with your excellent statement.
Senator O'MAhoNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. in., the subcommittee adjourned.)
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UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
TiEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
OF THE Co I

Washington, D. 0.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10: 15 p. in., in room
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Estes Kefauver (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Kefauver.
Also present: Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania; Wayne H.
Smithey, member, professional staff.
Senator KEFAUVER. The committee will come to order. Our first
witness this morning is Judge Musmanno, distinguished member of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
We are delighted to have Senator Clark from Pennsylvania who is
here to introduce and present Judge Musmanno. We will be glad
to have any words from you Senator-Clark.
Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
courtesy in permitting me to appear before your subcommittee this
morning to introduce formallyto you a gentleman whom I am sure
you have heard many thin about. That is the distinguished Justice
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Michael A. Musmanno.
Judge Mlusmanno has lad a long active, full, and varied career. He
first, I imagine, caine into national prominence many years ago when
he was counsel for the defense at the Zacco-Vanzetti trial in Boston,
endeavoring to protect the civil rights and civil liberties of those two
unfortunates.
Since then lie has had a distinguished career at the bar and in the
Navy during World War II.
He has been serving with distinction on the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania for the last several years where his industrious research
and his keen interest in the liberalization of the law of our Commonwealth has made its mark.
With respect to the subject matter before your committee the question of legislation or a constitutional amendment to roviae for the
case of Presidential disability, a matter which is of theeenest interest
to the entire country, Justice Musmanno has given very grave and
careful thought, brought to bear upon the fine powers of his active
mind and I have no doubt that the suggestions which he is prepared
to make to your subcommittee will be a very realbenefit in the solution
of this most difficult problem, which I think all Americans must hope
can be solved in a satisfactory manner at the earliest possible moment.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.
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Senator KEFAuKit. Thank you very much, Senator Clark. Tie fact
that you would come here and speak so highly of Judge Musinanno is
a great recommelat ion to him.
Of course
1 we know of your active participation in the judiciary of
Pennsylvania for many years, Senator Clark.
We would be glAd lf$ou would sit, with tho Cobnnittee this morning
and join in any questioning that you care to.
Senator C.ARK Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I have
another committee meeting to which I must go, and q want to thank
come here.
you again for permitting m6 t'o
Mr. MUsMAINo. Thank you very much, Senator Clark.
Senator KXVA1UVR.' ,Tl[(kO Musmnno, Senator (lark and also Senator Edward Martin Senator Clark's colleague from Pennsylvania,
have both suggested that you would be able to enlighten the committee
ontids iml)ortant. problem. Senator Martin would also be here except
that he isl being given an examination by a physician todaYhis regular
checkup. Ile asked me to explain to you' thnt, ha was glad to foin with

Senator Clark in pIrsenting you to t eonniittee and in feeling that

you would have a contribution to make.
I read in the Now York Times, Supday, of a new book that you
have written, Judge Musnanno, of your experiences as a lawyer over
r4 riod of mary nany years. It sounds like aii interesting hook. I
think you are entitled to a plug for your book this mormng.
svraNNo. I want, to asure you it was entirely coincidental
Mr.M
that thatreview appeared on the eve of my appearance here before
I 1
:. I
the committee.
,fusmnnno, will you
Justice
well,
Mr.
.
Very,
KY.vAUVE
Senator
41..
pr~d
a prepared statement, The full statement will reprinted
Mroll*

1?0

any of it y:ou do not read, or if'you want to sumso'that
ifi
the record
marize,
the entire
Statement
will appear as presented.

STATEMENT 01F PENINSYLIVANIA SUPOM~E COURT $USTJOE
MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO
Mr' MsMoANN. I shall be pleased if you care to put any questions,
as I proceedI with my exposition of what I regard to be a workable
Plan to solve the problem which has plagued oul country for 168 years,
.as to what should be done in the event of a Presideiitlal disability.
Mr. Chairman, every 4 yetirs the Peopte of the United States elect
a President and a Vice President, The Vice Presidest mist answer
to precisely the same qualifications required of the Pre~ident, But
once the Vice President takes office he becomes a stranger to the
President's office for whichlihe i§ fully qualified, while the back of
the 'man who is P resident sags under h weight of the burdens incrasingly piled up6i it.
No one with the meagerest cognizance of public affairs can fail to
,per'.ivethat it is'physically impossible for any one man to discharge
all the duties which now devolve Upon the President of the United
States in response to the dictates of the Conitjtution and because
the imperHous demands of daily recurring national crises.
Since 'the Government must, of "Course, continue to function, regardless of limitations of flesh and bone, the'President'is compelled
to tuni to some one or more other persons to discharge executive pow-
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ere and duties, lest Government collapse. Thus, the President depends
on an assistant to the President, sometimes referred to as the "Assistant President," ail office which (oes not exist in the Constitution.
It may fairly be assume(], without intending any disrespect, that, in
loyally and conscientiously assisting tile President, the "Assistant
President" doe some things which constitutionally must be (lone by
the President himself.
I make no observation on how he does these things. Ile probably
does them well, but he has no authority to do them at all. Not only
does he have no authority to exercise Presidential power but the
people have never passed on his qualifications to do what the President alone is supposed to do.
In the meantime a man who possesses the constitutional and occupational fitness to be lPresident, which fitness has been considered
and approved by the people, stands by idly and impotently. Is it
not the acme of absurdity that the Vice President, with all his proved
capacity to assist the President, must emplo all his time as a timekeeper of debates in a legislative body of which he is not a member
and where he call neither speak nor vote-except in a tie, a rarity so
oxceptional as practically to be nonexistent? And is it not even
more absurd that when that legislative body adjourns, the Vice President has no duties at all, except to keep healthy so as to take over in
the event the President dies or resigns, tle latter of which no President hiag ever done yet?
In no other sphere of activity-military, civil, commercial, industrial, or fraternal is a substitute chief officer held in idleness until
the moment he is to become chief himself,
The vice commander of an army, division, or regiment has duties
which are indispensable to the success of the military entgrpnse.
le renders continuous and unceasing assistance to:his uprior
and is so intimately associated with what his chief is d6ing that in
the event of an emergency' he assmnes command without' a break in
the continuity of operation.
.
:
The executive officer of a ship has duties of an extremely important
character, aside from taking over the command of the vesselin the
event the command devolves upon him.
The vice president of an industrial corporation is not kept'hidden
away from the ofice and he plants of the company until lie is summoned to head the business" of which he has been kept in complete
ignorance. He works by the side of the president ofthe railroad or
steel company or the automobile firm at all times, and he is qualified
at every and any moment to undertake with up-to-date competence,
the responsibilities of the president, should it bec&ne necessary to
do so..

President Eisenhower is tleqnlv president who, hiile not utilizing the capacities of the Vice Piesident to discharge Presidential
functions (since lie may not do sO constittutionally),has at least allowed the Vice President to be kept minutely and intimately informed
on the problkims confronting the lhite House, and therefore, 'the
people of the United States. It is nothing short of shocking to learn
from former President Truiman's memoirs that' before lie became
President he was denied even the slightest knowledge' on the atom
bomb. It was not until the day after he had been sworn in as President and had had his first Cabinet meeting that he learned 'of the
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most, destructive weapon in tile 'world, and learned further that. he
was the person who was to decide if and whea to use it.
Under the constitutional amendment which I offer, (ongess will
supply tle niehinery to determine whether the President. at any given
moment is physically capable of standing on the bridge 11d giving
the orders wiueh will carry the vessel of tile well-being of the merican people t1trough the storm which may threaten our security and
even slyival.
If, because of illness, tile Pretiident lacks the strength lid kehless
of perception needed to gliide the ship through heavy seas and foul
weather, a 91uitabh toniss-&ionl will so declare,, and direct the Vice
President to take tie helim.
We could be coifonted with such a situation tomorrow, a year, or
a decade from now. And no one realizes that. possibility more than
President Eiseilhower. lie has expressed'himself emphatically on the
subject.
Seeral plans 'lave already been discussed in this connection, bit
I am constrained to say, with all respect ab'd courtesy to tie authors
of the various plans,, that in my option tile), are not feasible either
because they lack working practicability or because'they encounter
constitiltional barriers.
Thus, one plan recoinnends that the Preident's Cabinet decide if
and wheii the President should resi Inif disabled. Since tie Cabinet
is made up entirely of Presidentia appointees, one cannot dismiss
the thought that their judgment anid decision could well be influenced
bypersonal considerations.
Another plan proposes that Congress enact legislation which would
permit tile Vice President himself to decide When lie should assume
office.
the
President's
' This
plan I respectfully
submit, is unworthy of Consideration. No
peoen should Ihve it inlhiS own exclusive power to elevate himself
to a higher office in a representative republic.
A Vice Presi(lent who would crown himself in such a fashion would
quickly find the crown tarnishing under the people's appraisement of
an act which could be interpreted as selfish, egotistic, and unworthily
ambitious.
,Moreover, there have not been lacking examples in our history where
the President and Vice President were of divergent political views
even though belonging to the Came political party, and there have been
painful occasions where the Chief Executive and the Vice President
were personally hostile to each other.
One suggested.bill provides that a commission representing the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government determine Presidential inability.
Senator Kv.F.wvEn. What bill is that we are talking about here?
Mr. M .TS3ANNo.Mr. CIairman, I (lid not endeavor to particularize
the individual bills because I did not want to be seemingly criticizing
the-wisdom of any particular Congressman or Senator, but I have read
all tle bills on the subject which I have been able to obtain, and from
all of them I have gathered what the various plans are, and I am indicating that none of those plans in my respectful opinion meets the
needs of the sitiat ion.
Senator KEFU'%VR. Yes. Very well, Judge, I understand. There
are several bills which would bring in the legislative, executive, and
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judicitd branches and I did not know if you had reference to any
particular one or not, but. you have satisfactorily'explained your attitilde.
Ir. MI'sitm, xo. Very well.
(lDi-usion off the iecold.)
senator ICEr'AUVn. All right, sit, will you proceed?
Mr. MUStAWNo. With regard to tie sutgestion that, tie chairman
just made, might, I respectflly interpolate here that the ratification
of a constitutional amendinitt does not take as long as is generally
supposed. David Lawrence, in an article which he wrote recently
on this subject, reminded us that the 21st amendment repealing tie
18th amendment was ratified in 10 months after submission.
Tihe 17th amendment, providing forl the popular election of Senators was ratified in 13 months.
The 19th amendment, which of course as we know granted women
suffrage. was ratified in 14 months, and the 20th amendment was
ratified 11 months following sbiunssion by, Congress...
.
I really believe, Mr. Chairman, and I am sanguine in this'hope, that
if Congress would adopt a constitutional amendment on this subject
quickly that we could still have a ratification of the amendment by the
Old of this year,
Before our brief discussion on constitutional amendments, I. was
referring to time bill which )rovides for a commission representing
the executive, legislative, and judiial branches of the Government.
While tie plan involved in that proposed legislation might meet
constitutional requirements it still would not satisfy, because twothirds of tile Commission woulh be made up of persons not elected
by the people and, to that, extent, the plan. would deny the people
an authoritative voice in the selection of their President.
Another serious objection to this indicated plan is that since tie
Supreme Court might be called upon to evaluate its constitutionality,
tile Chief Justice and the senior Associate-Justice who are declared to
be members of that proposeA Commission would be disqualified from
considering the case, thereby depriving the country of a full judicial
.I
review at the time it.would be most needed.
Tie Chief Justice of the United States has already informed Congress that the entire membership of the Supreme Court is opposed to
such a plan. Of course, tile Court's wishes should be respected.
Still another plan declares that the President. should voluntarily
resign if disabled, and if lie refuses to resign, impeachment proceedrngs could be initiated to compel him to do so.
T'1his would be a most sorry solution of the problem. It.wrold
make of a President's unfortunate illness the matter of a "state trial"
with all tile agonies which go with it, not only to the principals involved, but to the Nation itself.
Tihe only logical govermnental body to decide Presidential inability
isCongress wich is responsible directly to the people.
Under the constitutional amendment propose, Congress would, as
I have stated, provide tme machinery for determining-Presidential
inability. I am sure thlt Congress can and will work out a suitable
plan to meet every contingency.
I personally would recommend that Congress enact. a law resolving
the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and house into a permanent
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Presidential Inability Commission. '[he membership of such a Commission would be large enough and representative enough to speak
for all parties, all geographical sections of the country, and all current points of view.
At the same time, it would be small enough to meet and act quickly.
The chairmen of the committees would be empowered to call a joint
meeting of the committees at any time, whether Congress be or not
be in session.
The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee would preside
over the Commission. This Commission, made up, as it would be,
of persons elected by the people and commanding the respect of the
entire country, would be entrusted with the delicate and grave task
of determining whether a President because of inability to discharge his powers and duties, should be displaced by the Vice
President.
Tn the event the Commission found the President unable to attend
to the responsibilities of the Presidential office, the Vice President
would become President for the period of the President's disability.
When the President would have recovered his health or in any way
have overcome his inability to act, the Commission would restore himi
to office and the elevated Vice President would revert back to his
original office.
A two-thirds vote of the Commission would be required to declare
the President unable to dicharge the powers and duties of his office,
and "asimilar vote would be needed to restore him to office, once the
disability ceased.
Circumstances could combine to prevent the President from fulfilling the duties of his office for reasons other than ill health. Now
that our Presidents fly long distances over oceans, deserts, and mountains a President's plane could be lost, so that days, even weeks, could
pass With no news as to whether lie hadsurvived.
'A President could conceivably becomecaptive of circumstances or
hostile forces. These things could happen when momentous questions could be demanding immediate answers. In such situations
where the President would'be unable to perform his duties, even
though presumably healthy, the Conimnision would be em powered to
direct the Vice Pirsident to become President until the President's
inability would lav' been removed.
But even Imore important than the matter of succession to the
Presidency is the need to ease the burdens of the President to the
end that there will be less chance of his becoming physically incapacitated while iti office. No President can possibly do all the things
which the Constitution of 1787 requires of him in the setting of 1958.
He cannotsign all the documents le is supposed to sign, lie cannot
read all the reports submitted to him to read, he cannot meet and
talk to all the people which in the full discharge of his functions it
would be expected he should meet. Ie cannot handle all the details
of recommendations for legislation, he cannot go into the minutiae
of the entire Military Establishment; lie cannot supervise the whole
diplomatic corps. He cannot review all the criminal convictions
under Federal statutes to determine whether he should exercise the
Presidential pardoning power.
The President of 1958 inust attend to matters which could not, even
have been imagined in George Washington's and John Adams' days.
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The President of today is studying problems provoked by sputnik,
lie must be schooled in missiles, satellites, aind rockets, lie must confer
with scientists, he must consider a revamping of our educational systei with emphasis on the science of survival.
He must study the globe and conc'n himself with what is happening in all the *European countries, in the Middle East, Far East,
Africa and wlherever else the Soviet threat of world domination rears
its pytion head to strike at our lifelines.
lie must study the budget and the tax rate. le must worry over
charts depicting trends in our national economy, lie nust keel) his
finger on the pulse of NAIO and our ever-growing number of alliances. Ile niust preside over Cabinet meetings.
lie must appoint judges and promote Army and Navy personnel.
lie must consider foreign aid amd reciprocal' trade agreements. lie
must ponder questions involving enforcement of court decrees and
the possibility of calling out the National Guard in domestic turbulences.
As head of apolitical party he must meet with party leaders and
map out political policy and program in various parts of the Nation.
Ever since Suez, scarcely a day has passed that some crisis has not
snarled the President's desk. He must watch the United Nations on
its ever-revolving carousel and international alinements and realinements.
There are national security meetings to attend and advise. There
is royalty to receive and entertain. He must give news conferences
where lie is placed under cross-examination which requires him to answer questions and elucidate on every phase of our complex Government, complicated foreign affairs, and technological advances in aircraft, satellites, and intercontinental missiles.
He must appear on television where he must be reassuring to a nation
of eager people seeking light and guidance, and in preparing'for the
performance he must keep in mind the triple role of a wise statesman,
a spiritual counselor, aid a charming actor.
Senator KEFAUVER. Judge, that is one of the best descriptions of the
duties of a President I have ever seen. It is-very vividly given.
Mr. MUSMANo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman
While the President is doing all these things, necessarily breaking
many of the rules of good health in exerting himself beyond the suburbs of endurance, the Vice President stands by' like a man at the
edge of a frozen lake witha rope in his iand which lie is forbidden
to throw to the skater who has broken through the ice.
Under the plan I reconimend-, the Vice President not only throws the
rope but he hastens to the rescue in a durable launch which will take
aboard all other national safeguards struggling in the cold waters of
I
indecision and delay.
If this constittuional amendment is'adopted' Congress would of
course provide for a! e)arate establislimeht for the Vice President.
He would have hig own staff and le would have his own mansion.
Naturally he would no longer preside over the Senate where he is at
present a robot who makes no decisions'aiid a metronome which controls no tempo or rhythm. I provide that the Senate shall elect its own
president as well as president ro tempoi'e, The Vice President would
thus dedicate all his time to the executive'branch of the Government,
to which he belongs and of which he is an inalienablbe integral part.
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Foreseeing possible criticisms that this lan might somehow ITduce the supL'eme power of the Peident and his responsibility to the
Nation, let me say at once that while the Vice President would work
closely with the President, exercising such Prisdlential powers as

are delegated to him, he would alwaysbe subordinate to the President.
There is no possibility whatsoever that by adding dignity and authority
to the Vice President's office, this would effect a lessening of accounitability in the Office of the Chief Executive.

National responsibility must always reinain In 0110 l)erslon, the
President, and by all owing him to decide which J)ow0eV8 11e will delegate for long or short, periods, our Govornent will have, as it, must
have, executive leadership in a single man.

our Nation.

lie will be the leader of

Illis task will always be the dedicated one of guiding the destinies of
the American people ever toward the fulfillment of the ideals of the
founders of our republic and the dreams, hopes and aspirations of
the American peoh)le.
In view of the fact that President Eisenhower has now suffered
three serious illnesses while in the White House, it has been suggested that if lie should again be incal acitated, lie should resign and
make Richard Ni.on Acting President until such tine as the President should feel he had fully recovered from his illness.
This plan was suggested at, the time President Garfield lay rostratee
from an aassin's bIllet.

(Garfleld's friends and supporters, however, refused to make the
recommendation because they feared that once Chester Arthur assumed the President's office lie would be installed permanently, and
Garfield, if lie should recover, could never again regain office, except,
of course, in a succeeding liatioval election. The same situation Iprevailed during the period of President Wilson's illness.
, As of the present moment time President could not even constitutionally delegate his power to sigp important documents in the event
some accident disabled his writing hand. When President Eisenhower underwent surgery at the Walter Reed Iospital for iloitis, lie
was under anesthesia, according to a signed article in tie Washington

Post February 2, for 4 hotrs. It, is frightening to contemplate that
if during this period the United States had suffered an atomic or

missile attack, there would have been no Commander in Chief to

coordinate defense, counterattack, and civilian evacuation. He did
ready United States defense forces for emergency before taking the
anesthesia.
In these days that large areas of the country could be wiped off the
face of the earth in a matter of hours, even minutes it is not necessary to point out how vital it is that we have at all times a CoinChief
ready to respond to any emergency.
Imander
Underinthe
plan
I recommend, the President, before entering the
hospital would only need to delegate his full powers to the Vice
President for the period of the operation, and the whole country could
be assured that in the event of an attack, we would not find our great
engine of defense immobilized because of . the lack of an engineer
to pull the levers.
Where the Vice President becomes President because of the death,
resignation, or removal of the President, or where the President's
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illness is ascertained to be one which will endure for some 6 months
or more, the Vice President, who will have become President, will
himself need assistance even as the President needed it.
It musLt be kept in mind that in three instances the Vice president
succeeded to the Presidency only 1 month after the President had
begin his term of office.

PWrsident Tyler served 3 years and 11 iionths of IHarrison's term;
Andrew Johnson served 3 years and It months of Lincoln's term;
Iarry Truman served 31years and 11 months of Franklin D. iloosevolt's fourth term.
Iu the other four cases where Vice Presidents became President,
their incumbencies were not of short duration. Chester A. Arthur
served out 8 years and 0 nonth3 of Garfield's term 'Theodore Roosevelt, served out 3 years and 0 months of McKinley's second term.
Filliore and Coolidge serve(], respectively, 2 years and 8 months and
2 years and 7 months of their l)redece.msors' terms.
So much, Mr. Chairman, did these Vice Presidents in some instances believe that they were serving out their own terms of the
Presidential office that in the cases of Theodore Roosevelt and Calvin
Coolidge, they both declared that the first terms which they served,
because of accession to the Presidency, constituted the first term of an
enumeration of first and second terms in order to determine whether
they should be a candidate for a third term.
flecause of the possibility, as exemplified by the above historical
facts, that a Vice President may become President for practically
the entire term of the deceased or removed President, I have introduced in my plan something entirely new in our governmental scheme.
If, for the purpose of conserving the President's health and allowing him to concentrate on the immediate momentous problems
of his Office, lie needs a Vice President who will take over some of
the burdens of the President's Office, it naturally follows that when
the Vice P'resident assumes the office of the President in his own name,
he will need, as the President needed, a Vice President to assist him.
I have thus provided that when the Vice President becomes President Congress shall elect a Second ViePresident who shall perform
all the powers and duties of the Vice President during the time the
Vice President holds the office of President.
The Second Vice President will be chosen from not less than three
persons qualified under the Constitution for the Presidency and recommended by the national committee of the political party of which
the President is a member.
If the Vice President assumes the office of President only temlorarily and the President resumes his office, the original Vice President reverts back to his Vice President's status and the office of the
specially chosen Second Vice President, if it has been created, shall
cease to exist.
Congress will undoubtedly provide for other features in the inplementation of this constitutional amendment.
We can entertain the hope that even after setting up machinery
for Presidential succession based on a President's inability to perform
his duties, the Nation will never have to witness a transfer of the
President's office in the midocean of crises, domestic or foreign.
But, so long ps.human flesh remains something less formidable than
stone and steel,'this uossibilitv always hovers within the reahn of po-
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tential reality and the time to take aboard an additional pilot,isnot
when the ship is headed for annihilating 'ocks, but before the perilous
passage is begun.
In any event there can be no question that the Presi(lent's burdells
have pyrainided until no human Atils cal carry them without hazarding his health and the welfare of tle Nation. In these crucial days,
and more crucial days to come, we can take no chance on a Pres idential stumble which could conceivably send our well-being, security, and oven survival over the abyss of complete ruin.
We1do not need, nor do we want, in the White House, a Hercules of
muscles and brawn, but we do want and can have a ]ivsident who
will exercise at all times the genius of leademhip the courage of
initiative, and tile (lynamc drive of concentrated edort, but we must

supply him with an armored knight who will hold off and strike
down the ever-pre.slug foes of distraction, detail, and( delay, while
the President leads us on to ever greater heights of peace, security,
prosperity, and human ha plpiness.
Senator Kv.FAuvtR. Judge Musmanno, you have livsentedia very
thoughtful and challenging statement, and one containing not only
a suggested solution to the iurnediate problem that. we are considering, defining the inability and the removal of the inability of
the President, but several other problems with which many o'f us
have beqn interested and concerned for a long, long time, and which
have been discussed by students of the Constitution and political sientists throughout the years.
It is quite apparent that you have given this matter a great, deal
of careful thought. We appreciate your preparation of this paper
and your appearance here.
Now if you will, sir, let us read your proposed amendment section
by section and perhaps we can discuss it as we go along.
Mr. MUSMANNO. Yes,lMr. Chairman.
S.9rion 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United

States of America who may delegate. Inwriting. such powers and tiess as i
hls discretion he shall deem appropriate, to the VMce Presilent whose exercise
of such delegated powers and duties shall have the same legal effect nasIt performed by the President.

Senator KF.FAUVuR. Now sir, I suppose that that would apply
especially to a President who is going out of the country or who may
be undergoing an operation or who, in the normal course of things,
would want to delegate certain responsibilities and powers to the
Vice President.
It would not apply to delegations during a period of inability, is
that correct?
Mr. MUSMANi o. That is true, Mr. Chairman. This is a voluntary
act on the part of the President to relieve himself of an onerous duty
or chore when more pressing problems are demanding his undivided
attention.
Senator KFA%
V.R. And the power to delegate would automatically
carry with it the pbWeir to take back?
MNr. MUsMAN-No. That is trite.
He could delegate a particular' responsibility, he could delegate the
powers of a particular department indefinitely or lie could delegate
certain powers or all his powers for a certain limited period of time
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indicated in the document of delegation, and he may also, after having
delegated powers unconditionally and indefinitely later recall those
powers by another writing.
Senator K(vIyAuVwEH. Very well, I think that is clear.
Now lot's go on to section 2.
Mr. MUSMANNO (reading)
S":v. 2. In case of the removal of fie Pre8ldent froin

oflive, or of his death,
resignation, or Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of
President, the Vice 'resident shall become Presldent.

Mr. Chairman, you may note there that I have altered slightly the
language of the Constitution which states in that respect (article II,
section 1, plragrapl 6) :
In case of ftie reioinvil of the President from oftlce or of his death, resigination, or Iillity to ilschirge the powers an( duties of the said office, the same
shill devolve on the Vice I'resilent.

Constitutional authorities have argued at great length and for a
long time on whether this provision of the Constitution means that
theV ice President shall discharge the powers and duties of the office
and therefore only become, in a manner of speaking, an Acting President, or whether lie takes over the office cornletely.

T1hie first. time that this question came beforetIeconr vsw n
Harrison died. A large body of opinion at that timo was to the
erect that ryier would Aucceed only to the powers and duties he
would be only all Acting president, and would not become President.
Tyler apparently was of that belief himself, because when lie first
took the oath, lie referred to himself as Acting President, but 2 days
later lie seems to have reconsidered his position and lie then declared
himself President of the United States. And all other Vice Pivsidents who have since become President. because of the death of their
lnredecessors have followed that precedent. But there still remains
some doubt as to whether because of the construction of that long
p.aragraph there may not be the interpretation that the Vice President only succeeds to the authority to discharge the powers and duties
of the Presidefitial office rather than to the office itself.
I have endeavored to remove all ambiguity by'saying that the Vice
President, in the event of the death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office, shall become President and
actually be the President.
Senator I(:v.wuvmr. Judge Musnianno I follow your logic and agree
with it as to the first two contingencies, tfatis the death or resignation,
but I wonder if where you make the Vice President the President in
case of inability, whether you are not getting into trouble in the event
that inability is removed.
Mr. MUSMA\' -No. I do not belir- j I am, Mr. Chairman, and I anticipated that possible obser Vation.
I use throughout my exposition and in this proposed amendment the
phraseology tiat the Vic'e Pivsident shall become President during that
period he is actually holding the Presidential office. I do not have
him an acting President, or a' temporary President.
I do not think' that when the Vice President, actually is exerting the
powers of the President that there should be any limitation on his
powers. specially if lie is representing us overseas or is dealing
with other nations should there be the thought that somehow or other
22324-58--0
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h6s actions tit-tt not. itiud 11tloy still llIet the approval of tle lVSiI believe thalt. during thie tulle, theo 'it-e Pi 8i(hllnt occuijpies tile
l11wieitial chair, wvhetbier it ho for tile lehnftlder of tile (01-111 of it
dend l'residleit. or whether it, be only for tho mitttei' of 6 iveeks wlifle
the Prckidllt is itniterIgol lug till o1)e1lt( loll 1111d1
conilleweiuee, thle Alive
1lli,oidet.shloul be aictinailys IIle I resideiit.
Of Course, Ur. ('1111i 1-1116, this ent ire cost itutiojnal antien(Idient, is
linitary. It, mu11st ho considler'ed ill till its Vill'10115 integraul pl~s.
''
1
i.'tto IKo restritedC to one0 pflrtietlllirrlual i(t'1Iillg
julst. whtt is te sj ucilie purp"Oe of that. (1cegation of imower, and L
tinik that, by (lt) inhe we pet to tile end of tile reading of thuis Whole
proposed llll(hlllt,
it will lbecolle iuite 11 fleiti t there 81hall be 110
questions about. (lie iit~ of it (1isalble Presidelut. to re('O~el his ofikce
otice hI& inability 11118 bell removed.
Senator IC~'Aivmll. All right, sir, then renud thle next paragraphl of
(lt.

sectiout 2.

11r. MNuSMANNO. Yes.

When theo Vice President thereupon becomes President for n
interval in excess of 0 nionths, Congress shall determine whether or not
11Second Alice P~resident shall be elected to lpelforin all the p)O1Vrl
anid ditties of the Vice President for thle period thie Vice P1reskdent,
shall be President.
Obl'iousl', if tie Vice Presidentbecomnes President onix for atiintter
of days or w-eeks, we wold not, wanht. to creatte thle office of Sec'ond~
Vice President.
Thle Second Vice Presidenit. shall be electedl by Coigress from not
les than three persons duly qilalifled under tlie Constitutin and
1'ecolllnime(i(d for' election by tile national Commilittee of thle political
part-y of which the President is ai memlber~.
Senator hKrw~uvri1. Judge,'Q in. thle election, of th new Vice President
or the Seconid Vice PreRidenlt by tile congress, I know it is not wellI
inl a proposed constitutional amiendmnent to (develop or to set forth
details, but. how dlid you have in mind Congress electing a Second
Vice President, that is by joint session or ill what mannerI
.1r.Nfvt.%-xNo. Ili ad in, mlinid, MNr. Chiairmann,'tile action 'of Collgwt.as Conigrs acts generally, by a iliajority vote of bothi houses,
just as any bill would! be enlacted. And ill view of tile facet that thle
lxv-ssible candidate for such. ail office could1( only come f roin the part.)
of which the President is himself it member, it. could not happen. tinlt.
because the majority of Congress'would be of a party opposite to that
of which the President is it member, that the Vice President would
then, be of it party opposite to the party of which thle President is a
member.
Senator KEFAUIER. Would you have in mind the Senate acting onl it
separately from the House or would you have in mind a joint session
with everybody having one vote.
Mr. MusirAw.-o. I lad not worked out that detail. I would at first
blush assume that each House would vote separately just as legislattion
is voted on. I doilot know that the House, and Senate ever join ill
one joint session for the purpose of enact ing legislation.
However, in working out the machinery, whatever might seem wise
woid of course still come within the framework of this amendment as
I have now drafted it,.
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Sotntor Krv,%tvrn. Your language there would, in your opinion, be
intcl'preted thenl to Illenn in such manner as the Congress inny decide?
Mr. MUvMANNO. Yes, that is correct, mid I (1o have a provision at
the end of the ainMdinent to that effect.
Senator KVAMUVV. All right, sir, let's go to section 3.
Mr. MUNMANNO (reading):

Sr.c. 3. In 'the event ti I'remhlenIt Imrmalile to (imclarge the powers and duties

of the offmee of I'resident for any reason, the Vice President shall become P1resident and continue in said office until the J'resldent whom he has replaced is able

to perform the powers And duties of President.
Thereupon, the Vice President haill resume the ix)wers and dulles of the office
of Vice President and the office of Becond Vice Presidetit shall cease to exist.

I think that. this language would carry with it the modifleation of
what minh1 seeming to be (idactic languageoin the first paragraph of sec.
tion 2, tiat the Vice President actually beconies the. President during
inability of the 'resident. And then you will notice that I add here
specifically:
Congress shall by legislate ion provide the manner of determining the
inability of the president, for any reason, to discharge the powers and
duties of tfie office of President and when such inallility has ended.
In my exposition, I have recommended a Presidential Inability
(1ommision inade up of the House and Senate Judiciary Committee;.
T'ho Congre s might desire to adopt some other method in which to
v.solve tIs )robleni, and of course it, would have that complete
authority under this amendment as now drafted.
Senator KPVAUVR. I would like to ask 'ou a question or two about
section 3, but let's go back to section 2 for just a minute.
I know that in determining to have the Second Vice President
elected by the Congress as a whole, either by each House acting separately or by a joint session, which is unknown in the working of Congres today, as you have pointed out, that you gave consideration to
the election under the constitutional provision of having an election
thrown into the house where each State has one vote, as in the case
of the electoral
where no candidate for President has a majority
college.
,
Vy did you not think that plan
more feasible?
Mr. Mus3,ANso. I thought this plan would be more feasible because it would be less cumbersome. It would be a vote of the membership of Congress rather than a vote by States, and it would provide for a greater and more responsible representative vote because
I include the Senate in the deliberation of the determination of a
Second Vice President, whereas in the election of a President, the
choice is left to the House of Representatives alone.
Senator KVAUVER. It would be more representative and more
democratic.
Mr. MusmANxo. And more democratic, yes.
Senator KEFAUVER. Sir, in theMr. MUs8xAxNo. Allow me to interrupt just there, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUVER. Yes.
Mr. 'MUSMANN0O. When the Constitution was drafted and adopted,

Senators were elected by the legislatures. Now of course they are
elected bY the people. :We have amore democratic choice, and, there-

fore, I thought as you have indicated, it. would be a more democratic
way of proceeding o elect a Second Vice President.
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Senator ICEPAUVEt. One of my good friends of the press has
pointed out hero that when the Constitution was originally written
and for a number of years thereafter political parties in the sense we
have then now were not. envisioned, and your section 2, the second
part of it, is based upon the theory that political parties will continue to be a part of our political system.
Mr. MUSAIANNO. Yes, I do. When the Constitution was written
and adopted, there seemed to be a feeling that George Washington
would live forever, and that there would be a unanimity of political
thought, on low a Republic should run, but we found immediately
after President Washington's retirement that there was not that
tilttilm
lIit.y.
In fact, John Adams' Vice President was not of the snine party as
John Adams himself, till(] now our system, our American systeln, ou1r
American party system, I think represents the very core of democratic
idealism, because wo have constant opposition to the party ill power.
We thus have a systein of checks It1nd balanees which tit iil timois calls
to account what. is being done by the party in power.
So while it. is not written into the Constitutli, I believe that our
arty system is as much a part of our governmental scheme as the
ivision of our Government into three departments.

Senator 1Cr.%uv... This would of course be the first time that

political parties were mentioned in the Constitution.
3fr. Mtus.%txxso. Yes; that is true, Mr. Chairman.
There are many features of our Government today which we
accept without question but which are not mentioned iinthe
Constitution.
For instance, the Constitution Makes no reference to the C(binet at
all, and yet we now accept the President's Cabinet as practically part
of the White House.
Senator ICKVFAuvvR. Except that nobody knows exactly Who the
Cabinet is.
I mean we think of the Cabinet technically as the leads:of executive
departments, and yet we find the Ambassador to the United Nations,
the head of the Bureau of the Budget and several other people being
brought in and classified as Cabinet members very often when actually
they are not heads of executive departments.
Mr. M3vsM.%r.YNo. Yes; that is true. There is no crystal)ization into
definite mnd precise hanguage statutorily or otherwise
6is'to What the
I
Cabinet is.
Senator KEFP.tvFR. Then, sir, it is well to assume that political
parties get. together on matters without delay and with unanimity, but
we all know of some cases where that has happened only.after a great
deal of agitation.
What if the political party representing the President's paity, the
national commit tee, just couldn't decide?
Mr. MUSM~,,o. I do not think there w6iuld be a dearth of candidates, nor would there be any trouble In selecting three of them.
The big problem might be how to select 3 outof 33.
Senator KEFAV-ER. Yes.
Mr. Mrs[XAN-No. And since Itwould' alwaysbe by a vote 6f ihe committee, it,would be quite fantastical to assunie that there could not be
a majority' vote on at least. three out Of the many Candidates tit could
be presented.
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Senator KEFAUVWm. I was not talking about in the Congress after it
got there.
Mr. MUSHfANNO. Yes.
Senator KE Avwy.R. I was thinking about in the committee itself.
Mr. MUSMANNO. Yes I refer to the national committee as such.
Senator KPAUYv R. All right, sir. Now in connection with section
3, you would leave the mach winery for establishing the Committee,
which would decide upon the inability and the removal of the inability
of the President, to Congress to decide I
Mr. MUSMANNO. Yes.
That machinery would naturally include a procedum. There
would be an ascertainment of the President's condition in the event
he was ill.
Certainly there would be prihaps even a smaller Committee appointed by the Chair of the Commission to select doctors and oxports to pass u)on or to examine and report to the Commission
on the President scondition.
There would be many details which I am positive Congress would
work out satisfactorily.
Senator KEFAUVER. This would enable Congress, to through legislation, decide that it, itself, the Congress, should decide, or it could
decide upon a Commission part from the Congress, part from the
executive branch or could decide upon a Commission wholly of
either, or it could decide upon a Commission as you have suggested,
made up of the Judiciary C6mmittees.
r USMAN NO. Yes.
.
Senator KEFAUVy.R. Of the House and the Senate.
Mr. MUsMANNo. Yes. When I first approached this problem, I
actually had Congress deciding the question of inability. I had
drafted that in very specific language. But then I thought that there
might be difficulties in the event Congress was not in session.
Some time would be required to bring Congress to Washington
and time mightbe of the essence. So therefore•
Senator K=,
u'vrx., Filibusters, delays.
Mr. MUSMANzo. That is true. It is all possible. So I thought
there should be'a permanent body, and I feel that the two Judiciary
Comniitte6. would fulfill all the requirements of -anyemergency.
Senator KFAuvER. I know the Judiciary Committees will be flattered with the confidence that you have expressed in them, Judge
Musmannod,
Mr. MUSMANNO. Yes; I do have that Confidence implicitly and completely.
Senator KEFuw'ER. All right, sir; suppose we go on now to sections
4 and 5.
Mr. MUSMANNO. Section 4. The Vice President shall not, be President of the Senate or preside over that body as heretofore..
I do not think that any gret constitutional authority has ever
ascribed t6 that feature of our Constitution any considerable merit;
namely, that one of the Vice President presidin'g over the Senate. I
think that featilre was included only to provide the Vice President
with some employment while he stood by ready to take over the
Presidency in the eveiit of a Pl1esident's death.
In many ways the Vice President was regarded as a rather superfluous in the early days of om- Republic, and even in the drafting*of
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thle ('onAtitiltion; Ill mw of theI debates onl (le subhject As8to how the
President, Should be' Ittlidressel? sollivleoe said that hie Shiouldl bo reforred
to As" Your I tugh 1i gIiyt'ss. ,T) lt, of Colirso was4 regarded by Fmo0st
of th0 miemlber's of tle Convenitionit s beiiig perfectly a1bsord. I'hey
1111vnal gee,4 ponl "You r Exelncind thiei nooi
1101
iggesteil
that. tNo Vice I resident. Sholdd be
ailvsc
s "Youir SntiliItimis
Exelle."
Senaltor I( '.tirwa I belve. ill thtl litt draft of tile Conistitut ion
there WVan't 11aN. Vice President.
Mr' ~UAN. In tilhe originall first drafti, tliat is trule.
senator 1 .tliYit lit the origitial first. (raft.
KNIr. IN st-SANNO. I II t iHhil&I ;VC4.
Senator hlAIi.Andi
ti
de
hcidled 1lIOli 01We Anid thevy had1to
iMr. iNVS18AN NO. That WAS it.
Senator Kumrm. Who wis

it that said that, (lit muAin job of (lie
Vie President, WAiS to wake upl ill tile morn-ing And inireli- aboit, the
he01lth of Ithe Presiden~t I
MAr.
IkM~o
1)(1iiwuher- ill thalt rather sulCessful DmusiCall
comedy, "Of Thee I. Sing," (here Was (lie usual smouke-filli'd rooni of
Xv1iriolis. pout icills s'eeting it valididato for tile Vico lIresidency,
and final VyAHIaui WAS Called inl fnid tle 8o
spkCeluna for tile conmmlittee
that. Was conlsiderinj vice presidential candidates s )enkiulg for' the,
4eolm11nittoo, said to tilis mu111who Nias Called 11k Ihyclle 11( d
him WVinterbottoun or somec such lad it'rous amie-he Said to 1dmn, "We
placed aill thle names of potential vice presidential nominees in a hat,
And unfortmntely yours was drawnn"
Senator EKWAivKr. Olt the Inure seriouna side, T think it should he
said, though, that, particularly begiining With President Trumain, hl.
portant Assignents liad beenl given to our Alice 1Presidoeits.
tpoOil (10Suggest ion~ of Presuident. Trumlanl, Congress enacte(L a]aw
making the Vice 1Presideitt a nienber of the Securit Council And Vice
President Barkley was given manny responsible duties.
you poinitedf out, this has been enlarged uponi by Mfr. Ri senhowei'.
'As
,NIr.
SA
& NX0. Yel.
Senator KF.\rR~VI. Ili regard to Alice President. Nixon I
Mfr. MulANo Vell, I do think that thoeoflice of the Vice President, now and for several decades, despite all the raillery Which, you
can find in plays and cArtoonsq, has achieved dignified stature and
nuder t ils poosed Amendment of mine. of course it Will be almost
on the level wit hpi'esideiitial dignity.
Senator K.AuVEII. All right, sir, now let's coiisier setion 5.
Mr. MuSHAN-No (reading)

tin

_

See. 5. The President of the Senate shall be choseni by the Senate
their
body and he will not, because of such presidency be relieved of any of hisfrom
duties or
deprived of any of his authority as Senator. When participating in debate,
will relinquish the chair to the President pro tempore who will also be chosen he
by
the Senate from their body. The President may, ait his pleasure, authorize any
Member of the Senate temporarily to preside In his stead.f
Senator KEFAUVER. Then the President of (lie Senate would be ju'st

about. the same as the. Speaker of thme HouseI
3fr. MfUSHA-xxo. That is it. exactly, Mfr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUV-EJ. All right, sir:
Mr. NfV8MA-.--o. Then ths other two sectons are really formial.

[Reading.-]
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Smo. 11.Congress siainI havoc jmver to) clforce this artile loy approjirlnto
h-gisli ttloul.
Si., 7. This artlo 8111ti I iojierative miiless It *,hall have been rntl~led nN
111 RIII'ludikliit to 1ii10 ('OUSIItfttli by thII( lglhiltulrC 4f the several Rtates,
ng lirvovil In the (Couuitttif(1ou, %vllih 7 yearm froin the ditto (it the mubmigMdom
thpreof tj (lipnMtets by tlip Cmingre..
Hue. 8. Thlis 0 rtleh isuoll tuule otfeet Ivllttll(y after ratltattln by the"
ri'ijiilip numblller of Htntes Aifter mu1hnh1481o11 thermfo.

I thought, tliil th0t111,
wa imiporl tnt, lwcauso if m5 jueed--auid of
ticed --801iI( 11F.iS1tlII1t) if) t111 di18011111'gO Of the j OWOES
tilh rt'silit tult. thle itwuiieiit I'residmil 1 I ou lul hav(
thii lbielit of 0tit Itls~iist1It iillleliultely 00- [is 504)1 Its it Call be gotC()lI'SM WOVI
(10
anmd d(li 18of

801110lt01- Ii FAUVIiv11. All. SuIiitliey, d10 ymJU luziVO 111y (le-t iOJ)H I
Nir. Sniithev is (lii very ab1)11
voliimiuel.
Air SiririiuwY. Judgre, I would liko to osk you it couple. of questions.

All'. Al 1HsNANS.

Ie.W, Mi'. SithOy.

Mr. Smirimr. First of atil Iunder

theO provisions of tile prewen Coll-

stitiit jot), (il whom (to you think ihe decision falls to deterimi tile
iudnlit~y of the1l',esidelit?
Mr. MUIJSMANNO. At t110 preSelit time thle Constitution (fOes not, inidiwate 011 W)'lOIJI thlo dJeciSioji Should fall.
Obviously if thle Presidlit, is able to determine himself hie would
decide, because li(%merely makes It Staltelmentl, "I ail tilable to discharge thle powers And( duties of my office," anmd the Vice President
woul1( then act a" Preideit.lnt,B t ile big problem, Mlr. Smithey, is
that if lio s110111( (d0 that, if tile P'residlent thloul( voluntarily allow
tlie Vice Pi'e.4ident, to take over the powers and duties of thle 1Presi(10111's office, what would happen when the President would have recovered from his illness, or would have removed his inability? And
it. is beciluse0 of that tCroubleSoI)e pr'oblemn that Ch~ester Arthur never
took over the duties of the I'idwilet during Giriel(D' incapacity,
which lasted 80 (lays.
During those 80 (lays Garfield performed only one presidential, act,
and that was to sign a bill or rather a paper having to do with extra(ditionl. There was always the fear on thle part of Garfield's friends
and supporters that if Arthur took over the p~resid!ency, that Garfie1ld could never become President again.
Mr. SMITHIEY. If thle President is incapacitated and unable therefore to make the (decision himself, do you feel that. under tile present
provisions of the Constitution it is incumbent uponk the Vice President to make that decisionI
Mr. MUSMANNO. I do unot. I would look upon that as being very
unfortunate.

Senator KirpAuvvE. In linie with that question, suppose the President, were obviously incapacitated, unable to carry onl, and was not
even able to write a letter asking the Vice President to take over. I
thought most constitutional lawyers had felt that in that circumstance
tile Vice President would have the power to take over the duties," andl
public opinion would be the judge ats to whether hie had done the right
tiling or not.
M11. MUSMAN No. That is true, but just as soon as that would happen,
you would have litigation.
Once the Vice President would take over the office of tile President
an~d made Executive orders, all those who would be adversely affected
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to an appreciable degree would question the power of the Vice Presi(telit to
President.
lIndividuials who might be disicharged from office or who might be
demoted would question the right of the Vice President to act as
President.
l1tit there is a greater problem, a greater worry than those which
I havo just indicated.
Of course, this does not, at all apply to the present incutmbent of
tile Presidential chair or any who might. in the foreseeable future

have the honor of sitting in that. exalted position. But we (1o know

that when Plresident Wilson was incapacitated, as he was for 18
months, it was assumed that he was incapable of performing the
duties of the President and there were overtures made upon Vice
President Toni Marshall to take over the Presidency. But ho never
did, for the simple reason that. he asstned that. his assuml)tion of the
office would be questioned by the ])resident. himself, because while
President. Wilson was physically incapacitated, and to a certain
extent paralyzed, he was mentally alert lind with that alertness lie
-still had (ie treilendouls power oft the Prvsidncw- within his grasp.
lie had his friends, his supporters, who would rally to his cause
and night well contest, and would undoubtedly have contested tile
Vice P resident taking over the Presidency.
Dr. Grayson, who was the President's )hysician, said lie would

never sig ta certificate of disability.
In fact, President Wilson isented very much that there were even
Cabinet meetings dui g that time. Secretary of State Lansing called
the Cabinet together on a number of occasions, and when Wilson was
able to exert. himself articulately, one of his first acts was to dismisg
Lansing for having done what lie thought Lansing had no right to
(1o. Thus you have that. probleni, and it is an immediate probleni.

What I think should lie done is that this amendment, this or one
similar to it, by the machinery which I have indicated should be
adopted at. once as a constitutional amendment and submitted to the
people. If the constitutional amendment is adopted by Congress-and of course as we know it. can only be adopted by a two-third vote,
and then it goes to the legislatures if the amendment is adopted and(
any catastrophe should occur along the lines you have indicated, you

at'1east would have the exprelsion of two-thirnis of the rej)resentatives
of the people as being in favor of a conunission to determine whether

the President is able or not able to perform the functions of his office.
Senator Kr, .tuFr. -Allright, Mr. Smithey.
Mr. S.trrmr.y. In the correction of the ambiguity which exists in
article II, section 1, clause 6, I take it from the fact that you sabmitted a proposed constitutional amendment, that you feel that any
solution to the problem must come by way of constitutional amendment, and that ft legislative enactment would be insufficient.
Mr. MrjsMANo. Categorically so.
Mr. SMrrEmY. Thank you, sir.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUVER. Judge Musmanno, we are certainly very grateful to you for this excellent presentation of your viewpoint and your
discussion of this problem in such knowledgeable terms.
We thank you very much for coming here and being a witness with
us today.
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Mr. M1TSMNNo. And I wait to thank you very much, Senator Kefauver, for giving me this great privilege and opportunity to (cone
here, and of having made it posiblo for me to come while I am still
in Washington, after having just been released from the Naval llospital in Bethesda.
1thank you very, very much.
Senator lF,'.,vmm.Now our next distinguished witness is Mr.
MAartin T1ay r,chairman of the subcommittee on presidential inability of the Rew York State bar. Mr. Taylor has a long and distinguished record as an attorney and, as an attorney, has specialized
on constitutional problems, lie is, and for a number of years has
been, the senior member of the law, firm of Reed, Iloyt, Taylor, and
Woishburni of 5'2 Wall Street, New York City.
We appreciate very much your presence here today, Mr. Taylor.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY, NEW YORK STATE BAR
M. 'l'AYJoi. This problem was stated in a very short, entence in
1787 by only one delegate to the Constitutional Convention, l)ckensoil. lie sald,,"What is inabilityl"
Senator KEFAUvwI. Off the record.
I)is ,umion off the record.)
fr. 'l..%vion. What Mr. 1)ickenson said was: "What is inabilit.y"That
Who
raises
the debate
question and who determines it ?"
was
all the
there was about it,It. was not until 1850
that a man named Cuirtiss wrote a book on constitutional law, and
he mpeated what l)ickenson said, al( wrote, "Nothing has been
addedto it."
The curious thing is that in that intervening period both Marshall
nud Storey, who wrote considerably on the Constitution, never mentioned the subject.
Now we get. to the present problem. I think most people are
agreed that there is no necessity to define "inability." Whatever tribunal, whether created by statute or by constitutional amendment,
should have the authority to determine inability, whatever the cause
may be. You might have physical inability, temporary or permanent:
yo. might have mental inability, temporary or permanent; absence
from the country, capture by the enemy theoretically, and any other
circumstance.
Whatever the tribunal is, it should make the determination.
Second, you come to who should raise the question.
Senator KEFAUVER. On that first point, I bllieve that that is the
general thinking of most of the constitutional students who have
spoken on this subject: that "inability" is a term that should be left
as it is.
11r. TAYLOn. There is more agreement on that than on any other
phase of it.
Senator KEFAUVER. Yes.
Mr. TAYLOR. You come to the second point: Who raises the question?
That I think is again involved with the third one-Who determines
it-because, whatever your method, whoever is given the power to deterinine, clearly might just as well have the power to raise the issue.
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we oicm to thle major p~robhell: Who determintes it? 'flhnt aigall
divides4 itself into two A,tionlH.
0n4en1t, or (les 1i1e power exist
l)oes it, retire %Const itutiollnl

in tile Tiegslturef

quest ioll: Whether it e deteriniiied I)Z act
Thel you glt to tile la1st.
be ( one?
of Colliiss or h, conistitutionlal ailielhnIIdeiit, how Should it,
o,. as to the flrst question, to whel her it should be by cost ItN-

tioial ainendnlent orly statutory enetnuent, there is itgreat deal

of dhlergenee of view.

was taken for granted that
in the lPresidential 8uccesion Act. it,
Colgres had the power to assq it. A great Imaly authorities, proft\qs,.ors
of const Ittit al
lwaI ve eXIl)reS.(4i the View tlint. tie general
the end of .ecAtiou I of the Collstitution, the brond compreehlase tit
hensive powers' section, is sufficient to give Coiigre.s that power.
so Ihut it hais raised 11lhIi('eit. qie8tion
There haus bee l iuch staidl
o that, whether you agree with one view or the other, I think the
practical view to take of it. is that there 18ust be a ('on.s8 itiltiolial
timendmett in order to remove that doubt.
It nay be as the gentlemaii who spoke before me said, the flmeni(ment i's categorically neeesary. We (1o not have to go as far as that.
It is practical and ne arv, whatever the fct. may 1* nbout thai.
An on that ground T think$'1enatorl(FTA1vtMv.
Now will you enlarge?

Mr. '1AYIOR,

Was goilg to.

Senator KVI. U'F.R. All riht,81r.
Mr. TAYLOR. rhre sugge.tilou was mlade by the former Attorney
(feiieral some months ago that it, should be done on the ground that
the Vice President already has the power, and that he should have
with him, in making the decision, the advice of certain members of
the Cabinet.
The Attorney General's argument was that, instead of clothing the
Vice Presidentf with the power, his proposed amendment. simply limited his power by giving some power that he had and sharing it with
the Cabinet.
That view I think is not sound.
It. certainly is not sound in the sense that. we are interpreting the
constitution; because, at the time when this was written, the Vice
President and the President were the people who got the most and
the second greatest number of votes.
Very soon that crystallized into political parties.
It was not likely that it was contemplated that the candidate who
had just. been defeated by possibly a narrow margin would suddenly
"myto the President; "Well, I don't think you are able to perform the
citiess of your office.' It has not been interpreted that way during all
these years.
Certainly it was not contemplated that the Cabinet have anything
to do with it because the Cabinet did not exist. It wasn't created
until by statute in the early part of the 1800's, so that his proposal
was not an interpretation of the constitutional provision. It was a
suggestion of a method of solving it now, which is, of course, different.
I go back for a moment ziow to the actual text, which recites in the
first three cases--death, removal, resignation, and so forth.
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Teioy obviously are Aelf-determining and, therefore there was no
problein of whether the Vice President succeeded to the duties or to
(he office, which has been the controversial thing, because obviously
nve
who was impeached or died or resigned cohId not resume the
T1he practice of swearing in the Vice l'residentt oh the denth of
lMrsideltS. which is the only one of those contingencies that has
illpeniid, has become nll accepted I)ractice, although there is nothing
inthe (onstitution at nil about it, t here is no provision for doing that.
It has bx como custom.
My own view is that those first three things contemplated succession
to the office, and that the inabiliy clause contemlplat(ed accepting the
rv-s)onsibility of performing the dutiess of the oflilce.
, here narseveral reasons that point to that. One is there are

various State constitutionH, even colonial charters, where a compar-

able provision exists as to a lieutenant governor mid the governor.
The common case now, for example, is where a governor itout of
a State, the lieutenant governor performs the duties of the governor
in that period. That think was what was meant by it. I do not
think it, meant, anything more thanithat, that during inability tile
dulties devolve(.
That I realize is a controversial subject and much debated.
Now, as to the solution of it, assuming that it requires a constitutional amendment, then you get to the problem which confronts you
gentlemen : What should it be
']'here have been all sort of proposals. There has been the suggestion of the Cabinet, there has been the suggestion of a special
tribunal, there has been the suggestion that the-Vice President sub.
stantially not only take the initiative but make the (determination,
the suggestion that the President make the determination.
Obviously the PIrsident can.
I think there is no power, I think there is no interpretation that
can be put on the Constitution language which indicates that it was expected to authorize the Vice President. to assume the duties. I think
it was deliberately omitted. The reason that I think that is
because if you read the debates at that time, there were tremendous
issues on which there were very strongly expressed views on both
sides, and when Dickenson raised that, I think he had in the back
of his mind, and some of the others had in the back of their minds,
Well,we will come to that later."
I think it simply never was done.
I do not think there"is an indication of how it should be done. It
clearly is a matter of commonsense that if the President simply said,
"I am unable to perform my duties," that would raise the question.
I should doubt whether the Vice President had any power to raise
it, and certainly there is no indication who else could raise it.
I
So I think it has to be met.
I think at the moment there is no way that, you could, at least so
far asthe Constitution id concerned, nio way you could say at a given
moment such. a person could, through such an act, have the Vice
President begin*to function.
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Mysug1toii ~oiwhat shorter than that of the gentleniui wvi0
preceded mec. 1 think it is too short, but. it is thle beginning of sonlie.
thing that Could be filnJplitledl:
li1ly1I lh
ip def'lr'nuhlu4 I111)--.4ii(0
W1(11 oOf 11iia4tV
Tihe moioul~ioivlent 111111iilit
1 li w vroidil.
iiitolt 38 l'oiigl('88 8111111
'1'hnat. omilits any langualige as to 10wt her 01' niot the o1flile or lthe duittes

on
enjti I think there
to. wielchqi (lelilberateh', (hli
ialmWt the, fact. tint any nN'. oif Coiigt'e.s (41111(
Clearly' over that.
TIn makingg it. as general and brief as that, I haud this in nIiiid:
As a broand principle of constitutional Jaw, thtem shwiild lie expwessed(
simply' the enabling power'; the basic Ch1a1t, to go by. and( if sonlie suchl
thing as that. is lf Ized, it. has the benefl that ('ongtv-ss could coroic,
over the years, the methiod which wvas. adopted.
Senator KryAuvrii. it other wvords, if onev mlethodi was tried anld
8some defect oCcnrre1VA
Mr. '1'.%yioR. That is it.
Senator K1yr.%vi-r. Then Congress would have inl its power thle
power of ('orieltion. without going through tile colliitionlal "imnt'idIte

Sittlceede

wout1ld be no question

11nent. process.

Mr. 'J.vin f von write into the Constitution the actual manchinler'y, for examit 1h, If y'ou p~ermitted the SuplreiiW' (Court,Judges you
would have t lte probl em, whielh is again a debated inatter, as to
whether n, Supreme Court judge should ftt option In) 4iy capacity
except ats a judge. You wvould- have the di ft kulty of '1imdomiig constitutional amendments, let. alone the difficulty of *patzsiiig then, blit
if You give that. broad general power to Congress, you canl ehiige that.
8enator K1Ppruk-F.R. Thein on that score you and Judge Musnmii
see eve to eye.
11r. T.AYIAR. qIhat IS right.
Senator01 K rFA'UVR. O11P of thle liternAtive resOlutioui.0 whli(-h I had
tiled is Senate Joint Resolution 133, which has thie saine thing in mind
of allowving Congress by legislation to determine ih'ability and removal
of inability. But. your language sveems to he shorter nn11101Vr to the
poiil voi read it. again, Mr. Taylor?
Mrh. TAYLOR (rea01ding) :
The oiiniinument anud ternlifiazi()1 of inability s10hall be 1tcrn111edt Iiy Suchi
iethodI as Congress shrill by law provide.

Now I usedI the words suchh methiod" intending by that that. it
should not be Congivss as a whole, for the -same1 r-easons that Judge
"Musmnanno pointed out, the difficulty of getting then together, perhuaps too much debate, partisan feeling, and so on.
Senator hEFAUVER. In other words, you would interpret your Iangn'age to not. authorize Congress itself to-.Mr. TAIVmoR. I said "by such method."
Senator KIEVVER. To make it determination.
Mr. T.%YoR. I was hoping thiey would not adopt the, method of
doing it--I
Senator KFmArVER. In Senate joint, resolution 133, which I referred
Mr. TAYLOR. I have not seen that.
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80e111tdr l%'VFArrVFI1. WhiCh is one0 Of 0li0 resolutiOiiS thalt I have filed,
ot. flint I nt snive flint, NRtho method thnt Miould be followed,IbecauSe
I do have another resolution, it provides file Congres inuiy provide
by law for file p~ro~cduire for(1) deteraiinig Ilnq Iinbiity. tif thie Premileiit to eih~eliargo the powers and
daiitp8 nund(2) deferinii
WNbii flip InabIlIty of the P'residen~t to dImthfirge
tli. powerH midilk-miII1 of film olve ling eaend to exI~t.
Mtr. 'IAVI'A1ii. l)(AW111t t hu P41y Sibstatttiitlly the sanule thing inl slihitly
IilloiV words?

Selntor I(~~luu.I siip)osC it does.
Mr. TAYviAUI. I iiieii it is Imp1l1icit iii flint senitence tliat I read that

if (lie J'iwsidet-

Senator
Diruv~.lo
you think it is clear in your langtiage
whether (lie President ('0d1( recover his office?
Mr. T.%x,.onl. 'es, certainly, becal _Se you see I tioe (lie wordIs "cornIlieiieeilit aIild terininat ionl of inhbililtuy
Senator I(xmir.n~a. And vou would &feltlint (lie termination of
iiinbility would auttointicafly carry with the reassumption of the
(ilties o;f the Priesidlent. by thle, President?
Mril. Tuvios,. I would think so, beenuse tlie precedling lan guin1ge says,
"tu easew of (lie inability." lith(le lnngitage at (ile end of article 11,
se'ctiont 1, you hiave, "'and suich officer' shall act accordingly until tile
disability lIe remnoved."1
It nnt lie a little too brief, lint I would think it would be a necessary
consequenve (liat (lie termination carries with it (lie end of (lie period
of iniatlility.
Senato0"r

I uVY.1. ANow Mr. Taylor, let's point out sonmc of the
irguituents against tlaepoposal (lint you have made alnd (lie somewhat
siiiilar ones made in Senate joint resolution 1.3.
'T'he tint is that (lie P~resident and (lie Ex~ecutive Office itself would
like to know before they give (heir approval to atproposal like this
just what kind of mnachinlery is gigto be set lip.
Thle Attorney (1e-neral has expizese1 thle ideas I real in the p)aperand lie will testify here sometime soon-that-Ml'. TAJM. May 1 interim laptyou? Is his proposal (lie same as wvas
put forward by Mr. Brownell (tc former Attorney General, or don't
youl know tltat i

Settator KF.tuiuit. As I get it, his proposal is that the Cabinet

iiuembers should make the deteiinination, but inl any event, it should
be anl executive determination aind not a legislative or a judicial one.

Mr. 'r.%vioi. That is substantially the same.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes; it is substantially tile same, I take it, so
that tlie first thing is tlint tlte executive department would like to
know what (lie rule is going to be before they agree to it, and the

seond thing is that thits is a matter of such great concern to the
people that any amendment to the (Conatitution should not, just delegate the power to the Congress but should enable the people themselves to decide by the ratification of the amendment what the newv
rule will be.
What is your answer to those argumentsI
Mu'r. TrAYLOR. I had assumed that, a statute would be drafted now at
(lie same time (lhat (lie amendment was proposed, which would set
forth (lie methiod which would implement this section.
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Senator Kt:VAUVF.B1. In other words, so that everybody might have
before then just what the Congress hs in mind.

Mr. 'I'AYLOr. Thereare two reasons for that. One is to meet the
point which you brought up. The other is that the school of thought
that it, requires no constitutional amendment might regard the passage of such it statute as a stopgap. While I do not hold that view,
it, is very largely held.
Senator KW:rAvvVs. In other words, that as a stopgap measure tile
Congress go on and patss a statute, but in the meantime have submitted
a resolution for all anmendinent.

Mr. 'I'AyLoit. That is it.
r1vrit. To give Congress the power.
Senator ICF.m

Well, sir-, do you not think that the passage of a stopgap amendment
might. deter or take away the interest in passing a constitutional

amendment?

Mr.''AYLOR. You mean a stopgap statute?
Senator KR,\UVvi. A stopgap statute.
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I do; but. you would be better able to judge that
than I woull. I mean that is more a political quest ion than a legal one.

Po,"ibly all that would be necessary would be a statement whieh

would satisfy the Executive as to the general theory of how the (-oilst it ut ion al amiend ment was to be ca rried out by stat ute.
Senator KICr.AvVnI. Well, this Congress might make a stateenlt
about how we exlwected to carry it out, although I doubt that we
would ever got evervimody together on a statement. But, the complexion of Congress night change very materially.
Mr. T.,Y.or. Yes.
Senafor KEr.Avw'r. From this session to the next one, and one would
not be binding on the other.
Mr. T.yi.or. Even the fashion in constitutional amendments has
changed.
Senator KFA (r'Fr.ASSuming a stopgap statute, or assuming that
the substance of a stopgap statute were presented as a constitutional
amendment, what would be your preference or what would be your
idea about who should do the deciding on inability and removal of
inability?
Mr. TAY.OR. You mean what such a stat ute should be, in general?

Senator Kr.AxTT.R. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. My owl view is and some of my committee member
do not agree with me, that Congress should create a permanent and
relatively small tribunal.
The objection to it which my colleagues make is that they would
be responsible to no one and they might take too long to make a
decision.
Senator KFAI'T11'r. You mean in the New York State ba" committee there is a
Mr. T.Y.oR. That is right.

Senator KEFAUVER. There is a division of opinion?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator

KF.UVvER.

How many members, incidentally, are on the

subcommittee?
Mr. TAYLOR. The full committee is about 15. The subcommittee is
Elihu Root, Arthur Dean, and myself.
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Senator I(zepAtivw. Is it getting down to too much detail to tell the
positions of each of you? You ale each distinpgiished lawyel."s,
Artlur
E4lill Root, and Martin Taylor. You feel that sonu'
jierniiaiieit)ean,
ConnnlliX.ion 51h0uhl(be established?
Mr.TAYLOR. 'T0he only (liverge nce is Mr. Root does not agree with
ine about, that. I [e leans toward the Cabi net idea.
Senator K(i*FAuvxI. Mir. Root leans toward the Cabinet idea?
Mr. 'IAYLORI. Yes.
Senator 1(FVAItvu. And how about Mr. Ilean?
Mr. ''AYLOR. I le has not exlresed any special view about it either

way oilthatjoint.
Senator l( rAtivF:i. And you in your own opinion speaking as an
individlfl, and not as chairman of this committee, wiat kind of commii.ion wouhl you have established?
Mr. '1'AY1,0. Well, not more than say 7 people. I have not thought
out. how to pick tile 7 people or 9, if you please, but, a small number,
but to serve during tile whole of tile term of say 6 years or some suel
iieriml5.

Senator KEl',V~uEII. Serving during itterm of 6 years.

Mr. 'TAl'oR1. WVell, atperiod longer than any given Congress is my
ideal or lly given political party.
Senator l(KJAUVtE. I do not wish to particularize resolutions that
I have filed, but I had another one here just. for the purpose of discussion, S. .J. lies. 134, which would have the fluestion of inability
and commencement and termination of inability determined by tile
Cabinet plus tile four leaders of the two Houses of Congress, two in
tle I louse and two in the Senate, with tie Chief Ju.stice of tile United
States acting as the chairnmn of the committee, but with no power
to vote. 'hnt I believe would le a committee with the present heads
of the executive departments, or 10 in number, the four lea(lers of
Congress would matte 14 and provides, that there must be the affirmative vote of a majority, which would make it 8.
Mr.T.%,'ont. And the Chief Justice is 15.
Senator IErFAUVFR. And the Chief Justice would be 15. HIe has no
vote, but there has to be an affirmative vote of 8 members in order
to find inability or removal of inability. Would you see any objection
to bringing in the heads of the executive departments and the leaders

of Congress?
Mh. TAYlOR. NO.
Senator KEP,.AUVER. Do you think a committee of 15 14 actually
with tile presiding officer w11o would have no vote, would
too many?
Mr. T.%YLOR. I would not say too many, but I think the smaller the
better, because if yopi are faced with the necessity of relatively quick
action, the smaller tribunal you would have, the better. And as they
obviously would have great responsibility, I do not think it is a power
that would be abused by anybody, no matter how small the committee.
Senator KEFAU-TR. The Chief Justice of the United States has written a letter speaking for all of the Court that the Supreme Court-does
nlot, want to serve ini the deciding commission and I understand the
logic of that, and I think it is sound, that the court should not be the
one to make the determination,.because as Judge Musmanno has
l)ointed out, they might lave to decide upon. the constitutionality or
the legality of certain actions taken.

PllI1DENTIAL, INANIATY,
MI. 'l'AVlIA1. Thereis a further objection to it. I. thiuk that you
Woull rrlly
l
have to aeiilld the Coust itut ion to ell]IrgI Ithe
1*f(ilge.'
power.
,,,
Senator IK*'M.'It,, Yes.
Mr. 'E.oA. Ad alno there is it considerable thou lit, I think, as
the discussion at the time of the Nuremberg trial, id ieates tht the
Judges should confhle themselves to legal mat tars.
Senator ]ivr',\vit. That is correct. I think it. goes beyolid the

jurisdiction that any of its would like to see the.Court take on. But
would you see any objection to the Chief Justice merely presiding at
the conlinittee meeting without the power of voting Mi. TA rkR. I see no necessity for it:
Soilitor ]rAuYr.R. My thoulit
ht in
that connection was that it would

add dignity and be a safeguarT to action 1)3 the committee, and I had

in mind( similar action by the Chief Justice in impeachmnent proceedit,"s it th16 Senate.

M4r. T.\ 'vr. 1 do not think that is really very important, either way.
Senator KEF.iuvEr. l)o you feel, sir 'that the majority of the Corn-

I li.,iion or Committee should be of the (ahinot, who-presumably would
have more Intimate knowledge of the Prosident's ability amld condition?
Mr. T.AYLtoR. T!ile' shouldI-ave.
In the case of Wtilson, that was not the fact. A small glrtl ) of
people surimniding tile Presidlent had the filcts allid the Cabiletl did
llot.
Certainly you would expect the Cabhinet to have great, knowledge.
Senator]K'rAI.\r, Mr. Sithey, (1o yout have any questions to ask
of .Mr. TayloU
Mr. S.NTIm'v. Mr. Taylor, I think you submitted a letter to the
Hou,; Judiciary Comniitte.

Mr. T.%YLOR. vihat is right.

Mr. S.Nrrmw. At. the time, that eonmnittee'w-s undertaking a similar consideration of this problem. fi the course of that. submission
you stated that shortly before the appearance of the Attorney General
before that Committee, the Committee on Federal Constitution of the

New York State Bar Association had presented a suggested amendileit.
to the committee.
Mr. TAmnor. That is right,
Mr. SMrrimv. What were the provisions of that )rOl)osed amend-

ment I
Mr. TA-rFoR. It covers the possibility of permanent-I will give
of it, While you are looking for that, Mr. Taylor, I take
you
a copy
oAcr.
Surrn.
it from the languagelof that letter that it. was the position of the full
committee, the 15-iiember committee on the Federal Constitution of
the New York State Bar Association, that an amendment to the Constitution would be required in order to correct the defect in the
Constitution.
Mr. TA'YLoR. That iscorrect.
Senator K.FAuvR. So we can have it in this record, suppose we
have copied in this reeordMr. TAYr. It simply amplifies the short sentence that- I gave you.
Senator KErA-ER. Suppose we have placed in our record at this
point the presentation by Mr. Martin Taylor of April 1, 195', to the
House Committee.
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(Tho document referred to isas follows:)
COMMIrT7X ON TilE JUDICIARY, 11O11s OF ItE1IPASERTATIV98.
On April 1, 1057, a statement n presidential Inability was presented to your
subcommittee by the Attorney Geierl. Shortly before that the committee on
Federal Constituiion of tle Now York State iar Association presented to your
subcommittee a suggested amendment dealing with that problem. It did not then
have before It the recommendations of the Attorney General. However it agrees
with him that In removal, death and resignation the office devolves but tLat In thie
case of inability the duties and not the office devolve upon the Vice Plresident, that
such Inability may be terminated, resulting In the president taking up his duties.
It agrees that a constitutional amendment Is the best solution. It is true that by
usage in those cases where it was impossible for the President to return, the Vice
President has taken the oath of office, although there Is no specific constitutional
sanction therefor. A constitutional amendment would forever remove doubt as to
this. Such diverse views have been expressed on the question of whether Congress
has the power to legislate on Inability that It may be contemplated that If such
power were exercised by virtue of an act of Congress without constitutional
sanction it would be tested ii. the courts. For those reasons the committee has
advocated constitutional amendment.
Our subcommittee on 'residential inability, of which I am the chairman, and
Messrs. Elihu Hoot, Jr., and Arthur 1I. Dean are the other members, have not met
since the statement of the Attorney General so there has been time for informal
iscussions only. Ilemice this memorandum Is submitted as an expression of my
own views although In general concurred in by the others.
Willo the Attorney General advocates constitutional amendment, he does so
on a completely different ground. Ills expressed view is that the Vice President
could not be divested, without constitutional amendment, of the power of deter.
ruination which he now has. The reason for divesting him of that power Is that
he should be given a more limited power to declare nobility and then only with
the consent of a majority of the cabinet who are executive officers. This memorandum Is not primarily concerned with the policy of how to deal with the question
of Inability but is submitted in the hope that It may offer some suggestions to
those having res pnsibility as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is
submitted that tie Interpretation of the Vice President's power advocated by
the Attorney General and his recommendation as to the Cabinet acting with the
Vice President could not have been within the contemplation of the framers for
the following reasons:
First, It would have been a simple matter to have said that the determination
of Inability should be made by the Vice President. The debates rather iddeate
that they avoided who was to raise and determine Inability. Nor was it likely
that the framers expected that the Vice President would act deterred either by
fear of the accusation of usurpation or reluctance Induced by loyalty. Also the
exercise of such a power without explicit direction would have been made at his
peril and might lead to an extraordinary situation In some cases, as for example,
where the President declared himself able to perform or resume his duties.
Second, at the time the Constitution was adopted, the Vice President was the
candidate who received the second largest number of votes. The supporters of
the rival candidates held quite strongly divergent views which very soon crystallized Into a party organization. It seems unlikely that It was In the purview of
the draftsman that a recently defeated candidate for President, then serving as
Vice President, should be given power under any circumstances to determine the
ability of the successful candidate to perform his duties.
Of course, it could not have been within the purview of the framers that the
Cabinet should have any responsibility in the matter as the Cabinet was not
then created.
As against the view that this power has been held since 1787 it should be considered that (a) it has never been exercised, possibly for the reason that it was
feared that the office would be vacated; (b) that It required congressional action

to implement it; (o) that such Implied power was not sufficiently recognized to
Justify reliance on It.
The Attorney General argues that the Vice President has always had this
power. He does not deal with the troublesome question which woUld arise if a
Presdent and (Viee President disagreed on the right of determination. His
argument Is based 'on the premise that since the Vice President has the duty of
acting In certalp contingencies he Is clothed with the duty to determine when
22324-58---7

It does ntot, of course, so state fit lte Constitution but
that colliligelOnY Cxist.
lte Attorney (leneral ctlntli; (lint It In a wel.est nliished rule of law that a
contingent litner gives its grantee the righlt to determine when to exercise It. III
support of this legalt generalization four cases are citeil. (See citation 20 to
Attorney Ocoerni'm itivitiorinduni.)
There was sustained Ii the Aurora cast, In 1813 [tic President's right to proclaim
ternintion of embatrgo In the Miartin catw Ii 1027 to calling out the( iitial, and
In 11)8, tile right to determine
fit tlie Fl eticie fitn 4 nld thep Ii111uiill ease8
chiging state%of ffacto to vary tWH. Each of thie above acts was dolie In pursuanico tif expiresm authority given lte P'residentt by Congress. This is anl entirely
differi itaiter from saying thant rowe%-r may he Implied where express direction
is nlot given.
Tho logical concluion, i time interpretation of any consitutlonal lainguage
dirmcing that soinethig be dione would be that someone, was directed to dto It.
fifortuately that does not auplear to bie so here unltess Couigrems under Its broad
powers wim eilietted to linpl-ent It. If by inference It wa expected thint
anyone hand (tt, iltwer without. i'otire.-kslonIia limieuentation, It imPubinitted that
It would be more likely to he Ihe President imiself at leAst where he was able RnIO
willing.
The view oitfite Attorney generall Is that It requires constitutional
amiendnient to give fte 1'resident this iwver aind atconstitutional niendinent tto
divest fte Vice I'resIdevit oft n power wvhivit he always find amnd apparently the
I'residltent never hiad. It is ouhtinitted that not for tiMs reason but for OneIitlefltion a tinstitutional uenditient should bp adopted to settle thle question of sueesoon to otfive where tlim i'resimtent cannot reqiume is duties amid of devotion
of diitieq where he many lie Wel to.
MARTMn

TAYLOR.

April 9, IM3T.
('olty for infornintion of Attorney (ierlCorielis IV. NVickershnin, biar
asqiatou rcomliuilitee ehiarimm: Atihur It. Dean, Esq.: RlihuRot. Jr., FEsq.
MI'. AYmiAR. 01tile p~lg jIreeiitg the StateImnt thtt I imade there,
yol1 will flil-Seniator I(Ervvrit. It, is oil page .12, is it, not, Mr. Tatylor?

Mr.T.ym.on. IIlmut, is thle (Intoofit?
On tlc Hrouse henriiugs thnt, we have here, of
Senator lr.r'iit.
April 1, l957, tile full text of Mr. Wickershamnn's letter is set. forthi.

1, 1957 the full text of 'Mr. Wiekersmamn's

letter is set forth.

Mr. +.'~f.ou That is right.
lts-Wt thle roltioin of 'Mr. Wickershlani contained in it?
Mr.
rrM'
uiw. resolution is conttuned in it.

m r. irAiii1. ntat is right.
S4euator RKrmuvvri. We will have 'Mr. WNicershani's letter maide a

part of our hearing too.
(The loeiment referred to is as follows:)
NiFw YORK STATF BAu ASSOCIATION,

('om NtIfirF.r o,,%1FrMlAT. CONSTITUTION,

Marc& 29, 1957.
lieu.h~'~~iTL(Cum.s.
Con, Pnmfllcc on thec Juidiciary.
Ilort.'e of Representalfrce, Wasthingtoi, DAC.
IIYAt '.NI. ('ELLFRt
As yon )%now, time ('oittee onl the Federal Constitution
of the 'New York State liar Acssociation hats studied the question of Presidential
Inability for some months and has given consideration to the many suggestions
made to thle Judiciary Subcommnit tee on the subject.
As a result It Is felt by thi committee that a constitutional amendment Is
necessary, and that the amendment should provide In substance.
(e) That the commencement and termination of any Inability should be
determined by such method as Congress should by law provide; and
Mb In case of the Inability of the President, that the Vice President should
succeed only to the powers and duties of the offle and not to the office Itself.
It Is clear that In Its present form the fifth clause of section I of article 11 of the
Constitution leaves open the matter of determination of what constitutes Inability
andl fails to authorize anyone to deal either with the beginning or the end of the
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disability. This fact has been a matter of embarrassment to tile Government In
the past and could be n matte,: of national dsasier in the future.
'1'he question of what happens on the death of a President and whether the Vice
President then succeeds to the office or succeeds only to the powers and duties of
tile office lane been sMtthM by historical tradition. As we all know the Vice Presl.
dent Is sworn In ns l'repident upon the death of the latter. Presumably the same
thing would happen it case of the resignation of the President or of hils removal
from oflfce.
On time other hand, it is not clear whether in case of Presidential Inability the
Vice president would become I'resident or would only be authorized to act as
President as one succeeding to the powers and duties of the olee. The words
"the same" have never been construed in this connection and this fact adds to
the confusion which Is so apparent In the recent discussions on the subject.
It is extremely doubtful whether Congress has power to deal with the matter
without a coustitutional nmendnent and clearly the ambiguity of the present
provisions cannot be ekired by net of Congress alone.
our committee concludes that a constitutional amendment Is necessary for
any final or nutioritative solution of the problem and therefore recommends for
your consilderatlon that the lifi clause of section 1 of article II of the Constitution should be amended to read ns follows:
"III Cast of the Itetimoval of til, president from (fle. or oif his Death or
ItesignatIol, tile solhd (Ofive slitil evolve on tile V'ice i'resh ent. in ('ate of the
Inability of the l'resIdent to discharge tie ownerss and i)uties of the Maid Office,
the said Powers and Dlutles slihall devolve ol tle Vice l'resldent. mintil lie Disability be removed. The Congress inny by law provide for the Case of IRemnoval,
i)eat, ItesIgii tlion or Inability, Ioti of tile president and Vice President,
declaring what Oflicer shall then be President, or in Case of Inability act as Presi.
dent, and such ()Iler siall be or act as President accordingly, until a President
siall lie elecled, or, in 'ase of Inaility, until thi D.iablilty shall be earlier rei|oved. Thiuclnrlwemipeiuent aimd terimlintion ',f ilmy Inaililly shall Is' determlnled
by such nelhld as congresss shall by law irovhie."
If this anenll'htlelit slall le ndopt(ed It would memin that lit .ase of thme death.
resignation, or removal from office of the l'resldenl, tihe Vice i'rlmllhtl wouhl be
sworn in ais l'residell. in ease (of tho I'resident's Inability, however. tht. Vice
President would only ll 0 x residentt, having his powers amd thlle, . until
the disability wtiS reimov(ed. congress s wild be called illooU to enaIt Iegislt,lon
eternmning the nlethoi by which the conmmencememt and terminatiln of nny
Inability should be determined.
In view of th, ntmint of time that would nece(sarily pass before adoption of
tile nmuendnientt there would be plenty of thue for your committee to consider
what methold should he adopted by Congre., for this aetermlnation.
in case of the inatillity of both the l're1stdent ail( Vice President, the change
contained in the amendmenit proposed above Is designed to make it plain
that the officer who shall then act as President shall do -4o on a temporary basis
unit the disability is removed or n President elected.
it is believed that no amendment would be smffclent to meet the problem without providing for the dletermination of the question of commencement and
termination of Inability of the President or the Vice President, or without
separating the provisions relating to inability from those relating to death,
rslgnatlon, or removal, thus removing the anbigulty involved In the present
language.
I sincerely hope that the foregoing will be of assistance to you and your committee lit your consiheratlon of this vital subject, and I am enclosing additional
copies of this letter for the other members of the subcommittee, and am sending
further copies to the coninittee's general counsel.
Respectfully and sincerely yours, COswzuLus W. WIOKE8Ht, OhAolmoan.

Senator KICr.%x,'.VR. Mr. Wickersham's proposal for a constitittiozal
amendment was, and the amendment. should provide in substance:
(a) That the commencement and termination of any Inability should be determined by such method as Congress should by law provide, and (b) in case of
the Inability of the President. that the Vice President should succeed only to the
powers and duties of the office and not to the office Itself.

The first part. of that is exactly what you have presented here.
Mr. TAYfOr. That is right.

PRMEIDEN T
r1A1

Se

of them1
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felt that it, ought to say in terms that it was the

devolution of the duties and not tie office should be covered in the
amendment. I do not think that is particularly important.
I do not think it is necessary, but if it is, it could be added as it Is in
that draft.

Senator KXvAuvKR. But the idea there was that inasniuh as there
was a probability or a possibility that the President would resume the
,of1ce that during that interim the Vice President shouldMr. 'TAYI.0s. '1Tat view had been expressed so often that we thought
possibly It would stop it forever if you said it in terms as it is in that
pr posed amendment,.
Senator I(mFAUvWR.

Mr. SMrt'muit.

All right., sir. Anything else Mr. Smithey I

This study that your committee undertook, how long

was that study?
Mr. TAmon. I tlnk it started about March 1956.

Mi' SMINTI.Y. So that it,hs been underway almost 2 years?
Mr. TAYLtr. That is right.
Mr. SMIT Y. You made a tconmendation as a subcommittee to

this full committee headed by Mr. Wickersham f
Mr. r,yi.on. That is right.
Mr. SmTnmm. And they in turn adopted this report
Mr. TAYLOr. That is correct.
Mr. SisrriY. llas it been presented to the State bar?
Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct.
Mr. SmTHr.Y. Ies it been adopted by the bar of the State of New
York?
Mr. TAYLOR. No, it cannot be because it has just,gone up there now.
As you know, those things move rather slowly.
This printed reord of it which I just got the other day is the sub.
mission to the State bar association. This is the report of the coinmittee. There is a rubber stanip on it January 23, 1057.
Senator KEAUT.R. May I see that?
Mr. SMmIRY. There is a statement in the letter of Mr. Wickersham
to the House committeeIt Is extremely doubtful whether Congress has power to deal with the matter
without a constitutional amendment, and clearly the ambiguity of the present
provisions cannot be cured by act of Congress alone.

Is that in accord with your thinking?
Mr. TA oR. Oh, yes.
Mr. SMrrnEY. And the thinking of your subcommittee?
Mr. TAYLOR. That is right. And the full committee as well. There
is no great difference of view about it. I do not want to give a wrong
impression about it.

AsI say simply Mr. Root leaned toward the Cabinet idea.
Senator kE-vAuvM. In order that anyone reading this record may
appreciate more fully the thought of people who have gone into this
recommendation which hias been submitted by Mr. Taylor here, I think
it might be well to read the names of those composing the full Constitutional Committee of the New York Bar Association.
In addition to yourself, Cornelius W. Wickersham Theodore Pearson, Eli IT Bronstein, Arthur H. Dean, Lewis R. ulick, John W.
MacDonn' John J. Mackrell, Leonard P. Moore Welles V. Moot,
Archie B. -orrison, George Roberts, Churchill RoAgers, Elihu Root,
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Jr., Arthur I. Schwartz, Harrison Tweed, and of course, Mr. Martin
Thy Or.
'lhat is a very distinguished group of lawyers, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYwio. We still haven't solved the question.
Senator Kr.rAuvv. Mr. Smithey.
Mr. SMITIBY. Mr. Chairman, I have one further question and I
think that will dispose of the questions that I have.
I think it was the position of the Attorney General before the House
committee that the determination of a disability of the President was
essentially a decision for the executive branch, and that under the separation-ofrpowers doctrine, it should be committed to that branch of
the Government alone.
Mr. 'rAYIR. Yes.
Mr. SMITIJEY. Do you see any question of separation of powers
involved in the determination of inability ?
Mr. AywIt. No.
Mr. SMITI Y. I have no further questions.
Senator KunEAVn. Would you amplify on that a little bit?
?*fr. TAYioR. I did not think there was anything to support that
statement except the wish to have it so. It is a question basically, first
of constitutional power, second of legislation under that power. The
Constitution as such simply provides the basic rule. What you do in
pursuanco of that is a matter of statute.
There is nothing in the Attorney General's memorandum which indicates why it Is so that that is an Executive decision.
Mr. SmTIEY. You would see no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers I
Mr.'AYrofn. No.
Mr. SMITIEY. If the decision as to inability was given to another
branch of the Government?
Mr. TAYLOR. No.
Senator CF.FAUVER. I think that, as a matterof practical application,
it is well to have at least a majority of those who are going to
pass upon the question, people who should be familiar with the ability
of the President and in everyday touch with him and his actions, so
that they could pass upon the question more intelligently.
But I agree with you that I see no constitutional reason why this
should be the case.
Mr. TAYLon. It may be practical and expedient but that is another
matter.
Senator KEAUVmR. Well, we certainly do thank you, Mr. Taylor,
for the consideration you and your committee have given this problem,
and we have a great respect for the judgment and the conclusions
reached by the committee of which you are the head, and your own
individual conclusions and views upon this subject.
We thank you very much for coming down and giving us the benefit
ofyour testimony
?think it would be well to put the New York State Bar Association
report dated December 31, 1957, in the record, if there is no objection.
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(The report referred to is as follows:)
REJenT OF COMMITrE

ON

F IDRAL

CONSTITUTION

To the .tcDbers of the New York Statc liar A soclaIioii:
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

The Committee tmi the Federal Constitution has studied the quesiou ot Presldential inability under article 11, section 1, of the Constitution, and has had the
advantage of reports from a subconmilttee consisting of Messrs. Martin Taylor,
Arthur 11. Dean, and Eilhu Root, Jr., who made a special study of the question.
It Is clear that in its presiwt form the fifth clause of section 1 leaves open
the matter of determination of what constitutes Inability and falls to provide
the method of determining either the beginning or the end of the disability.
This fact has been a matter of embarrassment to the governmentt in the past
and could be a matter of national disaster hi the future.
At present the fifth clause of the section reads as follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his I)eatb, Itesignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and l)mties of the said Office, the
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both 'of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then Act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the. Disai'ility be removed, or a
President shall be elected."
Thus Congres.i is authorized to provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or InAbility of both President naid Vice President, declaring what offi~r
shall then act as President, until the disability Is removed, or a President
elected. In consequence, Congress has emcted the so-called Succession Acts,
designating who shall so act.
But the Constitution falls to give similar authority to Congress with respect to
the matter here discussed. Only an amendment to the Constitution can cure
this der..t.
Several suggestions have been made proposing an act of Congress or an
amendment, none of which appear to be adequate to imeet the Issue in a manner
that would be understood by or acceptable to the American people, a consideration of highest Importance. These Include proposals that the President should
make the determination, or the Vice President or the Cablnet or both; or that
a conmmission either of selected officials or (listhlnglusied citizens should be sp1)ointed for the purpose. Another propoal is that the matter be referred to
he courts. And there are other suggestions.
But these are matters that by proper constitutional practice should be decided
by Congress, the representatives of the people of the country. Just as the Con.
stitution now authorizes Congress to provide by law for succession where both
President and Vice President are unable to act, so should similar authority be
given to Congress to provide the method of determination of the vital question of
Inability to act.
Moreover, each of the various proposed methods of determination Is untried
and open to objections. To freeze any one method into the Constitution now
would make correction in the light of future experience or change of circumstances extremely difficult, because It would require an additional constitutional
amendment. This danger can be avoided by a constitutional amendment which
gives Congress the power to select the method; then correction or improvement
could be made at any time by Congress enacting a new law.
The question of What happens on the death of the President and whether the
Vice President then succeeds to the office, or succeeds only to the powers and
duties of the office, has been settled by historical tradition. As we all know, the
Vice President is sworn in as President upon the death of the President.
Presumably, the same thing would happen In case of the resignation 9f the
President or of his removal from office. Presumably also, In case of Presidential
inability, the Vice President would only be authorized to act as President, succeeding to the powers and duties of the office only. But this conclusion has been
questioned. The words "the same" have never been construed and this fact adds
to the confusion which Is apparent in the recent discussions on the subject In
Washington and elsewhere. It is of the highest importance that the Constitution
should be clear on this point, and that the text should be readily understandable
not only to lawyers, but to laymen as well.
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As a result it Is felt by this committee that a constitutional amendment is
necessary, and that the amendment should provide In substance:
"(a) That the commencement and termination of Any Inability should be do.
termined by such method as Congress shall by law provide; and
"(b) In case of the Inability of the President, that the Vice President should
succeed only to the powers and duties of the office and not to the office itcei."
At best it is extremely doubtful whether Congress has power to deal with the
matter without a constitutional amendment and clearly any ambjigulty of the
present provisions cannot be cured by act of Congress alone.
This committee concludes that a constitutional amendment Is necessary for any
final or authoritative solution of the problem and recommends that the fifth clause
of section 1 of article II of the Constitution should be amended to read as
follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death or Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on the Vice President. In Case of the Inability of the President to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, thq
said Powers and Duties shall devolve on the Vice President, until the Inability
be removed. The Congress may by law provide for the Case of Remhoval, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then be President, or in case of Inability, act as President, and such
Officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President shall be elected,
or, in case of Inability, until the Inability shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termination of any Inability shall be determined by such method
as Congress shall by law provide."
If this amendment Is adopted It would mean that In case of the death, resignation, or removal from office of the President, the Vice President would be sworn
In as President. In case of the President's inability, however, the Vice President
would only act as President, having his powers and duties, until the Inability was
removed or a President elected. Congress would be called upon to enact legislation providing the method by which the commencement and termination of any
Inability should be determined.
In view of the amount of time that would necessarily pass before the adoption
of the amendment there would be plenty of opportunity for the congressional
committees to consider what method should be adopted by Congress for this determination.
In case of the Inability of both the President and Vice President, the change
contained in the amendment proponeI above Is designed to make It plain that
the officer who shall then act as President under and pursuant to the Succession
Act shall do so on a temporary basis until the Inability Is removed or a President
elected.
It is believed that no amendment would be sufficient to meet the problem without providing for the determination of the question of commencement and termination of Inability of the President or the Vice President, or without separatIng the provisions relating to inability from those relating to death, resignation,
or reiuoval, thus removing any ambiguity involved in the present language.
The committee does not believe that the amendment should prescribe the
method for determination of the factor relating to inability. It is better constitutional practice to leave that matter to Congress, which under our prol)sed
amendment Congress would be authorized to provide for by legislation.
On March 20, 1057, the chairman of this committee wrote to lion. E'manuel
Cehler, chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, presenting the views of our committee with additional copies for other members of
the subcommittee and for general counsel. Our letter was given wide publicity
at the time and was later printed In the report of the hearing of April 1, 1957.
In commenting on our views, Congressman Keating stated that he wanted to say
parenthetically that he understood that our committee did not agree with anybody on this problem, adding "which Is par for this course." Ills statement am
to our nonagreement was something of an exaggeration since we do agree with
the former Attorney General, Mr. Brownell, that at least a constitutional
amendment Is necessary.
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TUR MYK
BRtI(IJI AUXNPMIT
For reasons slated In earlier reports of this committee we (*ntinuedlnt our
]aut meeting to optposo tho so-called lricker amendment as set forth In Ren(oir
)Irheker's proposed treaty cmutrol am endmenit and accmpnyiling stteliteet
(8 Congrexplonnl Recorid, Senate, pp. 2W9-20, JYAn.?, 1057).

Dated: Deember 31, 101?.

lRespeet tully submitted.
Oornotlus W. Wleersham, Chairman; Theodoro Pearson, Hocretary;
F.11 It. lronstoln, Arthur H. Dean, Lwls It. Oulhek. John W.

Mnclonald, John J. Mackrell, TLonard P. Moore, Welles V. Mont.

Archlo 1. Morrison, (]eorgo Roberts, Churchill Rodgers, ilihu
Root, Jr., Arthur IT. Sichwartu, Martin Taylor, Ilnrrison Tweed.

e4enator KvriTvYR. We are glad to hear from any interested citizo

and Mr. Charles Kre." of Binghanmton, N. Y., who hns been an official
up there, has a suggestion ho would like to make at this time.
STATEMENT OF OHARLES KRESS, CONSULTANT, BINORAMTON, N.Y.
Afr. Krrs. Wr. Chairman, T will be very brief, realizing (he shortage of time.
I would say my views represent perhaps the suggestions and opinions of the man on the street.
I am a former moyor of BiTnglniton, N. Y., and have been a
consultant to various Selutte and I Touse committees.
I have been greatly intrigued by this problem and have given it.
considerable study.
Of couse, I am somewhat abashed to testify in thypresence of
sich legal goius and brilliance as there is here. 'l'lio
Constittiion
provides now that in case of death, IXsignation, or removal of the
President, the Vice President nutomticl ly takes over the office without any action by Congress or the Supreme tourt. _
Is it not reasonable to assme that the same thing was intended
by the Constitution makers in respect to Presidential inability, that
the Vice President is to take over automatically without any action
by Congress? Ifa President dies or resigns, Congress does not have
to meet and elect the Vice Preident. He automatically takes the
job. In fact, the Constitution seems to limit the powers of Congress
to legislate in this field only in ca.* both the President. and the Vice
President are out of the picture, and then only on the matter of
succession.

A constitutional amendment could take considerable time to come
into being, and the President himself has stated that hie felt there is
a present urgency in this matter.
omet hing along the lines of my plan could take effect immediately.
I would not propose to change inany respect the present provisions
or at least the intent of the Constitution that the Vice President automatically takes over when the President is unable to act. I would
merely set up by legislation a formal procedure by which the Vice
President does this. A speedy process is imperative in these jet-age
days
ahe Vice President cannot just go over to the White House door
and shout, "Im taking over." They might not even let him in. There
has to be some offloial ceremony to be observed. But in the first
analysis it seems up to the Vice President to initiate this process.
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seems that
if his dtlly to do o under tho Constitution. This
allItpiweonim
thatit there
is thel.spirit of good will and mutual dedication to the public good existing between the Preident and the Vice
President.
Thero has boon some disposition I think in some of (he 140an9 sug.
getod to make it, easier for the Vice President, but that does not
seem to jibe with iho Constitution. It 18 a big part of his job whether
h likes Itor not. history may show that at feast two Vice Presidents
wore reluctant or even refused to do what might be considered their
duty in this respect. But that wqq in a different age aMid vastly difforont titnes. In these times of reAter political education,of ilstantaneous public information over piss wires, TV and radio, and the
more powerful effectiveness of public opinion I do not bellve a Vice
President would hies1itate to do his duty if tile safety of the Nation

warranted it and start the operation of taking over when the Presi.
dent is unable to act.
• I feel this important question must be approached with a perspective
entirely disassociateod from today and present personalitis-andprojected ho6 the years ahead.
I If a President finds his condition is such that he wants the Vice
President to temporarily take over nd act, and there is complete harmony and understanding between the two men, it does not appear to
me that any new legislation is needed.
Suppose that as of now we ha1d a President who had become hope.
lessly paralyzed, mentally as well as plyeically and the Vice President the Cabinet, and the White House staff all knew the President
was incompetent, and they all agreed the Vice President ought to take
over.
So he does take over, issuing aproclimation that the President has
been unable to act, and as Vice President he is assuming the Presidential office. Who would there be to stop him I
. Congress couldn't do it. Only the Supreme Court would have the
power to say whether he acted within the Constitution or not.
All the discussions I have heard seem to relate to medical disabilities
of the President which would render him unable to act. I can think beyond this to a situation whore, fantastic as it may seem, the President
might in time of war be captured by the enemy and thus be unable to
act.

I At one time Presidont Roosevelt. in wartime flew over enemy terri.
tory and one of his escort planes nearly had to ditch. It could have
been the Presidential plane forced down in enemy territory. And
wartime conditions could also make ineffective any plan of succession
which required congressional action, because under thermonuclear
war the Washington Government might be completely wiped out.
iow the plan I have in mind was this:
1. The question of Presidential disability is a matter of deep public
concern today.
The Constitution provides that tho Vice President shall take over in
event of the President's inability to act. But just how this process
would take place is not made clear, and undoubtedly there will be a
number of measures introduced in Congress at the coming session, try.
ing to clarify the situation, these including proposed constitutional
amendments.
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2. I would lavd the Constitution alone and try to clear the matter

up with a bill which would provide as follows: When the President
suffers a disability which prevents him from acting, tie Vime President
and the Senate and Houso leaders of the President's political party
would prepare a certificate setting forth the facts, inchwding medical
evidence, and dlaring that the Vice President is temporarily ammninf the Presidential powers at a certain time.
This certificate would then be filed with the Supreme Court which
would then immediately convene, review tile facts and circumstances
set forth in the certificate, and determine if the proposed action was
within the Constitution.

The Supreme Court will have the power, but only by unanimous

vote, to (ispprove the certificate, in which case the Vice President
could not take over.
The Court would thus serve as a brake an any hasty f' ill-advised
action, but. an emergency would mot have to wait. upon aly p ossibly
delayed formal Court approval. If the Court. could nlot agree
proin'ptly to disapprove the certilicate, then the plroeedig would go
ahead and the Vice Pre.sident take over tt the tine declore(F.
3. Plainly the question of disabtltly and inability to act cannot.
be left entirely to a President as he might have a I)aralyzing disability and be incapable of coherent thinking.
The question of replacing a temporarily disabled President is a
constitutional one and it. is the unquestioned proper function of the
Supreme Court to interpret our Constitution. Thus under my plan
the Court would always exercise disapproval powers in each case
where the question of replacing a temporarily (lislbled President
might arise.
4. To prevent the remote possibility that some overly ambitious
Vice President might try to "steal" the Presidential Oflice by refusing
to give it back to a fully recovered President, my method would further provide that once a disabled President has recovered, he womld
then file a certificate of such fact with the Supreme Court announcing the time he would resunue his Presidential powers.
If the Supremie Court expressed no unanimous disapproval, the
Presideitt would then automatically resume his office at tile time set
forth in his certificate.
The same procedure would be employed in case a Vice President
temporarily acting as President, also became disabled and had to be
replaced.
I realize thid this is not a constitutional amendment suggestion and
I submit it perhaps as a stopgap measure which might possibly have

some chance of enactment in this Congress.

I know I am asking now a question that is in the minds and hearts
of every thinking citizen of the United States when I ask the honorable chairman, and I ask you from your point of legal brilliance,
what is going to happen to this country today if our President tonight,
God forbid that it should happen, would be stricken with a paralyzing
ailment that left him mentally and physically helpless?
You, Mr. Musmanno, have said that if the Vice President did take
over, there would be mitch litigation. I think the public would like
to know exactly whht will happen.
Do you feel that the Vice President under those circumstances is
violating any law or constitutional provision if he does take over?
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We hvw got to hinve at Presi&,dei.
Sinelody his got to nct, and who
else blt liim could do it I
Mr. MITSMANNO. Y'ou might ndlire. our question to (ho Chair.
Mr. l(.tAq. 1 (10.
Senator 1CHFAuvit. That i8 a question we are considering here,
Mr. Il(res. I had always it.miIuied I lint if there is no question of the
President's inability, tlhat the Vice President]had the right to take
over, but of course that does not nvoid the fact that there might be
litigation, confusion, chaos, as .Judgo Musmanno has pointed out,
flihat also public opinion and our dealings in the field of foreign
n
policy are also grave questions that have to be considered, so that I
think we are nl agreed that certainly this is a field that ought to be
clarified so that we can be sure that we have an able responsible man
acting and dischmarginig the powers at1i( duties of t e Presidency it
all times.
Mr. K1twm. Can I say this: If that disability did occur to the Presi.
dent as things stand today the Vice President would take over and
wouldn't )to receive the support of the Congress and the people of
the United States?
Senator KYvuvvE,. I am just n Senator who has ideas about the
Constitutrion just like Judge Musmanno and many other people do.

Mir. KRFm. Thank you, Senator.
Senator I(F AUP.R. Thank you very much. I think it should be
pointed out that the views of the man on the street and the view of
lymen is very important in the consideration of this whole problem.
I am glad that Mr. Kress has expressed his point of vidw because
public understanding is a very necessary ingredient of all of our
actions under the Constitution and under our laws.
On Friday, the 14th, at 10 o'clock in this room we will hear from
Mr. Henry Fowler, attorney of Washington, D. C and former Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Also Prof. Edward
Waugh, department of history and social sciences, Eastern Michigan
College, who has written extensively on this subject.
On Tuesday, February 18, the Attorney General is scheduled to
appear at 10 o'clock, and on Friday, February 28, Mr. Charles Rhyne,
the president of the American BIar Association is to appear before
our committee.
Is there anything to be put in the record at this time, Mr. Smithey?
Mir. SMITHEY. Mr. Chairman, we have some statements from eminent persons in the field of constitutional law or in the field of Governmient, but in accordance with your wishe.s in other hearings, I
had delayed submitting those for'inclusion in the record until the
last session, in order that they might be printed in the appendix, if
that is your desire.
Senator KE.VAUV R. Very well, we will not in any event place them
in the record at this meeting today.
We stand in recess, then, until Friday, February 14.
(Whereupon at 12: 30 p. m., the committee was recessed, to reconven e at 10 a. m., Friday, February 14, 1958.)
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Senator KEFAUVEI. Ile is also a member of the Iar of tie State of
Virginia.
Nr. Fowler, you have a statement. The entire statement will be
printed in the record, but you may read it or discuss it as you wish.
STATEMENT OF HENRY FOWLER, ATTORNEY, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
FORMER DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
Mr. Fowrrr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I shall attempt to extemporize and discium the statement rather than
read it verbatim.
I am very honored to be here as a witness before your subcommittee
to anticipate in your deliberations on this very important question.
I am not going to attempt to take ip any historical background or
analysis of many of the questions because I know you have many
scholarly studies that. ate much more inclusive that are available to
you.

I want to, this morning, try to be helpful to the suibcomnmittee, and
I believe the only way I can b hell)ful is to try to present a very specific
and concrete point of view that would promise a prompt and practical
beginning on this very diflicult problem .
I will say at the outset that. it, is my opinion it. is legal and practical
and desirable for the Congress by legislative enact ment at tills session
to facilitate the orderly evolution upon the Vice President of the
powers and duties of the President ln the event of the President's
inability to discharge them, and a resumption by the President upon
the pa,%ing of his inability.
1 do not believe a cost itlit ioial amendment. should be lecessary,
in view of the very general language of the inability clause which
omits any" specific eIthod for initiating or (leterulillilig an inability,
and the "availability of tile so-called necessary and proper clause in
section s of article f of tile Constitutioi.

There are two provisos to this opinion tliat Congress can act without constitutional amendment. I'ey have to do with the nature of
tile enactment. The lirst is (lint (lt means chosen by the Congress
would be al)propriate to tle simple objective of facilitating the. devolition of powels in question by providing orderly procedures thiat would

be reasonably acceptable to the officials coiuceriand and the public.
The secondI proviso is that tile means chosen should not violate the
overriding constitutional principle of the Eel)aration of powers or
disturb any conceivably existing constitutional authority in tle President and tlie Vice President.
This is perhaps the salient point that I would like to bring out in

this presentation. I believe this can be accomplished by miiking the
statute and its procedures declaratory and permissive rather than
mandatory, and by keeping those procedures substantially within the
executive framework.
I shall develop this later in my statement.
I realize that Congress may deem it wise to dispell any doubts of
its constitutional authority to enact this type of law in advance of
a judicial test, or perhaps it might wish to make tle procedures to
be outlined mandatory on the officials concerned, the President and the
Vice President, rather than declaratory and permissive.
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If either of those conclusions is reached by the committee, I would
suggest the initiation of a simple aimendifleit to clause 0 of section
I of article 11 alllrmatory of the power of Congress, precisely along the
fines proposed by you, Mr. Chairman, in Senate Joint Resolulion
133.
That poposal would be in addition to the act of Congres, io be
discuss.

Now lily written statement includes an identification of at least
four objectives that should be sought to be accomplished by tiis corrective legislation.
Briefly, the act shoulli help to make clear that, in event of a Presidential inability, the Aice President does not become the President,
but only an Acting P resident, assuming the Io)wers and duties o
the office temporary y for (lie duration of the I residential iinability.
I believe declaratory action to that effect by the Congre&s would
amount to a legislative construction of the nature of the-Vice President's tenure and would servo to mniuiniize this troublesome question
which has helped to plague and frustrate the purpose of the Founding
Fathers in providing for effective continuity for the lixecutive power.
Senuator I(:r.%uvir. Mr. Fowler, would you have that apply to tile
Vice Iresident in (lie event. lie takes over upon the death or resignation of (he President?

Mr. FOWLER. I have not covered that, Mr. Chairman, because it
seemed to me that was not one of the more important problems at the
moment, but it seemed to me that custom had rather established the
fact that in six previous instances where a Vice President has succeeded to the powers and duties of the office, that, in fact, he became
the IPresidenL
I think that the important gap to be filled is a construction of what
the precise legal situation is when the Vice President takes over because of an inability, and you still have a living, eligible President once
his inability should be removed. That is the situation on which we
should be very clear that the Vice President only assumes the powers
and duties of the ofice, not the office itself, and therefore when the
inability is terminated, the President may resume those powers.
Senator KI.AUVER. That would not be inconsistent with the custom
that has been established of the Vice President taking the oath as
President?
Mr. FOWLER. Not at all.

Senator KEFAUVER. Upon the death of the President?
Mfr. FOWLER. Not at al.
They are two entirely different situations.
The second objective is that the act should provide a simple means
for devolving temporarily the powers and duties of the Presidency
upon the Vice President by act of public written notification by the
President himself in cases where he is physically competent and willing to acknowledge his inability.
I believe this arrangement which is included in other bills which
are before the committee would take care of a great number of likely
cases.

Senator KEFAUvFJI. Some have suggested that the President should
write the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
pro temporo of the Senate. Others have suggested he should write the
Secretary of State.

108

PIMSIDENVIAL INABILITY

Do you have any feeling about to whom the letter should be written?
Mr. lowiymE. On page 14 under item 2 where I ain describing or
attempting to describe, or outlining the statutory proposal, it is suggested that the message by the President be transmitted to the Vice
President with copies to the President pro teipore of the Senate andl
the Speaker o tie I louso.
I think technically the President would tell the Vice President h
wants him to take over and snake that a matter of national record by
the usual practice of sending a message up to the heads of the two
Itouses.
The third objective of the act should be to provide a niethod and
pr
ire for th determination of a Presidential inability where the
Irsident is unable or unwilling to declare his own inability.
Tho greater part of my comments and statement is directed to that
most diflicult aspect of this overall problem.
Finally, the fourth objective of the act should be to provide a
precise method for determining the end of the inability and the return
to the President of the powers and duties of his office, after either a
voluntary or involuntary inability determination has resulted in the
assuil)t 1on of those duties by the Alice President.
Now I should like to turn to what I think is perhaps the most crucial
problem underlying this current situation, namely, whether Congress
has in (lie Constitution a Ixisis for taking helpful and corrective action without a constitutional aluendnent.
I believe the chairman knows that. there is considerable authority
other than the present- witness for the proposition that in absence of
ainy sp~cifle and well-defned constitutional provision for dealing with
inability, Congre. could under the "necesary and proper" clause
undertake appropriate legislative action.
I cite here )r. Corwin s views from his classic treatise on the Office
of the President, and I think lie expresses the basic underlying thesis
when he 'says:
The fraluers ueant to provide a functioning system of government and presuniably did so. At least there Is no apparent reason why Congress should
take a less vigorous view of its own competence than it would when it pro-

vided a method for the settlement of the Ilayes-Tilden disputed election In
1877 and therefore prevented a civil war.

I have included in my statement a reference to the considerable
body of contemporary opinion that. existed at the time of the illness.
of Garfield and Wilson, that action could be taken under the so-called

implied powers of the "necessary and proper" clause.

Think the committee is of course-aware of the fact that many contemporary scholars have gone on record similarly in the hearings before the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee.
I think the important thinA to note here is that there is an element
that is sometimes overlooked in that this "necessary and proper"
clause 18 of section A of article I endows Congress not only with
the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the so-called granted powers to the Congress

which appear in the first 18 clauses, but also, and I quote:

all other powers rested by this Constitution in the Oovernment of the United
Stated or In any department or officer thereof.

Now it is the latter part of this "necessary and proper" provision
that attention should be directed to, and I suggest to the committee that
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it nieans nothing if it does not give Congress some authority to enact
legistat ion necessary and proper for carrying into execution the Execu.
tire powers endowed in the IPresident and the Vice President which
mayl Hecoo il,
%rective because of An inability of the President.
I'here are those, I think, who contend that in view of the fact that
Congre.m in clause 6 of section 1 of article It,
was specifically granted
the authority to declare what officer should act as Wridcnt in event
of the inability of both the Pre-sident and the Vice President, that the
old rule a)plies that if a law specifies one power it thereby excludes
any other power. They would suggest that this denies Congress any
other authority in this area. But I do not believe that the grant of
this broad and unlimited specific authority of the Congrems to act in
matters of P1residential succession when both the President and the
Vice President are unavailable should be construed to preclm(le the
Congress froi exerising perhaps a more limited prerogative to enact
nece.&-ary and proper measure, designed to assist the President and
the Vice Pivrsident in keeping with this problem of Presidential inability.
Senator Kr(r,.%iiwvvn. Mr. Fowler, do you agiee that article II, seetion 1, clals 6, referring to the power of Congress to determine who
.shall act uijonl the death, resignation, or inability of both the President
and Vice 'resident refers only to who should act on down the line
of succession, and not to the immediate thing we are considering here
of how you determine inability I
Mr. PowLII. I would so agree, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ICFvAuvIum. So any right of the Congress to act would have
to be under the "necessary and proper" claiseI
Mr. Fow :R. Precisely.
Senator KEVAUvE.n;'J see.
Mr. Fowir.R. I would suggest that this "necessary and proper" provision gives Congress the authority to aid or facilitate the discharge
of the responsibilities lodged in other departments.
Otherwise, the express reference to the power to enact legislation
neessary and proper to carry into execution all powers vested in the
National Government or any officer thereof is relatively meaningless.
For over 169 years, as the committee has studied, this Nation has
encountered a series of serious situations in which the problem of
Presidential inability has not been met by a practical procedure or
practical solution.
Today it seems reasonable that appropriate legislation to provide
some such procedure to facilitate or aid in this transfer, where desirable, is necessary and proper to carry out the execution of the powers
vested in the National Government, and particularly in the Executive.
Indeed, I would suggt.th4t a failqj ,,to take some action simply
continues the risk that a situation may arise where the powers and
duties of the President cannot be' executed because of an inability, in
the absence of any appropriate or practical formula for dealing with
such inability.
Now I do not want to trespass on the committee's time to elaborate
and analyze many instances in which the Supreme Court has relied
upon this "necessary and proper" clause in upholding congressional
enactments, including instances that give orderly procedure to the
operations of other coordinate power, namely, the Executive and the
22324-58

8--

110

PRSI

DIEN(V'ALg

INADIITY

~oule of areas which 1 think
aRte.
(oi of the striking ones is Noxi various eniiciis that Coiigre.si h1n4
lpu1sed over' tho Iy%%as to) promlotoe fllcieiiuy and inteif liy in tho dischaIVr of th0 WO
(icilt
ii of All flt)e Qe1)IO)yeCH Of 111,1 expect~ ive de'1)111ilivIL't Ild 1t) iroviiie lWol)W iistlidlil'e inl I Iii exectit ive pxiblic
seorvice. 1,'h1t, is pursn'ltt to iio specilkc grantedl power to tho (,oilgress', 11nd yet ('igre.,:* has not lii'sitilted historically over the years
Io enlact it series of civil ser-vice la1ws anld Iliws designed to p~rotectft,
integrity (if11lk, public Wervit-e, Oil th10 Ilheo. tha11t it is nrPCOSS1ixry 1111d
jiiial,

Wit, I should like to suiggost. at

Inv ana11logouls, %leir, the0 (7011

VCV'ss
has1

prop~er to theQ fiict ionilig. of i li execift le (1pl lilielis fu111agellcies
thaM t hilgh standard of colidiict 11111
problity "shouldhi) prlovided for.
Agalin (he ('oib i itionl only M1uthorIMes 1iLP CoiigrQN-8 to0 81(ieciCally
deini 11nd. punlish crimes of piratly, felony onl the high seals, 1111(1 offol'es lialin4. Il law of ntioll, tresoI lild counterfeiting.

IX
111olesbecaulse
l
it is necessary to elfictuato (lhe overall authority
oft tho Not ional (iovornment, as the Senator of course kiioivs, weo have1
anlextensive Pedleral Crimlinail (1 Ota withii hundreds of wenactilments set

forth ill title XV~111 of (lt)e code, and tlin courts have said repeatedly
inl
eases that flh ait
11ority to eiiaet Pedlerxi ciiiitl laws Ot Iitr titan
11050 speiii'lly r1'ferrid to in lte Coistiit it ion ispcsaytmdjropor
to an extecutionoof thie powers granted tlie Nationtil (l1overnin eint.
Another amihlogoImS sitinat ion is the power which ('onproess limi exer.
vised reeatedly to mike elfeeive the operation of the "'ederitl courts.
jiist to vite otio, tho Congress, mnay direct. (lie retnovid
example,
of Aui
a ca-'
fromn a State to atFederal cotirt inl it criinal pro:ectit ioni
11Ilitst atFedleral officer for acts dlone under color of federal law, and1(
other examples.
lfinlally, pust to vite onle ilore, lilte legislation that has to do0 with tho
claims against the Covernment. 'Fhere have been at Series of enaictments, aisthe chiairimin will recallI ilk whichl Congress has givenx special
direction to tho honoring of claims by various groups or citizens
the (ioveriment.
aginwt
There are)other examples, but I w~ill pass oil.
XA.
-. reldiv, carixt mulst he take in anly legislative enlactmlent of the0
typo referred to to assure that. thie mepans chosen are Appiro V.riate, to
fa-cilitating this devolut ion of tle powers and duties of the 1 resident
uiponx the V~ice President in a practical aind workable manner. Tm
method selected should avoid any arrogation of authority to determine
that inability to forces- or groups lin a mannner that would be de.9tructive of the principle of balance of power in the Constituttionl.
I believe if these precautions were observed, they should place the
legislative enactment. beyond substantial risk of successful challenge
on constitutional groulnds.
Of course anybody could bring 'a case and undoubtedly there would
be one in the future regardless of how insubstantial the claim might
be, but. in my opinion, With the type'of enactment to be outlined. such
a challenge will not be sucessfufl.
Senator KEFAuvER. Mr. Fowler, on that point., quite 'a nunober of
witnesses, such as Mr. Taylor and r understand, the Attgrnei General before the House Cominittee -Sir. Taylor representing a committee of the New York State Bar Association-have stated tha while
it, might be possible that a statuilte would take catre of Qie situation,
that it should not be left. to statutory enactment. for two reasons.
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First, there is the facet, ax you say, flint, a uil. would be brought, and
thee iteaHof the Act ing l'residenit, partlilanrly ini the event someo dispute
night. ariso bftwe'n the 1n
PITi
eident. anM th0 I.WrediVito
vliltsu
h~ii lliik-1red to lw 1nnn1lh', lightht ho (Ijie-st ioiird, ai11( litigatilon a11(
tloiiflxiOli W0uld 11effltf.
You would not. kniow nmitiI after a ense renehlied tlie 8iiprcei Courit
Mletlimr he"hand acted Constitutitonally or uiot.
Secoiidly, I Ihalt tIIisx is suchl ItI i Iijor-l t Ilit(t4. t Iliat, eoen concedinfg
0( IL'giluity of it xl ut utory elnact niiwt, it, it; Wnihii ug fint, pcoipl t hleil
solves fughlt to dveilo upon I) way of ai coiist it ut lonnI arliuein ment.
D o you t hinik there Imumuiel validity to those argiiemits ?
MiNI. Fowli'lli. I hanve refIlectedl oil finht posit ton coiisidleral~y, Mr.
(Jhitiiii, 1111(
1 have tried to putL my own posit ion hero as clearly its
I Could.
It.~~~~~~~
111 l~l oIht.11doh3
not, I ilieve 1110 Constitili 111 should
IM
11111idfor frivolous; reiksolis. If we did so, we would sooiier or
nlu ithvit very cumnbersoinc and uniiworkable docunit. I
hielievu it, wits the iition1(1 of thle lFouniding Feathers, and finta is the

grelil. geliiuix of t ie Conistitult ion, f lint it. is phlruioexl for the most part,
in geiieral teiiis, thereby giving us itcertaini flexibility to iL4 operti on

dulild dlptniil it~y to new coindit ions ainid sit uat ions.
Initin, fir
auendopy it, wvould he verr niwisE for the Congress. to
iniiat
al amndaoryprocces throng~r monioxrooal tlint would
lImIIrth~le Coiisti itI oi with a (letiiil(d and( riil
decscriptLion of tho
mean4 and .iet hods to be utilized in hianingi~~ tim inabilty probler.
Th'lat wvotld niot. oiily elilillmei* thle Colis itult
1ionl, N)it Wouhld tenid
to free-Ze thle preceduire int~o it forjil tlint might hplovo impractical ini
Noul)( Iater sitUAtion.
However, I would certainly have no substantial objectioni to accomnpniiip
h, legislat ive eiinetiient. p~roposed1 by a sim11ple constitutional
imnI'eiiiif afil I natory of tile powers of ()iig rms ialonig tile Iiies volt
propose, oir lit. le-a,4ta resolut ion initroduced1 by the chirnm
of this
commiuit tee, Malit is S. .1.Re.;. 133.
Senaitor l(FVAUI.1. Juist affirming that Congress should have tilt
pmow~er to (leuil with this; p~robleml by mtatite.
M~r. Fowv.Euu. Yes. I recognize that. the Conressq may. concludeaifter further analysis of the legal nnl conistituitionial considerations
enneUTlig Ithe authority of the Congress to net that there is a substantial doubt there. There are differences of opinion omi it. Or it.
might feel that it is better policy to move for an nifrmatory conslitutional amendment rather than watit for the action to be challenged
because of the reasons the chairman has suggested.
Or it might. wish that the procedures that are proposed here as
dleclaratory find permissive be made mandatory on the President and
the Vice President.
In any of those'eventualities, it should certainly initiate the amendator process.
have only one more point to make on this constitutional problem,
and that is to point out what the committee is fully aware of.
There are some who contend that the Constitution already by implication has given the final authority to act as judge of the Presi(lent's inability to the Vice President, by providing that he should
take over the'duties of the office. There is the implication that he
should be the final authority to determine the inability, and accord-
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ingly it Is urged that the Vice President's Implied authority could not
be constitutionally divested without some coustitutiondl niondilont.
I believe there is both a pmctical and a legal answer to this content ion,
The practical answer is that the Vice Presidents themselves have
never adopted this theory, and thoy are not likely to in the future. It.
would be certain that the exetise of any such prerogative by the Vice
President solely, without any anssistance from any other procedure,
would undoubtedly envelop tie administration of tile executivee Ofliceo
in a cloud of controversy and debate, and his elrectiveness would be
diminished and the country would suffer.
Now for the legal answer, there are two paris for the legal answer.
The first.is that the Constitution does not. provide in expr& (orms that
the Vice President has the sole authority to determine an inability
and I do not believe it is likely that the members of (iho Constitulional
Convention would have x1ried upon so1e so-called rule of law that in
contil gent grants of power the one to whom the power is granted is
to decide when the emergency has arisen.
I do not. believe they wild have relied on that doctrine in such a
highly important and signitcant mailer as the transfer of the powers
And duties of the Presidencv from one elected to his next in line.
The second part of the legal answer is that the procedure established
b]islattou
be,mandatory,
ns I have mentioned
earlier,
ii~ivo
rathervanl
thant
by providing
thatdeclaratory
tie fldvije and
and pormceominendation on inability iade *available to the Vice President by
the procedure estabslihe . shall not be binding or controlling, bti(
advisory on the Vice Prwident.

Such'a declaratory and peri.niiive entneint would, I think, eliminate anly grave contitutional question of displacing anl implied colnstitutionai power inherent in the vice residential office.
Now so munch for the constitutional argument on the power of
Congress to act under the existing cirnumstances.
The next section of iny statement is devoted to a development of
some of the considerations, assunling Congress does have a residuum
of authority to act in this situation without constitutional amendmont, some'of the considerations that should attend the exercise of
that legislative choice of means.
The chairman knows the guiding light for the exercise of legislative
power, based on this necessary and proper clause, is contained in Chief
Justice Marshall's classic opinion in Aic6ulloch v. Marylad.
That statement always bears repeating and I will quote it:
Let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all theans which are ap.
proprlate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.

Now what are some of these considerations
The flrst as the Chief Justice's statement indicates, the method
chosen should be consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
Let us suppose that the means chosen leave the authority 'in making
determinations of inability or the termination thereof predominately
in the executive branch so as not to be destructive or impair the independence of the executive branch.
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In that case I suggest they are consistent. with tIle letter and spirit
of tie Constitution and its overriding principle of tie separation

;,Ct
I s

s
ppo
)OOfit

aho

enuls chosen are dleclaratory and per-

missivo rather than mandatory, designed to assist, rather than to
compel. In that event, there can be no real question that the "loans
are prohibited by some grant of lower, iniplicit in the Constitution,
to the principal ofliciols concerned; namely, the President and the
lice 'resident,
The second consideration is that thte means chosen should be practica! and plainly adl)ted to the end of facilitating tile required action
where needed.
They should encourage and make possible (he ready initiation of
Ilia procedtures looking to a transfer of powers in ease of an inability.
In short, they must be designed to overcome the inertia which has
marked plrviolis occasions in which tile country has been confronted
by this problem.
Those in a position to know and understand the seriousness of the
situation and its effect, on the functioning of Government should be
in a position to initiate the process of determination.
These include the
hPresident, when he is physically able to make
such a determination, and the Vice President, the members of the
Cabinet and the Speaker of tile Ifouse of Rlepresentatives and ftie
pIesident pro tempore of the Senate, who incidentally are the officials
unmed, pursuiant to the Constitution, by the Presidential Succession
Act as the officers upon whom the responsibility rests for maintaining
effective continuity of executive authority.
By tile same token, those chosen to assit in and facilitate tle making of this determination should be, I suggest, predominantly those
close to the elected leader of the people, ciose to him personally, politically and in tile day-to-day discharge of their official duties.
The inquiry into inability should be calm, friendly, sympathetic
and, ill no sense partisan or analogous to impeachment.
Given a procedure embodying tis concept, with the clear right of
the President to resume his powers anti duties when the inability is
ended, not seriously jeopardized, the means chosen can be said to be
practical and I would hope that they would be readily exercised in
event of any necessity.
Now the third consideration is that the procedures instituted by
legislative enactment to facilitate this very delicate transfer of authority should be politically acceptable. They have to satisfy the people,
the public at large, the Nation, as to their fairness or as to the fairness
and propriety of the action when taken, and thereby serve to rally the
country and the various instruments of the Goveinment behind the
Acting President for the time in which he must serve.
There may be other standards and tests suggested. There is certainly room for considerable debate as to whether any given procedure
properly accords with those principles.
Of a certainty, of this one thing I know the chairman will be certain, that no solution suggested is going to be acceptable to everyone.
If you can get a solution that is acceptable to let's say an 80 percent
satisfaction of those interested in the problem, I think a very constructive legislative achievement would have been accomplished.
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I have been presum)tuous enough to try to outline a statutory
method that is within the present constitutional competence of tl',
Congress and responsive to tle,%considerations.
It of course would be n act. of ('oiig iss subject to presidential
veto, and if passed, would indicate both tie approval of the legislative
and the executive branches.
This plan is baeI primarily ol one originally prolmsed by Mi.
Arthur Krock of the Now York Timines, who has studied this subject
intensively and presented testimony dealing with it. to the slecial
subcommittee of the lHouse Judiciary ('onimittee on April 12, 1956.
1 have taken the liberty of making some modiflcations in Mr.
Krock's plan which have been suggested by intervening observations
of a number of experts, by the -constitutional question which was
raised from various quarters.
There is a particular debt to somne
of the observations of Prof.
Jo.-, d1 E. Kallenbach of the department of political science of the
University of Michigan. I do not. know Mr. Kallenbach, but his
observations appear at. length in his testimony before the llouse cornmittee and in tie report of the llouse

.Judicinry

Coumittee on Presi-

dential Inability dated Januiuary 31, 1956? where lie submitted a
response to the questionnaire from the chairman of that, committee.
Now the plan in brief would he as follows: The first section would
include a declaration of policy or purpose-a statement why Congress&
believes it is necessary and proper in advance of the inability of the

President to prescribe a practical procedure to facilitate the orderly
and prompt determination of that inability and the proper devolvenieat. of those duties on the Vice President, and the circumstances and
procedure for a resumption of those powers and duties.

Another section, simple in form to which I have already referred,

should provide for the devolution

bLy the act of the President himself

when lie is physically able and willing to take the action that involves
the transmission of a message, a written message to the Vice President.
with copies to the Speaker and the President pro tempore of the

Senate.
The next section should create a special lody of limited function,
known as the Inability Advisory Council, coml;osed of the 11 persons

named in the Presideltial Succession Act. of 19-48 to asqsuro continuity
of executive 1ower in event neither the PIrsident nor Vice President
is available.
As the chairman knows, these include the Speaker of the House,
the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Secretaries of
State, Treasury, Defense, the Attorney General, the Postmaster
General, and the Secretaries of Interior, Commerce, Agricultur
and Labor.
Senator KEFATIF.r. Somehow when the Department of Health.
Education, and Welfare was established, the succession act was not
amended so as to include the Secretary of that Department.
Mr. FOWL.TR. Yes.
Senator Kr.FA v
committee.

R.

So you would leave that Secretary out of this

Mr. FowL n. I have no opinion on that, Mr. Chairman.
I think it would be perfectly appropriate to amend the succession
act to include the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as
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palt of this framework, because lie does have a very important role,
and I do not think it, would detract from either the ]'resildeitial Succemsion Act or this-proposed Inability Advisory ('ouncil to have
it .soincluded.
Tiho next section shouhl treat of (lie situation where the President's
inability concerns his physical or mental coalition from a health
stalidpl;Oit.•

In such cases it. woull lirovide that, upon (lie request of the Vice
President. or iy two vienbers of the Inability Advisory Council
filed with the Se retary of Slate, the Secretary '6f State wouhl convene the ouiicil by due and proper notice, to consider the desirability
of inslituting a formal determination of the inability.
Upon aflirmative vote of a majority of the Council in a meeting
called for this purpose, the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service should designate a medical panel of five leaders of the medicall
profes'sion, from tie heads of the medical departments of volunteer
hospitals. After an exanipation of the facts and the submission of a
report by the medical panel, the Liability Advisory Council, by a
majority fuiding, is empowered to declare the inability of the President. to dis.harge the powers and duties of his office, and to advise the
Vice President in writing, recommending that he should forthwith
assume the powers and duties of the President, provided that nothing
in this section shall make the advice and recommendation binding or
controlling on the Vice President.
The findings of the medical panel shall be advisory only and not
binding on (lie Inability Advisory Council, but a copy of the report
of the -findings of the panel, together with a copy of the report of the
Inability Advisory Council, shall be made public at the time the Council shall make a formal report to the Vice President of the inability of
the President.
A subset ion should also provide that the Council, at a meeting called
for the purpose, at the written request of the President or any member
of the Council, may determine, by a majority finding, tfat the inability
of the President is at an end, provided that nothing in this actionn shall
make the advice and recommendation of the Council binding and controlling on the President.
lie may follow this procedure, in other words, if he so wills. He
may assert that lie is able and this act would not in and of itself prevent
him from resuming his office.

The next section should provide a procedure for the operation of the
Council where the Presidential disability is due to reasons other than
health. That would dispense with the requirement for consultation
with the medical panel and the publication of a report. containing the
findings of any medical panel which would be academic under those
circumstances.
Finally, in such legislation,.it would seem to me to be desirable to
provide some modus operandi for the devolution and the powers of
the office pursuant to the terms. of the Presidential Succession Act
when because of war or hostile enemy attack, such as might occur in

case the Capitol should be subjected to an atomic bomb, the President,
the Vice President and a number of members of the Council would be
not available for action.
I have no suggestion as to the form of a provision that this provision
should take for this extraordinary and unusual emergency, but I
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vould Buggs that oto might bo dovoloped with tho advico of tho I)ih(or of l)of 1lso Mobilizatliou Intho liglit of platn of (hat olilco for the
maiutonatco of govornmont and pubito authority in (he case of enoiny
attack.
There (are both problems of comnunicationl amd successiot involved
there, and I do not, think I have lho knowledge and am siflciently ini
tolteh with the situation to suggest ai practical answer.
Air. Chairman, that conchlm as ily stalement.

I am again deeply

honored and appreciative of tho opporttnity to appear Ixiforo the
Committee..
(Mr. Fowler's statement is as follows:)
SrATPr;UNT O

I. PoIwO.WR 111,ATINU TO 'rESIIDENTIAL.

lURNaR

NARIITT

IUICtLATION

Mr.Chairman am gentlemen of the coininittee, my name is henry I. I".owhr.
I am a practleing attorney with the firn of Fowler, Leva, liawes & Hymlngton,
170t K Street NW., Washington, 1). U.
I au very much honored to be hero as a viness bIfore ilss iiwomniltteo to
participate in your dellberatlons on the very Iportant and complecited queslion of Vresidential Inability legislation.
I. COIRKQTIVS LE"O8LATlON AT

HI118SESSION IS CONSTITUTIONAt1Y

Y'.Amni.l

Any r~sumd of the historical background and analysis of the imnny issues of
law and statieraft surroulIlnlg this topeiwould be repetitious and presunptuous
In view of the availability to the committee of many scholarly studies and coinments. If I can be of any help to this subcommittee lils morning, It would be
by endeavoring to present it a Specific and concrete polnt of view that promises a
promit and practical treatment of the problem. Accordingly, that will be my
purpo," ,
I my opinion It Is legal, practical, and desirable for the Congress, by legislatire enactment at this session to facilitate the orderly devolution upon the Vice

President of the powers and duties of the Pr'sdent in (he event of (lie Presi-

dent's Inability to discharge them and their resumption by the President upon
a passang of his Inability.
No constitutional amendment should be necessary Itiview of the very general language In the inability clause of the Constitution (clause 0 of section 1
of article II) omitting any specific method for initiating and deernIining nn
Inability finding, and the availability of the so-called necessary and proper clause
(clause 1, section 8, article 1). There are two provisos to this statement.
The first Isthat the means chosen by the Congress be appropriate to the objective of facilitating the devolution of the powers !n question by providing orderly
proc u"
reasonably acceptable to the public and the officials Involved for
assisting In determining the Inability of the President, the assumption of his
duties by the Vice President, and their resumptlonby-the President. The second
proviso Is that the means chosen should not violate the overriding constitutional
principle of separation of powers or disturb any conceivably existing constitutional authority. This can be accomplished by making the statute and its
procedures declaratory and permissive, rather than mandatory, and by keeping
the procedures substantially within the executive framework.
Perhaps, the Congress may deem it wise to dispel any doubts of its constitutional authority to enact this type of law in advance of a Judicial test when
action Is taken pursuant to It, or, perhaps, It may wish to make the procedures
prescribed mandatory on the principal officials concerned (the President and
Vice President), rather than declaratory and permissive. If either of these conclusions is reached, I would sugegattitltlatJoh of a simple .amendment to clause
6 of section 1 of article I affirmatory of the power of Congress, along the lines
proposed by the chairman of this committee In Senate Joint ]Resolution 133, in
addition to the act of Congress to be discensed.
31. SOME MAJOR OBJEOTIVES OF

CORRECTIVE LEOISLATION

At the outset. It would be well to Identifyosome of the major objectives of
correctire legislation:
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(u) 'Firn net Pholild help to make clear thani, Ill event of a IPgQkidential InAbility", 11e ViLVi I'rVoldent dise. fiot hiecoie [lia 'rcmIident, Niat oftly an acting
I'fePmiltit, iMumnihiM the power and dfuties of Ilse Otl1ce only tesiportiily for the
durittlon of 11. lt 'resldentiul "inabIlltfy." 'thlis nctlon Joy theo Pingress would
Itoinuat. to a legiltlvo etio~ruetlon it tfhle nature of lte Vice fIremdenL's tenure,
Ini calto of a Priesidentianl "linablilly." It Phould herve ft whniiilze this: trouble.
Hoti ijiioxtlion that land helped to plangue and frustrate fipe purpose of the Found.
lugx i.'ulierng Ii providing for e~eclive contliuluiy for lte iExecutive power when
(it, J'restuent Imuiiiablo to illsechorgo It.
Mlv Thle 0(1l Pdanuld jirovinin' a alanpirie meanx for devolvitig temporarily thie
litwern and dulenth's
110remldency upton lte Vice P'residenit by act of public
the
wril i('i notiilnniloo boyfile l'ros'ildent hlitimlf fit camem where hw In pliyotialjy
coiiil'nit anid wiIlaig to acknowledge lilm "imblily."
Tills arranlgemfent ulI.
nloulhlly wouldn take caire of if great uuiniber of tlie likely vasem.
We 'rho net1 should plrovidle it iethod ndt procedure for the delt'rinlination of
n Preoildeal lot *'inliliy" where theC Prfesient INtunable or unwilling to dclare
laim own "iaublil(y." Tiheo greater pRtI (if lily comnunientm mvill be devoted to tis
inont niflilult osPIet of lte overall probllemi.
(di) 'The net iliouhi jarovlde af pre('ino mnmelbod for determIiilng (ho end of an
"'linblily' naiflip return to lte PI'rnsllcit (if lte iverm and dutties (if him
00lhce. otfter either a voluntary or Involitintfry deter [in tin (of arn "Inability"
hamn
resulted Ii lie asuuinitlon of those powers And( dlleo by the Ve 'rcsldlent.
Ill. TrIM MATUREn oV ?W: (XINHTITIJT101Als

lIAMN FOR ACTION 11YOO)NOisHS WITHOUT
AWAITINO OONATITUTIONA1L AUFNOUI;NT

'Thiere Imn. cons~iderabile rextpecthable authority for thie proposition that In the
ishoenre of any apetifle And well-dnefined constitutionally! prOjVIsIO far dealing with
flie "Inrbloliy" problem,
('ongresm under the ''nereota ry And jiropfwr" Misunse of
fip Cnaiimitollon (clouse 18, x"c. 8, Art. 1) may undertake appropriate leglaila.
tive nelion. In urging Ii view, JDr. KIiward 14.Corwln, orte of oujr outstanding
c'ninltiilonot authorities, In Il book, The Prexidenit: Me1cand Powers,, had
thin to Ray:
"Tme frulniers meant to provide a functioning xyttlem. of government aind preauuinia ly ild so. At lea at there In nio apparent reason why Congress should take
a lexx vigorm view of Its own comnpetene than It would! when It provided a
method ftor the settlement of the Ifalyea'J'itden dIxtauted election In 1877 and
therefore prevented n Civil WVar." (See 1957, ed. p.M.
Jn tuines of previmia oigetuslon prompted bly lte illn".s of Oarfleld and Wil.
son, there wn cons9iderable ojalnion to the effect that thi elnne embodyingt the
nno-elled Implied ilwecrs gives Congtress power to Implement the "Inability"
clauseo snce thim Is ni power necessary and proper to make effective the PExecutive power and guarantee that It shall not become olorniant.1
Manny contemporary legal scholArn have Also gone on record to thin effect, as
reflected1 In the heparings before the pubcormmltteo of the Irouwe Jiinlicary Corn.
ittee And In the report of January 31, 1056, setting forth responses to a questionnaire.
It should be,. noted that clause 18 of xnen 8 of Article I endows, Cona'res,n with
the power "to make nil laws which shall he necessary and proper for carrying Into
fExeculioon the foregoinq Powers and all other Poicers reslt'd by thisv 0 onitl ituto-n
in, the ao-erimnent of the United Nottes. or in anti Department or 0171"er thereof."
(Itnilc nunplied.J The )Atter part of thin prolvision meonq nothiniz If It does
not give Congress some Authority to enact legilation necessary And proper for
carrying Into execution (in addition to the exprem. mpowers of Conzre'ss o;Pt forth
In preceding 17 clauses of nee. 8), "all other powers" vested by this Constitution
Ini the Olivernment of the United States or any "Officer" thereof.
%See Rolh C. Silva In her artile. "Prooaidenfti Sneceasion and [usA0bility." in Law
1.454). at fontano
Univertrity Rchool of JAw (oinnin
Problemp.
t'ontempoiry'
Lind
4. r'hpre-Pb
gA t iriiji
thia iltok
view to the followlnr: 2 John Randolph Tujcker. Conatitu.
iof the U7nited States. 713 WiI99): Cooler. Presidentlod Inabllity 1. Xorth Antorfe'n
Review. (1AI) ait 425-427: Cnurtla, Presidn'ntlivi Inabillty. 25 Jlsrrer's Weeklv at 0M1
aindi 11R1: Jildev' Samue'l Shellaharper and Goyv. John Davis Long quoted in the Vew York
Jiemalil. Soptember 5, 1881. p. a. toAx. I aind 2: former Aftrney 41#neral A. Scboonmooker,
Jr.. of New York. atntM- in New York I(erald. September 1?. 1551. p. 4. Cola. 1-2: Congresman George Robeon. New York Wrhune.
lenrher 2. 1881. p. 51. Col. 1: fr~
Vice Praildtnt S~chunyler Colfax. New York Triboine.
tember S. 1581. p. 5. eoL S;
Repre.'entative Irliften N. McArthur, Jleari.'ga beflomreonmttee on the Judticiary an
It. It. 12609. 12029, 12849, and H. J. Rea&297, 60th Con., 2d sea.. (1929), at 33.
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There are those who contend that, in view of the fact that the only power specifically graitl to Contres.. In clause 0 of section 1 of article It Isto declare what
officer shl:;' ii%.t
as 1.resIdent hi ease of veancy or inability hi both the PresI.
des'.., tind Vice Prestdency, the riilo
of"ihelusto unlus, exclnslo alterlus" denies
C congress nay other authority In this area. 'T'hisgrant of broad and unlimited
specillc authority to (lie Congress to deal with presidential succession litcase
of lie unavailability of both the President anti the Vice President should not be
construed to preclude Congre&q from exercising Its more limited prerogative
Inoemnct neessary nnd proper measures, for example, designed to assist the
President and Vice President litcoping with lite problem of Presidential
"inaility."
This 'necesary and proper" provision gives Congress authority to ald or
facilitate the discharge of the responsibilities lodged iliother departments.
Otherwise, the express reference to the power to enact legislation necessary and
prolxer to carry Into execution nil powers vested in the Nntional governmentt or
any "Ofilcer" thereof Is relatively nienilnglegs. For over 109 years the Nation
has eneoumitered i series of serious situattons of practical I'reshilentinl "inallity"
without tie development of nn effective procedure by (te Executivo for devolving
tie powers and duties of the P.resitency temporarily upon the Vice President.
Tolay, It scens reasonable that apprropriate legislation to provide some proceunre to facilitnte this transfer where deirable Is necessary and proper to carry
Into execution all powers vested in the Nnthinal (loverninent. Indeed, a failure
to take soine action continues the risk that n situation iay rise where the
powers nmi duties of the President cannot be executed because of an "Inability"
and the irnspince of any appropriate and practical formula for dealing with It.
I slidl not trespas upon Ithe eoinmiltre's thne to elaborate nud analyze the
Iuiny Instances in which tile Supreno Court has relied upon tlis "necessary
amid proper" cliise it upholding coigressional enactmenas, Incluting Instatnces
flint give orderly prticil'ure to the operations of other coordinate powers, naniely,
the executive and tile Judicial.
Asuredly, care

iust be taken

itntny legislative enactntent of the type re-

ferred to to assure that the ineaus chosen are appropriate to assisting or facilitatIng a devolution of the powers and duties of the President upon lite Vice Presldent lit a practical and workable manner. The method selected should avold any
arrogation of authority to determine the Inability and the transfer of authority
to forces thnt would be destructive of the delicate balance of power embodied
as an overriding principle in the Constitution. These precautions, if observed,

should

erve to place the legislative enactment beyond substantial risk of suc-

ctcssfuil ciihtllenge on constitutional grounds.
.411

nillnt ion should ittls Ihe 11.1110 at (1i1ispolilt of tile cOlMIcitIoi, Soiaetl IOCS

MIdlaniced, that the 'oiistitution has already givent by
illication the itlhorlty
to act as Judge of the l'reslhnt's "inahillty" to the 'ice President. Accordlgly It Is urged that (lie 'ce l'resh'hnt 1uhl not constlnitlhuilly Ik'divested
of (iIIs power without a coiistitutional anlidment.

'There is a practical :iid i legal answer to this coiitentlon. The practical
answer is that Vice residentss thensev's'have never adopted this theory ainid
are not likely to in the future. Also, it is quite likely that the exercise of such
a prerogative by a i'hic President would euvelop tine adinilstrato of the
Ifluet, ilia clord of tittroversy aid debate. Ills efftectiveness would be
diminlshdti and the c.unmtry would su|iTor.
Tine legal tusver is lit two parts: Tie

first is that the (olnstitutlon does Inot
so provide in express or implied ternis. it is not likely that the Founding
Fathers would have tvlhed upon the sn-called rule of huw (hlt litcontingent
grants of power the ,mie to whom the power is granted is to decide when the
emergency has arisen. in such ia highly important and sigulileant matter as
tie transfer tofthe Ixjner and duties of the 'residency front one elected to his
next-in-line. The stxond part of the legal answer Is (hit the procedure established! by le;islatlo .un be delaratory andl pernilssive, rather than mandatory.
By providing that the advIce and renmmninendaton on "Inablilty" nilade available
to the Vice President by the procedure established shall not be binding or controlling but advisory to tle Vice lPrisident, any grave constitutional question
of displacing an Inpliled constitutional power Inherent in his Office can be
avolled. So much for the existing (mastituttoial power of Congress and the
argument that Congres-,s Is without present authority to pass a law designed
to facilitate the devolution of Presilential powers to the Vice President in an
orderly and appropriate fashion.

We come now too the related qutlon of whether or not a constitutional

amendment is necessary or desirable to enable Congress to act. Some of the
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be.*n Illicl|

(_ocgre s shiIuld leastt promptly' with thils l)robilen )y it legislaltve

fed.

na(Ineint.

Its ronmisttutional authority to nt itiong certiinliJnes x(,iis mut'ffle tiy c.ellr.
Actioi need 1iar be further dehiyed because of [lie desiree (if soni
to estichlisl

the constitutional nthorlty to hunfdlp the problem beyod any ioscllple ilolii.
While, n indllcatid nbove, It Is linot coy view that a coistitutlionl c icueldienlt
is ne essary, It does not follow that anl afllrmatory effort to amend the ('wstltutioi on tils score Is undesirable.
The (onstitution sholl not be changed for frivolous causes. It would be
unwise for the Congress to Initiate the nendatory proes through soin, prtoposial that woulblhurden the Cotistilutlomn with a letuiled ullld rigid dhcription
,)t (lie leallS 11il!
tllethoto bWutIized In handling tile Inillity
proileim. 'Thils
voirse nilghi fend too free
flie iro .edlure into a forni flint ulcght prove linira'theal In the future.
flowover, (litri, s would I no substantIln objection to uccmiimnIying till JvgisIntive ennodi'lnt piriiposid by it simple ('OJs titionlial liiendlinent allioatfor) of
iabe power of Congres iiloig the Iliws proiom-d by the
rlilioif orf this coinIif(e In ,SiiitleJoilnt lIesohillon 133.
'Tie coliliiiltt(t lilly con ilil, after further alnlysls of tie legil uicii cocstltuilonnil ( osidern(Itoiis concieri'ink the authority of Congress: to act InI til alPriuite
Ilicilr thit tht-re i it suibstantial oiloult. Or It ilay feelthat It is
better policy to uliove for li aflritiatory constitutional amlndllent rather than
walt for action pursuant to Its hglislative eiactient to IN! ,hlleyieg! In tin,
enioirts. (r it iny wish to make the procedures mandatory. In these eivntli:ililhes It should erlilnly Initiate the aiiendatory plroce'ss.
IV.

SOMEl VONIIIDIERATIONS
C
WiICHi SHlOWED A7I7END TilE 1"ISATIVE ('JiitI;
36r.A',Ns OR PROCEDURES IN TRiATINO TIE "INABILITY" PW.OIIA$I

OF

Tile gilding light for any exercise of legislative power, hased on the necessary

amid proper clause, Is contained in Chief Justice Marshall's classic opinion In
./McE(ulloch v. Jlorylaicd (4 Wheat. 316 (1819))

where he wrote:
"Let It be within time seope of the Constitution, and all means which are
nplroprlae, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
lult consist with the letter und spirit of the Constitution, are (instltntionai"
(p. 421).
What are some of the major considerations which should affect the congressional choice of appropriate means in this situation in keeping with tie spirit
of Marshall's statement?
First, the means chosen should be consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
ILet ns suppose that the iueans chosen leave the authority In making
determinrations as to Presidential Inability or the termination thereof pre.
dominantly In the executive branch so as not to be destructive of the Independence
of the executive. In that case they are consistent with the letter and spirit of
(le Constitution and Its overriding principle of the separation of powers. Let
us suppost also that the means chosen to facilitate the devolution of the powers
and duties of the President upon the Vice President In event of a Presidential
inicbility and their orderly remmption upon a determination that the Inability has
1usaseal, are dechratory and permissive rather than mandatory, designed to assist
rather than compel. In that event, there can be no real question that these
means are prohibited by some grant of power, Implicit In the Constitution, to
tlhe principal officials concerned, namely, the Presdent and Vice President.
Second, the means chosen should be practical so ns to be plainly adapted to
the end of facilitating the required action where needed. They should encourage
and make possible the ready Initiation of procedures looking to a transfer of
powers and duties when the executive authority cannot be fully and effectively
exercised because of a Presidential Inability. In short, they must be designed
to overcome the inertia which has marked previous occasion& Those In a
position to know and understand the seriousness of the situation and Its effect on
the functioning of government should be In a position to initiate the process of
determination. These Include the President, when he Is physically able to make
such a determination, and the Vice President, members of the Cabinet and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the
Senate, i. e., those who are named, pursuant to the Constitution, by the Pres-dential Suecems-lon Act as officers upon whom the responsibility rests for maintaining effective continuity of executive authority.
By the same tokeh, those chosen to assist In and facilitate the making of a
determination of Inability or the end thereof should be predominantly those close
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to the elected leader of the people personally, politically and In the day-to-day
dirchrge of their oflelal ditties. The Itiitilry should be calin, friendly, sympaithetie and, in tin sese partlsn ior analogous to Impeachment. Given a promedure, embodying this concept, with the clear right of tie President to resume hi
poiwers and dtties when tie ",ability is ended, not seriously Jeopardlld, tho
imeans chosen can le said to, e praelenl.
Third tlhe roedmures IntlitutR by tegislatlvo enactment to facilitate this
delicate transfer of authority should be politically acceplable. They should
satisfy the peoile and tpublile Olnoin as to the fairness nld proplriely of the action
and, thereby, rally the country behind their new acting pretldetnt for the tine
lie nu.0ttserve.
Perhaps other standards or tests may lhe considered. Also there may be room
for considerable debate ns to wheti.er n given procedhre prolxrly accords with
these conlilerittlons. Of a certainly no precise solution accedaibie to everyone
call be devised. Nonetheless, I have been presumptuous enough to try to develop an outline of a statutory method, within the present conslitullonial coti.
Ipetence% of the Congress nttd re\ponsive to the foregoing consilerattons. It
would be provided by in net of Congres, subject, of course, to tile usual Presidentia veto so that, In event of Presidentlial approval the procc(iure described
would have the backing of both legislative and executive branches.
This plai Is based primarily on one originily proposed by Mr. Arthur Krock
of the New York Times, \vlio has studied thits topic intensively and pre~elmteti
testimony dealing with It to the Special sut'onmniltee of lhe llnuqe Judicinry
dettil Inblitly on April 12, IP0 (see hearings before
L(inittee on l'reon
Splxcial S'ubconmmilttee to Study P1residential Inability of the Connimittee oil
the judiciary, iouse of leprosentltIves, p. 01 et seq.)
I have taken the liberty of making sone minor modtflcntions In his lnn
suggestei by Intervening otservatlons of a number of experts, with a particular
. Kalienlich of the I)epnrt.
debt to soni of the observations of Prof. Josrl
nient of Political Science of the University of Michigan. I have not had the
il'lesurc of metlng hn but his observations appear at length fi the testimony
before the House coiwuliteo and In the report of the House Judiciary Cont.
mittee on Presidential Inability dated January 31, 1050.
V. OUTUtNE OF PROPOSED PLAN
The plan suggested for your consideration would Include the following pro.

visions:
(1) A declaration of policy or purpose--a statement of the reasons why It

Is necesnary and proper, in advance of the Inability of the President to dils.
charge the powers and ditties of his office, to prescribe a practical procedure
to facilitate the orderly and pronlt determination of that Inability and the
proper devolvement of those duties on the Vice President, as provided In clanso
6 of sxctlon 1 of article 11 of the Constitution, and the circumstances and pro.
cedure for a resumption of those powers and dtties by the 1resIdent.
(2) A section simple in form providing that upon the transmission by the
President of a message to the Vice 'resident with copies to the President Pro
'empore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House stating his Inability to
dlcharge the powers and duties of his office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President, until the transmission by the President of a message to the same
parties stating his resumption of the powers and duties of his office.
(3) A section creating a special body of limited function, known as the "In.
ability Advisory Council," composed of the eleven persons named In the Presidential Succession Act of 1048 to assure continuity of executive power In Grent
neither the President nor Vice President is available (3 USCA sec. 19). These
Include the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro teipore
of the Senate and the Secretarles of State, Treasury, Defense, The Attorney

General, the Postmaster General and the Secretaries of the Interior, Commerce,
Agriculture, and Labor.

(4) The next section should treat of the situation where the question of the
President's Inability concerns his physical or mental condition from a health
standpoint. In such cases it would provide that, upon the request of the Vice
President or any two members of the Inability Advisory Council filed with the
Secretary of State, he (the Secretary of State) shall convene the Council by
due and proper notice, to consider the desirability of instituting a formal determination of the inability of the President, Upon an affirmative vote of a majority
of the Council in a meeting caled for this purpose, the Surgeon General of the
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Public health Service shall designate a medical panel of five leaders of the
medical profession, from the heads of the medical departments of voluntary
hospitals. After an examination of the facts and the submission of a report by
the medical panel, the Inability Advisory Council, by a majority finding, Is em.
powered to declare the Inability of the President to discharge (lie [powers and
duties of his oMe and to advise the Vice PreAldent In writing, recouumnendlng
that he should forthwith assume the powers and duties of the I'resident, pro.
vlded that nothing In thl section shall make the advice and recommendation bindIng or controlling on the Vice residentt. 'Ihe findings of the medical panel shall
be advisory only and not binding on the Inability Advisory Council but n copy of
tIle report of the findings of the panel, together with a report of the Inalbllty
Advisory Council shall be made public lit Any time the Gouncil shall make n
formal relort to Ilie Vice President of the Inability of the president.
A subNectlon should also provIde that the Council at a meetlng called for thnt parpoge
nt (lie written request of the l'reshidit or any member of the Council may deter.
mine, by a ninjority finding, thAt the Inability of the President Is at an end, pro.
Vld!N that writhing In this sectiOn shlll make the advice ind recommendation of
the Council binding and controlling on (he 'resident.
(5) A further section should provide a procedure for the operation of the In.
ability Advisory Council where the PresIdentlal disability Is doe to reasons other
Ihnu health, dlspensirng with the requiremient for the consultation of the medical
pmnel and the publIcatloi of a report containing the findings of that panel.
(0) An Additional section should provide n mollus opernindl for the devolvement of the powers and dulles of the Oflec of the president pursuant to the terms
of the I'resldentinl Huccesslon Act when because of war or hostile enemy attack,
such as might occur In case the Capital should be subjected to atomile bombing, the
President, the Vice President, and a number of members of the Inability Advisory
Concell would be killed or wounded. The provision for thls extraordinary and
unusual emergency should be developed with the advice of the Director of Defense
Mobilization In the light of the plans of that Office for the maintenance of (Cnv.
ernment and public authority In (he case of enemy attack by atomic bombing,
since both problems of communication and succession are Involved.

Senator 1(rVA UY . Mr. Fowler, one question. If the present law
is as you have stated, that the Vice President has no legal right to
do-ido on his own to determine the matter of inability of the President and to take over in that case, how would this declaratory and

permissive statute strengthen disposition?
Mr. Fowv,t. Mr. Chairman, I believe you misunderstood me. I
did not mean to imply that the Vice President is without authority
under the Constitution. My comments went to the practical fact of
history.
Senator K

,EFAUVER.
Yes.

Mr. FowLER. That in previous instances he, the occupant of that
office, has been unwilling to exercise any such power if it exists, or to
assert that he has the authority. I think that his reluctance has
been probably for factual or practical reasons for fear that he might
be thought to be a usurper or for fear that his action would be
considered improper and disloyal; that these considerations have
held back the Vice Presidents who have been in this situation from
acting.
The whole purpose of this particular procedure proposed here
would be to provide an arrangement or a procedure where the advice and recommendation of such at body along the lines indicAted

here would fortify the Vice President and indeed make it clear that
the responsible officials of Government deemed it his duty to assert
the inability.
I think as a practical matter with this procedure available, it would
be much more. likely that in event of any future situation, a Vice
President would assert his authority. The act as proposed here, if
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it. I., kept ill de0111,11ory nild porinislIo tni would nlot collide With
1111% existilig Implied nut-hority i tile Cons8ftitton today but It Would
IHollYu lj 11( bliY up lind MiIlpot and itinke Jpriitticaf the exercise
Of that nut horitv.
If, onl thlo othor 1111nd, ('o igr 'i shotild desire to iniiko tlit p)ro.
Veduren mandat11ory, 111141 11miko (lie del t-rillIin( ionl of thle Inmd1bility ('oluul
vil nlot Ildvisory 6ut t11111,
1 Wouldl sggest. 11I100i. those vwimlstillce.4
lhat tii tistlit i Ial a1t1101(11110t allong the flnes sliggeStd by you,
simply atirpiatorY, would beN In olider.
811i1itor E.LV1. As I unldetandi(
te Ildi(Hply part, it would11
A411i1V tWN acquiescence14- both of flt Vice MVresident. and of (lie
1'resldenit.
Mr. Folvixit. Well, ill atells where (ft)e itmahilifV waiaton
\y 1
11ter of
Ilii'itltl or 1110iital i'ollitioii, ItC WOli1 llot, require tho amient. of (to
l'mv'sidoilt.
U poll t(li vote of the majority of tile Ilnbility Advisory
(1oillititi, they~ would rev'ominenid to tile ViceX P'resident. thnt. lie A.s"lliue
IIloepmNwers anitd du t 6't of IIlk oive,
Nowy it Nhis ly.Av~nsl t hat for remions t hat oxist at. the tine,
aietVc
''s
Iteil~lit 1\efilse to ll."1iune those powers anld
dt io' dL'slittC flit) aiibili ty or O-Al existence of f ill
'diep
1111(1
il'toliikieudui I loll.
(Molilelitato'si Cons"ideredl that. poS,8ibilit y Mnd there 1111beenl disculssioii of whether 11writ of 11nanditimis shot bd
h issucil, I. 1think mider
thlose Cirell ist ances,' wherek the Vice P'residenit. is unuwilling, despite
this kind of a idig and determnatioii, acttually there is little re-olliisk, that tilt' C'olitr callohave.
Seine have silggsl'ed thnt mider those ic*tne
iiecuiei
uIight he proper becaullse of a1failure) of tile V'ice Pres iNdent
WMIXJillgq
to asAi't, or1to Cai'rv out wht 01re thle (lilt ivs of Is office hut, OxtN-pt for (tat. pwzsihility of inppeeineont. procee(ligs, I woid think
lt1 there would he no way in, whilh yolt canl force atnami to a-ssine
he owes
ad (iltjesofti otlc in such a situtition.
Senator IKrr.%uvRe. And then likewise there tihld be, tin way you
V'ould force Ithe old I"MReidenit back ill uponl a finding thudi inabiility find
termin ated.
.Nrr. Fomvixtt. If hie (11(1 not want. to serve.
Senator KYrPuuvv.R. Uiiless l]e wanted to serve.
Mr. Fow~i.r~.That. is correct, sir.
Snntor Kv-F.%uivY. Mfr. Fow~ler, yout have given uts a statement that
retlects ai great deal of thought and study and background. It is a
--eholarly primsnt tt ion. I know it. will certainly be considered a sub-

stantial and a.worthwhile contribution to the th'Inking on this suibject.
and we are very grateful to yon.
Mir. Fowjx:. Thank yon, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KFF.\u'vFR. Mfr. Smithey, dto you have any questions to
ask ?

Mr. Smtrrimy. I have just a couple of questions, Senator.
You touched on one briefly in Tour remarks just now.
Does not any statutory souion, Mr. Fowler, carry with it some
legal uncertainty as to the ability of a recovered President to reassume
the duties of the PresidencyI
Air. Fowi~n. It does carry some uncertainty. The P assage of an
act along the lines indicated here and also suggested by, I believe,
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tnig
in wolid 1uiiolint
Hontoi 1'iyiie ill One( oif thie HcA'!I1011$ of II
to a Ieglislntw Ooist riet ion of what. I lit !onli Itii ion lliauti8 when there
is it P~residenial liability.
vertd litalnl('O where eongres,Nw,*ill the palst, Moro1( hatV'o been1I vo'll-41f
1iljve H4't. at. reit, Owh
rilc
IJ to legliitie
sioiilnl iici8 11116il1iJli
(j.it ioiis of this sort.

Adivuallj, I think in tho Firm. Ooiigiess there wasi Al net pnvoed conMining thle Const ii iion to give fio Peirrsideiit tho power to reniove
Ithat tooik rare of tlint,prolileiui
LP)Is8 11ippo)liited to oflkt; by hill)i 111ii1
IlInI I Ine, 11nf10l we got into Owhquest ionl of I lie illixed hegishalV a , d peveutlye agenicipes.
Ut Would liIo. coniplele in, Hettle with July tilirlily thint ronst it tional
110.4 le'gislait ive conl(jilest loll, blli I be{lieve for all prod tica pjiIs'
sI mue ion by tlio Coji rss ivouh 1('ear it up.
I bldievo. in the 201h nineidinl(it, uiiiil n6418 iii the Presidenltital 'Suecesioli Adt M4ii 'on~cept. of ait Iratifer of tflep poes n(l ditit ies of
(lie office raitei' 111liante oflice itself hns beenifile. sub/oct of biothi conlle ('lillvii(lit. I I 1111k t hat it. is a
legislated
iii('nt 1111(1
Htilt Iiolill P'

ver

t1he jreseilt sitult 1(111
rils1k ini tenp of111
%r.
I[Ti[lY. Is(re not a further weakness iii the statutory appronu'li, ill (1li1t. any test of the legality of thaut apprii~oh would collne
itt theI inost iiioppori ine tinle?
Mi'1.Feowuvn. Thlit is Itue, and( I have referred to that,. I think it,
would coniie it. anl illoppjortiune Qule, Itlotgl I would~ personally
ttiit

think it would be atvery unwise principle to Say that, fihe Constitutionl
should he iiiioldeo every titne uoiigres undertook a very inipo rant
enlactmlent, ben~iise wiome Iodmight, inter chailleinge it, in (lie courts.
Yoit would verve Hhortly, i tlink, get. a constitution that woidlo be
like the Napoleonic Code. It would lo.% a goodl (lea]1 of what has made
it. thlegreat instiment it is today.

Thlat point of view oeos not Appeal to mne, amending the Constitusolllebody is going to bring n. case in the future, unless the
committee and( the Congress fee thatthis is really a su bstantial (doubt,,
unless it. is a very close question i~n the opinion of tile committee, then
tile kindl of afirnhtory cojlstititioi N amendment. that Senator
Kefauver hans Ipro poseol would seem to me to be thle desirable course.
"MrMI%rTIIY. Isn't it true historically tilat in the. instances where.
10on because

this. Nat iou has experienced some Presidential inability. that Vice
Presidents have hesitated to take over the office of the Presidency, and
Cabinets have failed to propose, that tile. Vice President take over the
Presidency, because they were uncertain.
Mr. F0.FR. Precisely.

.Mr. SMITHF.Y. As to the power of tile recovered Preiident. to resume
the powers and dutie-s of tile office.
Mr. FOWLER. I believe that is the historical fact. I would also suggest that if Congress should pass this type of law, declaring in event
of the inability of tile President, simply the powers and diulies, if not

the office, should d devolve upon tile Vice President, I believe that would
put~the question pretty much to rest,, andi I would suggest t-hat a Preident would not hesitate under those circumstances, and his Cabinet
would not hesitate to arrange for an orderly transfer of the powers
and duties because of this vague fear that once there had been a doVJ.Ition, that the Vice President would serve out the term regardless
of the recovery of the President..I
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)o you feel it wise in your plan to have such largo
Mr. SMuTliun.
representation of the monbers of the executive branch in innlaing this
lermina t ion, and such al imbalance between the legislative and
the executive inmaking this determination t
Mr. 1?owltxn, In an effort to bend over backward to avoid any
serious constitulional question under [li doctrine of separation of
powers, it skems to mo ihat the )rtdoiinant detormhiation should be
on (he executive side.
My choice or my suggestion that. that be the medium used arises
primarily out, of rxgarl(-o devise a method thnt avoids ally suggest ion
lhat the Congre.s or the Court. or that some other branch of (|Mvernment is nctwicling 1p)oii the independence of the E1xecit ive in this
re Yar .
"As'npractical niatter, I think there 1ar0 two argumnids. One, lint
because these me are .o CloAe to the Pirsid(entl that they would 11ot be
likely in event of his illness, or hicapacity, to move or to reonniid
lhat the Vice President take his powers zmd duties.
That. is a matter of opinion. I seems to me lhat on the other sido
for such a serious act. yot want the judgment made by people who
are close personally nnd officially in day-to-day operatioli, who can
see what, li lrsiatit's condition is doing to ile nirai-s of government, and yet. who are very loyal and fril
to hill so that if this
group of n'en ma the recoilnl
menditio or isiked the
President
the country at large would be satisfied that lhe Psident's friends anid
those who'wert, in tl best position to know both about his coildition
and the effect it. was having on the affairts of goveriient, would have
made the determination.
I point out-1 am not too familiar with it, but my understating
iq--the British House of Commoniis has taken a steel some years ago,
they passed a new Regency Act, in which they selected live l)eople
who woul determine when the Monarch was able to discharge his
duties. They were his spouse and four officials, who were very close,
would be very closo to the King or the Queen as the case niight, be, in
their dischar e of their official responsibilities, and people whose offices
would tend to make them sympathetic and friendly rather than
antagonist ic.
Mr. S.trritr. Just one further question, Mr. Chnirnman. You will
notice, Mr. Fowler, that in article I, section 1, clause 6, the language
is in sequence. It speaks of death, resignation, and inability in tie
same clause so that, whatever it is that the Vice President takes at
that time, he. takes it in all those instances. ,
The precedent having been established by Vice President Tyler and
later affirmed in the succession of 6 other Vice Presidents, and on 1
occasion in ,Johnson's impeachment, having been confirmed by the
Congress. do you think that the Congress would now find itself iinder
.ome difficulty in asserting that. it has authority to determine that. it
isreally the p;owers and duties that devolve upon the Vice President,
rather than the office itself?
Mr. Fow.r. I do not, think that presents any difficulty. Tt. seems
to me it is so clear that in the case of the death of the President, the
question of whether the powers and duties are assumed or the office
its lf is assumed. there is no real question there.
In the case of an inability, the reference hack can certainly be in
terms of construction to the powers and duties, rather than to the
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office, and if Congress declared this particular meaning, I would think

that would pretty well set the question at rest.
Mr. SM1IT1IMY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator lK:VAUvtE, Mr. Callaghln, the legislative assistant to
Seitator O'Mahoncy is present.
)o you have any questlojs?
Mr. CAr~L,,IuAN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
8enator lKEAv,.u. Another question, Mr. Fowler.
You ]lave the Committee consistiiig of the Vice Pre.9ident and the
President of tlie Senate pls certain CabineL members. I am sure it
is ridiculous for anyone to think seriously that the Speaker and the
President pro temper of the Senate might color their actions or thinking in matters of this khid by the fact lhat their action might put
thenm one step nearer to the presidency itself, but might not they be
reluetait to servo oil such a committee on tie basis that somebody
mi ght think that they had somo personal or political interest?
Mr. Fowami. I wouldn't know, I have no way of knowing what
IIheir attitude would be on that.
It does seem to mie as tie chairman has indicated, that in such a mat'-

ter of this sort that men who through long periods of public service
have risen to that situation, that the thought that their action in replacing a President or a Vice President temporarily wouhl be colored
is just so remote to tile that I would think that til0 other argument

should prevail, namely, that the Congress, with the approvIof the
President, has deternlined in the Presidential Siccesaion. Act, that
these particular officials are the ones who are responsible for maintaining a continuity of executive power, and they have already been
chosen as it wore, as the persons with that responsibility.
In tile caso of thia two officials mentioned, In addition to their legis-

lative duties, and that under those circumstances it seems to me t at
we avoided the problem of a separation of powers by selecting thoe
officials, and if we provided for the determination to be madely any
other group, you might got into, at least I can se where there might
be objection from the executive side.
Senator l_.FvAUnR. My anxiety would not be that they might take
some action for their own benefit, but that they might lean over backward the other way to avoid any criticism that they were enhancing
their own political closeness to the presidency.
Mr. FowLJt. Mr. Chairman, in a very close case where it was just
touch-and-go as to whether an inability should be determined, I would
eco no reason why in such a situation they could not in effect decline
to serve in that kind of a case, and a majority finding of thie group
would be sufficient under the law for the action to occur.
And if it was a close case and any individual did not want to be
placed in a position where he felt he might be criticized I should not
think there would be any reason for insisting that the whole panel act
and vote, and they could excuse themselves or disqualify themselves
in that particular situation.
That would leave the remaining 9 persons available as a majority

for a vote of 6 of the remaining 9, that would be sufficient to trigger
this mechanism.
Senator KEFAUVE.r. I know you observed in 1 of the resolutions
that I have sponsored that I had the 4 leaders of Congress as mem22324-58----9
-

~
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bers of tho committee along with tho members of the C"abinlet. Mint
i8 your thinking about that? Thnt is till four lenders of Conivms,
plus tho Cabitiet, but not tho Speaker nd not thle P'resident, Iwo
A~IVxi. OIFH I Would 110t. qua11rrIliat. 11ll With fithat V1ice Of )Proi.
I think it. wouldd still leave (itI I rdtoininlatit, control of the sittint01
ill tlit, exe'cut ive branch and ntot niro4gate file authority to inake I !io
detorinaltions 11way froi ie e xeeultive branchl, aind InI my Opinion
it wold be consistent with tlie prineilple (if separation of powers.
'rho only3 reaCflOl that. I could seo' agaiiist. it. is it Couldl l' Arguedl by
some that. this is bringing tho leg ishat ire briich too much uIto tile
problem.
1 (to not think that ar'gtiument is atsountd one tigainst iiicidiig thle
four persons you have nent ionied, aiid I iniv~iidu~ally eoul l hardly
subscribe to it.
I hare mande tho other Suggestion here oni the theory that, Congress
ha11already ill tho preivslelitifll slicCs'siIII Act (lehlielel the pl)oIb
who arve conceried with ile plWitll of eCXIM'iit ie olitiluity, mild
thait is atusefuil preedenit for this purpose here.
Senat1or. K~r.muVFt. Well, wve are' cei'tiiily Vry grattefiul to youl,

M1r. Fowler.

M4r. FowtFR. Th'lank oul, Sir.
Senator Kr..%tv~t. Our next witness is P"rof. E-,dgar 1VWVatgh.
Profess-or Waugh is head of thie depnirtment of history anld social
seienices ait. Easterni ieligan College. 1-c hang had a long experience
as a toeher of political science nd the ('onstitut ion and lins written
two books dealing with this andl related problenis.
We( are ghanl to harve you here, P"rofessor Waugh. Youir hiogrnphy
as we hanve it will be printed in tile record at this point.
(Thlt autobiography referred to is as follows:)
FUGAR W. WAITCn

'.&M.
A., University of
Borni Goodiiiiia. M4ippNoveinlwr 140,1001. It.
Further studies, Coliunibin University,. Oeorge Washington Untversity anti University of michigan lAxw School. lins taught in 1)01)1 e(Iueatiofl
s4ystezns of Mississippi, Texas and NMichlgau. At present Prf~rfPoltkal
Science, Eastern Michigan College. Member of Anierican Federation of
Teacbers-AM~-CIO, American Political Science Assqociation and Authnri Mldl.
Democratic nominee for State Saperlntendent of public Instruction of Michigan,
1901.
Author of two books-hfeaven Speaks Amierican (Cedar ]Rapids, Iowa 1J39)
and Second Consul: The Vice Presidency-Our Greatest Political Problem
(Indianapolis and 'New York) 1950.

NIIsissilip.

STATEMENT OF PROF. EDGAR WAUGOH, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, EASTERN MICHIGAN COLLEGE
Mr. WArm!. Thank ou very muchl,1Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUTER. Professor Waugh, your statement in full will be
printed inl the record.
Any part that you summarize or omit will be printed as if you had
read it. Now you proceed in your own way, sir.
MNr. W'Avoii. Thank you, Mfr. Chairman.
I wish to state that I appreciate very much thle opportunity to
present, my views to this subcommittee.
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I know Ihe enorinous time|pre ssre mnder which vo o erat', And

I 1ii goilg to try to make my te.t inmony just as brief a

Call.
I wotild like to ntiko one correction for the record, Mr. Clhairtuifil.

I Rill Itot head of the dIepartillent of history 111d .m ifl sciences. I
11111
profesoor of political science lt Ei.sferni Michin,. College. We
have various social scienltes in one deparl inent,.
Seniator NErAli7'a. Well, mir, yo Ire very niolh,,t to correct to
I101c11d, bill. lero in the political fi of t.he Nation, we always ehvate
goo I twoplea little bit if wcanl.
Mi.
.wuu. Thnnk you.
.1%
It. was very kind of yoi, Mr. Chairman, to invile Imy goodl wife to
Si )y lily side, 11t1d 1 (f1 not wish to inject political consheral ios, but
it 1 llO15 ap propriate i ,iusei I think il 19.52 slip wa the ||ost
enthusiastic l,,stes Keftiver fnn ill the lUiited States.
Seiiilor K(Y;r.%itivE. Well, 1 nln very glad to hear that. I didn't
kiuoxv it, but seeing how intelligent and pleasaw lipe is, 1 am not slurp' ied.
Mr. W1'.iiu. As I proceed, Mr. ('hairnian. its Will .id, 111' state1int will go ill the record so it will not he necessary for fie to repeat
the Inilk of Ilhe stitleiient.
In the (iiA place, I would like to say tliat I filly sigre with lithe
previous wit nless that the Congress has power to act. *
I woilld evel go further thalln t, previous witness. Mfr. 14owler,
did. I believe the Congress has
1i
full power to act not only inder
the elast ic clause as he elaborated it, ht I think also we intist look
it tile Coistitiution as a whole, lind niany times the Supreme Court
has dolne so.
I agree with the previous witness that. the subsection clause in article
11, section 1, that is clause 6I, where it gives Congress power to declare who shall act in case both the President and Vice President are
disable(l or removed or resigned or deceased, does not specifically give
Congress the power to act on the point we are considering.
I agree to that. But I do not agree that it is without significance
even on this point, because it seems to me that when we look at the
(Constitutioli, as a whole, Congress is given pIwer in the last resort to
see that there is a President, and we must presume that the Consti-

tution meant a President able to function. It would be foolish to
think that. Congress would have the power to see that there is a Presi-

dent without. meaning that there is a President functioning.
So I think that is with significance as we look at the Constitution
as a whole.

We notice that in article II, section 1, clause 3, now repealed by the
12th amendment, but not, without historical significance, the Congress had a responsibility. In case the electoral college failed to
yield a majority for President, it was up to the House to step in and
choose from the highest 5 and then if there was a tie for runnerup
which would be Vice President, it. was up to the Senate to make the
choice.

In the 12th amendment which succeeds that, if the electoral college
fails to yield a majority, again it is up to the House to step in and to
choose a President froni tilie highest 3, and the Senate to choose a
Vice President from the highest 2. And also we get to the 20th
amendment, and where we have neither a President-elect nor a Vice
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President. elect who was qualified, again it is up to the Congress to

declare by law who shall act. as Pre.ident.

What I am saying is, if we look at the Constitution as a whole,
Congress ischarged wit Aseeing that the e is a lIvIqideitt, RIO it. must
mean that it is it President who is active.
Now this is a strange e way to start, and yet to wind up advocating
a constitutional amnt ond ti.I al aiong those who bilievo that a
statute would be sufficient, who believe there is constitutional power
for Congress to act, but. I observe that there is a wide difference of
opinion.
There are many able students of th Constitution within tho (olgress and without who believe that, a constitutional imnendmnent is
necssary, and it. is such a sriois question that I believe the happiest
solution' would be both a constitutional amendment and a statutory
approach.
(o not lieve there can be a happy solution without both.
Now Very briefly, I have started with thme proposal made by then

with
Attorney (emueral llrownell and President Eispnl1mower that is,

the Preident's endorsement to the House Judiciary Sxubeommittee
on Presidential Inability on April 1, 1957.
Now why do start with this? I will be very frank.
I think we have had so many proposals and so ninny solutions
offered that I think it is time we begin to reduce them.
I am on record as proposing a different solution, but I think it is
time to reduce thim.
Now my feeling is this: When the President of the United States
endorses a proposition, it. (loes not necessarily mean that it should
go through but it does mean it. should have weighty consideration
and when it concerns his office nid his office alone, I think it should
have distinct priority of consideration. It should be. considered,
adopted or defeated with priority over all propositions that have beIn
presented to the Congress.
Now'you will notice that I have made a draft with modifications
of thatplan, and that I have underscored all of the places where I
advocate either change or addition. Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend
to be an expert at. draftsmanhip. I am pretty well satisfied with my
own teaching job and am not applying for a job in the drafting
service here. in Congress.
I feel pretty amateurish at it, but I felt. I could do this more briefly
if we followed this.
As you will notice in this draft which I have presented, action 1
is identical with section 1 of the plan p'esented by Mr. Brownell with
the endorsement of President Aiseinhower. Tfiat means it finally
clears the situation that when the Vice President takes over for a disabled President, lie becomes an acting President.
In other words, what it does, it establishes the same rule-I beg
your pardon. Section I makes it clear that the Vice President taking
over for a President in case of death or in case of resignation or
in case of removal, becomes the President for the unexpired portion
of the then current term.
It adds nothing new except. one thing. 117 years of history since
the Tyler precedent have established that the Vice President becomes
President on the death of the elected Chief Executive.
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This only establishes (lie same rulo in case of his resignation or in
case of his Imoval from oflice.
It would appea' sensible, because if tie President dies, the Vice
President becomes President. If the President resigns, he is out for
the rest of his term. 'T'here is no ten porary character about it.
The same rule should be logical. If the Piesident is removed, he
is out, an(l therefore the sao itile should apply.
uit tliat relhy adds
nothing now.
Of course, there are many able scholars who believe the framers
of the Constitution did not intend thnt (lie Vice President become
President, but with I17 years of history back of us since the Tyler
precedent, it. is rather late to label ihat as a period of constitutional
error.

I believe it, would ho well to settle the question for all time in a
coist itut ional aenidinent.
Sect ion 2 of this draft I fim subliittIng is exactly the sarmn as section
2 of th prio)osal which Mr. lirownel submitted with the endorse.

nIent, of residentt lisenlIower.
'flint merely makes it, clear fhint if the President declares in writing
that he is unable to serve, then the Vice President shall exercise,
shall disharge tie powers aid duties of (lie office as acting l'rcident.
Tliat I think is the sense, Mr. Chairman of virtually everyone who
has testified before your committee, that i case (lie Vice President
takes over for a disahhed J'resi'ent, it should be tem porary and he
should merely be acting l'resident and should not, woud nt oust the
elected Chief:
Senator I(1:rAuvF:,. Profesor Waugh, in considering whether you
might have added something to section 2 rather than just Ict it
stand as submitteAl by the Attorney General with the approval of
the President, did you think about the emoluments? There is quite
a discUi.'-ion as to whether the Vice P'resident when acting as President should receive a higher salary, whether lie should receive the
Presidential salary, whether he should live in the White House,
whether he should have the benefit of (he emoluments of the office.
Mr. WAuOIL. Yes. Mr. Chairmnan, I have added one section providing (lint Congre.m could implement this proposed amendment by
appropriate legislation, and as to your question, the first part I would
answer very definitely this is a very wealthy nation, andwe have no
reason to be bothered about the extra salary. If we were a loor nation
we might, but I would say that while the Vice President is acting
as President, lie is )erforming those very heavy burdens, and my
opinion is that an act of Congress should grant him the same salary
which the President receives.
I do not think in case the President is declared disabled, where he
has himself declared his own inability, the Vce President should
occupy the quarters which the elected Chief occupies.
Now I believe that if a President became so disabled that lie believed really that lie was not going to be able to serve any more,
he would tender his resignation, and that would bring section 1 into
execution.
So I believe that lie should not occupy the White House quarters,
but should get the salary attached to the office.
Senator I(EFAUV.R. I agree with you that is a minute matter that
should not be dealt with in a constitutional amendment directly.
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Mr.W mV.u. Yes. Thankyou, Mr. Chairman.
Now when we colie to section 3, section 3 of the proposal 1m(ade by
Mr. Brownell, if you will recall, and I have undeiescored the chlnges
here, it. said if the Presidont (1oes not so declare, the Vice President,
if satisfied of the Prsident's inability anid upmn approval in writing
,of a majority of-it used the expression lithe heads of executive
of the I'residont's Cabinet." Now I
c
dlepartIuents who ae 11ebers
have struck out those terms and hrve sulstituted a majority of the
principal officers of the executive departments.
The reason for that is this. I thought in the hearing before the
]louse sulommittee, Mr. Keating Itade a very substantial observation. Ito said in substance, "You are using this term 'majority of the
heads of the extvutive Iapartments who are ineiihers of the Presi(tkltlts Cabiet't , and lie said that the terni "Cabinet" is unknown
to our Constitution and virtually tiknown to our laws.
in other words, he pointed ouit the fact that the Cabinet was a kind
of expansive thing.

a large as the PI'isident wants it. or it. can be us small,
It call itand I think we all agree that is constitutionally true. The President could say today, "I want. the Secrtary of State ll(Seturetary of
Tetasury and Secrtary of 1)efense in my Cabinet. '1he rest of you
(your w'ork, hut I (o not want you
stav dow in your offices and d(o
collectively fulltioning with me," and he would have constitutiojnal
authority to do so.
So he felt that something very indellinitO was lbing left. there. I
also think so. I think it. was a valid criticism. I believe the Cabinet
is the proper body to adis" the Vice President.
lut I do not b~iieve that we should leave it vague and indefinite.
Therefore, I have substituted the words "principal officers of the
mX.outive departments."

That is a term distinctly known to our Constitution. If you will
,recall, this term expre.ly appears in our Constitution, article 1I,
section 2, clau-e 1. There it autliorizes the President to require in
writing the opinion of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments. That is known to our Constitution and we are told
that it is really the origin of the Cabinet. President Washington
sought to It.the Senate to serve as an advisory council, was unsuccessful, and tereupon he looked for advice elsewhere and he Mad this
and reasoned thus: "If he could require the opinion in writing of the
principal officers, why couldn't he require their verbal opinions in a
collective cabinet ?" And that is a good part of the origin of the
cabinet system.
But th1en using the term "principal officers of the executive departments" would alone leave it still somewhat indefinite because who are
the principal officers? I suppose you would say 10. Now with your
10 mior executive departments, but. you have 3 subdepartments, anid
you might say 13 then.
But I have proposed adding this:
The Congress may by law eclare which officers, numbering not
less than seven among tlose heads of executive departments appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall for the purposes of this article be deemed to be principal officers
of the executive departments.
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NowtheI think
clearly
thatdoindicates
the Cabinet,
that is
exactly
I did
not
in intplementing
this and
article.
what
Congress
would
put in 10. 1e say that there are 10 major d-epartments. The reason
I did not put 10 in is this: I felt that some (lay the Congress and the
President both might wish to carry out executive reorganization and
if they wished to carry out executive reorganization, we would not
want to freeze the necesity of a minimum of 10.
I cannot conceive, though, of any executive reorganization which
would reduce our major departments to le.s than seven.
So that is the purpose here. [hat seems to me clearly to describe
what. we think of t6day as the Cabinet, but it does not erase the
indefinite features of the same, and I believe would make the matter

satisfactory.
So much for section 3.
Now section 4 is an exact repeat of section 4 of the EisenhoworBlownell proposal:
Whenever th l'resldent declnres In wrllig that isinability Is lerinlnIatCl, lhe
'resident shall forthwith disdiarge the powers and duties of l8 office.

That I think is something in )rinciple that we all agree with. That
if the President says, "I am able to perform," it should normally be
conclusive, and I think that is what is involved in section 4.
However, again I think Mr. K(eating in the Ifouise sublommitte
hearing called ttent ion to a very substantial weakness.
Mr. "Keatingsaid you might get under section 2 section 3, and section 4 a situation where some (lay tile Vice President, with the written approved of a majority of the Cabinet, might say, "You are
unable,' tWd the next d Nay
tme President might say, "Iam able," and
the next day the Vice President, with the approval of a majority of
the Cabinet might say "You are unable," and the next day the President would say, "I am able," and we might have a ridiculous and
chaotic situation.
Mr. Chairman, I think a chance of such is most remote, but if we
are going to close the gap, we ought not leave a gap. That is why I
have suggested adding section 5 to this proposition.
Sae. 5. Whenever the Congrems, two-thirds of each Hou" concurring therein,
shall find that a grave crisis has arisen with regard to a ques'lon of the inability
of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office and that a prompt
and satisfactory determination cannot be concluded under the provisions of
sectIons 2,3, and 4 of this article-Now I pause thete. Whenever they find such, certainly I cannot con-

ceive of the Senate and House of Representatives, if that ridiculous
situation were going on, of one day the President saying, "I am able,"
and the next day the Vice President, with the approval of a majority
of the Cabinet, saying, "You are unable." I cannot conceive, regardle s
of the political complexion of the Congress, of a failure to dig up that
two-thirdis vote to so declare.
Now why the extraordinary two-thirds majority? I believe that
Congress should never interfere in this situation until the condition
has gotten out of hand, even thought under our present Constitution
it could.
I am asking the Congress to limit its own power. That may seem
very naive and optimistic to do so, but I am asking that the Congress
limit its power for th6 good of this Nation, and the first, Congress
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showed a very flue example when it proposed our Bill of Rights. It
did consideraby limit its own power, and I think here it. would be
wholesolme to do so.
Now then, once by a two-thirds vote of each iomeso theiHouse and
Senate have found "tat under these sections t satisfactory solution
cannot, be concluded, then the Senate and 11ouso of RepresentatIves
assembledd and voting as one body shall forthwith proceed to make
a determination of the question by majority vote"-tlie reason I have
said by injority vote and one body is beauso Mr.Chnirmini, we do
not want a deadlock when. it comes to this, and If we had an extraordirary majority we would Wt a deadlock.
lut,when we say "by in fjority vote, and both houses voting as one
botd," we are not oing to get a deadlock.
"'lie
vote is going to go one way or it is going to go tie other, and
we tre going to get, a definite detrniniintlon.
t
Tihen:
nnd sitch a deternilintion of the Inability of the President or Its termination,
by (ho NSlinti ani Itlso ofiteirvseiiativs, shall be cOnclusiive-

in other words, that is it-any provisions of seclotis 3 and 4 of this article to he contrary notwIthstalidlhg.

Now this limit on congressional power I believe is wholesome.
IAsbelieve
in keeping
withwheni
the spirit
of Ihe pastcalled
Con stin?
itution.
T saiditinis the
beginning,
was Congress
A.; a lus{
resort, if the electonil college did not. give us a Plresident, the ('ongrx, would come in. This is as a last resort.
Now this leaves the matter in the executive family where it should
be, I believe, in respect to the separation of powers. "But if the executive fauilty cannot settle its own internal prollemn, then I insist that it
invites antd deserves tie intrusion of the legislative body, and I do
not believe that. the legislative body should ever totally dlivest itself
of power to intervene.
I would like to say one word, Mr. Chairman, before I conclude.
Section 0 we can1
allsee is simply:
The Congre." shall have power to Implement the provisions of this article
by appropriate legislation.

I did not use the term "enforced" though I wouldn't object to it.
I used the term implementt" because actually sections 2, 3 and 4
are in a sense somewhat or virtually self-executing, except for tiat one
case where Congress would declare who are the principal officers of
tile departments.
I think it requires implementing more than enforcing. It requires
Congress to act. under section 3, and also I think it, would require
that Congress would have to act under section 5.
When the Senate and house of representatives cone together assembled as one body, there would have to be some legislation about its
organization and p'rocedure, o I have used the term "implement."
Section 7 is an exact copy of section 5, I believe it is, section 5 of the
Eisenhower-Brownell proposal. It is routine and self-explanatory.
N'ow one other word, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to close. I
am one who on record has proposed in the past the association of members of the legislative body with the Cabinet in an inability decision,
but I have come to the conclusion that it is better not to. I would
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say, though, Mr. Chairman, if we are going to include them, I rather
agro witi I the implication of one question you presented to Mr.

Fowler. I rather agree if we are going to include them, that it would
be better not to include, the Speaker or the President pro tcmpore, for
(liefiiiniplo reason that yOU indicated.
great danger is (lint. they would be conscious that the public
might. i ink that their close relation to Presidential duties in the
Succesion Act. wouli influence tlw jidgnt.
I believe if we are going to inclutle tiem, I woul agree with the
implication of your question, it woUld be to use the leaders, say the

majority nid minority leaders. This I tlnk would be a very wholesoeI I fig.

I think as you doubtless know, that our good neighbors in England
have established really an official standing and I live in Canada,
for the minority leader. In other words, the minority leader in the
IHouse of Commons is paid an extra salary for his services to Hor
Majesty's Government. If we are going to associate the Congress
wih it,
I believe it would be wholesome to give an official recognition
to the services performed by party leadership in the Congress.
But I would prefer that it bo left in the Executive family, and with
the Cabinet, and I will proceed very briefly to state why I believe
that. would bo true.
']'he first thing I would say on that, to leave it with the Cabinet to
advise, Mir. Chairman, is the simplest plan that has been proposed.
In fact, I am inclined to believe in this plan over a great many others,
because it was so simple that we overlooked it, and on a complicated
problem I believe we should invite all of the simplicity that we can get.
The second thing that I would state with regard to it., Mr. Chairman,
this involves no additional machinery of government. We live in an
ago when as the price for modern civilization and our security, we
have to have mounting numbers of boards and commissions and
agencies, and I think ,~icever we can solve a problem without, creating a new one, it is a very happy thing, and this does not. It leaves
it with the Cabinct going on from day to day and it never becomes an
inability council, tinss a case of inability comes up.
A third reason, it refrainsSenator Kr.EAUVEI. WhIeI you use the term "Cabinet," you are
speaking of heads of the principal administrative offices?
Mr. V.uoir. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I am glad you asked
the question. I mean within that section where Congress describes
which are the principal offices according to this proposal, principal
officers in the departments.
Since we think of it as a Cabinet, that is why I am using the term
"Cabinet."
So in using these heads of executive departments, the third advantage would be we would not impose on the President the psyclhological
hazard and potential embarrassment of having an inability council
hovering over him. I think to have an inability council, a special one,
we are going to remind the President all the time that he has a danger
of breaking down in health and breaking mentally, and he ha a hard
enough job. I would prefernot to do it.
In fact, I think Mr. Brownell made an excellent statement when
he said we ought not to put the President constantly on trial as to
his health.
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I think the Pi sidency i, the most magnificent contribution that

the Alnerlean people have madn to the science of goverillelit, and
we Imust Ihe very cairft that nothing is (10110 to ill ally Wiy liliillish
tho dignity of that Office.

A. fourth reason I would like to mention is this: W1e live in an
ago of earth satlelites and sped may be of the very essewie. What
could be more speedy! llere are the heads of the departments close
to the President, close to theo Vice Pesidlent, since for a (barler of
a century Presidents have ivited their Vice Presidents to sit in thle
Cabinet, which is a very wholesome development, I think, and close I o

the probleills which cluster around the White I louse door.

I think we could get the most speedy decision there off any tlmit we
could get, and it could ho done quietly and cnlnly and
( without the
kind of a to-do which might impair the dignity of tie Office of tile
President.
Another reaSOn, I believe it would ofter us the most abundant
assurances against. resort to inability proceedings born of political bias.
I do not care how fair it is. If this country ever suspects there is
political bias, in an inability determination it would dangerously dis-

rLpt the unity of the Natio'n.

Ifere then (lie Vice President is rego-

a rly a memlr of the Pisident's political Inrty. All of the heads

of his departments are either memblPrs of his political party or if not,
they are normally in sympathy with him, so they are persons who are
in political sympathy with him. They are highly fiduciary. Oni the
record as a whole they have a record of lovalty and they would not
tolerate an inability proceeding that was horn of political bins.
o I think that ihat is a very important consideration.
Another one, briefly: It would be in keeping with our principle
of separation of powers because there would be normally no intrusion
of either of the other two branches into the situation. The matter
would be settled within the executive family and, very important., I
think, it. would be vttled by members of that political party with
whom the American people have in a sense entrusted executive
power for 4 years, and if we believe in party responsibility, I think
that. would be quite important.
Finally, perhaps the most important of all, this plan would give
the President satisfaction and comfort that he is not, going to be
subjected to political assaults on the grounds of inability.
,ow in brief I submit. President Eisenhower has thought more
about this problem than any President-than any man in Anmerica.
Three times illne,% sufficient to threaten his continued working capacity has attacked him. Ile undoubtedly has given it serious tihlought,
and he has indicated that these department heads are the ones he would
feel Wtisfied with having associated with the Vice President.
I believe that it is good. I think it is fine reasoning.
Now finally, Mr. ChairmanSenator K-AUvwr. Professor Waugh, you are making a very file
statement, an interesting and useful one. You take all the time you
wish.
31r. WAUOH. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
Now the objection has been raised to the department heads, Mr.
Chairman, and a very intelligent question caine from our attorney
for the committee to Mr. Fowler, about whether thes-e department
heads, because of loyalty to the President or some reason would be
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11iid we point to tIlle ( arlield ii md Woodrowv W~ilsoun

IinIcidenutsShould11( lie entirely dlim.
Nfi-. ( 'laii'iiiaui, I beilieve' tho
viiiited iii our' diy, and I hatve thfree reasons for saying sio:
First, its Wi18 Iiiiluted inl your

itiestioiiq,11Mr. Attorniy, wit

MNi'. leoler, when tlhe (larfield and Wilison iin et s failedl to tlike
ne
1(1ioul, t herel 1-1isprIiu doubt. whether fil attempted
1HIitl1ii'iu
Mr.Adhiur ias thli ct ig I'r-esidentf, thinikiung I hey
installat ion of
WO'itlil Ie! doiluI Woor1Air. Mfartihall Is Acting P'residlent, might turn
out, to ho. ilalll huti as lesiuleut, and1( they Illighit outst the. elevted
'lint was 'ertilit a (41181itiut onah hnziil- (l thle fiie~, :1i1d
Chief.
110) ('ah1iiict w~ouild vish it) i~fflI fi iil1ci which nIight have the0 resuIlt
(of oust iuug Itheir Chi ef.
Ili this proposal that daniger is entirely find comple1tely erasedl.
'l'li Vice 'residleit becoines (lie Acting President, and lie acti; only
fl~iily esord.So (lintis gone.
uiiti te ~rsi~et'
Now thie scoind r'eason I wotuld like to state is this:
fIn the t ine of thle (uirlield find( Wilson incidents, tli( Cabinet (do!jiartunent ) hends hind neither statutory nor conistituiouual authority or
ilitty to niiako such it decision.
NXow, if tho C~abiniet, the (iuurield Cabintet of- the Wilson Cabinet,
lid ruled filie Presidentt disabledh and1( caled onl the Vice President
to take over, uuidoiitedly hiirge elements of filie population wvodd
havoc said, "You have tisiiijwd it power that is not given to Y'ouhy the
Conistitutioni, is not givenito1 yoil by staltte andi~ your behavior is most

Th'lis us, entirely eruised. Ili this pi'oI)o)Sal these department heads
not only Iitive a power. butt a constitutional duty to approve in writ,.
ig a temporary accession of the Vice President as Actin~g P'resident,
if the 11'resident is disabled and he does not announce his disability.
That makes, I think, a substantial difference.
The third thing and pehaps as significant as the others, in the days
of the Garfield and WilIson incidentW. Mr. Chairman, this country had
ocean barriers in which we trusted. In both those cases we felt an
enormous degree of smug security because of ourogeographic position
Wilson
across. the oceans. No Cabinet in the Garfiel days or theT
days wold( feel that our national security was seriously jeopardized

by* a failure to bring thle Alice President in as Acting President.
But every one of ifs knows that (lay is gone, and the Cabinet, knows
it. IThis Cougress has considlered so many measures of nationalscuiritv that it would lie idle for ine to say. 'Mr. Chairman, why it is
reognized that (lay is gone, and any Cabinet knows it is gone.
All (lelrtrnent headls today know *that with the President 'as not
only the defender of American security but the defender of free men
t'veryvhere in (ile worhl, if (lie President is disabled and unable to
act att all, W.erious Jeopa;rdy to our national security is threatened.
("aI youl Imagine ny (1abluiet, any dhepartmnt headsz. With the 'Secre-

hat ii ofStt, with the enornious respoiisibilitic's for the foreign relalnf0111, COiiitiV anld with tile ectayof I )efense with anl
(10ilo'i
IXuiS son)Sibilitv for thle Iiiilitary Aecurity of this country,.
cati you imagine that (h~eyN
would shield a ihis.abled P~residlent, knowing
that, it jeopardized the security of the country?
I think we ought to give ihe Cabinet credit today for knowing
that we live inl an atoici age. I think this would be true but, I thin k
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JOINT' IMS:O1LUTlON i'rpo~ing an nixtndriient to llio ('onxtitotIn of tilt lUnited Htntoo
rv1Mltilt to ca ies iiero tit(I'roa'ldciit to unltre to d~ilcinrgo (Ito powers nil ties of hIii

president fromt 0111ce, or of his deuiti or
S.i'rioNi 1. In vax tit tile retnoval it Io
mesgiiatioti, theit,% Nl 'resitient shall become President for tile untexipired portion
of the then citrrent term.
Syrc. 2. It thle P'resident shlnt leelare lin writing tfiat hto Is unithlo to discharge
the powers andt titles of his offlch, mui powers and duties shalli be diseliargeti
by the Vice Prxsldent its Acting President.
.Axc,&. If the ll'etlent does not so declare, tile V'ice l'reshient, It satisfied of
the President's Inaility, and upon approval lit writing of a niajority of tile
priNcipal officers of the executive departments, shall discharge the powvers inti
duties of the office as Acting President, The Congoress may by lato dc'clare which
officerse, nwinbering not less than, seven aniong thosrc heads of exrccutii'e deporttnents appointcd by the P1resident by and with the advice and consenft of the
$emote, shall for the purposes of this article be d~eie~nd to be principal offiecra of
the cz~vutr departments.
&v,. 4. Whenever thle President declares In writing that his Inability Is terutinated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and duties of his

office.

Srw. 5. lWheuierer the Congress, twro-thirds of each House concurring -therein,
shall find thal a grace crisis has arisen with regard to a question of the inability
of the President to discharge the poicers and duties of his office and that a prompt
and satisfactory determination cannot be concluded under the provisions of seetions 2, 3, and 4 of this article, the Senate and House of Representatives asscmlbled and rating as one body shall forthwith proceed to inake a determination of
the question by majority rote; and such a deterination. of the inability of the
President or its termination, by the Senate and House of Reprcsentatgive#, shall
becoxeiwsive., any proirisione of sections S and 4 of this article to the contrary noatwithstanding.
Smo 6. Thc Congress shall have power to implement the provisions of this
article by appropriate legislation.
Soc. 7. This article shall be inoperative unless It shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission.

ST&TE'F.YT OF EcoGAN W. WAUGH,

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, EASTERN

MICHIGAN COLLEGE

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate very much
ti'e opportunity to present my views to you on this very important and delicate problem. I am well aware of the enormous time pressure under which
you work and I shall endeavor to come to the point with dispatch.
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hinve tilmsi nut priority. Thiey aetoiuld r'celveth e first.iiand foreiia'nt eanxioernluau. I hiive emiboill joly paropoeaed toitlhing 1iji of fiole #11flfltraltio'" plan
lnitn draft for ao itatendiieiit to tle Conxatilutlon. I do not pretend that I alin
soart of (IiIng-iaidced You will doubtlefs obsMerve
lin tiny way nil experl itt (1111
that I lini no more than tiln nuuiteur-batt I believe I curt convey iny thoughts
leayeai li lem4 little by following at definite jiroiositi.
Ifat tracI of flits4 pan Is Idenltia w~ith mctlo I of file atlrutnist riat Ioimas in
uil lareseitt(41lfly Mr. llrowinell. I huve copied It word for word. It shvouil lrovoe to coitlroverey. It worely declarces that upoin file reuuiovill or ulith or
remigititloti of tile laresldolit, (lie Vice larcslrle!nt becoiien P'resident. It P4.'fb
Ilsite- (ito saiiio rule rcgtrdlag removal or resIgnaition that we have rilways
followed It case of thle death of the President. Wilth regard to the situation
at tile death of n 1'rosIelent It a~cdds nothing to our eitailsbeu lpractice. M~'atover iny have been fite Intention of tlie framers of the Conlitullon-cnt it
waas probably (fiat tlie Vice lare,4demit Mhould be Acting I'rcroldet--the 117
years of history that have followed tile John Tyler precedlent would Appear to
have pirovided a settled answer. All seven Vice lrexidentmi who leave sitc.
needed decensedh Presidents have taken the Presidential oiath, have regarded
themselves o~ Plpresidents, and tile Nation all a whole In both offlelaI and turivate
circles has generally accepted their vliw. It would be ratlier late to Intel all
these years as a period of constitutional error.
Section 2 of tis plnn Is an exact copy of the same section of the J'lseabowerBirownell plan. It merely states that the P'res(ient may declare In writing hi.
own Inability, thus calling on the Vice President for temporary service asl Acting
]President. It ends all (longer that the elected President would be ousted. This
section seems to me to .)e no inore than plain commonsense anti It should stir
little controversy. I think Mr. Birownell made a correct observation when he
expressed (lie opinion that thiss provision, standing by itself" would take care
of most of the cases of Presidential inablilly that we will ever face. It is a
patent fact that the Presiden has a job of inankfllng proportions and we surely
should not hesitate to grant bim this avenue of temporary respite.
Section 3.of this plan carries the substance of the Eiseahower-Brownell plan,
1. e., that If the President falls to declare his own Inability, the Vice President, if
satisfied of the President's Inability, and upon approval in writing of a riajorty
of the Cabinet (department head component), shall discharge the powers and
duties of the office of President as Acting President The adminlstration's proiposal used the expression "beads of executive departments who are members of
the President's Cabinet 1* ."1 Serious objection was raised as to this expresslon beforethe Celler subcommittee of the House (using the term Celler suobeommitte after Its chairman for brevity). The objection centered around the fact that
the term "Cabinet" Is entirely unknown to the written Constitution and only remotely known to our laws and that It can be expanded or contracted as to mtembership atbte pleasure or even at the whim of a President. Mr. Keating. I believe
was disturbed by this indefinite character of the proposal and I think his observation was valid. The plan submitted here contemplates the Cabinet but puts the
matter In more definite terms. It substitutes the words "principal officers" of
the executive departments-terms expressly used in the Constitution, artirle 1I,
section 2, clause 1. This expression, we are told, bad a direct relation to the
development of the Cabinet. President Washington, after unsuccessful efforts to
use the Senate as'an advisory council, noted that the Constitution authorized
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Vle congress would be viniut)NNered to dpinlre which of the prinelpal oflcers nre
to shars with th Vice PrsIldent an itoblilty decision. The qualilcntoatn "nuln.
bering not less than seven" NPused rather thnn the Iinuiber 10 in order that such
il 11elidcuient would not by direction l se obstacles to future execuitte reorgit linti[on tit retluiritg t delrlment hends. The ehlntices, however, are most
reontte that any futlue reorgotullstioa pinns would cell for leis titn 7 deportmiaent
heads,
TIe utse tf the Calbflet for such a Iiiirliose sens to me to offer iiumerable
advantages. Time forbids tht we note but a few of the virtues of the ilanl.
it is refreshingly siiiuiuie-ii fact so slitille that inny of ts, Iicluding myself,
untot nlously shiMl away from It li the early stages of tie current dixctulosa-arid with n coumlicated prolleitt we ought to welkonie nil of the KilliplIclty that
we can get.
It involves Ito itddltional Inclilnery--io addition to the over mouttting nUilntir of boards aut
ltls
t
iis
id igenlee, however npcess.ry, that seem to toe
vlstoil uin us as a sort of lories for the comforts (,if modern clviliatiol SlAid
for o ur security hita tdlingerols age.
ly this pham we would refrain front Imposing on the President the paycholoul.
cal hlaard antd potential enlhnrnsnment of having ever hovering over him the
shadow of a slwlnl inbility eonmilton, iorhAvis looking for a way In which
to make itself useful, and serving as a constant reminder to the President that
any day le uiay break down uhysleally or become a mental Incoinpentent. As
Mr, lrownell expressed It, we do not want to place a President "constantly on
trial as to his health."
If time should be of the essence-nd It certainly may be In this ago of manmade earth stellite and the like-we can devise no agency which would be
in better position to give a prompt, informed Judgment. The Cabinet In clome
to the President, clo.e to the Vice Presldent-since Vice Presideants by courtesy
of suceestve Prteldenta have now held Cabinet seats for a quarter of a centuryand clo to the problems which cluster around the White House door.
It would offer us the most abundant Insurance against resort to inability proceedings born of political blas. The Vice President Is regularly a member of
the PresIdent's political party. The department heads are appointed by the
President, with senatorial approval as little more than a formality In most cases.
They are normally members of the President's political party, and If there Is an
occasional exception, he Is usually a political supporter of the President. Their
relation to the Preident Is highly fiduciary and they have a tradition of firm
loyalty on the record as a whole. They would be among the last to tolerate
a politically Inspired move to embarrass the President with a groundless Inability
proceeding. This is an extremely important point for It might be less dangerous to le-tve the whole Inability problem unsolved than It would be to adopt a
plan which would leave the door ajar for political assaults. It would leave the
primary responslbillty for the maintenance of active executive power to members
of that political party to which the American people have In a sense Intrusted
the executive power for 4 year. It we believe in party responsibility, then this
should be wholesome.
It would be In keeping with our principle of separation of powers and would
afford the maximum of protection of the Independent status of the executive.
The decision would be made inside the executive branch. The President's officlal family would give the answer. No Intruders would be interfering. The
official family could make Its decision quietly and Informally and without the
sort of ado that might impair the dignity of the office of President, by all odds
our most magnificent contribution to the science of government.
The public would have the greatest assurance that there would be no temporary and Involuntary displacement of the elected Chief Executive unless we
should experience a simultaneous occurrence of two grave situations, namely,
hteb level executive power inactivated by a President's disability and a state
of public affairs which ivtulres Immediate directives from an active executive
head. Any precipitate aunt ill-advised effort to displace the President without
his content for ever so short a time might disturbingly disrupt the unity of the
Nation.
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Finally, and perhaps most limlrtant of all, It is n plan In whi%,h the 'resident
can have conilileice. To adopt a scheino which Involves a ,our(e of anxiety to
the i'remiiict would be worse than to leave the matter unsettled as It In today.
h'ia Preildent, as the Congress fully recognizes, carries crushing burdens and we
inumt by all ineiis have a plan which Is salisfactory to blin. Oil this point l'resldeut ilsen.hower Is surely the most competent man In Amnerica to speak. On

three oc mitin since lie bevniafe Chief 1Mectiilie he has been stricken will Illness

suflhielutly serIos to threaten his continued working calaeity. There Is no
question but Ih1t lie hls given the ziatter we are discussing most serious thought.

SIhink his Ideas ont the subject should carry great weight and he had mande It

plain ihat the Cabliet Is the proper body to share with the Vice President In
making nl hinbllity declsion.
As you kntow, sonie able students of the problem have expressed serious doubts
about tho sultablity of the Cabinet (department head component) for such a
function. They contend that the Cabinet by reason of Its loyalty to the President
will tend to shield him and, therefore, it can not be relied upon to give approval
of n temporary accession by the Vice President even If the need Is quite patent.
They point to the historical record-to the failures of the (arfield and Wilson
Cabinets to take aflirmative action. I think those cases should be discounted
entirely today for three reasons. First, at the time of the Garfield and Wilson
affairs the Cabinet had nelter statutory nor constitutional authority to take
aflirmative nation. Many would have regarded atlIrmallve action by them as
extraordinarily presumptuous behavior. fly contraRt, under the current proposal the Cabinet heads would have expressed constitutional authority and Indeed
the duty to approve a temporary Acting President status for the Vice President if
the need should clearly arise. Second, in the former cases the Cabinet definitely
feared that by affirmative action they might be instrumental In ousting their
Chief permnnently. That danger i completely erased In the Uisenhower.
lBrownl plan ns It Is imado perfectly clear that the Vice President would merely
become a temporary Acting President. 'Third, at the time of the Garfield and
Wilson cases our ocean barriers provided us with a rather smug national security
and a Cabinet could go ahead and sbleld a disabled Chief without patently
hazarding the security of the Nation. That situation is gone and we all know It.
It Is Incredible that a Cabinet today, having within Its ranks the Secretary of
State who Is supposed to keep I close touch with foreign developments and the
Secretary of Defense who has a large responsibility for our military safety,
would refuse to approve the temporary accession of the Vice President to the
post of Acting President If our national security would otherwise be jeopardized.
If our Cabinets In this day have sech confused notions of loyalty there Is little
hope for us as a nation anyway. Why not give #he Cabinet credit for knowing,
at the very least, that we live In #a atomic age?
Section 4.-This plan copies tCe Elsenhower-Brownell props word for word
as to section 4. It means thr. when the President declares In writing that his
Inability Is terminated he performs again as President and the Vice President's
function as Acting President has been concluded. This needs no elaboration.
Section 5 would be an addition to the Eisenhower-Browne!" plan. During
Mr. 1lrownell's testimony before the Celler subcommittee, Mr. Keating raised
a very significant point. As he saw It, we might get a chaotic condition. One
day the Vice President with Cabinet approval might say the President Is unable
and the next day the President might say that he was able and so on ad Infinitum.
I think he was right. While the chances of such a situation are most remote, It
Is a possibIlity and if we are going to close a gap we ought not to leave a gap.
Section 15would completely close the gap. Congress could then step In. By a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, Congress could declare the patent fact that a
prompt and satisfactory determination could not be attained under sections 2,
3, and 4. The two-thirds vote Is suggested-as assurance that Congress will not
Interfere unless the situation Is really out of hand. On the other band, If the
situation should become chaotic I cannot Imagine a failure of the two Houses of
Congress to come up with the two-thirds vote. Once Congress has made Its
declaration, it would proceed to take positive action. With both Houses voting as
one body and by majority vote it would make the necessary determination of
the Inability question, and its determination would be conclusive. 'The joint
body and majority vote are suggested In order that we will tot risk a con.
gressional deadlock. Congressional action would be a last resort. Primary responsibility for the settlement of an Inability question would be left within the
executive household. There would be no congressional Interference until the
executive family exhibited its incapacity to handle the matter, and In such a
case it would Invite and deserve the congressional Intrusion.
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Section 0 Is also an addition to the Etienhower-llrownell pjnii. I have slg.
gested the word "itpleient" rather thnn the usual word "enforce" ns tile amendhwent would be fi the larger Aelise sclf-exNtithlg. however, snine legislnti
would doubtless be necessary with regard to the organilvation and procedure of
the 2 I louses operating as I body ituiler section r.
ectlon 7 Is nn exact copy of section 5 of the Eisenhower-lirownell proposal.
It Is routine and seif-explatiatory.
THE STATUTORY APPROACH

I aid In the beginning that I thought both anieulmnent and statute wohild be
neeis.ry to a complete solulton, IEven If we walt until nn owendment Is ratifiled It will then doubtlecss be necessary for Congress to Implemuent the ilmiucdinent
by law. With nit nnm1enldmlelit stuch as Is stggestl here It would certainly be
nemessary for Congreos to imnplenwnt sectiolns 3 and 6 by laws. Fturthermuoe, It
night be well, mrid I think it would be, for Congress to consider going nithlad atl
enacting the substance of sections 2, 3, anti 4 into law. I believe Congress has
ample power to do so under the Constitution. The statute would hold tie title
pending the ratification of the amendment and I do not believe It would have to
hold very long. I believe the States would he quite prompt In ratifying the
anendmient. There has been so tuch dlsciisslon of (lie Inability matter and Its
gravity during tihe past 2 years that the public has been niade well aware
of the neel of action. I am sure that tile Btates will speedily ratify any reason
able atamtndnmnt dealing with the situation.

(l)iscus-ioti otT the record.)
Senator KrEtAuvmu. I have 1 or 2 quetions to ask you, sir, and
then I shall ask Mr. Sinithey and Mr. Tallaghan if they want to ask
any
questions.
1rbiu
say you think that this problem can constitutionally be handled
by statute?
Mr.
aUon. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEEAvwR, What would you think of the proposal made by
Mr. Fowler that we pass a law which would be an interim measure,
and then reinforce it with the submission of a constitutoili amend-

meat simply giving the Congress the power to act in this fld?
Mr. W tlotl. M., Chairman, I agree with the first part of your
question. I think by all meas that Congrm should pass an interim
statute. I think they have power to and should.

I disagree-and I also think a constitutional amendment'should
be submitted parallel or even before I believe the constitutional
amendment should be submitted and then immediately after its submission, there should be a $tatute.
My reason for saying first a constitutional amendment is this: I
have no doubt this has been discussed so much, Mr. Chairman, by
the people, any reasonable amendment to the Constitution is going
to be ratified b!y the States, and it is going to be ratified very rapidly

by the State6 if it is submitted.

But I would think you should propose the amendment first; then
pass the statute.

Then I think you are much less likely to experience an Executive

veto.

Now I am not going to be presumptuous enough to speculate on the
interrelations between the Congress and the Executive but I can

see where there is a great chance of an Executive veto, regardless of
who is President or of what party, unless an amendment is submitted
first, and I disagree with merely authorizing Congress to act.
My position is that while they now have the power to act, I do not
beieve Congress should have the power to act except in a last resort,
and I prefer a proposal such as I have presented where we give Con-
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gress the power to act in section 5, 1 believe it is, of what I propose,
only if Ile lxecilI lve fiimily does not settle it.
Illit if wti propose an aienditent that Congress can interfere, then
we are j)ro)osiig, I suppose, that Congress cain interfere at any time,
111 I thin tile Executive would be frightened by it.

If we prol;oSO an amntlmont such as tils, limiling congressional

pow%,er, Alr. Chairman, than I do not Ix-lieve the Executive would be
nearly so constrained to veto a statutory approach, because the Executive would feel confident the amndment was going to be adopted.
lBut if you (1o not have an amendment which linits congressional
power, the Executive might feel, "Any act of Congress which I
ap rove sets a precedent for congressional intrusion."
Tlhat is my answer to that question, Mr. Chairman.
Senator K EFAUVER. It has been suggested that rather than just an
amendment authorizing Congres to act, that is a constitutional amendmen authorizing Congres to act, that the resolution might be worded
to authorize Congress to set up procedures for determining, which
would be the distinction-it would mean that Congress itselfwas not
to be the determining body.
Yes.
Mr. VAU0o.
Senator KEPAUV4R. Would that make any difference in your
thinking I
Mr. WAtIoir. Mr. Chairman, I believe that would still have some
of the weakness-I should not say weakness, but some of the source
of anxiety to the Executive that a simple amendment empowering
the Congress to act would have, because if Congress is empowered to
set up the procedures, I suppose they could set up procedures which
might frightenn the Executive. They might set up procedures requiring physical examinations and that sort of thing, and, as Mr. Brownell
suggested, to require tho P'esidnt to have one doctor after the other
cohi ini
and examine the-Prfident, to make the White House a clinic,
it Senator
might be frightenin to the Executive, I think Mr. Chairman.
K.FAvjvF.R. flrofessor Waugh, you said tiat there was great
public interest in this and you felt an amendment would be readily
adopted.
I agree with you. I think there is great public interest, but you
are closer to the people out in the country, their thinking about this
in the universities.
Do you find this is a subject that is being discussed and thought of
and debated by students in universities and people here and there?
Mr. WAUohn. Mr. Chairman, certainly among student groups it is.
I may say that repeatedly, for instance, members of the political
science faculty in the institution where I teach at least have been
interviewed by students in recent months on the question, because of
what they say are their intercollegiate debates, debating with other
question.
collegesont
I tleink the
public isinterested, though I really think this has
happened, that the matter has been studied so long-now it has been
some time since Mr. Seller submitted his questionnaire and then the
House held hearings, and the Senate is now holding hearings--i think
a yreat many of the public are, you might say, getting to feeling, "Oh
well, they are going to discuss it, but we don't believe anything is
22324-8-0----0
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Now what is your comiient with repeat to thli objection?
ru'. wVmA'ul l. Mr. Sunilhey, I am not very niuch impressed by fiM
hject~ion. 'My feeling is tWat in tho proce.ss of deiocraey, olectioll
is ti n
is to nit end. .Justcasting a ballot. for the purpose of voting
forisoniono nieais little. It is a means to tin end.
So I feel that. when we go out, to vote for President, we cast a ballot
for that candidate for President, of course we know the electoral college indirectly is in there, lut now it is virtually direct election. I
think the people -av, "This is the pemson we helieve will carry out
policies that we beliA-e in. We believe il this tin. Now if we Alieve
in this man, we believe in this 1n11's ability to ipl,.oint people who
Believe as lie does."
I look upon the appointients malde by the President, as the instrumentalities of carrying out the people's will at the time of election.
They are, as I see it, indirect iepresentatives of the people themselves,
because they are appointed by a person the people have virtually
chcon.
Furthermore, they are confirmed by the Senate. In most cases it
is a formality with the Cabinet and I think that is proper, but they
are confirmed by the Senate.
So they have appointment by a President chosen by the people indirectly and confirmed hy the'lUnited States Senate, now chosen by
the people.
So I think there is enough popular representation there to erase
that objection.
Mr. SMITtx.. I take it, that, you would deflto one of the powers and
duties of the office of the presidency as being the power to remove or
replace members of the Cabinet,
Mr. WArOH. I do, yes.
Mr. SMrrEtY. Do you perceive any difficulties which might arise
in the recovery of the office by the Pre.;ident if the Vice President were
to assime th duties of the'presideney and then discharge members
of the Cabinet and appoint people of his own persuasion I
Mr. WAroir. I do perceive a difficulty there, Mr. Smithey. I feel
this way about it, though. There is no"way on earth that we can remove every difficulty, and I like to quote'wlht Alben Barkley, the
late and lamented Vice President, said. On one occasion I remember
Mr. Barklev was addressing a group, and when he went to this group
he was with a newspaperman, as I recall the incident now, and it
happened to be a Democratic group.
Senator KFAUFtrvT.R. That wouldn't have been unusual for the Vice
President.
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Mr. W,Atun. Not unusual, Mr. chairmann, for Mr. Barkley to be
with a 1)emocratic group. And some of the younger Democrats remarked that Warren llarding- wis dishne.o. Mr. BArklay immediately look issue. Ile said:
Warren Ilording wali nt dihoniest, however regritttlhle theW
administration were.

ndals In his

lie said :
(Jice a person beconies l'rcmident of the United Htate8, it does something to
him, uid any citizen of the Uilted States when he Iecotties President, that office
.lots rorni'thlng to hin and gives him one purpose, anud that IS to do his bCet
for the American people.

I think Iht saite Ilingil)plies to a Vice President whenl called
tvill)-1'irilv ilito the .lienil,rs of (fiat ,flice to perform those (lutie.s,
and I myself believe Ile chatue is most remote ihnt a Vice President

a lrvsident. would take ahanitige of the stricken President.
I belkeve the public would reISent it.
I think if it is a temporary illness, let's say it was such as President
tl,,isonhower's
ileitis attack or something like that should the Vice
lhPsident come in and tear up things, there would be such public
resentment that it. would ruin things and I believeMr. S.ITMJIE. In other words, you believe he would forgo one of
his prerogatives in order to maintain stability
Mr.WAuou. That is right.
Senator KWAUVER. Ile would likely have the feeling that he may
just be acting for a few weeks or months and that there would be
public ieentment if he changed the team drastically.
Mr. WVAuo.
Yes, Mr. Chairman, exactly.
Mr. SMrrmr. I notice in your plan that you call for the initial
action by the Cabinet or by the principal officers of the executive
departments.
If r.WA tT.
Yes.
iieting

Mr. SmrTmEY. And that you leave a residual power in the Congress
to .settlethe matter should they fail to act.
Mr. WAroir. Yes.
Mr. Szxrrimy. For some reason, or should some difficulty, as you
have suggested, occur.
Mr. WVgAUaH. Yes.

Mr. Smrrnry. Now do you see any issue of separation of powers
involved in any amendment such as this.
Mr. WAUGH. Mr. Attorney, I do not. I feel the separation of powers
principle is one that should protect the independence of the Executive,
but already in the Constitution we have all the way through conressional participation in the choice, even the choice of an Executive,
f-the electoral college fails.
So if this is any violation of separation of powers, certainly the
Fathers put in the Constitution something that would be.
But I do believe that any amendment which gives the Congress
substantive power to intrude at once would go further into the invasion of the separation of powers than anything that the Fathers
had in mind.
Here is the last resort proposition.
Only if the executive household does not settle its own problem,
then somebody has to. and I cannot s anything better than the
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Conr,ss. I do not tMink the Supreme Court, should, Mr. Attorney.
I thnk it is something of a political question, aid I think the Suprenme
Court might ]have to review, for instance, in later cases, action il
which it has taken part, lnd if I am correct, the Chief Justice has
s oken out that he himself wouhl be reluctant to see the Supremc
Court brought into it. So what is left of the three branches? heree
is the Congress, ns a last resort. 'hat is tile way I see it.
Mr. SMITlv. I notice that you ha11Ve no speciic or no direct provision for the recovery of tile powers and duties.
l)o you feel ihat. the ov requirement on that poilt. should be
the (eWision by the President as to whether lie is able to restile?
Mr. WAOIG. T11e decision by th1e President as to whether lie is able
to resume his powers and duties, yes, Mir. Smithey, I (1o. But when
we coaie to section 5, when we coie there, I think the language is
broad enough under section 5 if the Congress now has reached a
determination of the inability of ti President, if it got to that
place, if the executive family did not settle it and it got that bad,
something terrible has hapIened in the executive department. Ihen
in that case I do not believe this proposal would indicate that
the PIsident's own statement would be conclusive. If the Congress
declares hil ill
a state of inability, and then he states lhat lie is able
again, I think that Congre.s is still in'
position there to interject itself
under section 6.
Mr..S.Nirrimiy. How-would you resolve the issue of the recovery of
the powers and duties of the oflfce•
MFr.V.Wmrni. Undersection 5?
.
Mr. S.IMIREY. Under the situation you outlined. You did sug,ges, an instance in which the President iiiight notirecover on his
own init int iye the powers and duties of the office,
Afr.W,%uoii. Yes.
Mr. Stmrr-iY. In that event, how would they be resolved
Mr. WVAToir. They would be recovered in tlt event-in the first
place, he would normally recover them under section 4. -That would
normally be the recovery, in any case. In any ease'if the President
has declared his own inability or if the Vice President, with the
approval of the majority of Nou department heads in writing, has
declared him unable, section 4 still would come into being if he says,
"I am able now," and Ito recovers his powers and duties.
Then suppose the next day the Vice President disagrees. If that
happens and you get a quarrel, then section &comes into operation.
,Mr.S.%trrim.Y. Wouldn't it be better to resolve the issue by providing
some mechanism for the resumption of the powers and ditties of the
office rather than leaving it to the President's own initiative?
Mr. WATTOH. Normally I do not think so. Normally I think that
we should leave it as section 4 does, with tho President's own announcement.
If I may explain it this way, Mr. Brownell gaid before-- may I say
the Cellersubcommittee for short, Mr. Chairman, because those subcommittee have long terminologies--Mr. Browntli said section 2 and
section 4 would settle alone nearly every case of inability that, we are
going to face. That usually the President, if he really is disabled
and he knows he is not. going to be ousted in the situation, he is going
to invoke No.2. And then certainly when he is able to act, lie is going
to invoke No. 4, and that would be conclusive at that moment.
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Under sections 2, 3 and 4 his statement is conclusive, but only when

tho( department, heads again say "You are mistakei," do you have
a qutilrrel there.
Or I think section 6iis bioad enough, Mr. Smithey, for this. Suppose a Calbilet would shield a IPresident. If things were going to the

(logs, if they were just ill failing to (10 anything about it, if it was a
IJinteiit situation, the Congress by two-thirl vote could conic ill there.
rlho langiiage (loes not confine them to a (jilarrel. But I myself have
great cofi(lwe. I h ave leard criticisms of Congress, but I have
sient it year ill Washington if) stiudyiing and visiting, and 1111 own

opinioln is (lat with regard to the Mem'ibers of Congress, their integrity
is certainly equal to or above the average of the American people.
Therefore, I 3o not believe two-third of both Houses would declare
a grave crisis uniles tlere was one. I (10 niot believe they wouhl. Then
I think if they had to step in and declare the President. disable(l, their
over would still be retained without another two-thirds vote, because

that resolution would be standing still in a grave situation.
If the President steppedup and sai(d, "I am able to act," and he
really was not, suppose he was insane, Congres has still that substantive power.
Mr. SMITmEv. Mindful of the fact that we are here dealing with
the Constitution, it occurs to me that we should examine all contingencies.
Mr. WAuomi. Yes, sir.
Mr. S3ITII Y. Now, one of the contingencies which might occur
would be that the President might become by virtue of the great
weight of his office, mentally incapacitated. That fact would not
prevent him, however, from declaring in writingMr. WAuon. That is ri git.
Mr. S3sITHEy. That he tliought he was able to resume the powers
and duties of his office.
Mr. WIAuon. That is right.
Mr. SMITMY. Now, if there is no direct provision for the recovery

of the powers and duties of his office other than the President's own
act, wouldn't the possibility just outlined present a gap in your proposal?
Mr. WAEoH. I do not think so, Mr. Smithey, under section 5. I
think it would present a gap under section 4, as Mr. Brownell left it.
That was one thing I was worried about, that the President, and with
no offense to the office, has such problems we wonder sometimes why
a President doesn't lose his mind with all the problems that he has.
If he lost his mind, he could, as you stated, write, "Yes, I am
perfectly able more able than I ever was," and that would put right
back in, but thlen the Vice President, with majority approval of the
Cabinet, could put him right back out, you see. Then that situation
would call for congressional action under section 5. That is my feeling, and my feeling is when Congress once declares by a two-thirds
vote, that the situation is grave, the substantive power of Congress is
now in full force, and their decision as to inability or its termination
then becomes conclusive.
Mr. SMITHEy. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Mr. CALLAOHAN. I have none, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUwR. Professor Waugh, your statement is entitled to
and will receive very serious consideration.
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Mr. WAuou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KPFuAvF.R. It is quite apparent that you have given this
matter a tremendous amount of study and you have also taken into
consideration the realities of political life in the Nation. We are
very grateful to you and to Mrs.Waugh.
Mr. Watuii. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak.
Senator KXFAUVER. Our next hearing will be on Tuesday at 11
o'clock at which time we expect to hear from the Attorney General
of the United States.
We will stand in recess until then.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the subcommittee was recessed toreconvene at 11 a. m., Tuesday, February 18,1958.)
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1958

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITrEM ON CoNSTITUTIONAL A-zENr8m-mw
OF THE COMMITTEE ON TE JUDICIARY

Vashittgton, D.

a.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess and subsequent postponement, at 2 p. In., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Hon. Estes
Kefauver (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding
Present: Senators Kefauver (presiding), Ofahoney, Wiley,
Langer, Dirksen, Hruska and Carroll.
Also present: Wayne W. Smithey, counsel, and Richard F. Wambach, clerk to the subcommittee.
Senator KF,.FATR. The committee will come to order. Off the

record.

(Discussion off the record.)
enator 1Dmszx. Can I note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that
Senator Langer and I may leave at 2:30 briefly, to conduct a short
hearing on a nomination in room 424, and we will come right back.
Senator KEFAF
vR. We are pleased to have the distinguished Attorney General of the United States to give us his views in connection with the problem of Presidential disability.
Mr. Rogers, you proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. RooERs. Mr. Chairman members of the subcommittee, a matter
of serious concern to the people of this country is the problem of what
happens when a President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his Office in the case of illness or other unexpected emergency.
There is agreement that there should be clarification and improvement of our constitutional system relating to such inability. The question is what is the most desirable and appropriate procedure for accomplishing this objective.
After careful study, I believe that t tion to amend the Constitution
is necessary to eliminate uncertainty and to provide for the orderly
conduct of government in time of future crises due to a President's
inability to act. The plan which the administration has recommended
for favorable consideration by Congress, I believe, provides a workable and satisfactory solution.
Senator KEFAUVER. It will be printed in the record without
objection.
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(The material referred to is appendixes I, II, and III, beginning on
page 177.)
Mr. Roons. I think that the subcommittee is in a general way familiar with that, and I will cover the provisions of the administration
proposal at a little greater length in a moment. You will notice that
the proposal would amend section 1, article II, of the Constitution,
and would be substituted for part of paragraph 6.
Now, the whole of the said paragraph in the Constitution is set forth
in my statement on pa e 3. And the portion of such paragraph for
which the new proposal is a substitute is underlined in this statement.
I would like to first, if I may, talk about why action is needed.
Strong disagreement prevails today concerning tle status and tenure
of a Vice President during the inability of the President. Distinguished students of the Constitution have contended that a Vice President would merely act as President for the duration of the inability.
Other respected students of the Constitution have argued that a Vice
President would actually become President and replace the disabled
President for the remainder of the term. This difference in opinion
respecting a Vice President's status and tenure during a President's
inability fully demonstrates the compelling need to remove the existing doubt and confusion once and for all.
Soon after President William Henry Harrison died in 1841, Senator
William Allen of Ohio objected to establishing the precedent of a Vice
President's becoming President upon the death of the latter, because
he thought that the precedent would complicate the situation in the
future when a President became disabled. As Senator Allen indicated, study of the records of the Constitutional Convention shows
that a Vice President was not intended to become President under the
succession clause, but merely to exercise the powers and duties of the
President until his inability was removed.
The subcommittee's attention is directed to a chart which is attached
to my statement. That is appendix II, and I think if you will look
at that for a moment, you will see the reason why there has been
confusion throughout our history on this matter of Presidential
inability.
Turning now to appendix II, you will notice that the Constitutional
Convention agreed to two provisions, and they are set forth in the
lefthand column of that appendix. And you will notice that in both
cases, the express language was stated, that the Vice President shall
exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen
or until the inability of the President be removed. And you will
see in the second one set forth that the same language is included
So it is perfectly clear that those two articles as passed and agreed to
by the Convention were intended to provide that the Vice President, in the event he exercised the powers and duties of the President who was unable to act, would act only until the inability of the
President was removed.
Now, those two articles agreed to by the Convention were then sent
to the Committee on Style. And the function of the Committee on
Style was merely to improve the language, but not in any way to
change the substance that had been agreed to by the Convention.
But it was in the process of correcting the style, in the Committee
on Style, that the confusion arose. And you will see why it arose.
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If you look at article II section 1, as changed by the Committee
on Style and finally adopted, you will notice that the language at the
endAnd such officer shall act accordingly and until the disability sball be removed
or a President shall be electedit is arguable as to whether that applies to the last section or the whole
section of that article.
Now, as I say, that is the real reason why the Cosistitution is indefinite today, 'because of that change made by the Committee on
Style which made the decision as to final language that appeared in
the Constitution.
Regardless of the intent of the framers of the Constitution, seven
Vice Presidents have, upon the death of the President, been recognized as having become the President in fact. As a result of the
precedents established whenever a President died, it seems to be assumed without question that the Vice President becomes President
and does not merely act as such when the President dies. This appeared to be Daniel Webster's view at the time of President Harrison's death-i. e. that Vice President John Tyler actually became
President. These precedents make it easier to argue that a Vice
President supersedes the President whenever lie exercises Presiden.
tial power. As we will note in a moment, in both the Garfield and
Wilson cases, the Vice President was not asked to act as President
largely because of the feur that he would become President and thereby
oust the incapacitated incumbent. As a result, the full extent of the
disabilities was carefully guarded because of personal loyalty to the
disabled President. More important, the public interest could not
help but suffer from being deprived of an active President in both
cases.
The things I am going to talk about next I think are probably
familiar to the subcommittee, but I would like to review them, because
I think it points up the most important aspect of this problem which
I believe has been to some extent overlooked in this whole discussion
of presidential inability. Since Harrison's illness was short, no question of inability was involved. However, President Garfield lingered
for 80'days after lie was shot on July 2,.1881. During this 80 days
he performed only 1 official act-the signing of an extradition paper.
Although his mind was clear during the first days of his illness he
was unconscious and it was reported that he suffered from hallucinations during the last days of his illness. Moreover, he was physically
unable to discharge the duties of his office during a substantial part
of the 80 days involved. It cannot be seriously contended that there
was no important business requiring the President's attention. Actually, officers were unable to perform their duties because the President
was unable to commission them. There was a serious crisis in our
foreign affairs. Yet the Department heads transacted only such
routine business as could be transacted without the President's su ervision. It was claimed that important questions of public =c
which could be decided only by the President were simply ignored.
Equally important, public opinion was sharply divided about the
manner in which public business vas handled. There was objection
to having the affairs of the executive branch managed by the Cabinet,
objection that Secretary of State Blaine was guilty of usurping the
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Prosideiit's duties, and insistent demands that the Vice President
exercise this Iower and that Secretary Bdaitio's alleged usurpation be
ended immediately.
After (larfield'8 illness had already dragged on for 60 days, his
plhysicialtis thought hto would recover; but, his convalsonce was
expected to take another 00 days. Therefore the Cabinet considered
the possibility of asking Vice President Arthlur to act as Preident
during Oarlield's recuperation.
Now this is th significant thing, It. seems to me, about that incident
In our history. All seven Cabinet members agreed on the desirability
of having Arthur act, as President. In other words there was no
question, no dispute as to the inability of the Prelent. Four of
thie Wvpno however, thought that Arthur's exercise of presidential
power would actually ma ke him President for the rema-inder of the
term and thereby o4st. Garfield from office. It. was reported that
Attorntey general Wayne MacVeagh shared these views. Consequently the Cabinet decided that (Garfield should not be advised to
.sk Arthur to act as President without first telling him of this pos.
sibility. Therefore the whole matter was deferrd because the
physicians feared tiat the shock caused by such a discu.imon might
e'silt in the Prsiden 's death. Garfleld's death on September 20,
made it ininecemary to solve the problem in 1881.
Now, the Important thing I want to call attention to in that caae
is this. 'rie question theme was not the decision about the inability
of the President, Everybody in Garfleld's Cabinet was of one mind,
that he was unable to tit . The reason that no action was taken was
because of the constitutional uncertainty of the meaning of that act.
In other words, it was felt that if Vice President Arthur took over
he would become President in fact, and that Garfield never could then
claim the office again.
Now, that is the weakness, as we see it, in the present Constitution.
It.1s go to the Wilson cage for a moment. There can be no doubt
that President Wilson was actually unable to perform the duties of
his office during some part of the period after his collapse on September 25, 1919, and until the end of h.s term on March 4, 1921. Nunerous domestic and international matters failed to receive his attention.
More important, this inability occurred during the Senate debate on
the Versailles Treaty.
The exact degree of Wilson's inability is uncertain. Whatever
Wilson's condition Vice President Marshall the Cabinet and the
public were not fuily advised concerning it. The Presidenta family,
his White House staff, and the Cabinet discharged public business
in such manner and by such methods as to them seemed appropriate.
History seems to indicate that Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Cary T. Grayson, the President's physician, played an important part in many
questions of public policy.
Soon afterWilson's stroke the Cabinet joined with the White House
staff in keeping the Government operating. Secretary of State Tansing called 21 Cabinet meetings to transact executive business. When
Wison heard of these meetings, he accused Lansing of usurping
presidential power and forced him to resign. Wilson seemed to
think that the Constitution did not authorize the Cabinet to act in
his absence, with the result that Government business was interrupted
during his illness
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Patrick 'l'uimulty, AVilwmo's secretary , repoied that Stwretary of
:Slate Lansing had HUt~e.4tod that, in view of the President,'s inability,
they should aik the Inie President to act am President. Ile quotes
hiniself as sayinlg:
You may rest a&aured that while WofmIrow Wilson IHlying in the Whlto Ilotme

on Elm broad of hiM back I will not W a party to oiNtIng him.

Titinulty also reported that, when Lansiing resigned, Wilson said:
Tumulty, It Is nevor tho wrong time to spike disloyalty. When Lansing sought
to oult iue, I was u1141li my Intk. I ill on sily roet now it-il I will not have
dislolyalty about me.

ilecausm of the belief that the Vice president would actually become President, asking Marshall to act us President during Wilson's
iinbility was viewed as disloyalty. Consequently, Marshall was
looked at with antagonism instead of as a person who could lighten
the disabled President's burden. Instead ot asking Marshall to exerciso the powers devolved upon him by the Constitution, they attoiin ted to keep the. Government, operating in their own way in order
to frestall any serioiis attempt ti declarei tile President's inability.
A, study of the Oat-field and Wilson cases shows that there is a
Ival ued for a ililens of suyplyint an active President during periods
of presidential inability. rhe belief that a Vice President actually
beomes President when called to act as such has nullified the con.
stitutional provision for the administration of the G6vernment when
a President is incapacitated. In the other two serious cases of presidential inability to date, the Vice l'resident was not called to act
as President and thereby supersede the disabled President for the
remain(der of the term.
The problem of providing for the exercise of presidential power
during priod, of inability would not be solved merely by providing
a means by which the inability could be established. Unless the President, his Cabinet, and his other friends are absolutely certai,? that he
may resume his powers after the termination of his inability they
will tend to oppose any attempt to declare the existence of inability,
viewing such a declaration as equivalent to removing the President
from office.

I might say that this administration does not support that view.
We believe, and as I will point out later, that in the event a Vice
President should act as President, that he would act only temporarily,
and the President would be able to take over the powers and duties
of the office as soon as he recovered from that inability. And Attorney General Brownell testified to that in the House, and I fully subscribe to that. I think the history of the Constitution fully supports
that view.
With this history to guide us, and with a need for uninterrupted
continuity of Government, we must conclude that action is vital to
solve the problem of Presidential inability.
Now I would like to talk ior a moment about the administration's
plan.
Section 1 confirms the present generally accepted interpretation of
the Constitution-that in case of removal of the President from Office,
or his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired portion of the then current term. T;,is affirms
the result accepted by the Nation seven times in cases of death of a
President.
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Section 2 of the proposal states that, if a President declares in writing that lie is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President. This section authorizes a President to announce
his own inability and allows him to do so, knowing that his powers
and duties will be restored to him when he recovers. Section 2 of this
proposal also would require the President to make this announcement
in writing. The reason for adding this requirement is to preclude a
dispute about whether a President actually declared lis inability.
The existence of a written document will prevent anyone from seriously denying that the President recognized his inability. I believe
that section 2 encompasses most of the cases of Presidential Inability
which are likely to arise. It removes the reason which caused responsible Government officials to fail to act in the Garfield and Wilson
cf s.
The only objection I have heard to section 2 is that a President might
use this section to shirk his duties and responsibilities. The obvious
answer is that a President who used this section to shirk his duties
would be breaking his oath to faithfully execute the Office of President and therefore, would be subject to impeachment for high crimes
and midemeanors. It a President should ever become so anxious to

be relieved of his duties and responsibilities, ho would not need to

declare his inability-he could simply resign in conformity with
article II of the Constitution.
Section 3 of the plan deals with cases in which the President is unable or'unwilling to declare his own inability. In such cases, the Vice
President. with the approval of a majority of the President's Cabinet
would make the decision.
The Cabinet is the proper body to participate along with the Vice
President in declaring a President's inability. The Cabinet is an
executive body, the President's official family. Its loyalty to the President is generally unquestioned. A decision of this body is least likely
to be suspected of enabling a Vice President to usurp powers on the
pretext of inability. .Moreover, the Cabinet is in a position to know
at once whether a President is disabled.
Under section 8, there are several possiblfk courses of action. The
Cabinet could notify the Vice Pesident when a majority of that
body believed that the President's inability was sufficient to warrant
a devolution of presidential power on the Vice President. The Cabinet has always notified the Vice President when a President has died;
and section 3 would extend this custom to the case of inability. Under
section 3 the Vice President might take the initiative without the
Cabinet's first inviting him to make the decision. Unlike the provision of th present Constitution, however, section 3 would reuire
approval by a majority of the Cabinet before the Vice President
could undertake the exercise of presidential power.
A Vice President who undertook the exurcise of presidential power
would be assured that his action could not seriously be branded as
usurpation because that action was previously approved by the President's own appointees in the Cabinet.
In addition to the safeguard provided in section 3 by the Cabinet's
role in the process, section 4 contains a second safe uard. It provides
that, Wvhenever the President declares in writing gat his inability Is
terminated, the President shall immediately resume the exercise of
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the powers and duties of his office. Thus, section 4 does, I think, provide a disabled President with a constitutional guarantee that he can
regain tile powers of his office without the concurrence of any other
official or group if lhe is of the opinion that his inability has been re.
moved.
As a practical matter, if the determination of presidential Inability
is left where the Constitution places it now-in the Vice President, or
if it is placed in the Vice President and Cabinet-as suggested, the
Vice President would never venture to assumo the duties of tho Presi.
dency unless it were clear beyond challenge in any quarter that the
President waR in truth and in fact actually disabled from performing the functions of his office. With a constitutional provision spelling out that the Vice l1'rsident only acts as President in a case ol inability, and at constitutional provision granting to the President the
right to rvaesrt his powers at any time, the Vic( President as a practical, political necessity in all probability would secure tile approval of
the &binet, of tile leaders and a great majority of the Congress, and
of a largo Segment of public opinion before venturing to assume the
presidential duties. On the other hand, with a constitutional provision negating any motive of usurpation in the Vice President by
clear language that he only acts as President for a temporary periodno Vice President would hesitate-as did Vice Presidents Arthur and
Marshall in the two most serious examples of this problem-to perform his constitutional duty of serving as the alternate executive for a
temporary period. The President's immediately family and friends
would-be stripped of any motive to oppose the-Vce President, as in
Wilson's case, for on regaining his health the President could simply
assert his right to the office.
Senator LANoER. May I ask one question before we leave? Wouldn't
it also be well to provide that the Vice President before assuming office
should agree to vacate the office as soon as the President said that the
disability had passed?
Mr. Roorm. I think that would be all right. But if we had a constitutional amendment such as we suggest here, that would be expressly
in the Constitution. So that it would not be necessary, I think, in that
case

Senator LANOER. In other words, in that case the Constitution would
agree for the Vice President?
Mr. RooEns. That is right. Now, that is exactly the point. That
is the reason why there is this confusion. And until the Constitution
is amended, in my opinion, it will never be clarified, because any Vice
President who assumes the powers and duties of the office, can be
accused of trying to take over the office. And historically in our
country that has been the cause of the difficulty.
Senator LANOER. If he signed this agreement I mentioned, he would
be barred absolutely in claiming the office in opposition to the President, if he agreed in writing to step down as soon as the-President said
the disability had been removed.
I
Mr. RooEns. Well, there are a lot of students of the Constitution who
think otherwise. For example, Daniel Webster said he felt that any
man who exercised the powers and duties of the President was the
President and could not be replaced. And as I say, in Garfield's time,
a majority of his Cabinet thought that.
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Now, this administration does not subscribe to that view. I think
we are all in agreement that any Vice President who exercised the
powers and duties of the office during the inability of a President
would be just temporary President, not Acting President. Ile would
not take over the office. But as I say, that has not been clear. And
several Attorneys General have felt to the contrary.
Senator KVAt' vwt..
Off the record just a minute.
I)iscussion oft the record.)
Senator KEFY.:,vit. While we are interrupted, are there any 1ques-

tions at this point, Senator lruska, or Senator Carroll I
Senator IIa,
RSKA. If the chairman pleases--I assume, Mr. Rogers,
that you will deal with this idea of the President, by his being able
to say his inability is over, at ll times l)Osseses the right to veto the
actiohi or nullify the action of a majority of the Cabinet and the Vice
President to the contrary, doemsn't he ?
Air. Ronxiis. That,is right.
Senator IltS,1KA. Is that dealt with later in the statement?
fr. RooEIIs. Yes, sir. That is the very next thing.
Senator KC'AVw-t. Mr. Rogers, would this be a good timie to ask
you about the objections-not the objections, but the possibility, extintoe though it might be, raised by Congressman Keating, to sections
3 an d4of Attorney General Brownell's propo l ? These possibilities
were dealt. with by Professor Waugh, of Eastern Michigan College in
his presentation the other (lay to this committee. Or would you rather
wait. until you finish your statement before discussing that?
Mr. Roomas. I will tell you, I am not familiar with that criticism.
Suplx se you outline it to me, and then I can decide. I may have
covered it later on in my statement.
Senator KF.FAuw.R. "Mr. Smithey, our counsel, says that you deal
with this in the next few pages of your statement, so we will wait until
later on to discuss that.
Mr. ROGERS. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Now, as I said, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Hruska, I don't believe
that a problem would arise if the Constitution were amended, as the
administration has suggested. I think that in the discussion of this
problem everyone has focused a great deal of attention on the question
of how the inability of the President is decided. And, in my opinion,

that is the wrong emphasis.
The emphasis really is once you decide the inability of the President, what is the result? Because if the result is merely a temporary
thing, then it is not so difficult, to decide the inability of a President.
But if the result is that the man who succeeds him is going to become
President for good, then the question of inability of the President is a
very difficult and drastic decision.
I think once the Constitution clarified that point, and made it clearthat the Vice President merely acted for the President while lie was
unable to act, then you would not have this same problem about the
difficulty of determining the inability of the President.
As I say, actually there was no difficulty either in Garfield's time
or Wilson's time about the inability of the President.. Most people
agreed he was unable to act. The difficulty was that. they did not dare
have the Vice President move in-the Vice President aidn't want to
move in because he was not sure that the President could then take over
the office again. I think if you remove that obstacle and had a con-
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stitutional amendment to make perfectly clear that that was not a question, that the Vice President was merely acting as PresidentSenator Kmr,%uvR. Senator O'Mahoney, we are glad to have you
here.
Mr. Ro lts. Senator O'Mahoney, I was just saying them has been
a wrong emphasis on this matter, I think. There has been a great
deal of discussion about how the inability of the President woud be
determined. I don't believe that problem would assume very serious
proportions if it was clear in the Constitution that the Vice President
was merely acting its President.
Senator O'MADONZv. That wasi my own theory.
Mr. Reoomts. That is right. And I have dwelt on that for some
length. Now, that (toes leave open this one contingency. And I doubt
that the contingency would ever arise-it never has arisen. But I
think we shom
consi(ler it here. What will be the machinery for resolving questions of the President's inability where there is a difference of opinion between the President and the Vice President as to
whether the fooer's inability is ended
My predecessor was of the opinion that the Federal courts would
dischaim juirisdiction iu such a case u)on the ground that the question presented was political, and that the only remedy was impeachient. The consensus of opnian is in agreement with Mr. Brownell
that the sole remedy is impeachment where there is a wrongful assertion of authority to exercise the powers and duties of the office. The
atteml)t of a Pre.sident to perform his duties when lie was in fact
clearly unable to perform might be classed as a wrongful assertion of
authority.
It should be noted, however, that impeachment proceedings may be
delayed if Congress is not in session. Article 11, section 3 of the
Constitution provides that the President may on "extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses or either of them." It, is. muikely,
however, that a President under attack for attempting to assert the
powers while still suffering inability would convene the Congress to
conduct impeacement l)roceedings against himself. Further study
is required to determine how Congress may be convened in the event
iml)eachment proceedings are required in a dispute involving 1residential inability.
Therefore Congress may think it wise to avoid the odium of an
impeachment by providing another but a similar process whereby
the question of inability could be determined in the unlikely event a
President and Vice President were at an impasse. The administration plan could be modified by the addition to section 4 of such a
provision. And I refer the members of the committee to appendix
ifI.
Referring to appendix III, this alternate section 4 would still allow
the President to resume the functions of his office at any time, but
provide for the immediate action of Congress, whether then in session
or not, to resolve the question of Presidential inability raised in writing by the Vice President, supported by a majority of the Cabinet.
This would only occur after the Vice President has taken over temporarily,, and after the President then asserted his ability to perform, and then the Vice President and the Cabinet still were of the
opinion the President was unable to act. By making the charge bne
o inability rather than impeachment for some offense, the necessary
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roceedings could be conducted in a more appropriate atmosphere.
Members of Congress who might be reluctant to impeace the President
would not have the same reluctance in removing a President physically
unable to perform the ditties of his office.
In my opinion this alternate section 4 would place the President,

Vice President, and Congres, in exactly the proper relationship to
the question of inability. The President cod always reassert his

power, the Vice President would acquiesce except in the unfortunate
situation where the President had misjudged his true capacity. In
that event Congress would step in and by its consideration of a charge
of inability determine the issue. A two-thirds vote of the Senate
would determine the xistence of a President's inability; a majority
vote of both Ilouses would restore the powers of his office to him.
Impeachment would remove the President permanently; a determination of inability would leave to the President an opportunity later to
reassume the powers of his office. The difference between the result
reached by impeachment and by an inability proceeding would justify
the enactment of the separate inability proceeding, anl would render
the whole l)roposed solution more acceptable, I believe, to the public.
Let me stress that the very existence of this ultimate power in Congress-which is the only power it needs in relation to this questionwould in al probability insure that this extreme situation would never
arise. No Vice President would resistla President reasserting his
claim to the powers of the office unless the President were in fact unable to perform. I mean for obvious reasons it would destroy a Vice
President-if he claimed the President was unable to perform and
the President in fact was able to perform. So no Vice President would
ever do it, and the majority of the Cabinet would not support him.
No President-in fact unable to perform-would be permitted by his
family and close personal counselors to reassert his claim and precipitate an issue likely to be resolved against him by Congress.
So I believe, it this alternate section 4 were included in the administration proposal, that it would never have to be used, and that the
decision of inability would be easy to make and could be really made
by the executive branch of the Government.
We must recognize that in this area as in others, not everything is
soluble and not everything may be controlled by law. Whatever machinery is adopted, it must not be able to be used as a vehicle for
harassing the President. So long as the determination of inability is
left within the executive branch, either by the President, or by the Vice
President, as is now true under the Constitution, or by the Vice
President and Cabinet under the circumstances proposed by the administration, there can be no harassment of the President or diminution of
his stature in the eyes of the people. The Vice President is of the
President's own party ;the Cabinet is of the President's own choice;
if there is a provision that the President can reassume the duties of his
office at any time, he is safeguarded.
But if we transfer the power of initial determination of inability out
of the executive branch, or in some fashion share it with others outside
the executive branch, then the way is opened for a harassment of the
President for political and personal motives. We may not always
have as President a figure of the national-and international stature
of President Eisenhower, nor one who has so completely demonstrated
his respect for Congress as a coequal branch of Government, whether
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dominated by his own or the opposition party, as has President Eisenhower. Our solution must contemplate the testing of it, if need be, in
circumstances similar to the time of President Johnson and the Reconstruction Congress, when violent personal differences and party
controversy would invite ths Congress to use any power it had to
determine Presidential inability as a weapon of harassment-if such
a weapon were easily at hand. A possibility of such political harassment could severely impair the Presidency at the very tume when assertion of its full power was most needed.
With these guiding principles in mind, let us now examine some
other proposals.
Senator KFUAUVER. I would like to ask you a question at this point,
Mr. Rogers.
Professor Waugh, who made a very good impression upon the committee, and who has studied and written extensively on this subject
matter, testified before us some days ago. His general peling was that
this was a matter so closely related to the office of the Presidency, that
the President's own feelings, wishes, and ideas in the matter should be
given extremely sympathetic consideration. And so he started as the
basis for his suggestion with the recommendation of Mr. Brownell and
.
ofyourself.
He did make two additional suggestions. First, that in section 8,
there is some confusion as to just which were the executive departments, and whether in the Defense Department, for instance, there is
one executive department under the Secretary of Defense, or whether
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force were considered as executive
departments. And so he suggested that Congress should by law have
the right to declare what officers were to be considered as executive
departments for the purpose of the interpretation of section 3.
He pointed out that former Attorney General Brownell's original
suggestion had been upon approval in writing of a majority of the
Cabinet. I see that you have changed it here to "heads of the executive departments." And that it was rather difficult to determine who
was in the Cabinet. One President might have certain people, and
another President might have others.
I have always felt that the law was pretty clear that we had 12
executive departments, and that since the passage of the law setting
up the Office of Secretary of Defense-- I mean 10 executive departments-the Secretary of Defense, that the Army, Navy and Air Force
were not considered executive departments within the meaning of this
]an

age. Is that your interpretations

Mr. ROGERs. That is my interpretation, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUVEn. So you do not think that needs any further
clarification#
Mr. RooF"s. I don't. I think the Professor is right in suggesting
that Congress would have the authority under the "necessary and
proper" clause to make that determination, if there was uncertainty
about it.
Senator KFAUTR. They have the'right to abolish an executive
department, whether it is specified here in the constitutional amendmeat or not.
Mr. RooEmRs. That is correct.
Senator IKFAUVER. I agree With you about that
22824-58---11
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Thevsecond suggestion hemade was in addition to alternate section 4.
Ai.I indergtand n' alternate section 4 you go through the same pro.'
cedure as in the case'of impeachment.. :,But it would not be impeachment,-:-_it would be determining inability, and therefore would not'
have the stigma of impeachment..
Mr. Roomig. That is correct.
-

Senator

KiFAVtitE

And once inability was determined by a two.

thirds votOof tht Senate then the,Congress, both-houses of Congress,
by a majority vote, could determine that the President's inability, had

terminated.
Mr. ROGERS. That is correct.
'SOntor Kb AuvER. NoW, he suggested a 'section that the two Houes
of Congress determine by a two-thirds vote, and then by a majority.
vote the 'second question to be determined-in'lieu of' g6ihg through
something similar to the system of impeachment.
:'I will
you with his detailed suggestions aid hig testimony
about it.':-'futnishi
.RokRs. I wbmtld like to look at that, Senator.
I might just mention a couple of other thoughts in donnection with.
this alternate section 4.
It would have about three advantages over impeachment, as I see,
iC 4irst.thhre is the, one you mefitioned-that it would not have the
stigma attached-to iethat impeachment Would. Two, impeachment
1Mr;

diuld-only.odcui- if Congress happenedd to be in session. If!Con-'

Are

is not in' session, you could not get an Impeachnient started,

'[Ilseyou could 'not get Congress back here probably.; .And this

section would provide that once' the Vice President ha d'flled an in''
ability petition' supported by a majority of the Cabinet, that Con.

gress would automatically convene under the provisions of this. So
ou'would not have a hiatus intime.
Impeahment would be a permanent ac--that Would mean you
would pernianently remove the President-while this provision of the
Constitution Would' be merely a determination of inabilltyi and if the
President recovered, the Congresscould restore him!'t his 'office. :So
I think for those three reasons, this is preferable to impeachment,
aid&I-think it is in accord with the constitutional impeac ent proceeding.- Inother words, it gives ultimate authority to the Congress
when the President' and the Vice Presidet are unable to agree on
inability.'
.*Stahator KZxAuvr,- "Vell, we always think of impeachment as being
for high crimes and misdemeanor. This is not a high crime or misdemeanor. Asa inatter of fact, I seem to recall that one-of the efforts tO impeach a Federal judge, the main char against him was
that lie was just dilatory and wouldn't do any work. Irhave forgotten
the Federal Judge's'kname. He drew his salary and would not try
any cases, and they brought an impeachment case against him. The
Senate held that just' being lazy and indilignt Was not a high crime,
or misdemeanor.'
Senator O'MAHO4HY. 'Mr. Chairman I am under obligation to 'returpto a joint meeting of the Interior committee, and the Committee.
'

on Public Works. I have a leave of absence for half an hour in order,

to come up here and listen to theAttorney General,.
Senator-Ka'Auvvn,-We: appreciat that and I know the Attorney
General would be glad if you would ask him any questions.
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I would like to aski or 2 questions.
Senia i0OI.M6HoNEY.
i

I have skif med through your statement. In general I agree
pretty,heartily with it j1 think, as a matter of fact, that you'have
disposed pretty_ *el of the suggestion of having a commission ap-'
pointdd tohandle these things.
I think also"you have disposed of the impeachment procedure,
although you adopt something similar to that in the alternate section 4.
But it seems 'to me'that there is a variance here from the original
C6stitution which' is not at all necessary. I am convinced from my
reading of the Constitution aid the records at the time, and of the
analysis that you have placed in your paper that it was the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to have the Vice President become
Acting Presidejt and n6t President. I think it Was only the political differentiatqn' between the' members of the cabinet of William
enry Harrison and the Vi
t that made Tyler insist upon
beng sworn in as P i t.
You haVe ' in
out 'that Senator Alen', Ohio held for the
interpretation ,n raising now.
oed amen ent. This pro. So I ques ri section 1 of yo
ydes that 0 case, of the
ov of t
resident" f
office or of
th) Vi Pr6sid t shall' beco ' President
his death r'resigiat'
for the
xpi
portion of t e th current ternm. That is a
change
e nstituti r
' ally
and as i _ho been.Bu it dop
'the''l
ought
ut by' he cti6n'of 'ler' and
mak the ice resident
ent, he it w s intenole that he
ident. II
shoul beonlytheActing
Sec ion, 9o 0ro
80 e.t
exception
bMe. If
the
a
antl
e
wbring\tatiisiable
to ischarge

_abe'u

the wers and duties
his o
disc egd
Vice
ident
."
on
ev
Io
in
futUre isagreennin the.ugtion
itthe

ldentdesnotsod

-S
c
..

powers and duties shall be
Ident. :hin 3-6 ins:
a I hole for

0a

that isA 1ie dob nqtdeclare ti at hais
powers and cities of his
the Vice Presi
In wrlting of a
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and fpon approval

and so forth 2
vslial discharge thoe

W¢,r as Ac

gr

ed

:i'"

•

'The qluetion tha aris& fimy 'mi'd' is what is the period within
vhicli the Vice President is to adli How rmuch time *ill he give
a sick Presidfit to declare 6r to make his judgment I -There is no
tittle limit-on ths So it could be within 24 houiis.,
Mr. RoGEs. -That is correct.
,Sen&torO'MtrOu6NxY. Now,doyouwafitthat,
Mr. RooE. Well, Senator, I'think- you'do, becAuse you might
have--I dont think you can'nieasure this n terms'f time.,It depeftds
tipblx the 'iiumstances. Yo night, have'a situation develop. wlere
24
hours dotild b 'just.as critical as a week. .
'
,:
,
-: I'thhik
that'tho Mison lhat it is perfectly feadilile and would work
is thatliic6Vice Piesidtitis going to assume the powsers-and duties sof
the office on a temporary basis unless he has a good deal of support.
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I mean he would have to have the support of the Cabinet, he would

have to have the support of the legislative leaders. He would have
to have a good deal of public support. The problem is not a problem
of the Vice President moving too fast. Really the problem is to make
him take some action in other words, to assume his responsibility.
As you know, in tie case of Wilson, Marshall had no interest in it
at all, And he was beseeched by a lot of the leaders of the United
States to act.
So I think if we put in emphasis on trying to be sure the Vice
President does not usurp the office, we are not racing up to the problem. The problem is how do you get the Vice President to act when
he should.
Senator O'Mf, oxzy. Well, my feeling is that we are not quite
facing up to the problem. I have read an amendment which has ben
before this committee which constitutes an invitation to the President
and the Vice President to agree among themselves. If it has the same
virtue as section 2-if the President shall declare in writing-that is
the same idea in this other amendment of which i peak. That affords
the opportunity for the President and the Vice President to agree
among themselves. And the same amendment has none of the points
which you have criticized with respect to the commissions outside of
existing public offices to judge. And it leaves the matter for the
Congress only when the President and the Vioe President don't come
to an agreement
Mr. Room.s. Well, I want to say, Senator, I aree with practically
everything 7ou have said. I don't want you to misunderstand me and
think Iam disputing you.
Senator OMAiioxty. I don't mind dispute.

Mr. RoGmS. I don't want to giveyou the wrong Impression, because
I may have to dispute you later on, but this time I agree with you.
But insofar as 1he point you are making now is concerned, I think
maybe you have overlooked the fact that the President might not be
in a position to agree. Suppose he were forced down at sea and could
not be located, or suppose he is in a coma. Now in those cases, certainly the Constitution as it now stands, we thin, would permit the
Vice President to temporarily take over the office until the President
was able to act
But because there isSenator O'MnoNy. I think it would now, as is stands-except
for the fact that the precedent has been created of the Vice President
declaring himself President.
Mr. Roozs. I agree with what you say about Tyler, too. The only
reason I think section 1 is all right, and I don't think should be challenged, is because it just recognizes the fact. I mean seven Vice
Presidents have become President, and we certainly have accepted
that as part of our history, and the constitutional interpretation.
So all it is is restating what we have accepted to be the fact.
Senator O'M.4oNrm Well you know, I am such a conservative, I
like to stand by the old Constitution.'
Mr. 0Roops. I think if Tyler had not become President in fact, if
he had continued on as Acting President, I agree with you that is
what the framers of the Constitution intended, then we probably
wouldn't have had this uncertainty as to inability. That is exactly
what Senator Allen pointed out. He said if Tyler becomes President
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in fact, it is going to cause a good deal of doubt on the inability
provision of the Constitution.
Senator O'MAH mY. Exactly. And now in this alternate section

4, in which you bring .Congress in you provide for a majority vote
in the House to determine flat the esident's inability has not terminated, and then you provide for trial by the Senate like the impeachment proceedings.
Mr. RooxPs. That is right. It isanalogous to the impeachment
proceedings.
Senator OMAHONEY. Yes. And I think it would probably be interpreted in that light. And therefore I raise the question for your
consideration whether it would not be better to have the determination made by? say, a two-thirds vote of the Congresm, when the President, being disabled, declines or is unable to determine it.
That is all I care to say, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to take the
time of the Attorney General. I must go back to this other committee meeting at which I am presiding.
Senator KzAuvFm. Thank you very much, Senator OMahoney.
We are glad for your presence and your questions.
Any other questions at this point I
Senator 0 MAuoznY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. RooEmm. Thank you, Senator.
Senator CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question
here. I have not had a chance to read all of your statement.
Do I understand that if the President declares in writing that he
is unable to discharge the duties of his office, that the Vice President
will be the Actin President?
Mr. Roos. That is correct, Senator.
Senator CARUOIL. Is there anybody or group to pass judgment on
the validity of the President's writing?
Mr. Roo.Rs. You mean the authenticity?
Senator CARROLL. Yes. If the President establishes it in writing,
that is in a sense a transfer of Presidential power. Now, if I correctly understood some of the other testimony, if the President should
recall that power by a subsequent writing, that that subsequent writing can be contested by the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet.
Mr. RooErs. Yes, that is correct.
Senator CARROLL. In other words, the thought running through my
mind is that the initial power belonging to the President is now transferred by virtue of a written instrument. That written instruments
I suppose, in writing means it could be dictated, and if his hand
touched a pen with his "X" that would be an instrument in writingthat would be a transfer of power. Is thatyour concept of a writing?
Mr. Rooms. No, I would think thatSenator CARROLL. Well, that is the law of instruments, isn't itt
When we affix a signature to a writing Mr. RoGaEis. I think it would have to be more than an "X", though,
Senator CARROUL Well, if he touched the pen, that would be a
writing. It would be valid in law.
I am thinking in terms of the conditions that obtain here. I think
in your previous testimony you had a President who is not conscious.
Supposing you had a President who is conscious but paralyzed-who
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knew what was going on and could not performn tie mautial task, but
touched the pien. Ti t would transfer.the power under our concept
hee, would it not?
Mr. RoEms. I think it would depend upon the circumstances. I
suppose there could be circumstances of paralysis so that the signature could be something other than a complete name.
c'Nintor CARnROLL. Well, really what I had iin
mind was the idea that
he could transfer the power to act as President. When he sought
to regain that power, even though in writing, there is a question of
the validity of his desire to recapture that power, and that. would be
passed ulon by the agent whom lie first designated, the, Vice P'esident, because the power is the President's power, the constitutional
power.
Mr. ROOERs. Well,letme seSenator CuOLL. Perhaps I will simplify it this way. If he seeks
to rain
the power which he has given the Vice President, that can
be challenged.
Mr.ilooim s. 10Well, that is right. ie regains it all right. ie becomes President. But. then th Vice President, with a majority of the
Cabinet, can file a petition with the Congress asking that they consi(ler the inability question. But the President would still continue
to act. lie would have the authority unless Congress found his inabilitv.
I want to emphasize again, Senator, that I think if there was a provision like this in the Constitution, this contingency would never
arise, because it never has arisen, and I don't think it ever would, because no Vice President would-and the members of the Cabinet would
never amsert the inability of the President after he reclaimed the office,
unless they were sure lie was unable to act. That. would destroy them
in the public mind.
Secondly, if the President and the people around him realized that
if lie tried to regain his office when lie actually was unable to act, that
tie Congress might overrule him, they would be most loath to suggest
he do that, because they would realize that would be a very odious
thing for him, and they would urge him not to do it. So I dihik the
fact that you had power in the Congress, to determine inability in the
event of that kind of a dispute, would in my opinion only arise when
the issue was clear one way or the other, because no Vice President
would ever claim that the !"resident was unable to act if lie thought
there was any uncertainty about it.
Senator CARROLL, Vell, there is considerable logic in that. What I
had in mind in the first place, was that when lie releases the power,
there is no branch or body of the Government that can question that
release.
Mr. ROGERS. That is right.
Senator CARROLL. But when he seeks to regain that power safeguards are proposed. So it is the question of the power oI relinquishment as to tie first, and then the President's possible desire to recap.ture the power later there is this difference between the two provisos.

Mr. ROGERs. That is correct.
Senator CARROLL. Had you thought at-all in any of your irtvestigations whether or not the President's disability issuch that he should
release his power?
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Mr. ]OGERS. I am not sure that I understand your question, Senator.
I am sorry.
Senator CARROLLJ. Well, supposing the disability is of such a nature
that we question whether it is that type of disability. I am just thinking aloud hero on this subject. Clearly the President could resiga,
and by a resignation he confers his powers on the Vice President.
That is clearly'under the Constitution.
Mr. ]{oorits. Yes, I covered that, I think, before you came in, Senator. I pointed out the argument has been made that a President
.might, just because he was lazy or didn't want to perform the duties
of his office for a whil-he might temporarily turn them over to the
Vice President. But as I pointed out in the statement, if lie did that
he could be impeached, because that would be a violation of the oath
of office. If hto iml properly said he was unable to act, it would be
grounds for impeacliment. I don't think aiy President would say lie
wats unable to act if lie was not in fact unable to act. And if he just
wants to get out of the ofiic, he has the power to resign. So I cannot
imagine the President wouhl declare his inability if in fact lie was not
unable to act.
Senator CARROLL. You think, therefore, there is no necessity for
anybody or any branch of the Government to pass upon his ability or
lack of ability at the time lie makes this transfer of power?
Mr. Rooi:Rs. Well, not more than you already have. You have the
power to impeach hun-if you think he has declared his inability when
ii fact he is able to act, then you have the power of impeachment.
But I don't think there is any likelihood that the President would do
that, because it is so much easier to resign.
Senator CARROLL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator DiIKsFN. Mr. Attorney General, it runs in my mind-and
I am drawing strictly on memory-that the shortest period of time in
which a constitutional amendment has been ratified was 9 months.
It has been years since I have examined into it.
Mr. RoGERS. I have that in the statement here a little later.
Senator IIRKSE.N. Well, the reason I rai. the question only is this.
Tn the nature of things, in legislative sessions and State laws being
what they are, and the problem of bringing together conventions that
might conceivably'ratify a constitutional amendment, a considerable
period of time might go by before such an amendment is ratified.
Now, in the light of that reality, is it your proposal that the administration would sponsor only one measure here, namely a proposal for a
constitutional amendment, and not a statutory proposal to meet any
interim or emergency situation ?
Mr. ROOERS. Thatis correct, Senator.
Senator DIRKSEN. So there would be no proposal for a legislative
enactment by Congress to cover this same matter?
Mr. ROGERS. That is correct.

Let me say on that point that the 17th amendment providing for the
election of Senators by popular vote was ratified in 13 months. To
repeal the 18th amnendment on prohibition by ratification of the 21st
amendment, it took less than 10 months. For ratification of the 19th
amendment, dealing with women's suffrage, 15 months. The lame
duck amendment, 20th amendment. 11 months.
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Now, actually the time is not very long. You can get them ratified
fairly soon.
The objection I have to the statute-well, there are two objections.
Some statutes that have been suggested I think are clearly unconstitutional. Now I don't suggest you cannot have a stat e that is constitutional. Aome of the statutes that have been suggested I think are
constitutional. But they would not eliminate or eradicate the weakness that now exists in the Constitution. In other words, you would
still have the same doubt that now exists as to whether the Vice President became President or became Acting President that you now have.
And the same doubts that prevailed in Garfield's administration might
prevail in another administration if you merely had a statute, because
certainly a statute would not correct the constitutional weakness that
exists now.
Senator KEFAuvEB Is it your feeling, Mr. Rogers, that the necessary and proper clause is not sufficient to validate a statute providing
for the resumption by the President of his duties?
Mr. ROGERs. That is correct.
Senator K.FAUVV.R. Do you deal with that?
Mr. Roous. I do deal with that.
Seantor KEFAv.
Very well, I won't ask you about it then.
Senator CARROLL. Just one further question along this line. Senator Dirksen gives me this thought
In this constitutional amendment, if the Congress should act on it,
we will say by June of this year, it would probably take another year
or longer for this--it could be brought up in the next session of
Congressf
M. RooERs. I think that is correct.
Senator CARROLL. So we would really be talking about a situation
that perhaps would come in 1959 or even the forepart of 1960?
Mr. ROER&S I thing that is correct.
Senator KEFAuYER. Well legislatures in most of the States meet
in the early part of 1959. Practically all of them do.
You may proceed, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Roovs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KZAUVER. One point. I am sure that no one would ever
suggest that the powers of the President are divisible. But for the
legislative history, it is your feeling that if he declares he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of the office, he cannot say that
"I am unable to discharge the powers and duties as Commander in
Chief" and keep the rest, or "I am unable to discharge domestic
duties" and keep the Commander in Chief. It is all or nothing.
Mr. RooERS. That is correct.
Senator KEFAUVER. I have never heard anyone seriously propose
that.
Mr. Roors. I think that probably a few duties that have been assigned to the President by statute might be delegated. But certainly
the constitutional powers and duties could not be divided.
Senator KFAUVER. Yes. I just wanted to get clear your opinion
about that. You may proceed, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. RoaERS. All right, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee.
I want to discuss various plans for the creation of a special commicion to determine ability. Some people have suggested that the
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commission be empowered to employ physicians and require the President to submit to physical and mental examinations and there have
been different proposals for makeup of the commission and the vote
of the commission and so forth. We think these plans should be rejected for a number of reasons.
First, it seeins unwise to establish elaborate legal machinery for
giving the President physical and mental examinations. This would
give a hostile commission power to harass the President constantly,
and risk danger of irresponsible demands for commission action. Not
only would provision for such physical and mental examinations be
an affront to a President's personal dignity but it would also degrade
the presidential office itself.
Second, it seems ill advised to establish complicated procedureA
which would prevent immediate action in case of emergency, because
there is a need for continuity in the exercise of Executive power and
leadership--especially in time of crisis. Investigations, hearings, find.
ings, and votes of a commission could drag on for days or even weeks
and result in a governmental crises, during which no one would have
a clear right to exercise Presidential power.
Third, such a commission would be totally unnecessary except where
there was a dispute between the President and the Vice President in
the executive branch itself. In my opinion uch a situation would be
most unlikely, once the principle is constitutionally established that
the Vice President's assumption of power is only *temporary and the
President can resume his power at any time.
1 think I have discussed the other matters in that paragraph.
Some constitutional authorities have pointed to the extraordinary
ad hoc commission of 15 members set up to decide the disputed HayesTilden election in 1876. This was a desperate remedy for a desperate
situation. In m opinion it forms no basis for a carefully considered
long-term constitutional arrangement which will be tested at some
indefinite time in the future with unknown personalities involved.
You recall the law that set that commission up was repealed
right after, so there was never any constitutional test of it.
Let us now consider some of the objections to the particular composition of proposed commissions.
I think it is now generally agreed that the Supreme Court should
not be represented on any Presidential Inability Commission. Ithink
the Chief Justice expressly stated that the other day.
Senator lKzzuvErn. Yes; his letter is in the record.
Mr. RooEsR. I fully concur in that view, and I think most legal
scholars feel it would be unwise to have members of the Court on any
such commission.
This leaves Congress and the Cabinet as the logical source from
which the members of such a commission would be drawn.
It would appear to be a violation of the doctrine of separation of
power for officials of the Congress to participate in any initial decision of Presidential inability. Especially is it the case where under
a proposed plan more than a majo-ity of the commission empowered
to vote would come from the legislative branch. In effect, it would
enable congressional leaders to put the President out of office, and to
keep him out, by declaring that he lacks the ability to perform his
duties.
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The lack of wisdom in any such proposal, I believe, is indicated by
considering a converse proposal. Consider for a moment a proposal
under which a coiumi.mion, composed of 4 members of the Cabinet and
1 member either from the louse of Representatives or Senate was
empowered to look into the alleged inability of Members of the House
and Senate.
Any such proposal would promptly and accurately be branded

as an unwarranted intrusion by the executive branch into the affairs

of the legislative branch. It seems equally unwise to give a committee
consisting of a majority of Members of Congress the power to remove the President of the United States.
The framers designed the President as the sole repository of the
Executive power of the Nation. lie and the Vice Pivsident.-tle alternate Executive-are the only two officials to he chosen by nil the
people. In the time the Presidency has grown as the national symbol,
a imifying symbol in any time of stresq or crisis. No solutionoto thO
Ioblem
of temporary liability should (ilute the prestige of the
Vresqi decy, diminish its stature, or endanger its tenure.
Summarizing my views on the various proposals of a Presidential
Conimission on Inalhility, I am convinced that this type of scheme is
unnecesary, would be tunworkable in practice, And ilould drastically
alter the concept of separation of power which has worked so well
tlropmghnut our Nation's history.
'tSnator
KvAVVEi. Mr. Rogers, world you mind an interruption
at,tht point?

Mr. Rowiqas. Not at all, Senator.

Senator K'EFAXVER. I see Mr. Ienry Fowler back in the audience,
and li'e te.Atified here the other (lay very convincingly on this subject
matter.
His proposal was-if you would rather not. discuss it now,
I won't. a.kVou
to-the heads of the agencies, plus the Speaker, plus
the Proqsident, pro tempore of the Senate Would be the ones to make
(hl'
decision.
.in other worxls, he would add those two from Congress.

I pointed out to Mr. Fowler that both the Speaker and the Presi-

dent pro tempore might'have some hesitancy in acting on the grounds
tJat omeonemight, accuse them of having a personal interest in gettinf '.oQe step closer to the. Presidency.
* Earo you given Mr. Fowler's proposal any thought, or do you:
wish to express yourop'doh'about it?
I
#Mr. Room.is. 'Yes, I have; I have not really studied it carefully.
Let me speak just for a moment to the question of a statute.
As I said earlier, I think a statute which would transfer the power
of determining inability outside the executive branch or in a commiiisioni. part of whose people were outside the executive branch,

wo,,d. bo unconqtitutional.

No-*, T have also pointed out that there may be statutes that could
be passed that would not be unconstitutional. 'And I think maybe
it. Fowler's suggestion would 1it that category.
, Tn Other 'words, as I understood hs proposal, he would leave the.
deciaibn in the Vice President where it exists now, under the Constitution, but he wouloi get up, by statute, an advisory ground to advise
*Ith Ithe Vice" Presideht, the ultimate decision being the Vice Presi.
dent's.
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I don't think that wouldSenator KEFAuvER. Yes that was his proposal.
Mr. RoGF.Rs. I don't believe that would change the constitutional
situation any, but I think it would probably have the effect, as a
practical matter, of making certain that the Vice President consulted
that group.
Senator KEFAUYEn. And of giving him backing for whatever action
he might take.
Mr. ROOERS. I think, as a practical matter, the Vice President would
do that anyway. As I have indicated, I don't believe any Vice President would act to take over the powers and duties of the office unless
he had a great deal of support, cause it would destroy him politically,
he acted in a manner which seemed to be usurping the powers
of the if
office.
In other words, the power has never been that the Vice President
acted too hastily. 'rhe problem is, How do you get enough support
for the Vice President so he will take over the responsibility' He
has always hesitated to do it because he was afraid he would be charged
with trying to get the Office for good.
Now, getting back to the point of a statute, the only objection I
have to a statute is that it might suggest that that was a solution to
the problem, and I don't think it wvouid. I don't think it would resolve
the loubt that exists today in the Constitution. The doubt is Is it a
temporary or a permanent things Now, that cannot be resolved by
statute. As long as that doubt exists, I think certainly future administrations will be plagued with this problem.
A Vice President, 1 think, just as in Garfield's time, would hesitate
very much to act if he thought that he was taking over the Office permanently. And until the Constitution is clarified-to make it clear that
he is acting temporarily, then you are going to have a serious constitutional problem every time the President is ill.
So I don't rule out all possibilities of a statute. Maybe a statute
would have some public relations value, but it would not have any
constitutional value.
Senator DmiKspN. One difficulty that I see with an advisory group
in a matter of such importance as this is that they could wield tremen-.
dous influence and yet have no responsibility, if it was only an advisory
group,
because the ultimate decision would have to be made by somebody else.
Mr. ROOERS. That is right. Another thing that Would be bad about
an advisory group. As I recall, I am not too clear on Mr. Fowler's
suggestion, because I have not seen it except through the paper, but
it provided that two members of an advisory group could call
Ia think
ineetin.
aNow,
i you can permit 2 or 3 people to start a formal prceeding
to bring an inability charge against the President, I think it would
have a serious adverse effect on the Office, because throughout the
history of the country, there has been a great deal of hostility between
Congress and the President from time to time.
.I certainly wduld be opposed to permitting anyone outside the
executive branch to have the power to initiate inability proceedings.
Senator CARROLL. Mr. Chairman--Mr. Hruska, go ahead.
Senator HRUSKA. When you make the suggestion that such a proposal would be unconstitutional, is that conclusion based on the idea
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of drawing on officials outside of the executive department to participate in such a Commission's activities? Largely a violation of
the concept of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Mr. ROGERs. Yes. Let me see if I can state it a little more simply
and directly.
The President-I think most constitutional authorities agree that
the power to determine inability rests with the executive branch of
the Government. Most authorities agree that the power now rests
with the Vice President. Most constitutional authorities agree that
the power-that once he determines inability, it is a temporary thing,
and the President can take it back any time, but there is general
agreement that the power now rests In the Vice President.
Now, the necessary and proper clause, as I pointed out here permits
Congress to implement a power which is already provided by the
Constitution. In other words, it says that Congress can pass necessary and roper legislation to implement a power that is already
granted. ' But the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution
does not give Congress the right to transfer the power.
In other words, if Congress says, "Well, the power is now in the
executive branch, but we are going to provide, by statute that we
have the power," that would ie clearly unconstitutional. You cannot transfer the powers granted by the Constitution by statute. You
can implement the power and you can permit the power to be exercited, and clarify what the Con1stitution provides, but you cannot
transfer the power, because if you do, you would not have a
Constitution.
That would mean that youl could transfer all the power of the
judicial branch of the Government and executive branch of the Government by statute. So you won't have a Odnstitution.
Senator HRUSKA. Well, then, the objection to the Commission would
lie, on these grounds, whether the Commissi6n were drawn exclusively
from the executive department or partly from the executive and partly
from the legislative, would It not?
argument is
think that
the constitutional
Mr. RoGERs.
stronger
if you No;
have Ieverybody
outide
the executive branch or if
you have a split Commission. But I think if you try to transfer the
power from where it now exists in the Vice President to any other
group, and it was on a mandatory basis-I mean advisory is something else again-but on a mandatory basis if you transfer the power
from where it exists to somebody else, even in the same branch of
the Government, I think you would run into constitutional problems.
Senator KFAUVvE. You also run into a constitutional problem on
this basis, do you not? If you are wrong about the Vice President,
in your understanding of the Constitution, only acting as President,
and not in fact beeom~ng President-that is, if he does, in fact become
President-then there is nothing in the Constitution which would
enable the President to get his Office back. So that the necessary and
proper clause does not cover getting the power back if the Vice President did, in fact become President.
Mr. Roo.Rs. That is correct. In other words, those people who
argue, as Daniel Webster did, and as the majority of Garfield's Cabinet did, and as a great many other people have, that the exercise of
the powers and duties of the Office in fact makes you President-if
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that is correct, if that is a correct constitutional interpretation, that
could not be changed by statute.

Senator
Senator

KEFAUVER. Anything
HRUSKA. That is all.

else, Mr. Hruska I
Thank you.

Senator KJCVAUVER. Senator Carroll.
Senator CARROLL. Do I understand, then that the proposals here
you are offering, that no person, no commission no group has the
right to make the determination of the Presidents disability, except
the President himself f
Mi. Roomts. And the Vice President.
Senator CARROLL. Well, initially does the Vice President make such
a determination ?
Mr. ROoERS. We think, and I think the majority of constitutional
authorities think, that the Vice President has that power today, under the Constitution.

Senator CARROLL. How would he initiate it? I am talking now in

the first instance of the President's disability. Is it your proposal
that the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet, without the
President's consentMr. ROEms. That is correct.
Senator CARROLL,. Well that clarifies in my mind that, and that
raises the next question. Let's assume that the President decided to
act on disability. He makes the decision, the designation of the Vice
President to act for him. Would there be anything wrong with
having the other branches of Government, whether it is the Supreme
Court or the Speaker, the majority leader, to be witnesses to the document which gives this--it would be a very important document, the
delegation. As long as the President makes the decision, would there
be anything wrong with them affixing their signatures as witnesses to
the delegation
Mr. RooERs. No, I don't think there would be anything wrong. I
don't quiteSenator CARROLL. My reason for it is this. This would be a very
important document delegating the President's authority, even tem.
porarily. And its impact upon the people, its newness, the innovation-it would seem to me it would strengthen the President's hand
to have the coordinate branches of Government witness what has taken
place in a public meeting.
Mr. Rooms. Well, I would not have any objection to that. As I
say, I think the President signs his name to a lot of important documents and you don't have much problem in establishing his si aure.
And I don't think you would have any difficult here establishing the
authenticity of his signature. I assume if a President signs such a
document, that he would do it in a way thatSenator CARROLL. It would be a very historic document.
Mr. RoEs. Yes. He probably would have it properly witnessed.
Senator DRKAxR. You are referring to section -21
Senator CARROLL. I am referring to the first actionon the part of
the President himself, who has the power and he exercises it. And
it is just a question of having the c'ordinale branches of Government'
there. I was thinking a little earlier about the possibility of a President who is completely paralyzed anid how his statement in writing
would be expressed,
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Mr. ilooEus. I miglit. say, Senator, that would he filed with the

Secretary of State, as other state documents are filed. And I am
sure that the President would have it properly witnessed. I don't

believe it is necessary to have other branches of the Government wit-

ness it. I don't believe you would have a question of authenjticity of
tile signature.
. Senator lriUsKA. Isn't, it. true to assume if there were a question
of paralysis in Which the situation would be that 110 couldlnot sign
his name, isn't it ivasonable to assunjo all) mark or designation T
might make on that paper with fihe intent it would be hii signature
would be properly witnessed and I suppose recorded in some fashion

which would appear likewise in a contemporaneous document?

Mr. locus. 'mI
es, 1 am1sure that that would be the case.
Senator I ,\VAMP.Ra.
All right, Mr. Rogers. You may proceed.

Mr. MrooEs. Well, I have really covered to a good extent the next

portion of the statement here, why 1 think a constitutional amendinient is n10COcsaXrv'.

'r
ifessor S t

ideland
states it,quite vell:

The problem seems to me to Involve a constitotionnl nmendinent
. The
Founding Fnthers wisely wrote Into our Constitution the doctrine of separation
of powers, from which the country derives many benefits, but which somewhat
complicates provision for Presidential Inability * * *. however, under the Con.
stitttion as it was well drafted, congress can no more remove the Presidont
than the President can reniove a Congressmnnn. An exception, of course, Is the
provision for Impeachment * * *. To turn over provision for suspending 'or
ending his duties to ordinary legislation would aiter , In an Important respect,
the present distribution of governnntal powers between the executive and the
legislative branches.

I pointed out that those who feel it can be (oil0 rly oil the necessary
and proper clause of'the COistitution, and I don't believe that it applies
for the reasins I have stated. There is quite a lot of authority for that,
that the necessary and proper clause does not--I don't think I will rewhat I said. It is a little more detailed in this statement than I

Jeat
lave given

it.
Senator K.F,%VE1. All this stnenient will be l)rited in the record.

Mr. loomrps. Fine.

It seems clear to me that the necessary and Iroper clause of the
Constitution does inot give the Congress power to determine the inability of a President.
I also have discussed the time it has taken constitutional amendments to be passed.
In summary, I think, first, the sounder logic is strongly in favor of

a constitutional amendment, and second, if there is this large body of

opinion which regards a constitutional amendment as necessary, it
would be illogical, to Say the least, to deal with this problem by statute,
and leave it. in the san, state of uncertainty as it is in now.
Finally, I should like briefly to comment on the plan under which the
Congress would enact a statute and submit an identical constitutional
amendment to the States at the same time. There is a precedent for
this dual procedure. In 1866 C-ngress passed the Civil Rights Act
over President Johnson's veto. During debate on the bill in Con.

gress, opponents to it pressed with great force their; arguments to
demonstrate that the bil wos unconstitutional., Thb 14th amendment
was adopted to obviate these objections" that' thretMnedi he validity
of the act.
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IThere isj however, grave clanger in this procedure whefi'nppli'e'd t
lPvesidentJal Inability cases. Iteort to the constitutional ainendpen1
routo at the same tine that a statute was enacted would be construed

as a confession of the unconstitutionality of the statute, and lead to

great public tension and unrest if there were any attempt. to invoke
It in a crisis. Indeed, it might well stir up heated litigation in a hatonal eniergency-tho very time that the country can ill afford to
await the outcome of protracted litigation, or be dhvlded by it.
For still another reason the 1860 precedent involving civil rights is
not an apt one in connection with the Presidential immability issue.
There is no question but that the Federal courts have the juris.
diction to consider the validity of civil-rights statutes and to hold
them invalid when they (to not meet constitutional standards. In
keeping with our traditions, decisions of the courts in cases of this
kind which the courts have long determined would generally be
acceptable to the people. But, as several scholars have pointed out,
statutes dealing with Presidential inability Involve political questions--questions which tile courts have steadfastly refused to assume.
In the leading case of Volegrovo v. Green, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
speaking for the Court stressed once again that it should etay out of
polrical controversies.

The Court said:

'rom the determination of such political Issues the Court has traditionally
held aloof, It Is hostile to a democratic system to Involve the Judiciary In the
polities of the people, And it Is not less pernicious if such Judicial IntervenUion

in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the
l W.

What would the result then be if a statute were eliacted it would
merely Invite a long drawn out legal battle at the end of which the
Court might decide (hat it has no power to decide the matter, and that
it, is bound by the Vice President's decision; or If it did decide it,
either the President or Vice President might claini that its decision
was worthless because the Constitution never gave the Court authority

to determine such a case. Thus we would-be back where we had
started from, except that now the confusion, chaos, and (issensionl
among the people would be greater than ever.
In other words, to summarize, I think that would create more confusion than there is today. I think there is less confusion now than
if we pass a statute that could be attacked on the grounds of con.
stitutionality.
If we are ultimately to-rely on a constitutional amendment any-

ways it, is my considered opinion that we should follow this course

exclusively now, and set all doubts to rest for the future. The machinery to be provided to resolve the inAbility dispute under any
plan, must not only be such as to achieve a just result but also to
insure its widespread a'cceptance by the people. And this can only
be accomplished by a constitutional amendment 1 simple on its face,
plain for everyone to understand, free of radical change, and so
emilently fair to all parties involved as to have universal appeal.
(The complete statement of Mr. Rogers is as follows!)
tooas, ATvpasZYr OEGzxtL. or Tuz EU1Tp.
STATUIRN? Or1o16x. WjjjA M P.
STATES5, O'q,,

ESJ DIENI4
FfA1"XLVTY
..
A'matteiof s riods concfflto the pebple of th6 cuntt ls the koblem 6fwhA

happens when a President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
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oMee In case of Illness or other unexpected emergency. There is agreement that
there should be clarification and improvement of our constitutional system relatIng to such Inability. The question Is what i the most desirable and appropriate
procedure for accomplishing this objective.
After careful study, I believe that action to amend the Constitution is necessary to eliminate uncertainty and to provide for the orderly conduct of Uoverament in time of future crises duo to a President's inability to act. The plan which
the administration has recommended for favorable consideration by Congress I
believe provides a workable and satisfactory solution.
The administration plan Is attached as appendix 1.
Strong disagreement prevails concerning the status and tenure of a Vice
President during the inability of the President. Distinguished students of the
Constitution have contended that a Vice President would merely act as President
for the duration of the Inability, Other respected students of the Constitution
have argued that a Vice President would actually become President and replace
the dlkgibled President for the remainder of the term. This difference in opinion
resiecling a Vice President's status and tenure during a President's inability
fully demonstrates the compelling need to remove the existing doubt and confusion once and for all.
Soon after Presideut William Henry Harrison died In 1841, Senator William
Allen, of Oie, objected to establishing the precedent of a Vice President's
becoming President upon the death of the latter, because ho thought that the
precedent would conlilicate the situation Inthe future when a President became
disabled. As Allen indicated, study of the records of the Constitutional Convention shows that a Vice Presilent was not intended to become President
under the siccesslon clause, but merely to exercise the powers and duties of
the Presidenut until his inability was removed.
This committee's attention is directed to a chart which is attached to my
statement.
Regardless of the Intent of the framers of the Constitution, seven Vice Presidents have, upon the death of the President, been recognized as having become
the President in fact. As a result of the precedents established whenever a
President has died, it seems to be assumed without question that the Vice
President becomes President and does not merely act as such when the President
dies. This appeared to be Daniel Webster's view at the time of President
lHarrison's death, I. e., that Vico President John Tyler actually became President.
These precedents make it easier to argue that a Vice President supersedes the
President whenever he exercises Presidential power, As we will note in a
moment in both the Garfield and Wilson cases, the Vice President was not asked
to act as President largely because of the fear that he would become President
and thereby oust the incapacitated incumbent. As a result, the full extent of
the disabilities was carefully guarded because of personal loyalty to the disabled
President. More Important, the public interest could not help but suffer from
being deprived of an active President in both cases.
Since 1harrison's illness was sort, no question of Inability was involved.
However, President Garfield lingered for eighty days after he was shot on
July 2, 1881. During this eighty days he performed only one official act-the
signing of an extradition paper. Although his mind was clear during the first
days of his Illness he was unconscious and It was reported that he suffered
hallucinations during the last days of his illness. Moreover, he was physically
unable to discharge the duties of his office during a substantial part of the
eighty days involved. It cannot be seriously contended that there was no Important business requiring the President's attention. Actually, officers were
unable to perform their duties because the President was unable to commission
them. There was a serious crisis in our foreign affairs. Yet the department
heads transacted only such routine business as could be transacted without the
President's supervision. It was claimed that Important questions of public
policy which could be decided only by the President were simply Ignored.
Equally Important, public opinion was sharply divided about the manner In
which public business was handled. There was objection to having the affairs
of the executive branch managed by the Cabinet, objection that Secretary of
State Blaine was guilty of usurping the President's duties, and insistent deinands
that the Vice President exercise thi, power and that Secretary Blalne's alleged
usurpation be ended Immediately.
After Garfield's illness bad already dragged on for 60 days, his physicians
thought be would recover; but hls convalescence was expected to take anotber

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

00

173

days. Therefore, the Cabinet considered the possibility of asking Vice
President Arthur to act as President during Garfield's recuperation. All seven
Cabinet members agreed on the desirability of having Arthur act as President.
Four of the seven, however, thought that Arthur's exercise of Presidential power
would actually make him President for the remainder of the term and thereby
oust (Jarfleld from office. it was reported that Attorney Wayne MacVeagh
shared these views. Consequently, the Cabinet decided that Garfield should
not be advised to ask Arthur to act as President without first telling him of
this possibility. Therefore, the whole matter was deferred because the physiclans feared that the shock caused by such a discussion might result In the
President's death. Garfield's death on September 20 made it unnecessary to
solve the problem in 1881.
There can be no doubt that President Wilson was actually unable to perform
the duties of his office during some part of the period after his collapse on
September 25, 1019, and until the end of his term on March 4, 1021. Numerous
domestic and International matters failed to receive his attention. More important, this Inability occurred during the Senate debate on the Versailles
Treaty.
The exact degree of Wilson's Inability Is uncertain. Whatever Wilson's condition, Vice President Marshall, the Cabinet and the public were not fully advised
concerning it. The President's family, his White House staff, and the Cabinet
discharged public business in such manner and by such methods as to them
seemed appropriate.
History seems to Indicate that Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Cry T. Orayson, the
President's physician, played an Important part in many questions of public
policy.
Soon after Wilson's stroke the Cabinet Joined with the White House staff In
keeping the governmentt operating. Secretary of State Lansing called 21 Cabinet meetings to transact executive business. When Wilson heard of these
meetings, he accused Lansing of usurping Presidential power and forced him
to resign. Wilson seemed to think that the Constitullon did not authorize the
Cabinet to act in his absence, with the result the Government business was in.
terrupted during his illness.
Patrick Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, reported that Secretary of State Lansing
bad suggested that, in view of the President's inability, they should ask the
Vice President to act as President. lie quotes himself as saying: "You may
rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the
broad of his back I wUl not be a party to ousting him." Tumulty also reported
that, when Lansing resigned, Wilson said: "Tumulty, it Is never the wrong time
to spike disloyalty. When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my back, I
am on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty about me."
Because of the belief that the Vice President would actually become Presl.
dent, asking Marshall to act as President during Wilson's inability was viewed
as disloyalty. Consequently, Marshall was looked at with antagonism instead
of as a person who could lighten the disabled President's burden. Instead of
asking Marshall to exercise the powers devolved upon him by the Constitution,
they attempted to keep the Government operating in their own way In order
to forestall any serious attempt to declare the President's Inability.
A study of the Garfield and Wilson cam shows that there is a real need for
a means of supplying an active President during periods of Presidential In.
ability. The belief that a Vice President actually becomes President when
called to act as such has nullified the constitutional provision for the administra.
tion of the Government when a President Is incapacitated. In the only two
serious cases of Presidential inability to date, the Vice President was not called
to act as President because of the fear that he would actually become President
and thereby supersede the disabled President for the remainder of the term.
The problem of providing for the exercise of Presidential power during pe.
rods of inability would not be solved merely by providing a means by which
the inability could be established. Unless the President, his Cabinet, and his
other friends are absolutely certain that he may resume his powers after the
termination of his inability, they will tend to oppose any attempt to declare
the existence of Inability, viewing such a declaration as equivalent to removing
the President from office.
With this history to guide us, and with a need for uninterrupted continuity
of government, we must conclude that action is vital to solve the problem of
Presidential inability.
22324-,8---58
12
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Aictlon 1 confirms the present generally'accepted Interpretation of the ConOtitutlon-that in case of removal of the President from office, or his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired lortlon
of the then current term. This affirms the result accepted by the Nation seven
times in cases of death of a President.
Section 2 of the proposal states that, If a President declares In writing that
he Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. This section authorizes a President to announce his own inability and allows him to do so,
knowing that his powers and duties will be restored to him when lierecovers.
Section 2 of this proposal also would require the President to make this announcement in writing. The reason for adding this requirement Is to )re .lude
a dispute about whether a President actually declared his Inability. The existence
of a written document will prevent anyone from seriously denying that tile
President recognized his inability. I believe that section 2 encompasses most of
the cases of Presidential inability which are likely to arise. It removes the reason which caused responsible Governncnt officials to fall to act In the Garfield
and Wilson cases.
The only objection I have heard to section 2 is that a President might use
this section to shirk his duties and responsibilities. The obvious answer is that
a President who used this section to shirk his duties would be breaking his oath
to faithfully execute the Office of President and, therefore, would be subject to
Impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. If a President should ever
become so anxious to be relieved of his duties and responsibilities, he would not
need to declare his Inability, he could simply resign in conformity with article
Itof the Constitution.
Section 3 of the plan deals with cases in which the President is unable or
unwilling to declare his own Inability. In such cases, the Vice President with
the approval of a majority of the President's Cabinet would make the decision.
The Cabinet is the proper body to participate along with the Vice President
in declaring a President's inability. The Cabinet Is an executive body, the
President's official family. Its loyalty to the President is generally unquestioned.
A decision of this body is least likely to be suspected of enabling a Vice President
to usurp powers on the pretext of inability. Moreover, the Cabinet is in a position to know at once whether a President Is disabled.
Under section 3, there are several possible courses of action. The Cabinet
could notify the Vice President when a majority of that body believed that the
President's Inability was suffclent to warrant a devolution of presidential power
on the Vice President. The Cabinet has always notified the Vice President when
a President has died; and section 3 Would extend this custom to the case of
inability. Under section 3 the Vice President might take the initiative without
the Cabinet's first inviting him to make the decision. Unlike the provision of
the present Constitution, however, section 3 would require approval by a majority
of the Cabinet before the Vice President could undertake the exercise of presidential power.
. A Vice President who undertook the exercise of presidential power would be
assured that his action could not seriously be branded as usurpation because
that action was previously approved by the President's own appointees in the
Cabinet.
. In addition to the safeguard provided in section 3 by the Cabinet's role in
the process, section 4 contains a second safeguard. It provides that, whenever
the President declares in writing that his inability Is terminated, the President shall immediately resume the exercise of the powers and duties of his
office. , Thus, section 4 does, I think, provide a dlabld l'resideut with a constitutlonal guaranty that he can regain thE powers )fhis office without the
concurrence of any other official or group if he is of the opinion that his
Inability has been removed.
• As a practical matter, if the determination c.f i'residential inability is left
where the Constitution places it now-In the Vice President, or if It is place!
in the Vice President and Cabinet, as suggested-the Vice President would
never venture to assume the duties of the presidency unless it were clear
beyond challenge in any quarter that the President was in truth and In fact
actually, disabled from performing the functions of his office. With a constitutional provision spelling out that the Vice President only acts as President
inws easeofitiability,' and d donstitutl6nftl'provislon granting to the Presldent
the right to reassei-t his 0owers'at in, tlme, the"Vice President as a practical.
political necessity in all probability would secure the appro-al of the Cabinet.
of the leaders and a great majority of the Congress, and of a large segment of
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publl opinion before venturing to assume the Presidential duties. On the other
hand, with a constitutional provision negating any motive of usurpation in the
Vice President by clear language that he only acts as President for a temporary
period, no Vice President would hesitate, as did Vice P'residents Arthur and
Marshall In the two most serious examples of this problem, to perform his constitutional duty of serving as the alternate Executive for a temporary period.
The President's immediate family and friends would be stripped of any motive
to oppose the Vice President, as in Wllson's case, for on regaining his health the
President could simply assert his right to the office.
My predecessor was of the opinion that the Federal courts would disclaim
jurisdiction in such a case upon the ground that the question presented was
IKl)itlcal, and that the only remedy was Impeachment. The consensus of opinion Is in agreement with Mr. Brownell that the sole remedy is Impeachment
where there is a wrongful assertion of authority to exercise the powers and
duties of the office. The attempt of a President to perform his duties when
lie was in fact clearly unable to perform might be classed as a wrongful assertioii of authority.
It should be noted, however, that impeachment proceedings may be delayed
if Congress Is not in session. Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides
that the President may on "extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or
either of them." It Is unlikely, however, that a President under attack for
attempting to assert the powers while still suffering Inability, would convene
the Congress to conduct impeachment proceedings against himself. Further
study Is required to determine how Congress may be convened in the event
Impeachment proceedings are required In a dispute Involving Presidential
inability.
Therefore Congress may think it wise to avoid the odium of an Impeachment
by providing another but a similar process whereby the question of inability
could be determined In the unlikely event a President and Vice President were
at an impasse. The administration plan could be modified by the addition to
section 4 of such a provision.
Referring to appendix III, this alternate section 4 would still allow the President to resume the functions of his office at any time, but provide for the immediate action of Congress, whether then in session or not, to resolve the question
6f Presidential Inability raised In writing by the Vice President supported by a
majority of the Cabinet. By making the charge one of Inability rather than im.
peachment for some offense, the necessary proceedings could be conducted In a
more appropriate atmosphere. Members of Congress who might be reluctant to
impeach the President would not have the same reluctance in removing a Presito perform the duties of his office.
dent
In physically
my opinionunable
this alternate section 4 would place the President, Vice President, tand Congress in exactly the proper relationship to the question of inability.
The President could always reassert his power, the Vice President would aeqnlese except In the unfortunate situation where the President had misjudged his
trae capacity. In that event Congress would step In and by Its consideration of
a charge of Inability determine the Issue. A two-thirds vote of the Senate would
determine the existence of a President's Inability; a majority vote of both
Houses would restore the powers of his office to him. Impeachment would remove the President permanently; a determination of inability would leave to
the President an opportunity later to reassume the powers of his office. The difference between the result reached by Impeachment and by an inability proceeding
would justify the enactment of the separate inability proceeding, and would
the whole proposed solution more aceptable, I believe, to the public.
render
SLet me
stress that the very existence of this ifitimate power in Congress-which is the only power it needs In relation to this question-would In all probability Insure that this extreme situation would never arise. No Vice President
would resist a President reasserting his claim to the powers of the office'unless
the President were in fact unable to perform. No President, In fact unable to
perform, would be permitted by his family and close personal counsellors to re-'
assert his claim and precipitate an Issue likely to be resolved against him by
,Congress.
I We must recognize that In thls area as In'others, not everything Is soluble and
not everything ma ' be coiltrolled by law. Whatever' machinery Is adopted, It
rittiat zot liohlb to be used ass vehicle for hariassing the Prestcent. So long as
the determination of Inability is left Witbiin the exetutiye bran/,b, either by the
Presidenlt, or'by the Vice President as is now true under the Conthitufiob, or by
the Vice President and Cabinet under the circumstances proposed by the admin-
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istration, there can be no harassment of the President or diminution of his
stature in the eyes of the people. The Vice President Is of the President's own
party; the Cabinet is of the President's own choice; if there is a provision that
the President can reassume the duties of his office at any time, he is safeguarded.
But If we transfer the power of initial determination of inability out of the
executive branch, or in some fashion share it with others outside the executive
branch, then the way is opened for a harassment of the President for political and
personal motives. We may not always have as President a figure of the national
and international stature of President Eisenhower, nor one who has so coin.
pletely demonstrated his respect for Pongress as a coequal branch of govern.
went, whether udoiniiiated by his own or the opposition party, as has President
Eisenhower. Our solution must contemplate the testing of It, if need be, in circumstances similar to the time of President Johnson and the Reconstructilwi
Congress, when violent personal differences and party controversy would Invite
Congress to use any power it had to determine Presidential inability as a weapon
of harassment-if such a weapon were easily at hand. A possibility of such
political harassment could severely Impair the Presidency at the very time whenl
assertion of its full power was most needed.
With these guiding principles in mind, let us now examine some other proposals.
First, it seems unwise to establish elaborate legal machinery for giving the
President physical and mental examinations. This would give a hostile com.
mission power to harass the President constantly, and risk danger of irresponsible demands for commission action. Not only would provision for such physical
and mental examinations be an affront to a President's personal dignity bt it
would also degrade the presidential office itself.
Second, it seems ill-advised to establish complicated procedures which would
prevent immediate action in case of emergency, because there Is a need for
continuity In the exercise of executive power and leadership, especially in time
of crisis. Investigations, hearings, findings, and votes of a commission could
drag on for days or even weeks and result in a governmental crisis, during
which no one would have a clear right to exercise Presidential power.
Third, such a commission would be totally unnecessary except where there
was a dispute between the President and the Vice President in the executive
branch itself. In my opinion such a situation would be most unlikely, once
the principle is constitutionally established that the Vice President's assumption
of power is only temporary and the President can resume his power at any time.
Some constitutional authorities have pointed to the extraordinary ad hoe
commission of 15 members set up to decide the disputed Hayes-Tilden election
in 1870. This was a desperate remedy for a desperate situation. In my opinion
it forms no basis for a carefully considered long term constitutional arrangement which will be tested at some indefinite time In the future with unknown
personalities involved.
Let us now consider some of the objections to the particular composition of
proposed commissions.
I think it is now generally agreed that the Supreme Court should not be
represented on any Presidential Inability commission. This leaves Congress
and the Cabinet as the logical source from which the members of such a commission would be drawn.
It would appear to be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers for
officials of the Congress to participate in any Initial decision of Presidential
inability. Especially is it the case where where under proposed plan more
than a majority of the commission empowered to vote would come from the
legislative branch. In effect, it would enable Congressional leaders to put the
President out of office, and to keep him out, by declaring that he lacks the
ability to perform his duties,
The lack of wisdom in any such proposal, I believe, is indicated by considering a converse proposal. Consider for a moment a proposal under which a
commission, composed of four members of the Cabinet and one member either
from the House of Representatives or Senate was empowered to look Into the
alleged Inability of Members of the House and Senate.
Any such proposal would promptly and accurately be branded as an unwarranted Intrusion by the executive branch into the affairs of the legislative
branch. It seems equally unwise to give a committee consisting of a majority
of Members of Congress the power to remove the President of the United Btatq&
The framers designed the President, as the sole repository of the executive
power of the Nation., He and the Vice President-the alternate executive-
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-are the only two officials to be chosen by all the people. In time tho Presidency
has grown as the national symbol, a unifying symbol in any time of stress or
-crisis. No solution to the problem of temporary disability should dilute the
prestige of the Presidency, diminish Its stature, or endanger its tenure.
Summarizing my views on the various proposals of a Presidential commission on inability, I am convinced that this type of scheme is unnecessary,
would be unworkable in practice, and would drastically alter the concept of
separation of power which has worked so well throughout our Nation's history.
In summary, I think, first, the sounder logic is strongly in favor of a constitutional amendment and second, if there is this large body of opinion which
regards a constitutional amendment as necesary, it would be Illogical, to say
the least, to deal with this problem by statute, and leave it in the same state
of uncertainty as It Is In now.
Finally, I should like briefly to comment on the plan under which the Congress would enact a statute and submit an identical constitutional amendment
to the States at the same time. There is a precedent for this dual procedure.
In 1866 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act over President Johnson's veto.
During debate on the bill in Congress, opponents to it pressed with great force
their arguments to demonstrate that the bill was unconstitutional. The 14th
amendment was adopted to obviate these objections that threatened the validity
of the act.
There Is, however, grave danger in this procedure when applied to Presidential
inability cases. Resort to the constitutional amendment route at the same
time that a statute was enacted would be construed as a confession of the
unconstitutionality of the statute, and lead to great public tension and unrest
if there were any attempt to invoke it in a crisis. Indeed, It might well stir up
heated litigation In a national emergency-the very time that the country can
IlI afford to await the outcome of protracted litigation, or be divided by It
For still another reason the 1866 precedent involving civil rights Is not an
apt one In connection with the Presidential inability issue.
There Is no question but that the Federal courts have the jurisdiction to
consider the validity of civil rights statutes and to hold them Invalid when they
*do not meet constitutional standards. In keeping with our traditions, decisions
-of the courts in cases of this kind which the courts have long determined, would
generally be acceptable to the people. But, as severAl scholars have pointed out,
statutes dealing with Presidential inability Involve political qnestion-questions
which the court have steadfastly refused to assume. In the leading case of
.Co0eprove v. Oreet, Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court stressed
-once again that it should stay out of political controversies.
The Court said:
"From the determination of such political issues the court has traditionally
held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the Judiciary in the
politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such Judicial intervention
in an essentially political contest be dressed up In the abstract phrases of the
law."
What would the result then e if a statute were enacte4 It would merely
invite a long drawn out legal battle at the end of which th6 Court might decide
it bas no power to decide the matter, and that It ti bound by the Vice 'resident'a
-decision; or If it did decide it, either the President or Vice President might
claim that its decision was worthless because the Constitution never gave the
'Court authority to determine such a case. Thae we would be back where we
bad started from, except that now the cOnfusion, chaos and dtssension among
the people would be greater than ever.
If we are ultimately to rely on a conStitutional amendinent anyway, It Is
my considered opinion that we should follow this course exclusively now, and
set all doubts to rest for the future. The machinery to be provided to resolve
the inability dispute under any plan, must not only be such as to achieve a just
result, but also to insure its widespread acceptance by the people. And this
-can only be accomplished by a constitutional amendment, simple on Its face,
plain for everyone to understand, free of radical change, and so eminently fair
,to all parties involved as to have universal appeal.

Afl'fltk I?
Resolved by the Setate aiud House of RepreAe tatire*of the United States
in Congress (two-third* of each Hou#e c&hft
#rftherela), That in lieu of so
much of paragraph six of section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the
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United ttteti as relates~ to the powers twnd uiutiesof-the Presidential offer dovolving or. the Vice J'resident in the ease of the resnoval of the President fromn
offic, or of im death, realgiintion, or Inability to discharge the ixowers tind
dutiest of tbe snid office, the following artileo Is iroilosed as an aniendinelit to
the Constitution, which shall be valid to all intent and purpises as part of the
Constitution when ratiflid by thip legislotures of three-fourths of thip States:
"JOINT KKOLUATION P'roposing an amendment to the C'onstitution of the'United States
relating g to eases where the P'res'ident is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his

"41rtoN* 1. lit cage of the removal of the P'resident froii oMee, or of his denth
or resignation, the N'ice P'resident shaill be onie Pros~di~it for ft, iexpircd lxor,
lon of the then current term.
"Sve. I.'. If the P'resident shall declare iii wvrittig that lie 18tinable to MR1cliargo the iwerit anid duties of hiR ofilee, such lxiwvrfiand1l duties shall be dilstho %'1cv residentt as Acting Presdent.
chnrgt~l boy
"Sy:c. 3. If flhe P'resident does not Fo declate, the N'ice Pre.sident, It stisfied
of the Preshict' iiiilliity, and] nuon approrwnl I writing of aitimajority of the
heads of emtcultve dlprtllents who are members of thep lreidenit's Cabinet,
shall dilseharge the powers miid dies of tue offlie As Acting P~resident.
"3i-e. 4. Wh'lenover theo President dec-laresr in writing th t hiL In.bt iI
terialtiateti, the President shall forthith discharge the lxiweori oaid duties of
his ollh*.
'Sce. 5. This Article shall be Inoperative unlps.4 It shall have been rutifled
as an~ aniendinent to the Constittion by the legislatures of three-fourthsq of
the%sovernl states within seven years from the date of Its submision."
APPESNDIX

11

A rich's as Agreed to by the Com yen on As Reported by Comm Eltee on Style anld
Mialty Adopted
Art 11, 11, ci. 6: "In case of the reAt t. X, 12:" * and In case of his

removal as aforesaid,
deoath, absence resignation or Inability
to discharge the powers and duties of
bis offie,
the Vice President shall exercise those
powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the Inability of
the President be removed.,
Art, X, I 1L: 'The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United
States shall act as President In case of
the death, resignation or disability of
the President and Vice President;
(semicolon)

moval of the president from office, or
of his death, resignation, or Inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the
said offce,
the same shall devolve on the vice-presldent, (comma)

and the Congress may by law provide
for thecease of
removal, death, resignation or Inability,
both of the president and vicepresident,
declaring what officer shall then act 4q
president (comma)."I
and such Offier shall act accordingly,. and such officer shall act accordingly,
until such disability be removed, or a until the disablity be'removed, or a
President shall be elected." (2 Max Far- President shall be elected." (2 id. 59&Ti
rand, Record. of the Federal CJommen 599, 026.).I
lion of 1787. 575,.573 (1911 and M13).)
A."N'uDIX III

(Alternate see. 4)'

SM.4. Whenever the President delsres In writing that hisinabilityy has terrnlnated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and duties of his o.; e:
Prorlded, however, that If the Vice President and a majority of the heads of
executive departments who are members of the President's Cabinet shall signify
In writing that the President's Inability has not ternidxiated, th~reupon:
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(a) The Congress shall forthwith consider the issu9 of the President's inability
In accordance with procedures provided for Inipeachnient, and if the Congress is
not in season, shall forthwith convent for this purpose;
(b) It the House of Iepresentatives shall on record vote charge that the
President's Inability has not terminated, and the senate so finds by the concurrence of two thlnls of the members present, the powers and duties of the office of
President shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting Preadent for the
remainder of the term, or untli Congress by a majority vote of the members
of both Houses determines that the Ptesident's inability hns terminated.

Mr. lRoor:is. Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.
Senator K r.,uvwro. Mr. Rogeri, in section 8, you have that,upon approval In writing of n majority of the heads of the executive departments
who are members of the President's Cablnet-

do you think the clause "who are members of the President's Cabinet"
should be there, because as I understand it, the President is not by the
Constitution bound to have any number in his Cabinett le might
just have the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury.
Mr. Roorns. I wouhl agree with that, Senator. I would be agreeable to leaving that out.-just leaving it as "majority of heads of the
executive de artments.".
Senator
0101Avwin.
Any questions of Mr. Rogers? Senator Wiley?
Senator Wiiv. I have listened to the discussion, and Ift sounded
very logical. You called attention hero to section 8:
If the President does not so declare, the Vice President, if satisfied with the
President's Inability, and upon apimoval In writing of a majority of the beads

of the executive departments who are members of the President's Cabinet, shall
discharge the powers and duties of the office.

Is it, your opinion that, if this, were to become an amendment,
you would be making the Vice Presidents power subject to the

aapproval, or is it the ilea that this is simply advisory to the Vice
,]resident?
.
.
Mr. Rooas. No, it is the former, Senator. I think according to, our
present interpretation of the constitution, I think it would be a limitation on the Vice President's power.
Senator Wmr.r. That is what you want to do about it?
Mr. ROGORs. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. Unless you were to provide that it should be advisory only, you would he taking away from an executive officer
power in order to meet a situation that may arise, as I see it..

:

Mr. RoER~s. That is correct, As a matter of fact, speaking for myself, Senator, I would not object to elimination of that. I think that
it might be helpful to the Vice President to have it in there, because I
think it would give him. support. And I think that1 as long as it'was
clear that this was a temporary thing, then the Cabinet would support
the Vice President; just'as they did in Garfield's time. And I think
the would in any case.
.
r*n othor words; Ican ot imagine a Vice President assumingthe
powers and duties of the office if the Cabinet opposed, hia.,
Senator DiKBEN, Well, the whole purpose i to fortify him and
dissipate thei fear that arnse in the Garfield case and the Wilson case,
Mr. Roo.Rs. That is co':rect, Senator.
.

,Senator Kr.FAuvER. &FenatorDirksen;

Senator Wrtv.'. Mrp.y I just ask one other question that bothers me?
When President Wilson was stricken, there was considerable dis-
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that versA-menMIy
a man may-be disabled
hyieallyanddisabled,
but
apparently
able. know
Or vice
mentally We
physically able. You can see that in the asylums. But, to return
to the current problem, there is no definition of the President's
inability. As the situation is now, it devolves upon the Vice President to define that term. If this amendment were to become part
of the Constitution, you could have a great deal of discussion among
a number of officials as to what the meaning of "President's inability"
is. In other words, it could not be one man's decision. That is
what I am getting at. And it may be getting into a situation which
involves personal interest.
Now, you had that Wilson situation. Some said he was disabled
and some said he was not. Some said that he, through his wife,
carried on, and so forth. We hope we will never have to meet that
situation. But I think it is important to get the phraseology clarified,
so we will know what we are talking about
Carry on sir.
Senator btisl.
Do you have in mind reciting in greater detail
in section 3how the inability shall be determinedI
Senator Wnxr. No, I don't know. I was just trying to get it
bussion.

clear that that phase presented a vast field of uncertainty.

Mr. RooiEs. That is correct, Senator. I think, though, that the

framers of the Constitution were wise in using that language. We
have not changed that language any, because I think it depends on
all the circumstances, and I don't think you could define it in a
constitutional provision.

The only change that this makes in the

Constitution is to make it clear that it is temporary and not permanent.
In other words, the language is just the same insofar as inability
is concerned-it is just the same as it is now.
Senator WILEY. I realize that. But I also realize now thhit it is one
man's decision virtually at present.
Mr.Roots. That is correct.
Senator Wmry. Now, what you propose is to leave it up to the
majority of the heads of the executive departments I

Mr. Roosas. And the Vice President.

Senator Wmzy. Well, a majority has to approve, according to this.
Mr. Rooms. That is correct.
Senator Wtty. And that, to me, is where you are running into the

snfa. But you always have to have snags, I guess.
M. Room. Wel, as I have said, Senator, I personally would not
be opposed to leaving that out of the constitutional provision, because

I think, as aprattle] matter, any Vice President would insist on getting the support of the Cabinet.
Senator'Wm ', So do I. In an hypothetical situation, exercise of
unusual authority often goes to a man's head, and inflates it.
Mr.Rooze. Well, as long as it is temporary, and the President could
reassert his ability to perform, I dohlt think there would be much temp.
station ofi the part of the Vice President to take over the ,owera and
duties of the office, unless he was absolutely sure that the President
was unable to act.
Senator CmnorL, Will the Senator yield.
How soon could the President reassert that I
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Mr. Booms. I think he could reassert it right away.
Senator CAmiOmu And when he reassert that, what would be the
next step, in your proposal 1
Mr. Roomuis. Well, as I saySenator CmRpoM Would that immediately divest the Vice Presidentf
Mr. Rooza. Yes,sir.
Senator Dnum4. The language there is "forthwith."
Senator CAno. Now, what is the next step after thatI
Mr. Rooms. Well, I pointed out here in the statement that the only
step that could be taken then would be if the Vice President and the
majority of the Cabinet still felt the President was unable to act, they
then could file an inabilty petition with Congress, and Congress would
immediately act on that, and make the deterinafion.
Senator HnusA. But that would be only under the alternative section 4?
Mr. Rooms. That is correct. Now, what I have also pointed out,
Senator, is that I don't think that would ever happen, just because of
the practical realities of the thing. No Vice President is going to say
the President is unable to act unless he is sure he is right and has a lot
of popular support. And that is not the problem. The problem is
how to get him to act. It is not to prevent him from acting.
Certainly no Vice President would ever assert the irabiity of the
President unless he was sure that the President was unable to act.
Now, once the Vice President took over the powers and duties of the
office temporarily, I cannot imagine the President reasserting his
ability to act unless he was able to act, because he would then riow
that, if he did that, Congress could overrule him. And the Vice
President would not want to assert the inability of the President unless
he was sure he was unable to act, because it would disgrace and destroy
him. And no President would want to assert his ability to act, and his
friends and family won't let him, unless he was able to act And if he
was not able to actand Congress said so, he would be disgraced.
So, as a practical matter, unless you had the final authority in the
Congress, in the unlikely event you had that conflict between the President and the Vice President, I do 'not think you would ever have the
conflict. And I think unless you do have some final authority like
that, there is an extreme contingency that might arise. You might
have a President who was mentally incompetent. But the Vice Prsident and the majority of the Cabinet would never file an inability petition in Congregs unless they were sure they were going to win.
Senator CARmoL. What vote would be necessary to sustain the
Vice President I
Mr. Roops. The same as an impeachment. It is analogous to impachment-a majority of the House and two'thirds of the Senate.
Senator Cmmomi. The reason I was bringing this out is the question of power politics.
Suppsing It arose, where th6re was this cot'flict between the Vice
President and the President and the Cabinet threw in with the Vice
President, and they took this action, by this majority vote. The
President could then coijnter forthwith, and then this precipitates the
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real legislative situation Whdil' the Coniitess, by tWo-thirds vote'has
r
t6suitiht the ViWe President and the CabTnet
Is that it in substance I mean if thor is a ruling on the Presi4ent's inability ?
Mr. R&Eaes. Well, a1 I Say),I easi't Iihiaglne the Vice President and
the majority of the Cabinet brIitiing that proceeding unless they wore
sure they NN.r right.,The only situation wliero that would occur is if
you had a meitAllyninilhlpteht 'Vice President and mentally incoml)etent Cab)l1t, -M other words, I can't imagine a Vice President and
'tile einmbrs of the President's owit Cabinet assertig his inability and
'asking'Con ivms to deide it, unlem they knewIhe was unable to act..
, Senator' tAIlMOLL. What you do, tlen, i! finally come back to the
*t00ligres to take positive action in support of the position of the Vice
President and the Cabinet.
Mr. Hooivas. In tie very unlikely event that wotild ever arise.
Senator CwntoiJ,. I know. But nevertheless it is a constitutional
-afeguArd.
Mr.' Roor.s. That is correct.
Senator C.uw i,,. So by setting up) that. constitutional safeguard,
it takes 111back to my first, question: should we set. )up any other
eopitlitutional safeguard on tIh- original act of the P resident himselfU
. I do not think it is necessary, but I would not. have any
Mr. Thoxvrtsw
ob*Ntions to it.
SInator C.uuitoL., There wouid not be any reasoit why the Congresm
could not pa.supon it inthe first instance. ,
Senator l(.p.ivwr.. You mean the validity of the signaturel
Senator CARULt. 'rhe validity of the signature itself. In other
words, you have two things, as I understand it; froin your testimonyani I as'ure you 1 am not. a student of thii. subject, and I am just
sort of shooting from the hip on this. But the question arises first
when the Presldent. sny., "I am disabled and I cannot fulfill the functions of my Office, ani I want to transfer it. temporarily to the Vice
President who becomes an Acting President.
Now, iU it should require congissional approval of such an unprecedinted act, there would bo nothing wrong with it, I nssumo.
It might slow down the process some: hutthere would be nothing
wrong with it. Because in the second instance, if the Vice President
and the Cabinet try to assert a power, which some of you con•stihutional lawyers say reposes in the Vice President, to make it permanent, if there is objection on the part of the disabled President,
it has to be done by two-thirds of the Senate. That is an impeachment.
Well, I merely offer the suggestion for you to think about. I will
not belabor the l61)nt.
Senator KF..VVR. Senator liruska.
Senator HRUsKA. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that I want
,to commend the Attorne General for coming in here 'ith this very
splendid 'statement. I think he has cleared up a good manythings
ad
misune
Im,a very, logical way which 6thrwise could
and
probAbly the emphasis placed'in the Wrong place.'
I do know that since the discussion of this subject has arisen, that
in my many discussions of it with laymen and lawyers' groups and
*
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lawyers tlienielves, that there bas bdetxatendency to make the mis.
take of placing em phasis uponi the *difficulty,of determining dis.
ability, ,And t think it is qtUite clear,, from a consideration of the
historical examples, that that is'not the problem,'
Mr. RooOs. That is correct.
..
,
Senator IlwsVCA.. Likewise, there is the second mistake commonly
made that the problem is to slow up the Vicd,6Preidefit from assum,
ing duties, whereas that iscontrary, again, to historical records.
Now, I would 'like 'to ask this ijuestiobi, Mr. Attorney General.
You have an appendix 1 iSectio 41 *hihh, of course, is different
from th alternate section 4. I should like to ask~yhu whether'you
have any preference as between the two, or ityou wofild hhve a'ny
disposition to say that one would be preferable to the other:in the
light of your study of this entire subject.
Mr. Roots.
Yes, sir. I prefer the alternatei sotion for thre6
reasons:

. One, ,the impeachment proceeding does not provide a method of
calling Congress in session when they are outof session.
* $enator HIUsKA. I understand the three points which youhave
advanced.
Mr. RooisRs. Secondly, an impeachment would be a permanent aet
and the President could never get back in office, even if he recovered
his ability to act.
And so far those two reasons and the other reason I mentioned, I,
.
myself, prefer this alternate section,
Senator ILAUSKA. I understand and I appreciated the reasons which

you had as signed, but I did not know you had gone to the point of
saying you preferred the one over the other.
r:
Mr. looF.ns. Yes. I submitted them this way because appendix I
is the proposal that Mr. Brownell made in the House, and I think it
is the original proposal of the Department. And on reconsideration,
particularly in the light of some of the objections that were made to
the impeachment proceeding, we have reconsidered, and I think that
we all feel that the alternate section is better. I think it removes the
objections that-have been made to the impeachment proceeding.Senator IRUSIKA. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator CErUvI. Senator Dirksen.
Senator DIRKSE.N. Mr. Rogers, in summary we are iithis position:
In your considered opinion, the enactment of a statute will not solve
this problem, or resolve the confusion.
Mir.lRoopms. That is correct.
Senator l
hRKsrI.
Therefore, the conistItutiorial amendment is not
only preferable, but ought to be pursued separately and alone, and not
in conjunction with a statutory remedy.
Mr. RooERS. 'T1hatis correct, Senator.
'Senator Dmrica. No." 2,. with respect to .these prowols tht are
now pending bef re the oommittee,,some of wjich invoke th9 poiier
pres& c of the Chief. JYnctic6 pieidina
ot, thei' SupreMeo'Ai or th'ai
Wi thit a vot; that those woilld be fataf on the' grouq'qWa first,
d* violate, lI your'jdgment, the separation powers
Nf
tfdi secondly,
h16 Sipi 'e Court has'al'ady reognzed thht inthe itate'hteit put
in the. rem9rd.
.
,
Mr. Rodm 'Tiat is crrect
.
,
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Senator Dimusex, No. 8,with respect to those proposals pending
before us, formally or otherwise.-and there am son, as the letter

from President Hoover and the letter from President Truman, which
are not formaliied in bills-they would be equally fatal on the ground
that again the separated powers are violated because there it imposes
a duty on Congress and also confers an authority on Members of Congress in the legislative division,
Mr. RorER. That is correct.
Senator DIRS1"N. So out of all it is your opinion that this matter is
going to have to be resolved wholly within the executive branch.
Mr. Roomm, Correct. Senator Dmicsew. Through the Vice President and heads of the
executive departments, or whoever else in the executive departments
that Congivms might add. But in any event, limited exclusively to
the executive branch.
Mr. RooG.s. That is correct, Senator.
Senator KIF.rAuvR. Mi Rogers, just I or 2 questions for the record
and for the legislative history.
Mr. ROmERs. Just to answer the last question-you realize the initial'
decision, with the proviso that if the two executive heads disagree,.
the go through his p)cedure-thn Congress has the ultimate
authority, but not the initiAl Authority.
Senator DimKsn.. Yes.
Senator K.A'AUVwR. Article IT, actionn 1, clause 6 gives the power
for the pasage of the succession act which we now have, of course.
It is not Intended that this ninendnient would take away or alter the,
right. of Congres to deal with the problem of succemion, where both
the President and the Vice President are unable to act or are dead.
Mr.-Roius. Not at all, Senator. It would not affect that at all.
Senator KXAvmtr.R. Now the next question is this. In the alternate
section 4 how do you visuarite Congress would be called into session?
And if the Congress is not in session, shall it forthwith convene for
tills purposes -Is it your idea that this gives the Speaker and the
President pro tempore or somebody the power to call Congress?
Mr. Roor.. I think it would be automatic with the filing of the
writing. In other words, once the Vice Premident and the maIority of
the Cabinet file the inability petition, then I think Congress would
automatically be convened under the constitutional provision.

Senator K.rATVEMR..AllAIght.

Now, the next question is on subsection (b) of section 4-who pre.
sides at a hearingbefore the Senate on the question of disability?
Would it be contemplated that the Chief Justice of the United States
would
Mr. preside?
R~oGRs. I think it would be just like an iminolhment proceeding. I tried to make it clear in my statement tjlat the same rules
P4 for Impeachment would apply. In other words, it is analogous to
.mpeaoehnnt, and the theory is the some-,-to give Congress the ultimate auithortty when thisproblein aTiue Just as you do in impeachment. A4d'all the procedures would be the same, except you would
autonatically convene Conrss and it would be temporary rather
thal permanent.
Senator KEFAUVER. The procedures are the same, but the issue Is
different.
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Mr. RoozrnP. That is right.

Senator KFCAUvY.R. And then the presiding of the Chief Justice, I
assume would automatically disqualify him in case of a court test
about the matter.
Mr. Roor.as. That is correct sir.
Senator KrFAUvr.R. Well, Mr. Rogers, I want to join in compli-

menting you on a very scholarly presentation. You have developed
this matter logically and well. Whether we agree with all parts of
your suggestions or discussions or not, we will give it a great deal
of attention. We appreciate your coming here today.
Mr. RooMRs. I appreciate your courtesy and the courtesy of the
subcommittee.
Senator KEAuvFrR. Our next session is on the 28th of February, at
which time we shall hear Mr. Charles Rhyne, president of the American Bar Association.
(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m. the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene, at time to be designated, on Friday, February 28, 1958.)
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FRIDAY, FEBUTARY 28, 1958
UNITrED STATES SENATE,
SuFco3mirrm ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
'OP THlE COMMMIFE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington,

b.

0.,

The subcommittee ;net Pursuant to recess, at 10 a. in. in room 457,
Senate Office Building, h-on. Estes Kefauver.(chairmian of the sub.1

committee) pressing.
Present: Seniators Kefaurer (presiding), Wiley, Dirksen.
Also present: Wayne II..Smit] ey, counsel, and Richard F. Wainbach, clerk*to the subcommittee.
Senator KFFAUVY.. The subcommittee will come to order.'.
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Employee Law, 1046; Aviation Accident Law, 1047; Airport Lease and Concession Agreements, 1048; cases on Aviation Law, 1050; The Law of Municipal
Contracts, 1052. Editor: Municipalities and Law in Action, 1038-52, NIMLO
Municipal Law Rev., 1052-, Municipal Law Jour., 1940--, Municipal Law Court
Decisions, 1042-, Municipal Ordinance Rev., 1053--. Author articles in field.
Horae: 2621 Foxhall Road, Washington 7. Office: 726 Jackson Place, Washington, D. 0.

Senator KEFAUVER. We are glad to have you with us, Mr. Rhyne.
You have a statement which will be printed in full in the record.
You can read it or summarize it or handle the matter as you wish.
Mr. RuNE. Thank you very much, Senator. I especially appreciate the kind and very undeserved words with which you have presented me.
Senator KF.FAUVER. Before we start, Mr. Rhyne, you are accompanied by your administrative assistant in the American bar activities. Will you introduce him
Mr. RuYNE. lie is Charles A. Dukes, Jr., who is a member of the
Bar of the District of Columbia, and a member of my law firm, and
this year lie is devoting all of his time to helping me in connection
with my duties as president of the American 3ar Agsociation.

Senator

KEFAUVER.

We are glad to have you here, Mr. Dukes.

Senator

KEFAUVER.

That is appreciated very much, Mr. Rhyne.

Mr. DuKEs. Thank you.
Mr. Ruy"iZ. I would like to say that I have known the chairman
of this subcommittee for some 20 years, or probably more, and
I certainly have great admiration and respect for him, and for the
tremeridnus public service lie has rendered to his native Tennessee
and to our Nation.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES S. RHYNE, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
Mr. RuYmN.
I do have a written statement. I think I will present
it in that form, Mr. Chairman.
-Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this
opportunity to resent my views on this extremely vital problem of
Presidential ina ility. I have been pleased to note the nonpartisan
approach you have taken to this problem, and the full and deliberate
treatment which is being given the important issues involved. Though
certainly I do 'not pretend to be an expert on this matter, I have a
great interest in common with all Americans in its resolution. While
serving as General Counsel to the Federal Commission on Judicial
and Congressional Salaries, I did have occasion to study the duties
and responsibilities of the office of Vice President rather closely, and
gave some thought to this matter in that connection at that time.
The American Bar Associaion has not considered or taken an official
position on the issues now before this subcommittee. I am here today
in response to Senator Kefauver's invitation to present my personal
views. So nothing I say'can be attribted to the association or any
other member thereof.
I. THE-NEED FOR OHANOE

Recent recurrent periods of illness sUffered by President Eisenhower
have created a wave of national concern over the present constitu-
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tional .provision pertaining to Presidential disability. The existing
provision is:
In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death, resign.

tion, or Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for
the case of removal, death, resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President and such
officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected (United States Constitution, art. I, see. 1, clause 0).

The fear is that the above provision is not sufficiently clear as to
how, when, for how long and under exactly what conditions the
President is to be replaced for inability. A brief survey of our Nation's history would appear to support this fear, despite the fact that
no serious disaster has ever occurred as a result of the prevailing
uncertainty.
As early as 1841, upon the succession of John Tyler to the Presidency,
objections were voiced to establishing the precedent of the Vice President becoming President upon the 1atter-s death for fear that complications might arise in the future in the event of Presidential
inability. Certainly the possibility of Presidential disablity is clearly
evidenced by history. On seven occasions the Vice President has been
required to fill un unexpired Presidential term. Three of these men,
Andrew Johnson, John Tyler and Harry S. Truman, served 3 years
and 11 months of that term. Chester A. Arthur and Theodore
Roosevelt served 8V2 years each. Millard Fillmore and John Calvin
Coolidge served over 21/ years. In each hittance, it is apparent that
had history been only slightly different there could have been a protracted period of Presidential disability.
There have been two historical periods of actual Presidential disability. The first was in 18$1 during the final illness of President
Garfield. For 80 days he performed only one official act, the signing
of an extradition paper. Daily physicians' reports clearly indicated
his inability to perform the duties of his office. During this time
foreign relations were completely neglected and onvv very routine
matters were handled. There was great dispute over whether the
powers and duties of the President could be only temporarily devolved
on the Vice President. President Garfield's death resolved the need
to determine the issue and nothing was done; but onopoint stood out.
The constitutional provision upon Presidential disability was a matter
of great uncertainty.
fl'
1
When President Wilson fell ill in 1919, the situation was even more
serious. For almost 1 years, he was unable to function except periodically. During the special session of the 66th Congress, 28 acts
become law owing to the President's failure to pass on them within
the requisite 10 days. The President did not meet his Cabinet for
8 months during this illness. Many students of the period a
that
public business in general and the fate of the Versailles Treaty in
particular were affected by the President's inability. But aside friom
any conclusion as to the seriousness of this period of disability, it cannot be denied that existing law was inadequate to handle the situation. This same uncertainty which has restricted and hindered action
throughout history still exists today.
In this critical era in which we live, with cold war in full swing
and hot war hovering in the shadows, it is more than ever necessary
22324-----i8
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1)iaidy
and hilnt tliIal hen
that. ecltivo leldersl-lil) be III one untoI
to ltd IIIHo1 n1tItetits nlftive. IliigO airea's of out. AN1t io cold IMI
it, is v'ital to our ,4eclrkty to
desotr-Oyed hi a iiiat1ter of liiilitu', 1111(1
hanve 1; PresIident roadh' to rC.%pI)Hd to etiierge itey ilisitly. I note
that l't$.sideltl1t. IS'lliwor hasi announced thut he lius ta1ken care of
his townl sitlitt loll. UI1t. ilt 1ter of sic1Ipa I-111iit11llit illuilltillV icmoll
nlot lie loft, to inlforl-1 ltraiigeiiieits, tind t ho Pre~siden~t, h1imsel31f has1
iN'%eO
III MMlIdcel perinaneni clum'i lcat ionl of our legill provision for han11-

dliii P1rosidentali ubilityo
I Llie e sident Mi.-iselamner has perfornmed it ,ireut public servicrevealing thle existence of hIs 11n(lorstiun~lig with Vive PreSident
Nixon. on tis innjortahit subject. Our people Ilre greatdy concerned
over this u'oblvem of lPreid~enlltl disability, wid t e.11 esitellt's stalteIlleiit willf ra"Siure theimi thall no lapseV will ocur. Ill
the exercise of
Presidential power anld thalt all eliergellcies will Wx m1o0t.
It.
will encd
Sonile of thle une1asy feeling here and 11hroad which it Ilecessaiy (liscilssion of this important. problem hnR vretiteal and serves as atstopgap)
until i pem~naanet.4 olit ionl call be achiieved.
'With resliet to secrey, I (lid not, read the President's comment .u
denying thle pulie thle otetnils. I feel surve thult ait thle proper time
anal place he0 will revel thle 1umderstandlig ill full.
Not. only our people, but all the people of the free woll hve a vital
stake in thie P~residency, its it is the most inI~ortait office in tile world.
1 am certalin tiaci will not, be left inl Iuncertaintv y tile l11esidlet.
The Premideni. should be commended for 16i foresight, and candor.
Wht. thle Prsident has done is in the public interest and along tho
lines of the objectives of the plan under consideration by this suhcolnnittme
IT. HO0W THE CiANOE SHOULD BIE ACCOMPISHED

Hravinig eogitized thle historical background, the present im1portaneie of -the problem, and statutory lawv to provide a solution, I now
examine the ineans by which a solutiion may be provided. Here there
have been two views: (1) That a change should( be accomplished
simply by passage of a l aw by Con grss under tile existing constituttionalf framework, and (2) that a flialige should be accomplished by
constitutional amendment) possibly imlemefllnted by congressional
statute.
Many who expound the latter view believe that. passage of a statute
alone would be violative of the existing Constitution, since nowhere
is Congress specifically given the power to act in this matter. Furtliermor6, they contenal that congresional action to remove the Chief
Executive would be contrary to the historical separation of powers
between the legislative and executive branches of the Government as
tacitly provided for in the Constitution.
Those who support the view that congressional action alone is sufficient generally find authority for such action in the "necessary and
proper" clause of the Constitution which provides as follows:
The Congress shall hare power 4 * To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this constitution In the Government of the United States,
or In any department of officer thereof (United States Constitution, art. I, sec.
8. clause 18).
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Relying llj)oll the latter part of this cluse, they find authority for
tio Coligregs to enact a law which is licemary and proper for carrying
into Oxceutlon fhi l)OWlor ves ed inthe executive department, in the
event of the disability of the Chief Execut ive, Oflicor.
Both views can Cinun support front sogien.ls of the public,
scholars aind Memiirs of the Congrosm who are among our most legal
a Ilo
nuthoriies oil cost itutionul law. I ain informed tlat both views
have found silp)foit aniong the eminent authorities who have already
to.9tifled is wjtleses iiI thislhearing.
I am convinced of only one thing, and that is that there is no
answer to thie constitutiolal )ower problem. I do not think thatclear
the
Suprenio Court has decided 1h issue, In cases such as United Stales v.
iarS8 (106 V1. S.629 (1883)) nid kan~a. v. Colorado (206
8. 40
(11)07)), which are solnet.lie s cited. Both of these state tile U.
general
pro lollon
it
t hut Coigaes-s cal legislate only on subjects where power
to legiHslte lims wen given by the Constitution.
The Harris case
decided that, the Constitution gave Congress no power to make it a
criminal ofrense for private persons to conspire to deprive someone
of eAqul protection. TJhe K11ns1s case decided that the Constitution
gave Congress no power to reclaim arid lintds not the property of
tie Unite(I Siltes. Neither case decided whether the Constitution
gves Congress the power to provide for a procedure for determining
resi(lentinl disabiit.y and the power to transfer Preaidential power
to n now executive in tle event of such disability.
Moreover even if a decision on this point, could be read into the
language of tile cases, it would still not provide absolute certaint
The Supreme Court has been known to change its mind, particularly
where its previous decisions are not precisely onl the point involved.
hoe constitutional validity of a statute on Presidential disability
can b tested only upon occurren(e of such a disability-a time which
I submit would be too late.
Tile gravity of tie disability problem and the uncertainty over the
question of the constitutional validity of a congressional statute
on Presidential disability absent a constitutional amendment is persuasive to me of the nevesity of acting by constitutional amendment.
ile certainty of a constitutional amendment, I believe, fully warrants
the lengthy process involved.
I recognize that amending our Constitution is a very serious matter. Tho fact that so few amendments have been adopted demonstrates the people of our country so believe. The office of President
of the United States is the most important office in the free world.
Ppeople all over the world are watching every action and sugg ertion
her. We must approach this problem with these considerations in
mind. The seriousness and importance of the matter lends wei ght
to the view that action should be by constitutional amendment. when
one adds the substantial constitutional doubt created by the controversy over the proposed statutory plan increased substance is given
to (ie constitutional amendment plan.
Again, I stress that this matter of constitutional amendment is
one of necessity, tq remove all possible doubts, rather than that those
wlho sincerely believe that a statute alone would be sufficient are wrong
beyond all doubt. The issue is not so clearly one-sided either way.
But the only. way to avoid adding uncertainty upon uncertainty is
to act- through constitutional amendment with the amendment so
crystal clear that all who run can read and understand.
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Now, having stated my preference for a change by constitutional
anendntnt, let me sketch broadly hie scope of that amendment.

First, I would make it more than a iiere authorization to Congress
to act. This abbreviated type of amendment leaves the way open
or partisan legislative interference with the Executiv--a violation
of tle spirit belitid the constitutional separation of powers.
But our Constitution, including its amendments, is written in gen-

eral language, and I would he loath to see a great deal of extraneous
detail included in this amendment. While Congress should not be
given i blank check to legislate on Presidential disability it should
be empowered to implement the Amendment by legislation which
spells out the details of procedure following the broad outlines lRid
out In the amendment.
1r. WHAT THE

CIIAoE 8MOULD IM

I shall now state my own views as to the procedural outlines which
should be contained in the amendment, breaking them roughly into
the procedure for initiation of proceedings, procedure for determination of disability, and procedure for reinstating the President after
the disability has ceased to exist.
Initiation of proceedings for determination of the President's inability: Many learned and workable acceptable proposals have been
made concerning how the proceedings to determine a President's
inability should W initiated.
If the President deems himself incompetent, as a practical matter,
lie is the one to initiate the proceedings for his removal which may
either be permanent under our existing Constitution or temporary
under various proposals now before this committee. This provision
need not be included in the amendment proper. It is good commonsence.
As to voluntary removal in situations where the President is himself incapable of making a declaration of inability or he refuses to
declare his inability, the various'proposals as to who should initiate
a series of events tlhat would ultimately result in an Acting President
are many and mention 'virtually all of our highest Government officials. They include proposals that Congress by concurrent resolution be permitted to initiate the proceedings. Another would authorize the Vice President and other persons authorized by Congress.
Various advisory councils have been proposed. The Cabinet alone
and the Cabinet and Vice President were suggested. Some have
proposed that Congress, the Cabinet, and the Vice President should
all have this power. Several propo als obviate the nessity of requirmg a formal initiation of these gikave proceedings by any one
individual or group if Presidential inability is self-evident and generally known.
I personally feel that the Vice President would be the logical person to initiate such proceedings. The views of the C binet ' the
Congress, and the others would, of course, be taken inder advisement by any American elevated to the increasingly -important office
of Vice President' but the decision should be his as to whether the
proceedings should b6 st.ted_
exist s :1 have sugProcedure for determiing 'that the inabhlt;
gested that the Vice President initiate proceedings to determine in-
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ability. That leaves open the question of who should decide the
question once it has been raised by the Vice President. Determining
thnt an inability exists involves two processes, an inquirer and i
method. 'rho latter, or the "how" of determining inability, is so
distinct a process that it will be given separate consideration. This,
it ishoped, will withdraw the process of how one should determine
inability from the variety of opinions centering around which of
ourUnquestionably,
officials should determine
inability. .
who should
determine Presidential inability is
one of the most controversial, hotly debated issues of constitutional
law of our generation. The officials and agencies proposed to determine inability are as many and all-inclusive as those proposed in the
prior section dealing with initiation of the procedure. The proposals may be summarize4 as follows:
1. Let the President decide. Letting the President decide his own
inability, without more, imposes a responsibility with too many uncertainties and is in reality our current situation. No man can really
judge himself. There may be instances when a President would
think lie is capable of performing his duties when everyone else
would conclude the opposite. There may also be Presidents who
with an abundance of patriotism and love for their country would
seek to step aside to avoid criticism when undue pressure is placed
upon them with respect to their health.
9.Let the Vice President decide. This plan would cast a tremendous responsibility upon a Vice President. iewould decide whether
to make himself Aet:ng President. Such a responsibility understandably cviated hesitation in a Vice President to act, when
he should act for fear of being criticized unjustly as a usu-per or
for acting didoally or improperly, and at the same time would allow
an ambitious Vice President to seize power under circumstances when
he should no do so. This plan could envelop an Acting President
and the office of President in such controversy and debate as to di.
minish the Acting President's effectiveness and possibly make the
whole Nation and the free world suffer irreparable harm.
The proposal that would permit the Vice President to succeed if
he and the Cabinet were satisfied that the President was disabled
in effect requires the consent of the Vice President for such a Cabinet
determination.
3. Commission representing executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. The objections to this lan are that the judiciary would
through participation be disqualifid from deciding legal quesdons
that might subsequently arise and that the legislative branch would
be allowed to harass a President they were in disagreement with.
Legal considerations involved in building another biige, across the
historical gap between our Constitution's separation of powers are
also involved. It is of course, imperative that all branches of Government cooperate in such times of contemplated crises as we are
considering today. Creating a commission composed of the officials
of the legislative branch as proposed cold also lead to unfair accusations
partisanship.
. 4. The of
Supreme
Court. Various proposals have placed the duty
to make this determination upon the Supreme Court, emphasizing
that here is an agency of our Nation that would least be apt to be
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partisan. Apart front colstitltioniiI questions involved in the Supremne Court s deciding such a political question, it is also certain
that disqualifleation of-the members of our highest judicial trilunal
would work a distinct disadvantage to our Nation if a subsequent
judicial decision were called for.
5. The Cabinet. The use of the Cabinet to make the decision on
inability has niany things to rccoitnnd it. 'i'hrb arm: (1) It iinvolves the creation of no additional machinery i (2) it offers a very
simple mechanism; (8) it prevents a special inability commission
front encountering Ombarrassing moments by creating a crisis in tle
Nation by being called together uiiecessarily and of constantly
watching over the health of the Prtesident: (4) the Cahinet is in
the best informed position to give a prompt judgment; (5) our people in effect vote to entrust a political party with executive power for
4 years and the Cabinet plan places responsibility upon this entrusted executive machinery and avoids any change or decisions on
disability dictated by 1)ollcal bias; and (0)in keeping wilh our
separati0n-of-p)ower-

doctrine, the

(abillht

iWell gives n1iaxinilint

protection to the independent status of the executive branch.
The argument on the other side about the Gatfield and Wilson Cabinots and their indecision is not entirely valid because the Cabinet
then had neither statutory nor constitutional authority to take action.
Any action by them would have been regarded as a usurpation of
power. In tlhe cases of the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets there was
also no way in which those Cabinets believed they could have the Vice
President. take over as Acting President temporarily and then reinstate President Garfield or President Wilson if their inability was
The ropedd statuttory and constitutional amendlater removed.
ments eliminate that po.sibility by providing for tie office of Acting
President. But tle most important consideration is that the Cabinet
knows more about our security picture than any other group of people
and if the President is ill, thly would not risk the security of our Na.
tion through his inability to act. In this shrinking and perilous world
that reasoning appeals to me very much.
How should inability be determined? Historically, the real problem
of Presidential inability has not stemmed from a question of determin-

ing the existence of any Presidential inability. Tils is the error of
those people who focus on some sort of a commnission plan with a staff
of medical experts to make the determination. The inability usually
has been clear and undisputed. Nevertheless, various proposals have
suggested a requirement that a finding of disability be arrived at only
after medical evidence has been presented and considered. But. it is
also true that any rational decision would have to be based on a certain
amount of such evidence, so that it would manifestly appear unnecessary to require medical testimony and public hearings in a constitutional amendment. To require such a procedure might well be burdensome and subject the existing head of our Nation to unfortunate publicity that can easily be avoided. W must do nothing that leads to
diminution in the stature of the Presidency.
Then, too, in certain instances it might be impossible to provide for
medical inspection and evidence as in circumstances when the President is captured by the enemy or is otherwise inaccessible. Requiring
a hearing would tend to further prolong the early return of our Pr.-
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dent in the public confldonce, leent inorale and provide unnecessary
delay at a moment when the Nation would vitally need its leader.
I say unnecessary delay since the President's own Cabinet selectees
would presumably acnt upon some form of competent information.
They wouhl obviously act only if the inability, was clear.
Who should deltermino that the iw shlent's inability has terminated? One proposal would permit the President to resume his duties
upon a simple declaration of his ability to do so. The chief objection
to such a procedure is that it might enable a niau to resume the office
of President while still factually incapable.
It has been further suggested that, in case of dispute the Congress
could be empowered to determine the termination of the Pirident's
inability in a hearing similar to impeachment proceedings but denoninated by some other name. The constitutional objeCtion that the legislativo branch would be determning Presidential succession would
not apply since a mere resumption of duties would I)0 the only issue
before Congress.
CONCLUSIION

I would summarize as follows:
First, a constitutional amendment is the only way to 0n( the uncer.
(ainty resulting front the controvermy over thie constitutional power,
of Congrei to resolve the Premidentinl inahility problem hy statute,
Second, the initial determination of Presiential inability should
remain in the executive branch.
Third, the President should have the power to return to his office
on his own volition when his capacity is restored.
Fourth, the ultimate power of review in case of dispute over restoration of the President to his office should rest in the whole Congress.
You have before you a problen which is not new hut which Is more
pressing for solution today than at any other time because of the
disastere that could befall our country and the freeworld from any
lapse in the exercise of the office of Preident of the United States.
Congress has a grave responsibility to perform here. I have every
confidence in your judgment and again congratulate you on the
thorough manner in which you have gone about your consideration of
the important issues which are before you.
I stress again trhat I have great admiration and respect for those
entertaining views different from those that I have expressed here. I
recognize tfat you have many different proposals before you which
have merit. T have not in this statement attempted to cover all of
the many rismifications of the many questions involved in this matter
of Presilential inability, but only to discuss what appears to me to
be the controlling issues. The ultimate decisions which this subcoimimittee must make will be extremely difficult.
I conclude by assuring you of my lasting interest in this whole
matter and of my willingness to be of assistance in any way I can
either personally or by persuading other members of the American
Bar Association to assist you in any way that you may desire.
Again I want to thank you for your invitation to appear here and
for the courtesy with which you have heard me.
Senator KEVAUVER. Well, Mr. Rhyne, we are certainly grateful to
you for giving us a statement that is well considered, both from the
legal viewpoint and from the viewpoint of practicality. And it is
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quite obvious that you have given this problem much consideration
and I know that the Men bers of the Congress, this subcommittee and
the public generally will apprwiato the importance of you ana the
American ar Association assisting in presenting this very important
matter to thepublic In an intellIgent way. We are grateful to you.
Now, may I ask you 2 or 8 questions

.

In your statement you would recommend that the Cabinet-and I

M1poo0 you are referring to the heads of the administrative agencies,
because they ma be ditffrent.,
Mr. RHYIN. Senator, I recognize the distinction there. And while
I used the term "Cabinet" I believe In a constitutional sense that many
of the constitutional experts use the term "heads of executive
departments." And every place that I used "Cabinet" I Intended it to
be the heads of the executive departments.
Smator Kr.VAuvr. Well we will use the Cabinet for convenience.
You recommend that the (3abhnet be the agency charged with terinination of certain questions here having to (1o withinabiity and
removal of inability, and you state strong reasons why this is true
which we all recognizo-t'ht they are closo to the 1mresid nt, and
know the situation of the country.
But arguments are made by some that they do not like the idea of
norelocted people having the right to make such an important decision. Argument is made by some of our colleagues that they feel that
some group of people who have been elected should have t0s responsibility.
Do you e anything inconsistent or wrong in giving this teponsibility to people who have selected by the President, with the advice
of the Senate
Mr. RIKYN.. Senator, I do not. I feel there is a matter of separation of powers which is involved here, and certainly this is an executire matter. And if you are going to take it away from the executive
and give it. to any other group, like the Congress, for example, on
this initial determination of disability, whether true or not, you
would inject charts of unfair partisan bias. And of course the Vice
President, under the provisions that I have seen, would also participate with the Cabinef in making this decision. And the Vice President is an elected officer. I think the provision that. I like best
provides with the consent of the Vice President the decision will be
made by the Cabinet. And of course he is the man who is most vitally
affected by this whole thing. So I think there is a safeguard insofar
as elected officials are concerned.
Senator KrFAUER. Well, Mr. Rhyne, I want to say on my own that
I first approached the proposition, this proposition, with a feeling
that there should be some participation in the decision by the leaders
of Congress, along with the Cabinet. That is included in the resolution I-have filet I have been impressed more and more by the
arguments that. you and others have made that the Cabinet approach
is a sound approach, and I think you have forcibly stated it. Iere in
your statement.
N ow, the other question is, you set. forth on page 16 that incase of
a dispute over the restoration of the President to his office, that the
settlement of that dispute should rest in the whole Congress?
Mr. Rum'.
Yes, I have, Senator, and my feeling ab-out that is
this. I first of Pl start out with' the conclusion that the President
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himself should at any time on his own volition be able to reassumo

his ofAice. And if thero is a dispute on his ability to do so at that

time, it seems to nie that we must have some iiechanisin, other than
his own Cabinet at that time, to decide that dispute, because the
Cabinet and the Vice President would have participated in the deci-

sion to, in effect, displace the President temporarily. So it was my
feeling that since the Congress is the traditional body that has passed

upon such imttenrs am imlleachment, which is a matter, it seems to
me, more related to the issue that would arise at that time that there
would be no infringement of the powers doctrine if the Congr
as
a whole woull pa upon the issue of whether or not. the president
does have the capacity to reassume his office.
Senator ]K:i'Auvw. I think that is a logical conclusion.
BMit now one question remains
i
hich you do not deal with, and that

is, during the pendency of the dis)uto, who shall exercise the power of
the President. That Is,assumin g that the President ha (lared his

inability, or assuming that tie Cabinet has deteminined the inability,
and the Vice President takes over and then tile President wishes to
resume his office, feeling that his disability has terminated but there
is a dispute as to whether he Is capable of doing so or not--do you feel
that the President should be restored to his duties and carry them
out while the issue Is being decided by tie Congresst
Mr. MitYNE. Well, I would feel something like this: That the President should give a proper notice of his desire to reassume.
Senator KVAuvP.R. You mean have some short waiting period?
Mr. .1imr.*. Yes--of a certain number of days, say 10 days--if the
President would decide he wanted to reamume his office, and he was
capable of doin it and if lie gave that public notice, and the Vice
President and t$io Cabinet did not agree that lie had the capacity to
reassun, I would say that the Congress would have to act within the
length oi time, or if it did not, the Presidefnt should be allowed to
rsume his office.
The office of the President is, as I have said before, the greatest office
in the whole world and I don't think we ought to do anything that
will diminish it. And I think that would be a protection against a
long, drawn-out discussion or hearing in the Congress. I think the
Congress could now, before any questions arise, draw up proper rules
of procedure for passing upon the issue so that within a period of 10
lays if there were any question it could pass on it, and would pass on
it because of its overwhelming importance.
Now I am quite certain, Senator, that some mechanics could be
worked out so as to prevent any questions arising with respect top assIng on that issue by the Congress. I don't attempt to state any definite,
concrete plan. But within that broad framework.
Senator K1'AUvER. But you would not write that into the constitutional amendment?
Mr. IHiipYB No. I would put in a constitutional amendment, Senator, the provision that upon giving notice, the President could, within a
certain number of days, resume his office. I think it is extremely important that we protect the stature of the office of the President. And
then I would provide that the Cabinet, if any question is raised with
the Vice President and Cabinet, could call the Congress into session
if it was not in session, and have the Congress pass on it. If the
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Congress did notlass uponi i withintlhat lugilh of timie, he P rhSident
would absolutely havea right tohilsolllce.
Senator K.Ativir.it, Senator Dirksen.
Sonnor D)ItRKN. I have only one question.
Auelally, if a disl1to ai'is',iis hildicated in your fourthO conclusion,
that is itdslite wihthili the executive brill itself, t caItbetbelweel
tle Preshlent, of conrse, and the Vice Pieldeui, and the m1ellbors of
theo Cabinet.

Now, there would be only one way to resolvo that disple, as I mo

it, mid that. i8 to 1Ind some arbiter on the outsle of the exeltivo
branch. And that is the basis for bringing Congtres Into it, probably
by means of a concurrent resolute ion or something.
Mr. ltityNw. Yes, that is rijht,
Senator iumisRN. So aotilly, I quito ag1e. I don't. believe iedoes
violence at all to the whole conee1It of the separlltion of powervI Ibecause it within that bIrneh, itself, you have a dispute, how slil It
be it'sohved t You would either have to go to some other instrumentaility within the executive brancl. But. if they pair up On oIIe sie
or the other, you are uot, any better off than you were heforo, and you
have a continuing dispute. So you have got. to get an arbiter omithe
outside
Mr. RuyxF.. Yes, I certainly ngree with you, Senator, and I think
that. Congress is the proper arbiter.
Senator Di8Ksrm. I t link that is all.
I want to say that. I think your capsule suimnation hiore uniter the

four heads pretty well shots ili)tho whlo case, Mr. lhyne.
Mr. livM. 'T'hank you. Coming from a great constitutional lawyor like you Senator, I thank you very much.
Senator kIVAuVFR. Any other questions, Senator Dirksent
Senator DIRKUsN. No, thank you.
Senator K'AuvV.r. Senator Wiley
Senator Wmx.. Well, I shall of course, take time to iead this. I
ain sorry I could not be holwr this morning, but. there were just too
many requlireMents oil Imy t ime.

I got, from the interrogation of Senator Dirksen, that. you felt that
it was necessary for a constitutional amendment to provide that if
the legislative branch womr going to have anything to (10 alut it, it.
had to be written into the Constitution.
Mr. RThTN.. Yes, Senator, I fool that's absolutely necessary because of the separation powers doctrine that is inherent in our Constitution.
Senator Wi.Er. I think there is a general concensus on that conclusion.
Now the whole question, then, goes to the matter of disability.
We had the Attoniey General up here, and he gave a pretty good
satemtenL I guess )ou agree with it. His conclusion was that in
the first. analysis, the matter of disability would devolve possibly for
a determination upon the Vice President. Do you agree to thatas it stands now?
Mr. RI YNP. As it stands nowyes, sir.
Senator WIM.E. That is what I am talking about,
Mr. Rit.rN. Although I adit there is some dispute about it, that
would be my interpretation-that now the Vice President does be.
cause lie is the one who-
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Sendetr lViixy. Now, Ilie materof (iiUiability itself creates it grolind
for it givai deral of argiunenil t.A nmaii umlight, be phyicall3' disabled
niid iot. iniit tit]l v-you agrep to flint I
'lie light. &I inlcaptitntel t o11 could riot oven
*enaor
1a,iv
Mign~ his name, and yet, W' folly (41ilp.ed to manke (letprininntiois or
icilolls.
Ali-. Riii-Nix. I am not it n101 lal (14(1or, Ind, I would aii
Hit lintooll'0111(1 eximt.

flitnt that

We liad flint Ingtane ii Ile ease of Presidelti Wilson, you remember.
And there was considerable dispute there back nwii fomi i between thle
Cabinet mid others. Some of them wanted to teke over (lie show, aind
Wilson said("No.$$
But, now thee is only ouie (inch questi101, w11( (hiat is,t lio general
Overfill ei'iability anmt need for' lahlCii at thig (ilia Woore thle
American people enl aunidieitimeli as you Iwoi outlinedl.
Now let's lhave your react in to (lint.
Mfr. Iltx. 11elI,.Senator, my feeling about it. issimply this. Tileo
Office of the President of (le thJifie( Istteo if; (lie Most Important
office in thia whole world. Because of Ilveident 14isenhower's fll esse
this quest ion lies received Attention, not only hierei in our country, but
throuighotit. t lie whole world. I have travel some IK0,OO mile" 'it the
last 6 months, and I fave traveled in Europe and South America. Arid
(hey (ire juist as nunch concerned-and I all tipeakingf of thia leaders of
time b)ar mnd some of (tieleaders of government (lint Ihave met'-about,
this Problem.
Tfeel there Is acertain amount of uneasiness among our people about
itI bcause they have (le very JuitifliM impression'that the existing
Hituiation rather clouds (lie whole problem. And I feel that (lie people
tire looking to (lie Congress to act on this.
Everyone feels now, because it has; been pointed up lin the press and
about 30O seconds fromi Wailstressc( repeatedly, that Moscow is oly%
ington, that (lucre may come a time on at moment's notice when the
Commander in Chief of our Armny, the President, inust be prepared
to throw every thing we hanve into some emergency. And no one wanta
to feel that (lhere could1( be ny possible lapse or gal) in the Office of
the President of the United States.
So oil your question about need, Ifeel that there is a need for the
Congress to provide an answer to this and to provide it now.
Senator 11 jrir. Well, of course, we Qhae hadar goodI many instances
in English history where kings have become incapacitated, and so
forth, and it has ben taken over by some successor when kings have
been insane.
But I are fully thatt in this space age, where (lhe world has been
contracted by man s ingenuity, that we have got to have new instrumentalities.
Whet I w~as really getting at was whether or not this creates a
situation for more chaos, For instance, you have got the Vice l'zeei.
(lent in (lie first, lace. Then, as r understand it, thIiere is some provision for Cabinet action; is that rightI
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Afr. RiiiNE. Yes; Cabinet action in conjunction with the Vice
President,
Senator WHEY. And then, if that is not determinative, for congressional action?
Mr..RIYNE. Well, my sug stion, Senator, was that the Cabinet,
with the consent of the Vice President, act in the initial determination of Presidential inability, and then if the President announces
that he is ready to resume his office, and there is any question as to
his capacity to do so, that that question be resolved by the Congress.
Senator
EVzY.
Well, we have had instances in history of people
clutching for power.
ne might seek to maintain power and the
other to take power. You lmv had kings dethroned, and you have
had a Cromwell, mid others that have marched in. And the hinan
equation is always a thing that has got to be considered. And as I
heard the Attorney General the other (lay, I was just thinking out
loud-and I am just thinking out loud noW-whether we were creating a mechanism that is more difficult to handle than the present
Constitution is it is. That is really the basic question.
It seems to me that here you have accoxing to the public papers.
an understanding between the Presilent and the Vice President, and
what, the exact, terms are we don't know, but apparently there is
complete agreement in case of any incapacity. If lie should become
so incapacitated, that he himself felt tflat fie could not handle the
job, and so stated in writing, do you agree that under the constitutional provisions at present that the Vice President would have the
authority to take over?
Mr. R*iYN. Oh, yes; I think that the Vice President could. But I
don't believe, Senator, that the announcement of the President-I
think it was a very laudable and praiseworthy announcement, and
he is to be commended for it--intended to suggest that as a permanent solution to this very difficultproblem. An I feel that an answer
must be given, and that the real answer is for a constitutional amend.
ment containing the provisions that I have outlined to be enacted.
' Senator WitzY. Well, you know that more cooks spoil the pie is an
old saying. You have got the Constitution outlining the situation as
it is. I am not suggesting anything in my opinion. I am just thinking out loud in terms of complicating the constitutional machinery.
And I am thinking in terms also of-you talked about the atomic age,
when it is probab y some 16 minutes away from Moscow we are, and
probably less. How in the devil would you ever get a Congres
together if you got into a war? You know you couldn't do that.
We have got to get adequate machinery-if we are awake now, we
have got to get adequate machinery to make it so that w6 could have
probably the Congress in session without assembling in Washington,
or even assembling in one place. All that has got to be thought out.
And if you are going to make this condition of action, of a congressional action, the question in my mind is whether you have got the,
remedy.
Mr. R1iYNrF. Well Senator, I am not suggesting on the initial
determination that congress. have anything to do with it. I am sugg t.ing that the Cabinet with the consent of the Vice President do it.
And that can be done in a few minutes.
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With respect to the President reassuring, I am suggesting that if
the President notifies in writing the Vice President and I assume the
Speaker of the House that he is ready to resume his office that he do
so in 10 days, or whatever days would seem to be reasonable, And if,
in the meantime, there is any question about his ability to do so, that
the Congress pass on it. And if the Congress cannot meet to pass
on it, that the President resume his office in that 10 days. He getshis
office back in' 10 days absolutely, unless the Congress meets in the
meantime and passes upon the issue or thereafter passes upon the
issue. So there would be no gap.
Senator WiLY. Well, then, according to your suggestion, th'congressional action would only take place after the Vice President has
taken over and there is a question then of whether the President has
regained his health.
Mr. Rinis.. That is right. And I would hope that no such dispute
would ever arise. I mean it is an "if" question, Senator, and I would
think it is almost inconceivable that any President whd didn't have
his full capacities would ever raise such an issue, or that any Vice
President would ever try to maintain his power if the President was
capable.
Senator WinEy. Ohl I couldn't agree with that statement. The
human mind is an unpredictable contraption and history demonstrates that men have gotten notions about their own superiority, and
their ego has unbalanced them. And that is why lam thinking in
terms of the machinery.
Senator KEFAuER. Are there any other questions of Mr. Rhyne?

Mr. Smithey, you have some I
Mr. SmTkey. Yes; I would like to ask a few questions, if y6u don't
mind, sir.
Mr..Rhyne, I noticed that, in your suggestions of a moment ago,
you said that the President ought to be permitted to resume his oflce
upon his own initiative.
Mr. RnYN. Well, I said after a certain period of notice.
Mr. Sm-rtEY. All right. After a certain period of time. That if
there was a dispute the Cabinet or the heads of the executive depart.
ments could then, with the Vice President) disagree and send the issue
to the Congrem by that action, is that correct?
Mr. RniyN. Yes.
Mr. SM!TBy. I presume that you would want to have some mechanism to insure that the decision would be by the Cabinet then in office,
the members of the Cabinet then in office I
Mr. Rnry . Yes.
Mr.in-timEY. Yo would want to preserve the persons then acting?
Mr. Rjmy . Yes; I thinks.
Mr. Smrrark. Now, in addition to that consideration, would you
limit the. membership in that deciding body to the persons who have
actually been nominated and confirmed for that office, rather than
.
the actng heads of the departments
SMr. RnyxE. Well, I would think that I would limit it to thoft who
have been nominated and confirmed by the Senate, because I think
that is i iportant.
Mr. Syrrimy. All right Now, with respect to the' statutory ap.
preach, I don't recall that you covered this in your statement.
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If the statutory apl)lrovli itused, do you feel thit theie is authority
in the Constitution for the President to rwover his powers and duties

once he has been replaced by the Vice president?
Mr. IhimE. WelI, tlt is one of the great uncertasitim, certainly

bawd on the experience with the (larllehl-and Wilson ineideits. And
I wNould say that cause of those uncertainties there may not. be-And that is the reatmn why I think the cowtittittional amendment.
should be used to eliminate all doubt. Itis a close question, I thlnk
there are probably views both ways. But the only way to relieve the
uncertainty is through the constitutional amendinent rule.
Mr.- Smi'iI . Now, you made allusion, inl your statement, to the
fvet that It has been sug tld to the subcoiniItteo that in the calse of
a dispute as to the Presiftfol's ability to resumo his powers and duties,
that, resort be had to sonie proceedings similar to imleachieut.
I take it from'your failure in your coticlusloms to end0rse that
speitfib suggestion, that you woUld suggest soinetting else besides
impeachnient proceedings
Oh yes. I think, as I thought I intended to say, that,
A[r. IiYN.1
it should be a roce'ure that.Congress. could set up ittde' this -ons1ituto11 amenu nient that would allow it to pass on this %-erysimple
issie. And so it would not be neces.iry to go through the mnachine'y
of inpitachuent.
Mr. SIITFY. As an aid in understanding your suggestion in that
regard, would you require, in the event the i-sue was to be determined
by the Congre, . that a vote adverse to the Presisients ivcovery of hi9
powers and duties' require two-thirds of the Melmbers of tile ('ongress-mor than a si mle majority, in other words?
Mr. RirNH. Yes; I think so.
Mr. Szmt'rE. Now, ifMr. Ruyx, That would remove all po.sible political bias charges.
Mr. Sinrrnxy. Nowsupposo for the moment that a President sought
to return to his office at a time when he had not recovered, and the
Congress made that determination. Would you thereafter allow hin
togo
l)ceedings again?
Mr.through
RI1YNX.tle
I same
haven't
considered that woblen, Mr. Smithmey, but

I would not foreclose him, I don't thin'. The Office of the PeS ident,
as I say, is such a great Office, that. I think there Ought to be some
limitation on it-lie should not be allowed to force the Congress to
go through this repeatedly. Btl after one adverse vote, it might he
the issue is so close as to his inability that at some later time there
would be no quest ion as to his capacity
Mr. SMITInr. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator KieFAUVER. Mr. Rhyne, I was interested in your additional
statement, commending the President and the Vice President on discussing this matter and reaching some understanding. And then
your further statement that yott were sure that at tile proper time
made.
and place that a full revelation of any understanding would
Mr. Rn-NiE. Well, I have no basis on which to base that except this.
Senator--that it seems to me that. in Connection with the President's
various illnesses they have made the most complete and full disclosuree
in all history of all facts, and so I would assume they would follow
thatbasio principle.
I
.
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8enatol KR'..Uvu. Well, you think It Is a matter of public in.

portsiaico that any nrrangement or agreement should in due course be •
Wade l)iibljot

Mr. IbiiyNix. I feel so, Senator, because as I 813, this office is so
all.iinportant, and everyone is interested in it, anid everyone has so
much at. stake in ths 01fce of tle Presidency, that I wof 1d sincerely
feel that at lie proper finic and place, fle under tniding hoh1l be
fully revealed.
Senator K(rauv, i. Well, I agree with you. And as a Senator and
chairman of this iubcorinatteelI want to make four points In connec-

tion with (hi matter which is being discussed at (lie present t ine:
First, 1 am glad(l that the President aiid the Vice President have
considered (lie matter together. And I have no desire to know of
their peronal tiseusiois of it. 1 think that is a matter flint they have
a right to keel) in confidence.
B5 ut, &coml, as to any arrai)gement or agreement that may have

re.sultled fioni thait )ersonal discussion, I cani see no reason in tile
world why the Congre s and lite people of the Unied States should

niebetoh/what it is. After all, it is our life as a cmntry, and perhaps

our lives as iaidividials vIich wold be involved should tliere be
aniotler sudden attack on (le President's health at a critical titte In

our existence.
Third, that no stopgap arrangenient, however nieritoriois the motive might be in naklnx it shold be allowed to deter lhe Congress in
trying to (leal with tile iindamental problem which this situation
creates. FI urthernoro, we are legislating hero for all time to cnie, and
not just for this l)ailicular situation now presented.
Fourth, it seems to me that. lite fact, that the P'resident and thq Vice
President feel that this matter is so important as to make ni agreemenlt shows the added urgency of and necessity of Congress itself
submitting a resolution to the people for an amendment, so that there
can be no question as to the legality of any actions that may be taken.
I)o you Agree generally with that?
Mr. IiYNEr. I certainly do, Senator. I think that is a very good
.statenlent.
Senator KF.V.%vvEn. At this point, we will have some communicalions that we vant to )lace in the record.
A statement from Arthur E. Sutherland, professor of law at liaryard Universify, in response to a letter of ours. lie attached an article
that lie has written, which will also be made a part of the record.
(The material referred to is as follows:)
LAW SCHOOL Or IJARVARD U.IMvmrsY,

Cambridgc, Mass., January 2j, 1958.

Senator RsTs KEFAUVEv.
Chairman, Standing Subxommfttceon 'onstitutionolAmendments,

Coin m Wee on the Judiciary,

United States Senate, Washington,D. 0.

DEAR SE AToz KEFAUYER: Thank you very much for your courteous letter of
January 10 to which I have been giving a good deal of thought. Last month I
wrote a little article for the New York Herald Tribune which set forth my ideas
about Presidential inability. I was interested in your Senate Joint Rewidution
133, for a constitutional amendment, Introduced January 9, 1958, which Indicates
that your views are very much like mine. I enclose a copy of the Tribune article.
I suppose one of the most controversial aspects of these proposals and similar
ones Is participation by the Supreme Court, or by the Chief Justice. Today's New

204

PllWIBLYN'IAL INADhIAY

York Titab Indicates that the Justics are opposed to tnny
participation, and this
atttud t In arcrd with the trodittonal and proper aloofteus of ho Court from
evorythitui

.utivtIlv

of pollttla.

Oil the other hat,

the great gravity of the

decision to be made coiieraling Prestidential Inability, and the necesalty tlat the

American people bo asuurd that the decision li Imado Imupartially, solely upon ihe
evidtea
teini to fulfie t i judicial element il the Oomilsuion which patoon oil
disltbillti,
With ful ralliatlon of the ndvantagee and dlsadvaitages luvolved,
I atur Inclined to feel thai the choice of the Chief Justice as the prestltig ofcer
*eld bo advantalgwts to the country. hlit I tu imnpresed by the reported
contrary view o thise directly concerned.
With lay beat wlsho#, I ant
Sincerely yours,
AR rti tiR1. WIT HRIIA D.
Ilroma the Now Yovk hIerald Tribu t, Dcwbtr It, 10511

A NOI'K Jvtazs18s PROlAL ON l'axaIbM11AL DINABIITY
(By Arthur N. R1therinld)
Mr. Sutherland, a former secretary to Jithtlce llolnue and protest.
sor of law at Ilarvard sli ce 10M, Is one of the Nation's outstanding
authorities on conmittutlonal law. In this article esleally written
for the Herald rlbuno lio discuss the question of 'residential

ability.

.Prsident isenhower, according to press reports, is renewing his Insistence
that the Congress take somie action to clarify the ancient problem of Preil.
dental disability. This is more a problem of procedure than of substAnce.
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Ofice, or of iis Death, liesiguatilou, or Inability to dis'harge the Powers and Duties of the mid Office, tie
ame shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law pro.
vide for tle Case of iemoval, l)e"tl, Iteslgnatlion or Inability, both of the Presl.
dent and Vice President, declaring what Officer hall then act as President anti
such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Dis'tblilty Is removed, or a Presldent

shall be elected." (Constitution, art. 11, sw. 1, clause 0.)
Anyonk- who hats worked ait draft Ing laws soon senses thle (1iMcutty of the tak
It Is not surprising that the re"t met% who drafted the Constitution should
have left 1 or 2 amubiguities. Under this clause It has been suggested that, it

the Vice Prosident take over even for A single day, he becomes President for
the retairndet of the term. Such a result scarcely seems sensible, however,
and probably most Americans would say that the President whom they bare
elected should be relieved of duty only during his Inability to discharge the
functions of hli, otice.
Since 18, however, there has been a persistent question as to how dis.
ability will be determined. On August 27, 1787, when the disability clause
was before the Constitutional Convention, John Dickinson of Delaware remarked that It was too vague. "What Is the extent of the term 'disability'
and who Is to be the judge of It?" ho asked. Dickinson's question has never been
answered; It caused particular concern during the months that preceded Presi.
dent Oarfteld's dentb, and during President Wilson's long Illness.
President Gartfield was shot by an assassin opi July 2, 1881; umtil his death
on the following September 19 he performed only one official act-he signed a
paper having to do with extradition. The Presidential duties of that simpler
time were much less exacting than they have since become, and the United
States was worried but not gravely prejudiced by the state of the President. A
much more serious situation arose when Woodrow Wilson suffered a paralytic
strite on September 2A, 1010. lie was Incapacitated at the White House for
at least 6 week., and attended no Cabinet meeting until April 18, 1020. Secre.
tary of State Lansing called a number of Cabinet meetings during the autumn
and winter, and the President's re entment at Lanslng'q Initiative Is thought
to have brought about Mr. Lansing's resignation in February 1920.
Not one of President Eisenhower's illnesses has presented such a serious situa.
tlon. Neverthele*4 as both the President and prominent Members of the Congress
hare recognized, the time has come to provide some procedure to determine when a
President Is so disabled that the duUes of his office devolve upon the Vice President. The importance of establishing some such procedure and the variety of solutions possible, appeared In the hearings held in April 1956 before the House
Judiciary Committee's Special Subcommittee To Study Presidential Disability.
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The point wan thore made that while, fortunately In the long history of the Prel.
deney there has been no Instance of i mentally IlI Ohlef loxccutlve, this Is a pot.
bully, and much a ituntio WoUld present serluS e;nbtnrraganients to the whole
Nntilon. One can easily Itnagflno soe future l'resldent, thus afficted, mili confi.
dent of fiim own continuing Judgment and bitterly resentful of any suggestion 1h1t
his Intelleciml powers had filled. Am In President Wllmon'a Illness, some of his
nossocIntes In the ndminilstratIon, out of loyalty tq the President and a belief In his
colltilI'd abilities, iaight continue to uphold hiiscompetence while others equally
conslientlous milglt feel that the situation called for the Vice l'reoldent to take
over. There In 11o existing machinery to resolvo much an impasse, 'rhe time to
provhlo It Is now, when the prolshcn has not yet arisen. Iftnmlever arlM, there
will be no time to provide for It and nio reasonable means.
At the outet a question arlses as to whether a conslltullonml amendment Is
necsainry, or whether an act of Congres will do, Iir'ro we are embarrassed by
what seemns nn oversIght of the con lltutional draftsmen, and In the absence of a
lenr consllttulonal directive, constitutional amendment seems the desirable
course. , I,nklng much a matndale, the congresss seems no more nlhorired to
unseat the Ilrepidel a, wheth r for temporary or permanent dlimAbhlity, than the
President Is atthorlul to unsat a Henantor or a Congressman. The Costitn.
tion provides only one procelure for removing a i'tesldent from ofllce--"imwaeh.
meat for and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and mlndae.
naennors" (art. I, se. 4). The careful constltntlonal prescdption for this
Ir
lcire, with Its connotations of criminality, nnkem more Nrmsli.'uoas the ab.
senco of any dillar provision for disabling Illness. A constitutional amendment
accordingly seems required,
Several types have been ssuggested. The slmplet amendment would authorize
the ("ongre to legllnte for the ease of i'reldentil Inability to perform his
duties. lot during a period of bitterness between Congress and P'resIdent, as
om-urred during the Johnson admnlintratilon, control of the Presidency by
legAIlailon might be unfortunate. Whatever the procedure Ix, It belomgs In the
Constitution Itself.
Not only does the country need the most accurate possible judgment as to the
President's condlllon, but that determination should be made In a way which will
gain a maximum of public confidence and acceptance. To this end represent.
lives of all three branches of the Government should participate In the declslon. It the question Is Illness (rather than some such question as capture
by an enemy force), the best possible medical opinion should of course be
sought by the body deciding on Inability. The Cabinet ha been suggested
to decIde; but its proper loyalty to a chief In his day of misfortune might
defer decision too long. Congress has the advantage of representing the national electorate, but the case of President Johnson suggests that Congress
had best not bear the sole responsibility. The Supreme Court of the United
States Is detached from politics and widely respected, but It should not be
charged alone with displacement of the Chief Executive. A better Disability
Commission would represent all three branches. It could consist of the Secre
tables of State, Treasury, Defense, and the Attorney Oeneral; the majority leaders of the two major parties In the Senate and House; and, as prelding ofiker,
the Chief Justice, with power to cast a deciding vote In the case of a tie. The
Disability Commission should assemble to determine disability on the call of any
two members. The disabled President, or any two members, should be similarly
empowered to call the Commission together to determine Presidential recovery.
Such a commission would have.the great advantage of sparing the Vicm
President the burden of announcing his own sucesson. And If It seems that
four Cabinet officers might delay a finding of Inability, one good answer Ix that
the elected President should not be unadvisedly or lightlydisplaced.
Senator KsXAuvER. A communication from Prof. Joseph E. ]ellen-

bach, professor of political science at the University of Michigan,
tobe made a part of the record.
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(The nmterial referred to is as follows:)
UNIVER81TY Or MIE WAN,

DEPARTM .XT Or PI)LATI(AI, SCtNCF.,
Apin Arbor, January 20, 1958.
lion. ,TT.5 KF.FAUVER,
&,mate Otfice Building,
Washington, D. 0.
DAR S NAToR KE Ar VER: In reply to your letter of January 10, I am enclosng herewith a statement of my views on the subject of Presidential Inability,
with particular reference to prolwsed bills and Joint resolutions pending before
the standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on
the Judiciary.
I have previously had the opportunity to express my views on this matter
before the Special Committee To Study Presidential Inability of the House Committee on tie Judiciary In the 84th Congress. You may flud them in the House
Committee Print on Presidential Inability, 84th Congress, 2d session, and In
the hearings before the special committee for April 11 and 12, 1050, of that
session. I have continued to give thought to the subject and to follow develop.
meant lit
connection with it. In general, Imy views on how the problem should
be met have not changed fundamentally, although I recognize the merit of other
proposals at variance with the approach I outlined at that time. I think that
the Congress should submit a constitutional amendment oilthe subject clarifying
the question of the status of the succeeding officer in different tyles of situations
where there is a devolution of Presidential powers and duties on a succeeding
officer. The amendment should also establish beyond anly doubt the authority
of Congress to provide, by legislative act, a procedure to be utilized in determinIng when a situation has arisen calling Into play the disability provision. I
believe that the Congress, under the terms of article II, section 1, paragraph
t, and the necessary-and-proper clause of article 1, section 8, of the Constitulion, now has the authority to provide such a procedure and that It should take
steps Immediately t do so. I think that If it did so, the procedure outlined
would be respected and utilized If a situation to which It applies should arise.
Itowever, I recognize that there are some grounds for questioning whether
Congresl, at present, has the power to circumscribe by statute the freedom of
judgment and action of the President and Vice President in a case of alleged
Presidential disability, especially In a situation where the President is unwilling
or unable to acquiesce in a finding and declaration of his own disability. A
finding that the 1President Is unable to exercise the powers and discharge the
duties of his office under these circumstances would have the effect of temporarily suspending him from office without his express consent. This is a most
serious step and could conceivably result In grave political controversy. Furtbermore, the usage to the effect that a Vice President who has succeeded to the
Presidency "beconies" the President, rather than the "Acting President," has
given rise to the belief, entirely erroneous in my opinion, that any succession
to the powers and duties of the Presidency by the Vice President forecloses
resumption of them by the displaced President. This view of the matter has
been a stumbling block for efforts by Congress In the past to Implement the
disability clause by legislation, and has deterred Presidents and Vice Presidents
from acting under this provision on their own Initiative. To resolve any doubt
regarding the possibility of a temporary devolution of Presidential powers and
duties on a succeeding officer, I think a constitutional amendment approach to
the matter should also be employed.
I have appended to my statement the substantive language of a proposed draft
of a constitutional amendment whlch would clarify these points. Also appended
is a proposed draft of a statute to implement the Presidential disability provislon. You will note that the proposed amendment is similar to Senate Joint
Resolution 133 in that it would leave to Congress the responsibility of prescrib.
Ing by statute te details of the procedure to be used for determlnlrg a Presidential Inability which the President himself does not recognize and declare.
I recognize the advantage in employing the "one-shot" approach by Including
in the language of a constitutional amendment an outline of the procedure to be
followed In determining a Presidential inability. However, a great amount of
detail must be included to deal with all possible contingencies and questions, and
supplementary legislation would probably be necessary In any event. In my
opinion it would be undesirable to place such matters of detail in the Con.
atitutlon.

PRFIUD

TIAL JAf lITY

207

I believe that the CongresS can be properly trusted to devise an acceptable
statute on the subject. If It be argued that the power might be ahux ed for part.
san reasons, the same can be said of almost any other power Congress now has
relative to the organization and functioning of the other two branches of the
National Government. Enactment forthwith of an Inplementlng statute would
allay fears that a Conxreos hostile to ihe Executive would selre the opportunity
to enact a salute on the ,ubjf.t converting the disability clause Into an Instru.
went for effecting removal of a Presildent from office on a trumped-up charge of
"disabllly," ratified by offrord of 'ongress4' own choosing. The welter of views
and opinions on this mutmjet wb(h the current situation has called forth, I
realize, has complicated O4 -- k f tle (niigress In choosing a proper course of
action. 1 think It highly Inqsirtmnt that in considering the problem the Congress
keep In mind that no yatim It canldevise will be absolutely foolproof, airtight,
and Incapimble of abuse In the hands of partian-mlnded, unpatriotic, and self.
seeking human beings. There has to he an assuiption that a procedure prescribed for dealing with a l're0lentlal Inability crisis will be used to achieve the
proper ends for which It was devised-the filling of an Intolerable vacuum In the
Presidential office. The force of public opinion and the good judgment and sense
of public duty of the officers involved can and must be relief on In the end to
Insure the realization of this obje tve through appropriate machinery provided
by law.
Thank you for the opportunity to express by vlews on thi4 matter.
Very sincerely yours,
Jos3jP
., KALX.I NRACII.
PROPOSEa CONrTITVTJONAi, AuIENmDMiST ON PRtErIDFTIAL 81iCeIzSiON AND
DISAIITY
ARTICIZ -

Six. 1; If the President dies, resigns, or is removed from office, the Vice President shall become President for the remainder of the term to which the President
was elected.
14c. 2. If the President becomes unable for any reason to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, they shall devolve upon the Vice President, who shall then
act as President until the disability of the President be removed, or the term of
office of the President shall expire. Congress shall by law establish the proce(lure by which the Inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties
of his office shall be determined, and provide for the case of the removal, death,
resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
officer shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
S.w. 3. Article II, section 1, paragraph 6, is hereby repealed.

PROPOSED STATUTE IMPLEMUINflNO THE PRIBID.NTIAL INABILITY CLAUSE

Be ft enacted by the Senate and House of Rcpresentatires of the United Statet
in Congress assembled, That (a) the analysis of chapter 1 of title 3 of the United
States Code (entitled "The President") Is amended by inserting at the end
thereof the following new Item:
"Sxc. 21. Ascertainment of the inability of the President to discharge his
duti.s."
(b) Such chapter is amended by Inserting at the end thereof the following
new section:
"SEC. 21. Ascertainuient of the Inability of the President to discharge his duties:
"(a) In case the President Is temporarily unable to discharge the powers and
(dttlesof the office of President, he shall so notify In writing the Vice President,
the Speaker of the Huse of Representatives, and the President pro tempore of
the Senate. Upon transmission of such communication the powers and duties
of the office of President shall devolve upon the Vice President, who shall discharge them until the President notifies In writing the Vice President, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the President pro tempore of the Senate
that he Is able to reassume the powers and duties of his office, or until a new
President is inaugurated, whichever occurs sooner.
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"(b) If at the time a President shall declare his inability to discharge the
powers and ditlies of his office there is no Vice President, or the Vice President
shall declare his own Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Presl.
dency, such powers and duties shall devolve, for the duration of the President's
inability or until the end of the then current Presidential term as provided in
subsection (a), upon the officer next in line of succession, as determined pursuant
to section 10 of this chapter.
"(c) In case of the inability of the Vice President, while acting as President
by reason of the inability of the [President, to discharge the powers and duties
of that office, such powers and duties shall devolve In like manner upon the
officer next In line of successlon, as determined pursuant to section 1 of this
chapter: Providcd,howestmr, That the President1 or the Alice President, as the case
may be, may give notice in writing of his ability to reassunie the powers and
duties of the office of President, and so reassume them, as provided In subsection

(a).

"(d) There is hereby created a Committee on Presidential Inability to consist
of the officers named in the line of the Presidential succession by section 19 of thls
chapter, the leader in the Senate of the political party having the greatest number of Members of the Senate, the leader In the Senate of the political party having
the second greatest number of Members of the Senate, the leader In the House
of Representatives of the political party having the greatest number of Members
of the House of Rtepresentatives, and the leader In the House of Representatives
of the political party having the second greatest number of Members of the House
of RepresentatIves. If the Vice President has reasonable cause to believe that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of hiq office and the President has not acted under the procedure provided In subsection (a) to cause
the powers and duties of the Presidency to devolve upon the Vice President, he may
request the Committee on Presidential Inability to render a judgment on the
question of the ability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his
office. It a two-thirds majority of the members of the committee find that th,
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, It shall
so notify the Vice President and he shall forthwith act as President until such
tiine as the lPresident shall notify In writing the Vice President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the President pro tempore of the Senate that his
disability has ceased, or until the end of the Presidential term, whichever occurs
sooner.
'(e) The Congress may, by concurrent resolution approved by a majority of the
Members of each House, declare that it has reasonable cause to believe that the
President, or the officer acting as President, Is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the office. Upon the passage of such a concurrent resolution the
Committee on Presidential Inability shall render a Judgment on the question of
the Inability of the President, or the officer acting as President, to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, as provided in subsection (d).
"For the purpose of considering such a resolution the President pro tempore
of the Senate may convene the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives may convene the House of Representatives.
"(f) If at any time there is no Vice President, the officer next in the line of
Presidential succession, as determined pursuant to section 19 Qf this chapter,
Is hereby authorized to proceed and act In the same manner as the Vice President,
as provided in subsection (d). In such case, however, the officer next in the line
of Presidential succession shall not serve as a member of the Committee on
Presidential Inability.
"(g) Any officer who shall, as provided In this section, assume the powers
and duties of the office of President shall be entitled to receive compensation
equivalent to that of the President for the duration of the period during which
he shall discharge the powers and duties of the office of President. During
the period he may act a President, such officer shall retain the title to the offie
by reason of which the duty of acting as President shall have devolved upon
him; but he shall not exercise the powers and discharge the duties thereof. Any
provisions of section 19 of this chapter inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed."
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MEMORANDUM ON PaMIDn rfAL INABILITY

(By Joseph H. Kallenbach)
Any plan for implementing the constitutional provision concerning Presidential Inability must provide answers to the questions and-problems which
follow:
1. How shall hiablilly be defined?
I believe that it is unnecessary and unwise to attempt to define by statute
the term "inability" as used in article 11, se.tlon 1, paragraph 0 of the Constitution. The framers In adopting this term undoubtedly had in mind any
contingency or condition that might render a President unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office as the public interest and necessities may require.
It should not be restricted to physical Inability as proposed in M. 23.
The
Presidency is an office that makes extraordinarily heavy demands upon the
physical, mental, and spiritual capacities of the occupant. For this reason,
inability should be determined in Ibls connection by a much more rigorous
test than that applied in determining mental competence or capacity of an
Individual to act in a personally responsible manner.
2. By whom shall the Inability of the Presdent be determined?
A statute on the subject of Presidential inability should first of all make
clear the right of the President himself to declare his own temporary inability.
If he regards his disability as a transient thing, as he might well do in the
case of a temporarily incapacitating illness , for example, he should have the
option of divesting himself of the powers and duties of his office, without on
the one hand surrendering the office irrevocably by resIgning or on the other
hand pursuing a course of inaction and drift.
In the event there is reason to believe the inability clause should be mad&
operatlvb; and the President fails or is obviously unable to act to give effect to
it, the statute should provide an agency for rendering an authoritative Judgmenl
on the matter, after due deliberation. My suggestion is that this body be made
up of the heads of major executive departments and congressional leaders. The
judgment to be rendered is one involving the evaluation of the public need and
necessity for a continuing responsible discharge of the powers and duties of the
office of Chief Executive in the light of conditions which seriously impair or
totally prevent the incumbent President from making a judgment himself on
the matter. 'Whether such a situation exists Is a political decision of great
delicacy and importance.
It requireS the evaluation of many political facts bearing on the question. For this reason I question the advisability of making it a
matter for the courts to decide. To refer the matter to the Supreme Court
for resolution, at proposed in Senate joint Resolution 100, would have the advantage of placing the prestige of that body behind the decision, of course, and
that would contribute greatly to popular acceptance of the judgment reached.
However, I question the advisability of vesting this responsibility in the Supreme
Court. The decision to be rendered Is not one based simply on application of
legal principles but on a weighing of various facts having political implications
and o,7ertojies lying beyond the realm of legal loglc and medical science. .
I believe the officers placed in the line of the Presidential succession have a
special Interest in and competence to make this decision. I favor the idea of
associating with them in this also the majority and minority leaders of the two
Houses of Congress, as proposed in Senate Joint Resolution 134. This would
insure a wider representation of congressional views, Including spokesmen for
both major political parties. At the same time the composition of the body would
insure that a majority of them are executive officials representative of the administration and presumably loyal to the President's interests. No recommendation could be made for a temporary devolution of Presidential powers and
duties except with the concurrence of some of the members, at least, of the
President's Cabinet. I think this is a proper and workable arrangement, tending
to insure that no decision authorizing devolution of Presidential powers and
duties will be made unless there is a strong and publicly defensible case for it.
J. Who sAall intMUMte contderatofo of tMe queslioh of Preidtentlol (nobility?
As I have indicated in the discusslon'of olnt 2) above, I believe the inl
tlative in bringing about a devolution of Plesdential powers and duties could
and should, normally, be left to the President aeing solely on his owii judgment.
The initiation of an Inquiry Into his ability to act when he falls to do so, or is
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obviously unable to do so, *shouldbe left in the first instance to the officer next
in line of succession, normally the Vice President. lie has a constitutlonal
obligation and duty to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case
of the latter's Inability. Hence he should be expected to raise the question of
the existence of conditions calling this aspect of the succession rules Into play.
Political consideration aitl loyalty to the President, however, may Inhibit hill
from taking the 'nitiative in presenting the question to the boly empowered to
ren er an official judgment. For that reason, I think the statute on the subject
should also clearly recognize the authority of the Congress to Initiate a consideration of the question. I believe these two alternative modes of presenting the
issue of a President's inability to the body empowered to make a Judgment
would suffice.
4. What should be the statue of the offlcer acting as Pre4ident during a period
of Presidential inability?
My belief Is that the statute should clearly state that the position of the
succeeding officer is that of Acting President. He should be regarded as an
officer to whose office there have been temporarily annexed the powers and duties
of the Presidency. Ile should retain the office by virtue of which he succeeds
to the responsibility of exercising the powers and performing the duties of
the Presidency; but he should be freed from the necessity of discharging the
powers and duties of his own office. Otherwise, in the case of the first three
officers in the line of succession, the Vice President, the Speaker of the House,
and the President pro tempore of the Senate, there would be an illogical and
conceivably unconstitutional joining of legislative and executive responsibilities
in the hands of one person.
The temporarily displaced President should be regarded as retaining title
to the office of President, but without the responsibilities of acting as such.
The devolution of his powers and duties under these circumstances must be
considered complete, embracing the totality of Presidential powers and respoisibilities. Unless the President retains title to the office itself, however, there
would be no basis for any action restoring to him the authority to exercise the
powers and duties of his office. The conception that there can be no separation
of the powers and duties of the office of President from the office itself has, up
to the preserqt, stood in the way of making the disability provision of the
Oonstltutiow 6ffective. It has been given support by the usage of treating a
Vice President who succeeds to the powers and duties of the Presidency in case
of the death of the incumbent as having become President. Unless this conception that the succeeding officer becomes President is clearly disavowed in
legislation designed to implement the disability clause there Is no point In
trying to establish a procedure for dealing with the disability problem as such.
Otherwise the procedure established becomes simply a special procedure for
removing a President on the ground of inability. There would be no point In
providing a procedure for reinstating the displaced President in an office he
has ceased to hold.
5. Who shall determime tMe question of whether a President'sinability h1 been
terminoted?
In my opinion there Is only one authority who can be expected to determine
this question, viz, the President himself. Regardless of whether he himself
voluntarily declared his own disability, or acquiesced by his silence and Inaction in a devolution of the powers and duties of his office brought about
through the special procedures for determining his inability, he must be recognized as having the right to exercise the powers and duties of his office if he
asserts that right, so long as he retains title to it. His power to do so should not
be made subject to the approval of any body created to give sanction and
political support for the temporary assumption of the President's functions
by a succeeding officer. If there has been a devolution of Presidential powers
and duties by default, so to speak, accompanied by a finding to that effect by
a responsible special organ of the Government representing both political
branches of thb. Government, It may be assumed that the Prisldent, before attempting to reassume the powers and duties of his office, will be able to demonstrate beyond all doubt that the reasons which led to the judgment that he
was incapacitated no longer are valid. He should not be regarded as having
been tentatively ousted from office.
If the President's judgment on the point of the restoration of his ability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office is not to be trusted, then the whole
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problem takes on a different form. It becomes one of devising a system for
suspending the President from office without his consent on the alleged ground
of Inability. It that is what is to be provided for rather than a plan for facilitatIng the operation of the disability provision of the Constitution, obviously there
Is a great deal more being attempted through the plans proposed than I had
assumed. I should think, at any rate, that If provision is to be made whereby a
temporarily disabled President would be required to secure the approval of some
special body or court before he could reassume the powers and duties of his
office, the matter would have to be dealt with by a constitutional amendment.
The statute I have suggested for dealing with the question of disability is based
on the assumption that the President Is still President, even when there has been
a temporary devolution of his powers and duties upon a successor. That being
so, I doubt that the Congress can limit, by statute, his discretion in determining
his fitness to reassume the powers and functions of his office.

Senator KEFAUVER. A thoughtful letter from David Fellman, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, to which
lie attaches a more detailed statement to be made a part of the record.
(The material referred to is as follows:)
TnE UNIVERSITY OF lWIScONSIN,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,

Madlson, Wis., January 15, 1958.
Senator EsTrs KEFAUVME,
Chairman, Subconm ittec on Oonatilut tonal A mendm en Is,
Senate O1)e Building, Washington, D. V.
D R SE1ATOa Kx.u T.AR:I am writing to you in response to your letter of
January 10, which is concerned with the question of presidential inability.
I made a fairly detailed statement of my views on this subject to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, on December 12, 1955,
in response to a request from Congressman Celler. I am enclosing a copy of
my statement, which will be found in the House committee print, 84th Congress,
2d session, presidential inability, dated January 31, 19560, at pages 21 to 26.
This statement still represents my views on this subject.
In the light of the several proposed bills or resolutions now pending before
your subcommittee, I should like to make a few additional observations.
I do not believe that a constitutional amendment Is really necessary in order
to authorize Congress to pass legislation on this subject. I think that normal
canons of constitutional construction would amply support extensive legislation
to implement what the Constitution now says on the subject.
Nevertheless, I see no greet harm in adding an amendment, if it will remove
serious doubts as to the power of Congress to act in the premises. If an amendment is added, however, it is perfectly clear to me that your 8. J. Res. 133 is
infinitely superior to S. J. 100 or S. J. 134, merely as a matter of form. The
Constitution is simply no place for the sort of detailed legislation proposed in
these latter resolutions. It is not wise, in my opinion, to load the Constitution
down with procedural and substantive details as to which the Congress and the
country may some time want to change their minds. It is wholly sufficient,
and much wiser, I believe, merely to authorize Congress to pass appropriate
legislation, spelling out clearly the area which the legislation Is designed to
cover. In this light I think S. J. Res. 1.33 Is altogether adequate, just as it is.
As my enclosed statement indicates, I take the position that the determination
of the fact of Presidential Inability should be vested in the hands of a specially
constituted body. I arrived at this conclusion by a process of elimination. In
my opinion, and with all due respect, Congress is not the appropriate body to
make this decision, first, because such a numerous assemblage of men and women
Is unfitted to decide a question involving the ability of a single person to hold
the office of President, on the basis of evidence, and secondly, because there are
long periods of time during which Congress is not even in session. I would rule
out the Cabinet altogether, since the members of the Cabinet serve entirely at
the pleasure of the President, have no wills of their own independently of his,
and have a vested Interest in the President's hanging on to his office under any
circumstances. I would also eliminate the Vice President entirely from the
process of making a finding of Presidential inability for the rather simple reason
that he would be sitting in Judgment of his own cause. This is contrary to the
most elementary rules of justice. Since the Vice President takes over the reigns
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of power when a President Is found unable to discharge his duties, he should
not, In tity opinion, be put in the position of having anything to do with the
making of the crucial decision.
By a proe
of elimination, we are led to the conclusion that since no available
governmental Institutlon In the appropriate agency for making a decision on the
question of Presidential disability, one must be contrived. Thus, I believe that
some sort of conuitsslon or committee must be set up which can make an author.
Itative and binding decision. The only remaining question Is: Who shall partielpate n (It decision?
This brings me to tip details of 8. 2318. I think It Is extremely unwise to
delegate tei power to make the critical decision to a pmnel of doctors, Wimlie
I think any tominli0lon inust act on the advice of doctors, I also believe lint a
politically responsible commission lit whose Judgment tie country will have
confidence must make the actual decision. Your own senate Joint IResolution
134 does not make this mistake, since the special comnision-o makes the concrete
decision, though I would prefer to specify that the contmis.qoIon shall net on tli
advice of physiciAns. But I atu very dubious about the wisdom of Ix-rmilitlti
members of the oliosilon political party to have anyihilg to do wlth the dccIslon. I should think that a decision wilt command greater public conldence-which, I may suggest, Is probably the key to the whole problem-If the lresldent's
ability to discharge his duties Is Judged only by his own party people. I would
exclude Democrats from participating in a decision regarding a Itepublican
President, and vice versa, because of the ease with which the charge of "pel.
ticking" can be bandied about. The only way to avoid the injection of party
politics In this connection, It seems to me, is to Involve only the members of the
PresIdent's own imrty. surely the country will be readier to accept a decision
by republicans that a republican President Is unable to discharge his duties
than one In which Democrats had a hand,
I should add that in order to buttress public confidence In the decision of the
special commission, the Supreme Court Justices ought to be Involved to time extent
at least of the Chief Justice and perhaps the ranking Associate Justice.
I recommend once more that the committee be kept very small, that It be empowered to act by majority vote, that It be required to consult physicians, and
make findings in writing. I would allow any member of tle commission to take
the Initiative In setting the machinery to work. I would authorize the comiuls.
sion to make findings both as regards disability and the termination of disability.
The only other point to which I would draw special attention Is the fact that
in all cases to date, whenever a vacancy occurred In the presidential office, the
Vice President took over as President. This was due to the fact that In every
Instance the President had died. But the Vice President cannot become anything
more than Acting President If he takes over merely for the duration of an ilness, since we cannot have two Presidents at the same time. Thus I think that
section 1 of Senate Joint RIesolutlon 134 Is very wise In making a distinction between the situation where the Vice Presidept serves as President, and the situation in which he merely exercises Its powe,'. Such a provision Is absolutely
essential If the problem is to be solved, because we have no precedents dealing
with temporary Inability, and a solution demands that a distinction be made
between the case where the President has died, or resigned, or been Impeached,
and the case where he is temporarily III, and for the time being Incapacitated.
If I can be of any further assistance to you In connection with this legislation,
please do not hesitate to call upon me. I am eager to help your subcommittee
find a proper solution of the problem.
l
DAVID FELLMAN,
Sincerely yours,
Professorof Polflicol Science.
REPLY OF DAVID FELLMA.,

THE UIIVE1rTY or WIBSOO~siN
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Congressman EzAcuVl. CzLLzR,
House Oee Building,We#fagptox, D. 0.
DER CoxossIAv. CmLiI: I am writing In response to your letter of November 29, in connection with your questionnaire on Presidential inability. It is
Interesting to note that the questions raised therein are almost Identical with
those raised by Chester A. Arthur In his first annual message to Congress, December 6, 1881. See Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (vol. 8,

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
p Os). Ills questions arose from the fact that President Garfield was utterly
capacitated for some 21A months before his death. He was shot on July 2,
1881, and died on September 10. Mr. Arthur did not undertake to discuss, much
less to answer, the questions he raised.

Before coming to your specific questions, I want to make the preliminary point
that the British have a specific procedure for determining the disability of a
reigning sovereign, and that we can learn much by examining It. It is, of course,
In any system of government a delicate problem which Is extraordinarily difficult

to resolve, and any solution Is bound to be something less than perfect, but
nevertheless the problem Is not Insoluble by any means.
The British statute was adopted on March 19, 1937, and Is entitled the Regency
Act of 1937. (The c'tation IsI ldw. 8 &1 (eo 0 ch. 10.) This statute was the
result of apprehensions, which Parliament itself acknowledged, arising from
the Illness of Ueorge V In W1)28 and in January 1930. Those sections of this act
which deal with a regency while the sovereign Is under 18 years of age need
not concern us here. But bection 2 of the act Is pertinent. It reads.as follows:
"(1) If the following persons or any three or more of them, that Is to say,
the wife or husband of the Sovereign, the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker of the
House of Commons, the Lord Chief Justice of lHngland, and the Master of the
Rolls, declare In writing that they are satisfied by evidence which ,hall Include the evidence of physicians that the Sovereign Is by reason of infirmity of
mind or body Incapable for the time being of performing the royal functions
or that they are satisfied by evidence that the Sovereign In for some definite
cause not available for the performance of those functions, then, until It Is de.
cleared in like manner that his Majesty has so far recovered Ills health as to
warrant Ills resumption of the royal functions or has become available for the
performance thereof, as the case may be, those functions shall be performed In
the name and on behalf of the Soverign by a Resent."
Section 0 of the act Is also pertinent. It reads as follows:
"(1) In the event of Illness not amounting to such infirmity of mind or body
as Is mentioned In section two of this Act, or of absence or Intended absence
from the United Kingdom, the Sovereign may, In order to prevent delay or dtfficulty in the despatch of public business, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal,
delegate, for the period of that Illnes or absence, to Counsellors of State such
of the royal functions as may be specified In the Letters Patent, and way In like
manner revoke or vary any such delegation."
Subsection (2) of section 8 designates who shall serve as counselors of state:
the wife or husband of the Sovereign (if the Sovereign Is married) and the four
persons next In line of succession to the Crown. This portion of the statute was
amended on November 11, 1013 (6 and 7 Geo. 6. ch. 42) to provide that the heir
apparent shall be one of the counselors of State If over 18 years of age.
I should like to focus attention on the principal features of this statute, particularly In the light of the questions raised in your questionnaire.
1. A committee of five Is created to make the decision concerning the
Sovereign's disability.
2. The committee need not be unanimous, but may act by majority vote.
8. One member of the committee Is the Sovereign's wife or husband; two
are high-ranking Judges holding office for life, the Lord Chief Justice, who Is
the presiding Judge of Queen's Bench, and the Master of the Rolls, who
presides over the court of appeals; the Lord Chancellor is at once a Cabinet
minister, the presiding officer of the House of Lords, head of the Judicial
system, and a leading figure In the majority political party; the Speaker of
the House of Commons presides over the elective body of Parliament, but
It Is Important to note that unlike our Speaker in the House of Representa.
ties, the English Speaker is a nonpartisan presiding officer who enjoys
something approaching life tenure, since be Is usually reelected to the House
of Commons by his constituency without opposition, and to reelected to the
SpeakershIp by the House, whatever may have been his original party affiliation, and whatever may be the party situation In the House Itself. Thus,
of the five persons who are eligible to serve on this committee, only the
Lord Chancellor may be regarded sb a party man. But It' Is Important to
note, In this connection, that the Sovereign is not a party man either.
4. The committee Is required to snake a finding of Inability In writing on
the basis of evidence which must Include the evidence of physicians. The
number and Identity of the physicians are not specified.
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13.Tie Ftatuto covers Inflrintly oit both Intiti ani body.
mL.lnctability of pertorning the royal funetionit In not dellied.
T. The ponsili lilly that the HoveroIgn many be incaalhe for siome reason
other than infiruilty tit Indui or body by 11ot being available to perform kInl
functions to also taken Into mois~dermiiiun. Mhat tuight leadl to such iun.
avAilability IAnot asit'ifled. lresniubly cahitmre by mm
foreign enviny would
bo anl exattiptc.
8. The statute rmxi\gnixes that the Siovereign nway ovircoine him dIsitbility
by kxxoining well, anti the voinmim declares thait hie ham reeiovered film
heeiltti so its to %varroittrttiiition of tile royal funtioms lin the very vaio
waty thAt It actit to make a litding of Iliiblily.
11.lit the, Carelof lioss serious lllnees, or absenct, front lithe kingdom, the
8overeign. numy delegate such poiwers tin niny be Iit'JO'Iary to carry tomthle
pmule bisinem to a grooll (if Cl oumelorm of Mte, film slouse midi thu 4
people, next III the tite tif suets.-iom, but hie inny revoke ihe delegittlon lin
hle saino maniiner t hat he nuitde It,
I comnenow (t the questions lout down lin thle qnestiotinmire.
1. 1 dt- not know wit thle auuthors of lte ('nvilutiomi imtitnded by Ouhiteri
-nbhily," except that they obviously Intendled to have tile VIct, Irtisilent servo
an Acting l'reibieut during a%perioA or Ilrenidcmtli iliuwbllly. Disambility was
never deimued, antd. was inuentoned onily onve III thle ues (if tile tConisttiull
Voml~entiom. A search of the- Itecti of lte i'cileral Conmventon, editd by 31nx
F'arrau (\Nw Haven: Yole University Prsrev. Md.. 1931), doe~s not yleld.
1111,0h. It Is oef Interest to nte that oin Aumgust 2T, acevrdimug to Abiishnm's Notes,
Mr. Dbickinson eresdthe thought that thle iseetiom under cliscu&,4lom was "too
vague." lie asked: "What Is thle extent tif thle terin lillsmility' amid who In to
be the judge of It" Biut so far aH wve knmow, no on% nmiwered. time questons,
anti the uuatter was thon poslioniedl. All other rererences to tile isability
clause tire III the ux'so
draft; of the document in it dievelopedl in the deiiberations of the Convention. 1.1tofar as 1 cal discover, there Im no evidence
that the Convention ever di~usetsetI the questions raised by Mr. Dickinson.
Whether anything was sal on this subject, lI the lStnte ratifying c'uinvenilom
I do not know, but I have not searched the records otil this liolnt. Perhil
soimtoie should do Juit that.
I think It would be extremely unmwise to try to define lte terin I'iiibliliy" 1mm
logislatiolm. Anly attempilted4 deititiosn would, I believe, ito mtore- hninIthnn
good, andi the more prolix (lhe deiluitlon, the ivorso It would lip. Anmy Attemiplt
to spell out just whit Is tueant by disability would eit her be tautologicail, repiltl.
tIons, or miseaiting, and lin tny event, a sure basis for uunn's.Amry disputation.
lBnt the law Is full oft umidelined andi undlefinabte terms, e. g., "reanalole 11181,"1
".due. l4M.A.V of law," "right and eqluity," etc. liut certainly comumuousemmse
dictates that disability may be due either to boilly or mental Infirmity, and It
thereC IS any. poSsilule ilonbii about It, then the law should say ats much,. It Is
certainly common knowledge that mental disability occurs, and thant It can be
as crippling as pimysical disablilty. If a special group ior commnittee Is created to
make a finding of disability, the lawv should provide that (1) the flnudimg should
be lit writing; (2) tile tiudhmug should be bamsedl on eviitemmce; (3) the evidence
should Include the testionv of physeltims.
Clearly the Constitution contemuplates that thie President mmy get ever his
disability, since It uses-. the phrase "until thie disability Is removed." Obviously
a sick man may get well, and the law should be clear on this point, that the
President resumesa all of his powers when his disability Is ended.
11. 1 think any member of the group or commit tee which would be authorized
by law to determine the question of the 1'reslIdent's Inability to dlischarge the
powers and dluttes of his otilce should be eligible to itiate the question. I (to
not believe Congress should undertake to performn this function, mainly because
the question may arise suddenly when Congress Is net In session. Nor do I
believe that such a numerous assemblage of mnen and women Is equipped to make
a specific decision bearing upon the qumlleiatlows of a, single person upon the
basis of evidence. I should think It highly Improper to entrust the Vice President with the Initiative, since his personal stake hI the decision precludes general confidence In the objectivity of any affirmative step he may take. Since the
Cabinet Is made up of personal appointees of the President who, serve at his
pleasure, I would regard the Cabinet as wholly unsuitable to make a decision of
the sort under discussion. So far as the Cabinet In concerned, the cards are
stacked so heavily In favor of one disposition of the Issue and against the other
that an objective answer based entirely upon pertinent evidence cannot be expected in all cases
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IIf. I think (ngresa
otght to irovlde for a procedure to deal with tie probe.
lem (of l'reslteidlnl Inabllity, For the rensois given above, the decision should
not, In nmy Judgiment, 1w (,ntrunted to ('ongre", sir the Vice i'r(tidpert, or the
tillnet, I Allggelt th' crentloii by sintilte of as slcirl continuing Comnnittee
which would b- emlpvvered to :a ke the critical (lecllon of Iunablilly, While I
havo not given a grent deal of thought to ti matter of (ho makeup of the Com.
inlite. sad further reflection might suggest a soinewlint different composition,
I would tentatively suggest, as a huis fot further discussIon, as follows:

I. 'fhe Col;llitt(, should Witvery srulti, so thalt It call act expeditiously

and decisively. I suggest 4 Comittee of live.
2. The niinbern t f the (osUzIt(tte could very well be the following:
(a) Tho i'repihleuit' xviIIe, or If tltre Is isoie, the next of kin, providing lie or she Is Oa, adult.
(b) The Chlef Justice of the Unit d Hiates.
(M) Tho Ifeillor Asmoclato Justice of the Supreme Court of the Unilted
1httes.
(d) Tih lender of the President's politicMl party In the senate.
(e) Thu leader of the 'resident . polticalI party It the House of
Itepresen taiives.
Thus, such a Committee would Include a member of tlhe PrexIdent's family,
2 life-tenuro Justices holding positions of great prestige and public confidence,
mid 2 ranking Members of the Hfouses of Congress. I should Insist that members
of thopolitiral larty li opposition to the President should not be put In the post.
tioll of partictwiling il tielclsIon that the Preoldert is tilable to discharge
tho duties of his office. I think there will be greater public confidence In the
participation of two imfxlrtant members of the IirAldest's own party. Our siu.
atlon It quite different from that of Oreat Britain, whose Sovereign Ix required
to be ilonlartixlas.
Our President Is always a partlan, and It Is right that be
should be a Isirty man, since our governmental system rests upon the foundation
of the Iwrly Pysters. It is therefore altogether Proper that leaders of his own
party should share directly in lit responslbililty of making a decision of 1'revidentitl hnblillty. Leaders of the opp(mltlon party would nejsarily act under a
heavy cloud(I of msaplelohi
about their motives If they find a hand in the matter,
however much their opinions are grounded in objective, weighty, and reliable
evidence.
IV. I think a statute of the aort I have dlscu.sl Iln It and III Is perfectly eonAtitliltionl. AU act of Co4ngrem se ens to be fully justified by the language and
purposes of article II, section 1, clause 0, of the Untied Stateg Constitution.
V. An I have indicated, I believe that the same body ought to hav authority
both to inltisto the question fnd determine its merits. I ace no reasM for setting
tip any ponderous or complex macdnery. On the contrary, there Is every good
reason to keel) the proc dure uncompllcated, So that a small group of responsible
people commanding public confidence can move swiftly and decisively. It eight
be wise to authorize the Chief Justice to take the initiative of setting the machinery in motion, but I do n6t see why any one of the five important people who
would serve oi the Committee could not request a meeting of the Committee for
the purpose of making a decision. For example, under some circumstances the
President's wife may very well be the most suitable person available to raise the
question of Inability. I am sure that no one of the five persons I have In mind for
service on this Committee would Initiate action Irresposibly, partly from the very
nature of their positions, and partly because the public would not stand for Irresponslbility In this connection.
W. The Committee should be free to declare that the President Is permanently
disabled, if the facts warrant such a finding. Certainly It Is common knowledge
that there Is such a thing as permanent disability. Aud there Is no reason to
believe that a Committee constituted as I bare suggested would make a finding of
permanent disability if It were at all possible to avoid doing so. If the disability
is temporary, the Committee should be authorized, by the same procedure utilized
to make a finding of disability, to make a finding that the President Is sufficiently
well to resume his duties and functions.
VII. If the disability Is temporary, I think, as I have Indicated, that any member of the Committee should be authorized to raise tilequestlon that the disability
has ceased to exist. Once the question has been raised, it should be determined
by a majority vote of the Committee. As In the case of findings of disability, a
finding that the disability has ended should be made in writing, on the basis of
evidence, including the evidence of physicians.
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VIII. The question whether, in the event of a finding of temporary disability,
the Vice President would succeed to the powers and duties of the office, or to the
office itself, is in my Judgment the critical question oin the list. For there is a
wide gulf between what I think was the plain intention of the franers of the
Constitution and actual practice in the several instances when Vice Presidents
took over upon the death of a President. The Constitution declares, In article
I, section 1, clause 6, that "In case of the removal of the President from Office,
or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said
Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President * * 0.- Clearly, the term
"the same" refers to "the powers and duties of said Office." It it was Intended
that the Vice President should become President, it would have been a simple
matter to say so, as it is said in section 3 of the 20th amendment. This view is
supported by other language i the Constitution. Thus, in the same paragraph
It is provided that In case both the President and Vice President are unavailable
for the office, Congress shall declare "what officer shall then act as President."
This language is consistent with the previous part of the paragraph; it does not
say that this officer shall be President, but only that he shall act as President,
"until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Note that this
clause does not say, "until another President shall be elected," or -'until the next
President shall be elected," but only "until a President shall be elected."
All other pertinent clauses in the Constitution are consistent with the language
of article II, section 1, clause 0. The 12th amendment, taking note of the fact
that it might happen that neither the electoral college nor the House of Representatives may succeed In electing a new President In time, provides that "the
Vice President shall act as President, as In the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President." Article I, section 8, clause 5, of the Constitution provides that the Senate shall elect a President pro tempore who shall
preside in the absence of the Vice President, "or when he shall exercise the Office
of President of the United States." Note that it does not say, "when he shall
have become President," which would have been very easy to say, If such had
been the intention of those who wrote the Constitution.
The language of the Constitution, that the Vice President succeeds to the
powers and duties of the President, or acts as President, or exercises the office of
President, supports the view that it was not intended that he should become
President. Furthermore, this is consistent with the requirements of a situation
where the President's disability is only temporary. Obviously it makes more
sense to say that for the duration of such a disability the Vice President shall
act as President, than to say that for this period of time he shall be President,
for In the latter event we would have two Presidents at the same time, which
is ridiculous. But it makes sense if, while the President Is too sick to discharge
his duties, we have an Acting President in the person of the Vice President. Of
course no such problem Is posed If the President dies, or resigns, or is removed
from office by Impeachment, for in such cases he ceases to be President at all,
and no difficulty arises If the succeeding Vice President becomes President. The
real harm has been that because he is now regarded as becoming President, a
solution of the problem posed by temporary Presidential disability has been
frustrated.
It Is only constitutional custom which decrees that when the Vice President
takes over, he becomes President. This custom, of course, is due to the fact that
in the seven instances where the Vice President has taken over, he did so on the
death of the President. The Presidency has never been vacated In any other
way. It will be recalled than when President William Henry Harrison died, on
April 4, 1841, only a month after his inauguration, and Vice President John Tyler
succeeded him, there was considerable debate over the question whether Tyler
became President or only Acting President. But Tyler had no doubt about it,
and from the outset insisted that he was the President. The country accepted
the decision, and thus every succeeding Vice President who went to the White
House on the death of the President became President ili the full sense of the term.
Thus, when President Roosevelt died, Vice President Truman became President
of the United States; and, as every preceding Vice President in the same situation
did, he took a separate oath of office when he assumed the Presidency. This
point is fully canvassed in Herbert W. Horwill, The Usages of the American
Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1025), chapter III, Accidental Presidents.
Custom has established the proposition that when a President dies the Vice
President becomes Presideat. But since we have no custom dealing with a situation created by the temporary disability of the President, I think it Is altogether
reasonable If a distinction is made by legislation between the two situations.
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We can continue on the assumption that In case the President dies, the Vice
President becomes President; while at the same time we provide that In case of
a temporary disability he shall serve only as Acting President, and that upon his
recovery the President will reassume the powers and duties of his office. Legislation to this effect would be clearly consistent with the language and Intent of
article ii, section 1, clause 0. As Acting President the Vice President would
have all the powers of the office, such as the veto and appointive powers, but he
would have to relinquish these powers upon the recovery of the President.
IX. If a finding of permanent di.ablity is made, I should think the Vice
President would succeed to the office Itself, and not merely to Its powers and
duties, just as he succeedsi to the office If the President dies, as Is now decreed by
our "unwritten Constitution." It may of course be assumed that the committee
which is authorized to make findings of disability will In the nature of things be
extremely reluctant to make a finding of permanent dliablity, and that so long
as any ray of hope exists the country would expect that the disability be regarded
as temporary, if It is at all possible so to designate It. However, there Is such
a condition as permanent disability, ar!l In that event I would think the existing
constitutional custom would control. There does not seem to be any very good
reason why It should not.
X. In the event of a finding of permanent disability, I believe the language
nf the Constitution, "or a President shall be elected," does not require but only
authorizes the immediate election of a new President. Clearly this clause permits
Congress to say, for example, that if as much as 2 years of the term still remain,
there shall be a new election. Whether Congress ought to use this power, and
provide for special elections, is therefore, In my Judgment, a matter of policy and
not of constitutional principle. My own feeling is that, In the light of our complicated State and Federal laws dealing with elections, the pattern of primary
selections, the structure of party conventions, etc., our Institutions are not geared
to holding presidential elections except according to the sequence of events that
occur according to the normal rhythm of the Constitution. But If there should
be a *,peclal election, I should think that It would be merely for the unexpired
term of the disabled President, for otherwise the sequence of events upon which
the Constitution operates would be disturbed.
XI. I believe that Congress has authority to enact legislation on all the questions raised here under the Constitution as It now stands, and that constitutional
amendments are not necessary. Such legislation, based upon the language and
purposes of the relevant constitutional clauses, would be Justified by normal
canons of constitutional construction.
I would like to add several thoughts:
1. If legislation on this subject Is to be drafted, attention should be given to
the fact that a Vice President serving as Acting President may also become unable
to discharge the duties and powers of the position. The legislation should therefore extend to anyone serving as Acting President, whether it be the Vice Presi.
dent, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the President pro tempore
of the Senate, or anyone else.
2. State constitutions usually provide for the contingency that the governor
may be so Ill as to 'e unable to discharge his duties, and the lieutenant governor
Is authorized to act as governor. This has happened often. The experience with
gubernatorial disability must by now be a considerable one, in the aggregate, and
perhaps there is much we may be able to learn from such experience. I suggest
that the committee staff make a study of gubernatorial disability,or, alternatively,
the Legislative Reference Service can be requested to do so. Such a study might
very well shed a great deal of light upon the problem, and tell us something
about what the American people are willing to put up with. I know of no such
study available In print today.
3. If legislation is prepared on this subject, I believe it would be wise to take
into the account the possibility that the President may be unable to discharge
his duties for some reason other than illness. That is to say, In the larger sense,
the problem Is one of unavailability as well as one of inability in the medical
sense. I do not believe that it would be either wise or necessary to try to spell
out the situations that might conceivably arise in which the President would
be unable to discharge the duties of his office. It is sufficient if the statute
made some provision on the subject, so that the necessary adjustments can be
taken legally, and with a minimum of dispute or lost motion when necessary.
Suppose, for example, a President were kidnaped, or captured by an enemy army?
I do not anticipate either of these things ever happening, but since it is at least
theoretically possible for the President to be unavailable for a variety of unfore-

218

PH tsii t:.riAI, INADIArry

en and lirh~lwt unttfores'eeitblo rcilson". the statute ought to cover audh coutin,
gtmelps. it cal be doni I a sluulile phrase, atit In done III the i.iigllsli Itegciy

At.
of any further service to the committee, llcse do not hridtate to
If I can beh

call uiX)II mie.

DAVID FLLMAN,

iHiuts'err,I yours,

i'rolernor of I'ollfleal Sclfr'.

Senator K('.mvrt. A letter from Prof. Mirk 1). Howe, of [nrvard

LAw "khool, which will be made a part of the record.
follows:)
('Tito material referred to is
LAW 80iOOI Ut'

UNIVERSITY,
lOFiHARVARD

(ambridgc, Alas*., Jonuary 10, 1058.

l;srre KEVAvvVI,
lon.Venuonitico
ontIAo J~lcoa',
Utef1d SlIt¢ eCli, Waashngton, D. 0.
Mv I)Era SrENAToR KI:vAvrIa: I have received your letter of January 10 con.
ceruing the Uatter of I'resldential Inability. 'The entlosd copy of a letter which
I addressed to Congre~smau Cleller some 2 years ago suminarlWs the views which
I then held anl which tWay I still maintain. There are but two specifle points
on which I appreciate this opiortunity to say a further word.
It Is my earnest hope that neither by constitutional amendment nor by leglslatire action will any attempt be made to Involve the Supremeo Oourt or iny of Itts
Justices In the adjudication of tho issues of inability. It seems to me clear that
an effort by statute to make the Chief Justice or any of his associates t IMrlici.
pant In the resolution of that issue would be unconstitutional. That fact
reflects not merely a settled rule of law but a wise policy of government. 1
should, therefore, greatLy regret any effort to alter the rule of law, for It that
were done we should Jeopardize the tradition which separates, so far as puossible,
our Fr'ederal Judiciary from participation In the resolution of political issues.
'he other point which I should like to emphasize, though of lesser Iportance,
seems to me to be of some significance. leleving as 1 do that under the Con.
stitution as presently written there Is adequate congressional authority to make
provision for the devolution of the powers and duties of the Presidential office I
should oppose the effort to put the formulation of principle in the form of a
constitutional amendment. I think that the position which I summarized In my
letter to Mr. Caller adequately Indicates the reason for this belief, I realize that
there bas been much discussion of the problem during the last 2 years. I still
remain convinced, however, that It would be Inadvisable to seek a constitutional
answer to what Is essentially a legislative question.
1ARK l)nW. lowE.
Respctfully yours,
JANUrARY 10, 1956.

Lion.

EMANUEL CELtXR,

Cormnaltct on tMeJudiciary,
)lomue o1 Rcprcscntatfive, W'ashlngton, D. 0.
Mr DFUM COGRIMSSI AN: Since receiving your questionnaire on Presidential
inability I have been turning the problem over In my mind. It is not, I ani
sorry to say, a question on which I feel myself peculiarly qualified to speak
and my thoughts, accordingly, are essentially casual. Because you have asked
for an expression of my vlews, however, I shall do my best to formulate
them.
Of basic importance, In my judgment, is recognition of the fact that any attempt to find a single answer to the unpredictable contingencies of the future
would be seriously mistaken. This principle leads me to believe that It would be
most unfortunate to attempt by any means to define "inability". It seems to me
that It is better to preserve the vagueness of the constitutional provision than to
attempt to achieve an undesirable, and perhaps an unattainable precision. It
seems to me, for instance, that an Inability which might present major problems If it should occur at the beginning of a President's term of office might
Involve no truly significant issues for the Government If it should arise during
the concluding months of his administration. To produce a single definition
and to seek-a single answer for problems which the accidents of time make essentially different would seem to me most unfortunate. I should, therefore, be
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opipofted to nn effort (n define "inoblIlly" by xtntute, const~tutional iiineiidwent,
or otlwrwIs('.
To may thim, hoiwever, is 11o1
to may Iflint no action lis desirable at [lie lorOJgflt
(Impe. lit nay Julgiieit It Is desirable thipt Congress by joint remoliffmn or by
sintite, biut lit tinly enso with t13e i'resiienil'm olllirIlW(*e, should assert one1isiisk
iarlnelple concerning tile protein of lijabilty. That principle In that tlip 1Mwer
to Inqire,i'ad taitlinately to decide wbother Inaiilty, trznijiruiry (or fP'lociriet,
i'xistm. imto be ('xerl94l toy the t'oongrei'. III lIny Juadgmtent tile Vice I'iesldeiit In1
clearly glisiionifled for interest front Initiatinig or deterinllig flls Issue. I
rIili7.4'N that the IP
L11t0
(O17f
Catbliet would. oilflip faIce on hi, make It a more
nliiIroilrlate body than Congress to determine whether thle I'rellelit, is able to
execute fim powers. (in tile other hand, I believe tliat the Intimate iis~oclton
be~tweent thMI,
Iremlnct and19
his C'abinet mankes It oit Inappjropriate ISAIy to dlecide
the matter. I idioidd see no reas'i why the Cabinet night not Initiate (Yingres91101111
nation, butt I take It tht no statute or remjlutioni uinced alosert that right.
I believe It linmortnt, however, that ('ongress should, before the issue arise,
l1K'4(rt Its resjKioislIty to determine the tact of inbllly and1(its determinlationt
thant [lie coiisriieiiveg of iii011iilly wilt be resolved by eongrei'sonnI ailtoi, within
the (Onstltutflom, In. the light of clrclinsfuncei RR they exist when action is
required.
Frnt what I have said I take It that you will understand that I believe that
It would be unwise to atteplt In advance to state by whom the I'repidenrsm
flowers are In be exercise d uring his Inability. A solution appropriate when
time Nation Is it poeace night be totally Inappropriate when It Is at war. Am I
ihave a really muggesiefl. the course afiVsabdo at the beginning of a Plresident'n
termi of office might wvell be entirely unsuitable V ifhInability should occur near
the end of his term.
ilehitid my Iartienlntr answers to your questions lies a strong convicion with
respect to our conptittlonal system. That Is the belief that the framers of the
('onstitution showed great wisdom In their fIdelity tn generalitles. I feel sure
tliat If we now seek (a provide rules for matters which they preferred toodispose
of by principle %%e will jeopardize the future. It In far wiser to leave some quesflin Kne tticd for In (101ng so we preserve for later generations the power to
resolve their own problems In accordance wvith'their own needs. I should allow
this principle to govern action with respect to the giroblern of the nature of
tlie Vice President's powers when the Congress has determined that the l'resident Is permanently or temporarily disabled. I therefore believe it unwise to
seek a present resolution of the 8th, 0th, and 10th questions presented In your
quelitionnaire.
From everything that I have Maid you Will realize that I believe that the
Congress posssses today the sol,3 power which It seems to me to be desirable
for It to exercise. That Is the power to assert an exclusive authority over the
matter of a President's; inability. I believe that such an assertion of authority,
concurred In by the President, would serve usefully to clarify an Important
issue and would (10 so without imposing unfortuhate limitations on an authority
which should he largely unrilinited.
Respectfully yours,
31ARK Dz.

llowr,

Professor of Lamre.

Senator KE.FAUVER. I hatve a letter from the Women's National
Republican Club, Inc., which will be made a part of the record.
(Tite material referred to is as follows:)
WOUFS'S NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CLUB, INC.,

New Yoork, N. Y., Janutoory 1I, 1958.

H~on.

4EsiE8 KEFrAuvmB

Unitted States Scnate,
Waushington, D. 0.,
DEAR SENAToR KEuAuvzz: The nationwide membership of the Women's National
Republican Club has approved by referendum a resolution:
'"That the Women's National Republican Club urges Congres-s to take Immediate and decisive action to provide legislation desgned to make it absolutely
clear as to who would decide that a President Is not able to carry out his duties."
We are following the administration's lead In recommending that a law be
parsed early In the session, concerning delegation of presidential powers. We
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should like to see spelled out by legislation, clearly an( without ambiguous
phrases, what individual or groups of Individuals would he authorized under
the law to declare a Chief Diecutive disabled.
We have pleasure lin transmitting to you this resolution.
Sincerely yours,
Bodice W. ALXXANDER
Mrs. Stewart F. Alexander,
President.
JAOQUI EN S. GurwLuo
Mrs. William S. Outwilig,
Chairman,Cornmittee on National LegIstalkn.

Senator KEFAUVER. We have a study about this whole problem which
has been conducted by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Library of
Congress, which has a lot of intersting background. It shows, among
other things, what has been done by constitttions of other nations.
That will be made a part of the record.
(The material referred to is as follows:)
PaZSIDXNTIAL DISABILITY:

PROVISIONS IN FoRaION CONSTITUTIONs--A BRIEr
VlYW I
YI

CONTEN'T8
I. Introduction.
II. The CWief Executive.
III. Executive power.
IV. Presidential disability: Latin American constitutions.
V. Concluding comments.
Annex.
Presidential disability: Constitution of the Confederate States of America.
L INTODUOTION I

Among the world's some 2% billion human beings there are now approximately
91 political entities which claim national sovereignty, and are in greater or lesser
degree recognized as sovereign. Of the total, approximately 90 percent possess
written constitutions containing the outline and the definition of the powers and
functions of the organs of the government. Although the precedents and traditions embodied in current constitutions may date back many years, a high percentage of the documents themselves are of relatively recent origin. For
example, about 45 percent were drafted within the past decade and about 70
percent are less than a quarter of a century old. The United States, strange as
it may seem for such a relatively young nation, has the oldest of all written
constitutions presenty in effect.
IL THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

The functions and powers of government in the majority of the nations are
divided into the three major areas of executive, legislative, and Judicial. Some
41 countries, or about 46 percent of the total number of nations, give the title
"President" to the Chief Executive of the nation, namely, Argentina, Austria,
Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Syria, Turkey, United States of America, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia.
Royal personages are designated as Chiefs in the executive hierarchy in the
constitutions of some 28 countries, or about 31 percent of the nations: Afghanistan. Australia (the British Crown), Belgium, Bhutan, Cambodia, Canada (the
British Crown), Ceylon (the British Crown), Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran,
I Prepared by Mary Shepard, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, the
Library of Congress, Washington. D.C., January 23 1958.
2This relew relies heavily throughout on Amos J. Peasle's Constitutions of Nations, 2d
edition. The Hague, Martinus NIJboff, 1956.
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Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Luxembourg, Monaco, Muscat and Oman, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand (the British Crown), Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
Thailand, the Union of Mouth Africa (the British Orown), the United Kingdom,
and Yemen. A governor general acta for the Crown in the majority of the
members of the British Commonwealth. '
The executive authority Is vested In a collective body, sometimes called a
Council, or the Government, or Praesildlu, In Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Hun.
gary, Poland, itumanla, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Sotiallst Repubis,
Uruguay, and a few others.
election of the Chief Executive is by polmiar vote of the people in these 28
countries: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rie,
Ouba, Domnlcan Republic, Ecuador, El Stlvador, Finland, Guatemala, Hatti,
H1onduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In the United
States presidential electors, elected by the people, in turn elect the President.
The legislative branch of the Government selects the (bief Ixecutive In the
following countrle, among otbeis: Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, OzechosiovakL,
Fraune, Germany, Hungary, IsraeI, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Poland,
Rumaia, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, U. 8. 8. It., and Yugoslavia.
III. F.XzeUTiVE' POWER

So-called cabinet government, where principal Executive power Is vested In
a cablnet.responsible to the legilature,Js found among many nations of the
free world, notably the members of the British Commonwealtb, Among the
dictatorships also many constitutions contain provisions for the dismissal or
resignation of the heads of the executive administration (the equivalent of the
Irime minister and his cabinet) If the legislative body ceases to support them
the constitutions of 48, or about r4 percent of all nations, Executive power
Is made subject to the legislature. Included among these are the constitutions
of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, Canada,
Ceylon, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Laos, Libya, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Syria, Thailand,
Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, and Yugosla nia.
In the constitutions of 28 countries the terms of office of the Executive powers
are made independent of the legislature, and the ministers beading the various
departments of the executive branch are made answerable to the'Executive
power. This Is so in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, cuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Korea, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Switzerland, United States of America,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Systems comparable to that of the United States, where major Executive
power Is vested In one person, the President, who Is elected directly or Indirectly
by the people and controls the Cabinet, are found principally among the Latin
American States. The constitutions of all of these have been influenced by that
of the United States. In the postwar era the constitutions of some of the new
countries, the Philippines and Korea for example, have also drawn largely
on It and reflect the basic outlines of the American governmental system. It
Is among these constitutions that the best basis for a comparative analysis
of procedures for coping with Presidential disability exists.
IV. PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY:

LATIN AMESIOAN CONSTITUTIONS'

Following are some questions relating to Presidential disability to which
answers are sought In Latin American constitutions:
1. What persons or agenis should initiate the question of the President's inability to discharge the powers and duties of this office? What persons or
agencies should determine that a Presidentlaldisability crzit? Should a
distinction be made between permanent and temporary disability? If so,
In only a few of the Latin American constitutions are these aspects of the
disability of an executive touched upon and even then with less than adequacy.
'See a"nex for excerpts quoted from Latin American constitutions.
M§4-"44:1-
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In general, two modes of procedure are provided: 1irat, It Is left to the I'rfsl.
dent himself to raise the question of his own Inability; second, the Congress
is designated to determine disability. A distinction Is usually iniade between
temporary and permanent disability, or absence from office, with corresponding
distinctions In procedure.
The Colombian Constitution, for example, provides that "The President may,
on account of III health, retire, for such time as may be necessary, from the
exercise of the executive powor" by giving due notice to the Senate or, In recess
of the Senate, to the Supreme Court. If there is an absolute default of the
President in his first 2 years, now elections are called by the substitute President. In the Costa Ilican Constitution the President may call upon either of
two Vice Presidents to replace him in his temporary absence but the line of
succession comes into effect automatically If the absence Is permanent. Under
the Dominican Constitution, a line of succession Is provided for during either
a temporary absence or permanent vacancy, with no specifications as to who
should determine a temporary or permanent disability. However, the President
may, by decree, empower a designated Secretary of State who fulfills the
conditions required for President to exercise the Executive power temporarily.
In the Venezuelan Constitution tie President Is empowered to fill temporary
vacancies In the Office of President by a Mlnister of the National Executive
Office designated by him.
The Congress Is made the responsible Initiating agency litthe Constitutions
of Ncuador and Peru. In the former It Is provided that the President ceases to
exercise his functions if he abandons Is office or demonstrates permanent physieal or mental incapacity, as declared by the Congress. It the Congress is In
recess, the Council of State is empowered to call to office provisionally the substitute President, if it considers that the President Is physlcally or mentally incapacitated, at the sane time convoking a special session of the Congress. The
Council of State Is composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a Bona
tor, a Deputy, the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Elections, and five other persons. however, the Council
Is not allowed to consider Presidential Incapacity except in response to a written
petition of the Supreme Court, accompanied by supporting documents. In Peru
the Presidency of the Republic Is declared to be vacated in the case, among
others, of the permanent physical or moral Incapacity of the President as declared by Congress. The exercise of the Presidency Is suspended by the tenporAry physical Incapacity of the President as declared by Congress. In case of
vacancy, Congress elects a President for the rest of the Presidential period.
In most cases a substitute President Is called upon to act until the disability
is removed, in the Interim of an absence, or for the duration of the impediment.

In at least two Instances, however, a definite limitation is placed on the time
a President may be absent on the basis of temporary disability without losing
the Presidency, permanently or temporarily. The Ecuadorian Constitution stipulates that, "If the reason which incapacitates the President from exercising his
position endures more than 0 months, the person replacing him * * * shall
complete the Presidential term. Under the Mexican Constitution If the disability of the President exceeds 30 days Congress may consider his leave of absence
and decide on the appointment of a President ad interim.
t. Who #Aould act as s sbtitute or how should o Presfdental vacancy be filled
incae of temporary or permanent disabilfiyt
Latin American constitutions provide for three broad lines of procedure In
designating a substitute President. In a number, the example of the United
States Is followed In naming the Vice President as the official who should take
over If the President Is disabled. Other constitutions authorize a line of succession beginning with some other official of the Government. Still others proTide for the election of a substitute, either by the Congress or the people themselves. In addition, variations Ir the same constitution may exist as to succession depending upon whether the disability Is permanent or temporary. In some
cases a Une of succession may be established for several substitutes and, in default of these, an election may be called for.
The Costa Rican Constitution authorizes the two Vice Presidents to replace
the President In the event of a permanent absence, to succeed in the order of
their nomination. If he is only temporarily absent the President may call upon
either of the Vice Presidents to replace him. In Cuba, the Vice President substitutes for the President and following in the line of succession are the President of Congress and, temporarily, the oldest Justice of the Supreme Court.

PRESIRBNTZL TNABlTry

228

When the Justice succeeds, a national election is called unless the vacancy
occurs In the last year of the Presidential term, In which case be holds office
until the end of the term. In HI Salvador, the Vice President i ,places the President upon the latter's temporary or permanent disability. It toe cannot succeed
designates elected by the Congress substitute in the order of their selection. 1f
all of these are unavailable the Assembly designates a person to assume office.
In Honduras, the line of succession to the Presidency In the event of the temporary or permanent dIsablilty of the President lies with the Vice President, the
President of the National Congress. and the President of the Supreme Court.
However, if both the Presldenit and Vice President are permanently unavailable,
the substitute President must call for an election. The Constitution of Panama
likewise provides for the substitution by one of the Vice Presidents In the order
in which they were elected, In case of a temporary or permanent absence of the
President. Next In line of succession comes one of the Ministers of State.
Other constitutions provide various lines of succession. In Chile, when the
President cannot exercise his oflice he is substituted by the ministers In turn,
with the title of Vice President, whom the order of precedence as fixed by law
may designate. Following these in the line come the President of the Senate,
the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the President of the Supreme
Court. When the Presidential absence from offie cannot be ended before the
completion of the time remaining of the constitutional period, elections are
called by the Vice President The Colombian Constitution empowers the Con.
gress to elect a designate every 2 years to take the place of the President In
default of the latter. In the absence of the designate the Bxecutlve Office would
be filled by the Mlinisters in the order established by law and then the Governors.
However, If the default of the President Is permanent, the substitute President
must call for elections within the three months following, the President so
elected to serve for the rest of the period. In th3 Dominican Constitution the
line of succession during a temporary or permanent absence of the President
Is as follows: Secretary of State for War and Navy; Secretary of State for the
Interior and Police; Secretary of State for the Presidency. If these fall, the
President of the Supreme Court assumes the role temporarily until the National
Assembly names a permanent substitute. The Haitian Constitution departs
from the norm by authorizing the Council of Secretaries of State to assume
executive power if the President finds It temporarily impossible to perform his
duties but in case of vacancy of the office the void Is temporarily filled by the
President of the Court of Cassation, or the Vice President, or the senior Judge
of the Court of Cessation who shall convoke the Primary Assemblies for the
election, within 4 months, of a President. The Nicaraguan Constitution empowers the President of the Republic to appoint a Designate who can substitute
for him if he Is unable to serve. If the Designate is also unable to serve the
Presidency passes to a successor elected by the Congress from among its
membership. In Venezuela, it Is provided that temporary vacancies In the
office of President of the Republic shall be filled by a Minister of the National
Executive Office to be designated by him, Other procedures, noted below, are
provided in case of inability to serve, presumably permanent.
lieveral constitutions place the responsibility directly on the Congress for
filling a temporary or permanent vacancy in the Presidency. In Mexico, for
example, If the President is permanently disabled during his last 4 years in
office (the Presidential term Is 0 years) the Congress acts as an electoral college
sind, subject to the attendance of at least two-thirds of Its membership, elects a
substitute President by majority vote (and secret ballot). If the permanent
disability occurs within the first 2 years the Congress by the same procedure
elects a President ad Interim who acts until a new President is elected by
popular vote to finish the term. In case of a temporary disability Congress, or
the permanent committee, If Congress Is not in session, designates an Acting
President to serve. The permanent committee Is composed of 29 deputies and
senators acting during congressional recesses. After 30 days.of a Presidential
disability the Congress considers what further action shall be taken. The
Paraguayan Constitution calls for the National Assembly to appoint the minister or functionary to exercise the Presidency until the end of the term if the
inability occurs within the last 8 years of the term. If It occurs within the
first 2 years, new Presidential elections are held. In case of temporary inability, the Assembly appoints one of the Ministers provisionally to exercise the
Presidency. Under the Peruvian Constitution if the Presidency of the Republic
becomes vacant, by reason of permanent physical or moral incapacity, the
ongress Is empowered to elect a President (by secret vote and absolute
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majority) for the rest of tho Presidintial term, In Venezuela, ini the event of
the inability of the President the National Congress electj a I'resldent b ,an
na.
absolute manjority vote, to serve until the end of the l'resilentinl ferm.
liorary vacancies are filled tit the inaneur noted above.
S1.should the ItiiI~ig of a peiiianit or temiporarpi disubltv duia(1~t the eouirac
fla erm affect the procedure to be' folloiccdt
ofe
arc'ldenta
lit the ninjority of the W~in American i'onstltitiitns, as In tlint of the United
States, the mie procedures aie followed for filling a preaidenial vacancy caused
by disability whether thip vacoucy occurs early or Inte during a presidentil term.
There am', ia few exceptions. Under the 0olonibian constitution, if there In n
absohlte default of the P'resident (luring the first 2 years of his term, new elections are catted to choose it President tit perve for the rest of the tenni. If, however, thep default occurs durlnjz lte iast 2 years, the [lie of succession established
In the (Constituiont center Into effect. The same thling holds trite In 1Paragiay.
In AMexico, If a pe~rmanient disability ovcurs within the first 2 years of lte 0-year
termi R new presidentlial eIe-tion Is cAlled to bie held at least 14 mionthm and not
mnore than 18 months titter thep call iR made, tin ad Interim President acting In
If the permanent ilisalillity occurst during the last 4 years the
thie meanwhile.
00119rtft elects a Pubstituite P1rcmident. lit solute ines, sutch as4in Holivia,
antini PAnaniain If the Vie President Is unable to substitute, new presidential
eleetlon-4 are called If the presitlentiol terni hait more thnn a ye-ar or two to run.
lin some cOases it new untindile froin tho iteople lit provided for when a pennak.
nucnt disability occurs, whenever that masy he during the prmei~ltitl term, either
by atnow election for l'resietdent by the lw4)ple (tit in (Chile) or by the Congres
(isIlI and Peru).
1. ShAould the he# thact a purison aeeit*ilc1 an sub.R11litlc Irialtle tib ai frontI
secekim thc prea fdciep?
Apart from i te quostIon of tihe nunkher of terms a P1resident himself inay be
allowed, a nulimer of the lieftil Aumerican const liutions pronouinc against pertaittling a substitute Preivsident from subsequently seeking lte ptresiency, at least
tmsttes that lte person ccuiFor example, tile ('ubauc ('otsltutio
Immediately.
pying the litrsliliency by retison of substitutions "cannot be a candidate ait the(
following election."' The Fl hi.alvatilor Cutistitulion goes a little- tlt farther and
provides that miyome whlo hast occvulied tlie presidency' "itay not be president,
Vice President, or desigmnte during thep following presidential term." 'Cho Mlexicanl ('olstittilo) [is the Ituost emiphtice of al. ipr(K'loing that "No citizen who
haes acted i i'n'sdent, eltx-ted by popular v-ote, or appointed aig substitute, or
provisional President, or President adt Interim can ever, In any event or for whatsoci-er reason, agin occupy this Ito-t." It should be noted, however, that the
majority of the constitutions are silent ontthis scert'.
V. (3NCLIJUIN(1

COMMENTS

Even this brief re% lewv maly suffice to show that there are important contingencies relating to P1resldenil disability tliat have not been adequately met In
many of lte lAtlin Amnerictis constitultions, just its there are lin our own. Indeed,
this Is nt surprising slice these comsttutions owe munch of their Inspiration to
that (of the 1United Stntvs. Although at lint- of isuccesslon of procedures for
choosing a substitute are p'rovided lin qll the constitutions, In ouly a few In It
made clear who shall Initiate tice question of a President's Inability or determine
that a 'lisability exists. The iluestlion of what organs or i*rsomus shall determine
)vhen a disability has ce.ased to exist Is similarly clouded.
Thet, aire. notwithstanding. Latin American procedures that could be exproblems of Preidential Inability:
anied with profit lin general studies of thme
for example, the procedures provided lin soini of these countries for a substitute
President to receive soine kind of atuumadate front the people at the t[ie of the
succession, at least when the rresidetialn disability occurs toward the beginning
of a Presidential term).
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ANNIOX
|'aVatDINTIAtL I)IsARI.ITY:

,ATIN ANKIIUAN CommiTUiiON5

PSINCIPAL PROVISIONS

1. Argentina: oontlffuluop ofMay 1, 1833
Arrice 75.-In case of sickness, absence from the country, death, resignation,
or removal of the President, the executive power shall be exercised by the Vice'resldent of the nation. In cast of removal, death, resignation or inability
of the President and Vicc.Preoldent of the nation, Congress shall determine what
ofclal shall act as president until the disablily is removed or a new president
Inelected.
(asii cdrd)
2. lolivia:(,'onltit.alion of Norcioiber2J, 19|5 (n,
Article 91.-4hould the 'resident of the Itepublie be unable to filflil his duties
or remain temporarily absent, either before or after the proclamation, he shall
be replaced In the Interim by the 'lce-1'rIdent, and, if the latter Is not avellable, by the president of the Senate or by the president of the Chamber of
Depnies, If the latter cannot not.
The Vice.lPresident shall occupy the Presidency of tilep uhle, should thl
remain vacant, either before or after the proclamation of the election of the
President, and shall act an Prteldent until the end of the constitutional period.
If there in no Vice-Presldent, the president-elect of the Sennte will act In his
stead, or, If the latter cannot act, the president of the Chamber of Deputies
shall act ns 'resident. In tie tatter case, anel provided that not over three
yers of the presidential term have elapsed, a new election for President and
i'lee.'resident will be held, tint otly tocomilete sMid iwrtl.
M.BrazlI: Conslitullon of September 2, 1946
Article 7%9.--he President shall be replaced, in case of Impediment, and sucteeded, in case of vacancy In office, by the Vice President of the Republic.
1. In case of impediment or vacancy In office of the President and of the VicePresident of the Republic, the President of the Chamber of Depuies, the vice
president of the F"ederal Senate, and the president of the Federal Huijrerme Court
shall be successively called to the exercise of the presidency.
.I. Mh ile: Constituf ion of September 18,1925 (as amtnded)
Article 6.-When the President of the Republic In person commands the
armed forces, or when from Illness, absence from the territory of the Itepublic,
or from any other weighty reason, he cannot exercise his office, the minister,
whom the order of precedence am fixed by law may designate, shall substitute
for him, under the title of Vice President of the Republic. In default of such,
the minister who follows In the order of precedence, and In default of all the
ministers, the President of the Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputles
for tie president (f the Sulreme Coirt surcersively.
In case of death, or declaration of there being cause for resignation, or other
kind of absolute impssibillity, which cannot be ended before the completion
of the time remaining of the constitutional period, the Vice President In the first
ten days of his incumbency shall issue the ptoper orders to proceed, within the
period of sixty days, to a new election of I'resmilent In the manner prescribed by
the Constitut.lon and by the electoral law.
5. ('olombia: ConJtitutlon of February 16, 1945 (with rnmendmenls)
Article l 2J-The Senate may grant to the President a temporary leave of
absence.
The President may, on account of ill health, retire, for such time as may be
netemsaty, from the exercise of the executive power; but notice thereof shall be
glven by him In due time to the Renate, or, In recess of the Senate, to the
uprtme ourt.
Article 1 .- The Congress shall every two years elect a designate, who shall
take the place of the President in default of the latter.
The term of the designate begins the seventh of August of the respective year.
Article 12.-When, for any reason, the Congres may have failed to elect a
deignate, the designate last elected shalll continue to act in that capacity. In
'Peaslee. Amos :. Constitutions of Nations, 24 edition. The lISue, Martnns Nijo.ff,
1056. Guatemala Is not Included In thisaoniIlation, since it Is not operating at prieunt
under a regular coslltutton.
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the absence of the designate, the executive office shall be filled by the ministers,
In the order established by law, and In default thereof by the governors, the
latter being called according to the proximity of their respective residences to
the capital of the Republic.
Article 1*6.-The person In charge of the executive office shall have the samne
privileges and exercise the same powers as the President whose position he fills.
Article 1M7.-In case of absolute default of the Presldbnt of the Republic, the
person charged with the presidency shall call elections for within the thin month
following. The President so elected shall serve for the rest of the period.
The person charged with the presidency shall continue exercising It when two
years or less of the period remain without calling new elections.
6. Costa
cea: Conatifutlon of November8,1949
Article 135.-There shall be two Vice Presidents of the Republic who shall
replace the president during his complete absence, in the order of their nonnatlion. During his temporary absence, the l'rosident may cell upon either Vice
president to replace him.
If neither Vice President can fill the temporary or permanent absence of the
President, the position shall be held by the Presilent of the Legislative Assembly.
7. Cuba: Oomh~ituttot"
of July 6, 1940
Article 18.-The Vice President of the Republic shall substitute for the Presi.
dent In cases of absence, Incapacity, or death. If the vacancy Is defllnitive, the
substitution shall continue until the end of the presidential term. In case of
absence, Incapacity, or death of both, the president of Congress shall substitute
for them for the rest of the term.
Article 149.-In any case in which the presidential substitutes established by
this Constitution are lacking, the presidency of the Republic shall be temporarily
Occupied by the oldest Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall call a national
election to be held within a period of not thore than ninety days.
When the vacancy occurs In the last year of the presidential term, the substi.
tite justice shall hold office until the term ends.
The person occupying the presidency by reason of any of the substitutions
referred to In the preceding Articles cannot be a presidential candiato at the
following election.
8. I)oaifcas Republic: Constitution of January 10, 1047
Article St.-In case the President of the Republic Is temporarily absent the
executive power shall be exercised during his absence by the secretary of state
for war and the navy; In thO absence of the latter, by the secretary of state
for the Interior and police, and If both are absent, by the secretary of state for
the Presidency. In case of permanent vacancy, the Presidency for the remainder
of the term shall be occupied by the person Invested with the office of secretary
of state for war and navy; In default of finl, by the person Invested with the
offce of secretary of state for the Interior anti police; and In default of both,
by the person Invested with the offlce of secretary of stato for the presidency.
These secretaries of state must always figure In the law which establishes them,
and to exercise their functions the samae conditions shall be required a; for
President of the Republic.
articlee 5.-Hiy virtue of a decree of the President of the Republic, and while
this is not revoked by another decree, a secretary of state designated by him and
.zsssing the conditions required by the Constittition to become President of
the Republic may atlt
exercise the executive power temporarily.
Article 5S.-In case of default of the substitutes provided for In Article 51,
the president of the Supreme Court of Justice shall assume the executive power
In the Interim, and, within thirty days of the date on which he assumed these
functions, shall convoke the National Assembly to name a permanent substitute
In a session that may not close or declare a recess until it shall have concluded
the election. In case It Is not convoked within those thirty (lays, the National
Assembly shall convene In Its own right to carry out the election in the manner
provided for above.
9. Ecuador:C(Yntifution of December Sf, 1916
Article 87.-The functions of the President of the Republic are finally terminated: by the end of the term fixed in the Constitution; by death, dismissal and
acceptance of renunciation: by abandonment of office or by permanent physical
or mental Incapacity, declared by the Congress.
0

S

S

S

PRlAIDNTEIAL, INABILITY

227

It, when Congress Is in recess, the council of state considers with reason that
there has been an atbandoninent of office on the part of the President, or that he
Is physically or mentally Incapacitated, the said council shall call to office provi.
slonally the respective substitute and shall by the Salme act convoke a special
session of the Congres to the end that It Issue the proper resolution.
Physical or mental Incapaelty way not be considered by the council of slate
except by virtue of a written petition of the Supreme Court, which shall be
accompanied by tie documents establishing the facts complained of.
That which In said In (his article with respect to the Presldent of the Republic
shall apply, In turn, to anyone occupying the presidency.
Article 88.-Whenover, either definitively or lemnorarliy, there is no titular
or elected President of the Republic In ofllice, the office shall fall to the Vice.
President of tie itemublic.
there also be no Vice-President, either definitely or temporarily,
Article 8.-If
the presidency of the Rtepublic shall be exercised by one of the following officers
In the following order:
(1) The residentt of the Hfouse of l)eputlen;
(2) Tie vice-presihlet of the Senate;
(3) The vIce-ltresldent of the Ilouse of Deputies.
Article 90.-Whenever a person who legally should substitute for tie Presl.
(lent Is lacklig or suffers Some accidental Impeillment, Ilin place shall be taken
by the next person mentioned In the preceding article until the exercise of the
executive function has been assuined by the person called to office In accordance
with the provision of the said article.
Artilke D.-llo who, In confornilty with the order and circumstances estab.
wished In the three l)re(vdlg articles, finally occupiles the office of [,resident of
the republic shall continue In office during the entire term for which the titular
['resident was elected.
tO. l Ralvador: Constitittion of Rcptcrnber8, 1950
Article 6.-lf
there Is no President of the Republic, due to death, resignation,
removal, -r other .atuse, ie shall We replaced by the Vice President; If the latter
Is unavailable, lay oe of tie l)eslgnates In the order of their selection, and if
all of these are unavailable for any legal reason, the Assembly shall designate the
person who Is to take offce.
If the reason which Incapacitates the President from exercising his posllon
endures more than six months, the person replacing him, in accordance with
the terms of the preceding paragraph, shall complete the presidential term.
If the Incapacity of the Presilent is tempoary, his replacement shall hold
)ice while such Incapacity endures.
Articlc 65.-A citizen wito occupied the Presidency of the Republic under
any title may not be President, Vice President or Designate during the follow.
Ing presidential term.
I/. llaUl: Co,.st.ltttio oI?,'orcmbcr 26,1950
Article 8.-If
the President finds it temporarily Impossible to perform his
duties, the Counril of Secietarles of State is charged with the executive authority
for the duratlrn of the Impediment.
Article 81.--In case of vacancy In the oMce of President of the Republic
through death, resignation or for any other reason, the President of the Court of
Cassation, or ir. his default, the Vice President, or In default of the latter, the
Senior Judge of the Court of Cassatlon, Is temporarily invested with the Executire Power.
lIo shall Immediately convoke the Primary Assemblies for the e-letion of
the President of the Republic, which must take place within four months after
the date of convocation.
The Provisional Chief of the Executive Power may not be a candldoae for
the Presidency before the Primary Assemblies which he has convoked, nor be
elected ly them.
It. flondura.: Constituttnmof March 28,19361
Article li.-The executive power Is exercised by a citizen who is called
President of the Republic; In default thereof, by a Vice-President; and In default of the latter, by the citizen who occupies the presidency of the National
* Honduras adopted a new constitutioa In December 1957.
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Vogrvsa or may have oeupied this poltiou hitthe last ordhiary leitalatiore;
and in default of the last, by the citizen who Is prtilent of the SuprMe Court
of Jusilke.
.4rticlo IIP1-In ease of temporary dimbility of the President, ho shall be
substituted In his functlons by the Vice-lPrvsident ; and fit default of the latter,
by the citizens inentionct Ii Article 114.
It tie default of the 1'remIdent be absolute, the VIce-President shall exerelse
the execrttlv I)ower for the remalning tlme of the perloid; but if the Vice-Preal.
dentI alI defaults aboltely, the oneo legally fitsubstitution shall one month
afterwards call an election for it constItutlonal Ierlod that will begin the first
of January following the convocation.
Arl('lo 1O.--Untlt the one dehsiginted by law occuples the presidency, the
executive power shall h exerlsed by lhe council of ministers; and If Congress
be not In eslon, the couinell shall lunnedlately call ili
the now omfial to give him
pofts(lon.

t3. .frftco: (oaIU8IIw101m ofI JnPary .1II,
1917
Arlite 4t.--'i 11'resIdent shilt center upon his duties on the first day of
,ecember and rnnaln In ollice mix years. No cilltzen who has acted as president,
elected by popular vole, or appointed as mlbstitute, or provisional president, or
president ad Itecrln., caln ever, In any event or for whalsoover reason, again
vulkv this li
thl.
ArtIle 8.111--I
th event of the prianent dlllllly of the Prelent of the
llelublle, If lhIs sMoil occur within the tlrst two years of the respetive term,
VOugrmns. If ti p..Aon hall forthwith act as an electoral college and with the
atten\danee of a lnst two thirds of Its total membership, shall choose a pres.
dent ad hitcre by seret btliot and by a majority vote; and within the following
ten ilays, the sme t'ongress shall Issue the call for elections for the president
who shall finish the respctive term. At least fourteen months and not more
than eighteen months must elap..e between the tlte of the call for the eleclions and the la te on which they nre held.
If Congress is hi recess, the permanent commilttee shall forthwith designate it
provisional president, ant shall all Cotgremi together in extraordInary s son,
at which a president ad intcrim shall be ailwlnted, nnt the call for presidential
elections issued In the manner set forth In the foregoing paragraph.
Should the disability of the President occur in the last four years of the respective term, Congres., If in seton, shall choose itsubstitute president to hold
offce until the end of the presidential term; It Congress Is not In session, the permanent committee shall choose a provlsiouIal president and convene extraordinary sections In order that it may net as an electoral college and proceed to the
election of a substItute president.
Arlicle 85.- 6 * In core of a temporary dleablilty of the President Congress,
or the permanent conmmittee If Congress shall not be In session, shall designate
an acting president during such disability.
In case the dIsabillty of the Pre.,dent exceeds thirty (lays and Congress Is not
sitting, the permanent committee shall convene extraordinary sessions of Congress to take a decision in regard to his leave-of-absenee and, In the respective
case, the apl.oIntmeut of the President ad inte-im.
If a temporary disability shall become permanent, the acton prescribed In the
preceding artkle shall be taken.
1j. Nicaraguo: Constitution of Yor-tibcr 1, 1950
Article I&S.-In the event the President of the Republic Is unable to serve, his
functions shall be exercised by the appointed Designate. It the President has not
appointed a Designate, or the latter Is also unable to serve, the Presldency of the
Republic shall be assumed by the President of the Congress, who shall Immediately convoke an extraordinary se&lon of Congress for the purpose of electing
a successor from among Its membership.
If at the time of a vacancy In the Presidency of the Republic, Congress Is
meeting In regular or extraordinary session, the President of the Congress shall
assume the Presidency of the Republic In order to turn over the offce to the
member whom Congress elects.
If the Inabtlity of the President to serve Is permanent, the person called upon
to replace him shall complete the presidential term.
Article 189.--In the event of a temporary or permanent Inability to serve or an
Indefnilte impediment of the President-elect, the new Congress shall elect among
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Its members the person who shall hold the office, temporarily or permanently as
the case may be.
16. Panama:Comntflutton ol March 1, 1946
Article 149.-I the temporary or permanent absence of the President of the
Republic, his duties will be pedormed by one of the Vice-Presldents In the order
In which they were elected.
0

S

S
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Artliolo 160.-When, for any reason, the absenceS of the 'resident cannot be
filled by the Vice-I'residents, one of the ministers of state, who fulfils the roquisites necessary for being President of the Republic, and who has been elected
therefor by majority vote, will fill the presidency.
Article 161.-Wben the permanent absence of the 1'resldent and Vice-Presldents happens not less than two years before the expiration of the presidential
period, tho person charged with the duties of tlo presidency will call presidential
and vice-presidentil elections for a date not later than four months away, so
that the citizen elected 're.sldent may take pome.lIon within six months following the call. The resiective decree will be Issued at tho latest eight days after
the assumption of the Iost by the mild ierson In charge. If it Is lens than two
years until the end of the term, the person In charge will perform his duties Urtil
the end of the said term.
Neither the citizen who has discharged the duties of the presidency within the
two years immediately preening the elect ins mentioned, nor any of his relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or second of affinity, may be elected
President or Vice-President in these elections.
Article 16t.-The citizen who replaces the President of the Republic will have
the same title and rank and will exercise (lie same attributes as the latter,
16. Paraguay:Cootlitution of July 10, 1940
Article .58.--In case of the resignation, Inability, or death of the Presdent of
the Republle, the minister of the Interior ivlli iunnedlately convok(, the Aumem.
bly to appoint the minister or functionary who should exercise the presidency
until the end of the term, unless the resignation, inability, or death occurs within
the first two years of the presidential period, In which the elrenmntnhce the provisional President will convoke the people to elections within a period of two
months. If the Inability is temporary the National Assembly will appoint one
of the ministers provisionally to exercise the presidency of the Republic.
17. I'cru: Constilutlois of April 9, 1983 (as amendl)
Article 144.--rhe presidency of the Republic Is vacated, besides In the case of
,
death
(1) By permanent physical or moral Incapacity of the residentt, declared
by Congress.
(2) By the acceptance of his resignation.
*
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Article l45.-The exercise of the presidency of the Republic is suspended:
(2) By the temporary physical Incapacity of the President declared by
Congress;
Article 147.-In the case of vacancy of the presidency of the Republic, Congress shall elect the President for the rest of the presidential period.
It, on the vacancy occurring, Congress is functioning, the election of the
President shall be made within thre days. If Congress is in recess, it must
assemble in extraordinary sessions for the sole object of electing the President
and receiving his oath. The election, In this case, shall be made'within twenty
days counting from that on which the vacancy occurred.
The convocation of Congress to assemble In extraordinary sessions to elect
the President of the Republic Is effected by the President of the Senate, or, in
default of the latter, by the president of the Chamber of Deputies.
Article. 148.-The election of the President of the Republic by Congr-ss shall
be made by secret vote, In permanent and continuous session. The person obtainlag an absolute majority of the votes shall be proclaimed.
22324-8----16
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18. Uruguay: Conjiflutlops of October26, 1951
Article 158.-The Presidency of the National Couneil of (tloernment
@hall be
rotation, by yearly periods, among the members elected by the i)arty which
obtained a majority and by order of their plate on the rpspeive list.
In the event of the absence, vacancy or temporary imlliment or leave of
the Councillor serving as President, he shall be replaced by the meviher who
followed hh on the said list, who shall also occupy the I'rsldemiey for the year
corresponding to him by virtue of the above provisions.
In the case provided for in the last paragraph of Article 151, the Presidency
shall be occupied by the members from the majority list in order of their position thereon, beginning with the one who received the most votes.
(9. Venezuela: Consliftuton of April 11, 1953
Article 106.-1n the event of the Inability of the President of the Repnblic
to serve after he has taken the oath of office, the Mlnisters of the Cabinet,
with a quorum of one more than half, shall select by absolute majority vote a
Minister to take charge of the National Executive Power. The Minister designated shall Immediately take the oath of office before the Cabinet and shall fnnelion as Acting In Charge of the National Executive Power. If the National
Congress is in session it shall proved, within ten , 1ays following the date of
the vAcancy, to elect a President of the liepublic by an absolute majority vote,
for the remainder of the constitutional period. If the National Congress [I not
in season, the Acting in Charge of the National Excentive Power, within ten
days after his designation, shall call an extraordinary session, for the purpose of
filling the vacancy. The National Congres shall meet within ten days after
the call, and, within ten days following Its Installation shall proceed to elet, by
absolute majority vote, a President of the Republi for the remainder of the
constitutional period.
The President elected in the manner indicated shall take office within ten days
after his election, taking the oath of office before the National Congresx. or the
FeWderal Coutrt If the former is not in session. If he does not do so the office
of Preident of the Iltepubic shall be considered vacant and the prcednre shall
be folliiwed that is provided In the foregoing article.
Article 10.-Temporary vacancies in the office of President of the Republic
shall be filled by a Minister of the National Executive Office designed by him.
The designee shall act as 'Minister In Charge of the National Executive Power,
after taking the oath of office before the President of the Republic or before, the
Federal Court, according to the decision of the President of the Republic upon
makig the designation.
PRESIDENrIAL DISABILITY: CONSTITUTION OF TmE CONFIDERATE STATEs

or AIERICA
The Constitution of the Confederate States of America, March 11, 1861, closely
resembled the Coustitution of the United States. The presidential disability, or
Inability, clause was, In particular, practically Identical, as may be seen from
the following transcript from the Confederate Constitution:
"ARTICLE

IT, PARAGRAPH

9

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his dcamim,resignation. or Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same
shall devolve on the Vice-PresIdent; and the Congress may, by law, provide for
the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and
the Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such
offer shall then act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President
shall be elected."

Senator KEAUVER. We will ask the staff of the subcommitee to
have the hearings printed as quickly as possible. Any other statements that are received in the next few days will be included in the
record.

i

Commager, Ienry Steeler, editor Documents of American History.
ton.Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, p. 881.

New York, Apple-
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With that our hearings will be terminated and the subcommittee will
try to inake a decision about this matter.
Mr. Rhyne, we again waint to express our very deep appreciation
have eiidered in giving us your
ho
to you for the public service
thinking about this matter and coming here this morning.

Mr. ijYNE. Thank you, Senator. I again thank you for your
courtesy and kindness in hearing me.

Senator KEFruvyAR. We stand iii rcess.
(Whereupon at 11: 25 a. in., the hearings were concluded.)
Subsequently, the subcommittee received the following communications:)
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THlE CITY OF NEW YORK,

DEPARTMENT OF l'VL8.IC LAW AND GOVERNMENT,
Vew York, N. Y., March 2, 1958.

lion. FSTES KEFAUtER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
)EAR HENATOn KEFAUVER: In reply to your telegram asking my views on the
problem of Presidential inability, I submit the following:
1. If Congress does nothing I shall not feel that the Republic Is Imperiled. I
held this opinion before President Eisenhower's recent announcement to his
press conference.
2. I think It might be worth while for Congress to consider passing a concurrent resolution along the following lives:
(a) The Congress welcomes the statement of President Eisenhower that Vice
President Nixon "knows what he should do it the event of a Presidential dis.
ability" that is serious, and trusts that there will be similarly clear understandings between future Presidents and Vice Presidents.
(b) The Congress expects that In the event of serious Presidential inability
the Cabinet, the majority and minority leaders of Congress, and the Vice President will take counsel with each other and will announce to the Congress the
-decisions that they reach. (I put the Vice President last In this enumeration
because while he has the right to act as ['resident in the event of Presidential
inability, It is not for him alone to judge whether he should exercise the right.
He should act as President only after advice taken from the Cabinet and with
the approval of the Congress.)
(o) The Congress expects to be informed from tie
to time on the continuance or lessening of the President's Inability and on the occasion of his re-assumption of his duties.
3. I view a constitutional amendment as (a) completely unnecessary and (b)
possibly harmful.
(a) Unnecessary.-I have a feeling that those who desire an amendment are
taking an "apprehensive" vlew of the Constitution. I borrow the word from
my former colleague, the famous international lawyer, John Bassett Moore.
lie described the "apprehensive" method of Interpretation as "fertile In doubts"
and as treating "powers as subjects of abuse rather than as national necessities
for sources of advantage." lie was dealing with the treatymaking clauses, and
apprehensions concerning them resulted In the proposal of the Bricker ampndment. I think that Judge Moore's view Is equally applicable to article II,
section 1, paragraph 6: "In case of the removal of the President from office,"
and so forth. Moreover, we should not forget what Edmund Burke said in his
famous speech on conciliation with the American Colonies: "In other countries
the people more simple and of a less mercurial cast, judge an II principle in
government only by an actual grievance; here they anticipate the evil." The
Americans, he went on to say, "augur misgovernment at a distance* and snuff
the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze."
I do not think we need fear that any Vice President taking over Presidential
"'powers and duties until * * * the Inability of the President be removed" would
Insist on retaining those powers when the President had made a recovery.
Which Vice President that this country has had (or which unsuccessful vicepresidential candidate) could be suspected of being capable of harboring such
a design? It Is alleged that our national nominating conventions sometimes
nominate candidates for the Vice Presidency with insufficient thought as to

282

PRFIDEN'IAL INABtITY

whether they would make good PeesIdents. I do not fear that they might noliinate candidates who would seek to be.men on horseback,
(b) Ilarmiul.-Even though a constitutional amendinent were enrefully
drafted, some spclfle provisions might well be Inapropriate in the event of a
situation that the draftsmen haed not contenplated. Then there would have to
be al endlavor to follow the inundlle of the atielendment, rather than to do the
wise and stsible thing. The more detalled the nmendinent, the inore einbarnissing some provision might be. Tke, for example, the prolpwil of a declslon roeahed by a majority of the Cabinet. The 4 Cabinet imeubers litthe
minority might con and
far more confidence froin the country thMin the 0 who
happened to be In the majority.
Whatever the merit or doumerit of these vilews, I have held then without
change for a good wany years. ]n 1920, I wrote for the Review art article
entitled, residentiall lInabllty," of which I vctlo.o a ol)y, and which you
may wish to Include in the hearings. It discu.ses some details of President
Wilson's Inability 'that I have not seen In Inrint elewhere; the dates on which
bills lN4emlte law without his signature, 111od tile tittes on wbicht ho was able to
sign bills.
I concluded this article by saying that perhaps Congress would be wise to
pass a bill along the lines suggested above. Since there has beek dis.Cussion
of a possible veto, I now suggest a concurrent resolution. To be sure, this
wouli be hortatory rather than mandatory, but I think that the expression of
congressional de ires anti exli talon would be just as effective as the enactniemet of a statute.
With high regard, I anm,
Yours faithfully,
LINDSAY R~OGERS,
lltrgcss Proftesorof Public Lar.

(Fromithe lemlew, May 8, 19201
RESIDENTIAL

INABILITY

(Mr. Wilon's improved health has removed from the problem of the (Itsability of a President to perforni the duties of his office, any pressure of present
urgency. But the experience of the half year during which hi$ IlIness was
serious serves as ample reason for discussing this Important and delicate question on its merits.)
Several proposals have eeIn made in Congress to decide how the fact of
Presidential Inability to act may be determined, and if the House Judiciary
Committee can agree, It will doubtless make s"mie recommendation. ' But the
chances of early action are not great, since the questions of constitutional law
and political policy are difficult and Important anti, judging from the attitude of
Congress hitherto, a decision will be long delayed. Not until 1880 did Congress
amend the Presidential succession law of 1792, which was, admittedly, Inadequate and, perhaps, unconstitutional. But the question should be answered:
If the President Is unable to act, who is to determine how administrative decisions are to be made and other public business proceeded with, In order that
the Government may not suffer a collapse similar to that of recent months which
culminated in Secretary Lansilng's resignat ion?
The framers of the Constitution attempted to guard against an Interregnum

by providing that "In tie case of the removal of the President from office, or

his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the

said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or Inability, both

of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as
President, and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed
or a President shall be elected."
This provision, although In ambiguous terms, at least considers every possibility except the death of the President or Vice President subsequen, to elec-

tion but prior to inauguration. That contingency, fortunately, has never con.
fronted the country, but Congress his not attempted to take measures to deal

with it. In five cases, owing to death, the Vice President has become Chief
Magistrate; Tyler, ]'llmore, Johnson, Arthur, and Roosevelt. Johnson was
threatened with removal, but no President has ever suggested resignation, and
the mention of this method of vacating the office is the only joke in the Federal
Constitution.
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The act of March 1, 1792, provided that tile President of the Senate pro tempore
arid tile Speaker of fhe hIouse of Rlepresenattives should follow tie Vice 'resident

In succe8lson to (he Presidency. There were, however, a number of objections
to this arrangement. Its constiitiona lty was open to question, since It was not
certain that the Speaker and President pro tempore were officers of the United
States within tire meaning of tie terr as used in the Constitution. In the second
place-and Madison was among those who pdnted tills out-if one of ihege congrensonal ofllcials went to tile White Illuse, there was no requirement that lie
give up his original duties, and his executive uind legislative functions aight
conflict. Third, between Congresses there is no Speaker of the House, aind
until 1890 the residentt of file Senate pro leinnjlre did not hold over; eonsequently, if tile President and Vice President should die during ti1s Ilterli,
difficulties would illuie.
There were a llinber of atteifllts to change the law. In 1420, tile Senate
Judiciary Cornnilttee wits orlere (o repirt wletlher any changes were necessary. It replied uinnimously that at thut lime It was Inexpedlent to legislate.
In 18.50, tile Coininlltte on the Judiciary reported flint the act was constitulloial,
but suggested thai, If there should iW a vacancy in the offlees of Speaker and
President of the Senate pro tvnpore, the Chief Justice of the Unitisl States (provided lie had not presided sit an ilnlpeachent) srid tlen tile Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of tile Unllcd States should succeed according to seniority.
No action was taken by fle Senite on this report, and the matter was not pressed
until 1881.
le-fure Congress ruiet il et -inber of that year sind before either the Speaker
of the House or the President pro tenipore of the Senate find been chosen, Garfield died. The fact that for souie time he was unable to perform the duties of
fis otllce caused the question of inability to be discussedd. and when, in 1S5,
during Cleveland's adniinistralon, 'ice residentt ]lendricks died, soine legislative action was felt to be nn,-cssiary. In both ca.CS, if the incurils-nt8 of the
Presidential oflive--Presidents Arllur and Cleveland-had diedl during the congresslonal recesses, there wold have Wen no one to take their places. More than
tint, It was possible for fhe ofilce to go to n nililber of tile political party which
had been defeated ii tile election, for, during Cleveland's terni, Senators Sherman
aid IngaI were Presidents pro tempore oif the Senate and were Republicans.
SOn January 19, 1889), therefore, Congress Igissl a liw providing that, If the
oltiltuional provision were invoked, su((e.sion to the Presidency should vest
in the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Serelary of the Treaiury,
the Secretary of War, tile Attorney General, the 'ostmaster ®General, the Scoretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior, in the order named. The
act also declared "That, whenever the powers and duties of the office of I'resldent of the United States shall devolve upon any of the persons nanied herein,
If Congress be not then In session, or if It would not niect In accordance with the
law within twenty days thereafter, It shall be the duty of the Iperwn upon whoil
such powers and duties shall devolve to Issue a proelialation convening Congress in extraordinary session, giving twenty days' notice of the tize of rireeting."
This statute, however, does not attempt to settle two linirrtant i iints. In
the first place, It seems to be agreed that Congress has the Iwer to order a
special election to fill a vacancy. The act of 17R2 provided that an election
should be held, but the question was left open in the act of lNS6. Senator hoair
offered an amendment giving the person who sucteeded to the Presidency the
right to serve until the expiration of the regular teran, but this was defeated,
and Congress apparently reserves the right to order an election, if it dieemes
wise. If a President were chosen under an Intermediate election, his term
would be 4 years, and that would destroy the present synchrony between the
executive and legislative branches. It is possible, moreover, to Inagine cases of
conflict between the executive and legislative when Congress would use this
method for getting rid of a President to whom it objected, and an Acting Presldent could veto a measure providing for a special election. On the other hand,
the Constitution unquestionably contemplated that only persons chosen by the
electoral college should serve as Presidents. Fortunately, however, the succession has never gone further than the Vice President, and the difficulties which
undeniably exist need not be solved until they confront us.
The second and more serious question is the meaning of "inability." and here
the writers are in almost complete disagreement. Prof. NY. W. Willoughby, the
leading authority on American constitutional law, simply states the problem,
and does not attempt to answer it:
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"In the absence of a definition, who is to determine, nd what conditions are
to be held to create, an Inability on the part of the President to perform his
official duties? What Is to he done in case the President Is temporarily disabled
by sickness, or accident, or Insanity? Who Is to de4ide, and by what criteria,
when this dixaeIement Is so serious and so prolonged as to require the appointment of an Acting President ?'
found in the North
The most elalrate discuss a of these questions bIto I k%
American Review for November 1881. Four distingulshed constitutional authorilies contributed to an interesting syil)siut on lresidentlal Inability,
apropos of the illness of President tnrflell. The ['resident's death rendered
unnecessary any decision In his case, but the various possibilities were fully
considered and widely differing opinions were expressed.
-Senator Trumbull took the position that as no proof was required when the
President died, "so in the ease of Inabillity the fact must be so notorious that
there can be no reasonable doubt about It, nor that an urgency exist requiring
Immediate action on Important nmtters, before the Vice President would be
warranted in assuming the duties of the President. Wheu such a case arises,
the people will not only acquiesce in the discharge of the Presidential duties
by the Vice President, but will demand that he exercise themi"
Senator Trumbull questioned whether nny law could be passed Improving
this situation. Ours is n people's government, lie argued, and peaceful succession to the highest office must depend upon the suplrt of public opinion.
This support Is both necessary and sufficient In eases of Inability as well as in
cases of election.
Judge Cooley, the eminent writer on constitutional law, urged that the qiieution of inability was one for Congress to determine. "ItIs porible," he said,
"for a case to arise so plain, so unmistakably determined ilnthe public judgment, that public opinion, with unanimous concurrence, woulo sumnmon the
Vice President to act. But though this would make him Acting President
do facto, he would become Acting President de Jure only after solemn recognition in some form by Congres." Such recognition, it may be said, has always
been given, even if only In the form of a communication telling the new inculnbent of the Presidency that Congress has organized and is waiting for his
message. And Judge Cooley argued that since Congress has the power to
embarrass and to tie the hands of the Vice President, Congress is competent to
declare when the Inability exists.
The third contributor to this symposium was Benjamin F. Butler, who thought
that the question of inability was a judicial one on which Congress could not
pass. He took it to be "axiomatic that when the Constitution Imposes a duty
on any officer, to be done by him, he must be the sole Judge when nd how to
do that duty, subject only to his responsibility to the people and to the risk of
Impeachment if he act Improperly or corruptly," and if in certain cases the
discharge of the duties of the President devolves upon the Vice President, "he
alone must judge, under the grave responsibility of his position, when his duties
begin, as he must determine how and in what manner he will exercise them."
Professor Dwight, on the other hand, took the view that public opinion would
not be able to restrain an ambitious man eager to occupy the Presidential seat.
He suggested that "some proper legal proceeding might be instituted by Congre,
In which the evidence required by law might be presented under the
general power to carry into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in
any department or officer of the Government."
It is evident that these views do not disclose any agreement as to what constitutes and who determines Presidential inability. Certain opinions expressed
by these writers, however, may be accepted. The support of public opinion
Is necessary if anyone is to succeed to the Presidential office; the responsibility
of the Vice President is heavy; Congress must approve, or a dangerous instance
of disunion between the executive and legislative branches might occur. The
Constitution unquestionably contemplated temporary inability, and it can be
provided for without submitting an amendment to the States. The Vice
President and the Cabinet, with the support of Congress, are competent to
determine the matter.
President Wilson ought to be rather reluctant to criticize any efforts which
were made during his Illness to prevent complete governmental inaction. Certainly the disposition of everyone-Congress, the Vice President, the Cabinet,
and the public-was against raising the question of how the Inability should
be met That It existed was sure. To mention only 1 evidence, 28 bills became
law during the special session of Congress owing to the failure of the Execu-
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live to act within 10 days (exclusive of Sundays) after their receipt at the
White House; and when full disclosures are made as to the nature and times
of the President's complete inability to act, It will be Interesting to check them
up with the dates on which bills were signed. For example, the President was
able to veto the Prohibition Enforcement Act on October 2?, but he did not
approve 2 statutes which became law on October 22 and 25, and he failed to sign
Public Laws Nos. 07 to 82, inclusive (October 28 to November 18), with the
exception of No. 73, the first general deficiency law for 1920, which was signed
on November 4. After November 18 practically all of the bills became law with
the signature of the President.
The Vice President, supported by Congress, could, under these circumstances,
I think, have asserted the right to act for the period of the emergency. But
the Vice President is an anomalous officer of the United States, who presides
over the Senate while he waits for the President to die. Although by the
Constitution he succeeds to the Presidency, he is, In most cases, totally anfamiliar with the l,
riploli'i of the administration. In spite of the fact that, for
long periods, Mr. Wi1,lon's Cabinet was Ignored, this body was the best qualified
to deal with the problems that needed consideration. A wise President might
have asked Secretary Lansing to call his colleagues together, and I cannot see
that the infornml Cabinet meetings constituted a dangerous precedent. The
President, perhaps, does not know that they were the only evidence to the
public that there was any Government in Washington, and they may have
saved Mr. Wilson the embarrassment of having the question of inability brought
to a settlement by Congress or by the Vice President, In response to public
opinion.
What seens to be required in the future Is a simple statute saying that If
the President is temporarily unable to nct he shall notify the Vice President
and request him to consult with the Cabinet-ns was done during Mr. Wilson's
absence abroad; and that if the fact of the President's Inability Is notorious,
and yet this action is not taken by him, the Vice President shall meet with the
Cabinet, Informing Congress of the situation, or calling it Into special session,
if this Is necessary. The Supreme Court of the United States c ,ld not be
compelled to pass on the question without n constitutional amendment enlarging
its jurisdiction, and In any event it would be a political matter similar to those
which the Court has hitherto wisely avoided taking any part in.
It Is true that such a statute as the one suggested might encourage an
ambitious Vice President to attempt to Interpret a temporary Indisposition as
constitutional Inability, but the fear of Congress and of public opinion would,
I think, be an effective bar. And, after all, it would simply be one more of
those political arrangements which for their success depend on that "natural
sentiment" which the historian Grote called "constitutional morality": "a per.
feet confidence In the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party
contest, that the forms of the Constitution will be no less sacred In the eyes of
his opponents than In his own."
LYNDsAr RooERs.

lion. ESTEe KI,'AUVER,

Tia- UNIVPMSITY OF CHICAGO,
Tnc IAw SCHOOL,
Ohicago, iM., March 8. 1958.

Chairman of Subcommittee on ConstituItonal Amendments,
United States Senate, Washington, D. 0.
DER SENATOR KErAUVER: In response to your telegram of February 27, 1 have
nothing to add to the views on the subject of Presidential disability, which I
expressed to the special subcommittee of the House on that subject, headed by
Hon. T nanuel Celler, of New York, about 2 years ago. (See hearings before
Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential Disability of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 2d sess., April 11 and 12, lo6,
serial No. 20, pp. 105-119.)
However, at the request of one of the newspapers here, I boiled down my
views on the most important aspect of this subject, last year, for publication
In their columns. I enclose a copy of the result, which is shorter and probably
for that reason clearer than what I had to say before the House committee.
I hope It may be of some use to you.
Sincerely yours,
WILUAU W. CsoSKE£a.
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i'ron the Chicago Vally News, April 10, ID571
PROrSSoR CROS5XIY: PRIr.8IDENTAT DISAPImTITY A JUDICIAL I68U,

I cannot agree that ('ongreq has all along had power, undkr the i'resldential.
disability provisions of tho Constitution, to deal fully-had it only desired to
so--with the three cases of Presidential disability that have thus far arisen.
Tho provisions In question actually give Congress no power at all In cases
merely of Presidential disabiiIty, death, resigntion, or removal from office.
The power given Is limited expressly to "the case of retmioval, death, resignation,
or Inability, hoth of the I'resldent and Vice President"; nd In such a case,
Congress can do noi more than "provide," or "declnre," "hy law," "what officer
shall then act as President." It cannot determine atuhoritatively that a case
of such dual disability lits arlsen.

It Is also not true, as soine have supposed, that Congress can deal fully with
Presitlentlal-disabllity cases, by virtue of the power it has under the "necessary
and proper" clause.
This clause empowers the Congress only to "make laws."
Presldential.disabllity cases do not call for the wakIng of laws: they call, ewhnn.
ever there in any doubt or difference about the matter, for the finding of n fact-the fact of Presilential dlisabillty-and they cail, further, for the application of
preexisting law to that fact-law already provided In the Constitution.
Upon any accurate view, what Is called foc Is adjudication; not legislation, or
the making of laws.
The widespread belief that the Constittitlon does not provide for determining
such cases Is a coneequence, I think, of reading the lPresIdentiai-disaillity provisions out of context.
In addition, there were certain transactions of the Federal Convention, on and
after August 27, 1787, which are mistakenly taken to confirm this widespread
view.
On that date, the Presidentlal-disabllity provisions In the draft cons. tuilon
of August 0 came before the Convention. Various members objected to these.
John )ickinson of IN;-laware complained because no "judge" of Presidentiai
disability was designated. On this ground and others, the provisions were post.
poned.
Four days later, they were handed to a conuittee for revision. John Dickinson
was a member of this committee. Yet, when the committee reported, It recoin.
mendt d lresidential-dlsability provisions containing no Indication its to who was
to be "the judge" in such cases.
So, if the usual view is correct, the Convention not only mmade no provisions
upon this subject; it must also have intended to make none.
This is. for me, a hard conclusion to reach; and It Is easy to show that It Is not
correct.
When John Dickinson made his complaint on August 27, there was, Indeed, no
provision in the Constitution upon the subject about which lie complained; the
judiciary provisions of the document were then very narrow.
Later, on the saine day, the judiciary provisions were, however, much extended,
and one of the extensions met Dickinson's complaint completely.
This wias the provision whereby the judicial power was extended to "all cases
in law and equity arising under the Constitution."
Cases "arise under the Constitution" whenever they present a question as to
the meaning or application of any of its provisions. Presidenial-disability cases
would fall within this category.
A ca-e Is, furthermore, a case in law or equity, within the meaning of the
above provision whenever It is a case of a kind customarily litigated in courts
either of law or equity at the time when the Constitution was drawn.
Among the cases then long customarily litigated In courts of law were cases
of "quo warranto." In such cases the right of an Individual might be adjudicated to exercise the powers and duties (but not necessarily to enjoy the salary
and perquisites) of a public office.
Presidential-disability cases would be such cases. So would cases arising
under the same constitutional provision that presented any question of the
removal of a Presidential disability.
Both therefore would be within the constitutional authority of the national
courts to decide: A conclusion In perfect accord with the general scheme of
tripartite division of governmental power under the document. For the cases in
question are cases calling for adjudication, and the Constitution puts them
where such cases are generally put.
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'rho Suprento Court has held that, In the absence of contrary legislation by
Congrer,4, the right of Initiating proceedings in quo warranto, as to offices under
the United States, belongs exclusively to tilo Attorney General. congre.,W, howover, can mold this remedy In practically any way It sees fit.
Thus, It could, and probably should, give an Initiatory right in all Presidential
disability cases to the Vice President; and to the President, In removal-ofdisability cases.
It could, also, It It saw tit, confer Initiatory rights, In both these cases, upon
any citizen; or it could, I think, provide for such rights In Congres Itself, as a
group of Interested citizens; or, in order to assure the right of Initiation to
both political parties, it could give such rights to a congressional minority,
preferably one not too large.
And, finally, it Congress saw fit to do so, It could put such rights into a special
standing commission of distinguished citizens. The right to counsel, other than
the Attorney General, could also be provided.
WILLIAU W. CXoss KEY,
Professorof Law, University of Ohtcoao.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ScIENCE,
Urbana, Ill., March 4, 1958.
lon. EsTEs KEFAuVEA,
Senate Olce Building, Washington, D. 0.
DEAN 8"iATol KzrAuwR; I apologize for not answering your January letter,
but I have been away from my office for the last 0 months on a research leave.
I have little to add to my letter to Representative Celler (January 0, 1050) for
the Siclal Subcommittee on Study of Presidential Inability of the House Committee on the Judiciary. However, the Intervening public and congressional
discussion further convinces me that a constitutional amendment is desirable..
As the Cobstitution stands .a plausible argument can be made that the
authority to determine the fact of Presidential Inability Is vested in (1) the
Congress, (2) the President, (3) the Vice President, (4) the courts. In my
Judgment the most pressing need Is to determine beyond any doubt where the
responsibility lies. Hence, I favor a simple amendment stating in effect: "The
Congress may by law provide for the case of the Inability of the President."
I believe that such an amendment is preferable to one that would Itself stip.
ulate the procedures to be used. It would allow Congress to change or modify
the procedures according to future experiences.
Of course, Implementing legislation would be needed. Since the existence
of "Inability," Its duration, and the question of whether the Vice President
should become President or merely Acting President fire "political" (but not
partisan) questions, I favor vesting this Judgment In the Congress which is
accountable to the electorate. I think past history Indicates the unwisdow of
placing the duty on the Vice President. But, in my Judgment, the resolution of
the doubts about who determines which procedures shall be used Is more Important than the question of which particular method should be adopted. I
would, by amendment, leave up to the wisdom of Congress the decision as to
how Inability shall be established.
Sincerely yours,
JAOK W. PXLTASOX.
COLO.NADE CLUB,
I'NIVE981TY OF VIGOINIA,

OAarlottesv'ile, Va., March 5, 1958.
Senator Esrs KEFAUVER,
Chairman, Standing Subcomm ittee on Constlitutional Amendments,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington, D. 0.
DEAR SEXATOR KnAUvx : I received your letter of January i0 last and your
telegram of a few days ago, and I tender my apologies for replying so tardily.
If this letter is not too late, It may be Included in the record.
I answered the questionnaire of Representative OCeller for the subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary and later testified before that subcommittee. I shall not repeat here what I then submitted, for it was published
at the time.
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My prsent Inclination 14 to slibmit to yolt son conclusions as of todny.
The Fubj ,t Ishighly important, tt nny solution which has I)cen mindl,, tIwlud.
Ing illy OWIl, Ias sqrtolq'4 objections. This Is proNibly why It has beti so hard
to agree.
One Is telnilited, after nil the discussion, to say, "Let us not fix Any solution III
advaiice, but leave Any netl situation which mny rise to Ie hanle'd when It
Arises."
But doing nothing Ini advnce hn the serious danger that, In nn emergency.
delay may be caused by uncrtintly, with disastrous results.
I view with alarm freezing a solution Into a cotusilutionnl amendment. because
the solution vhosen may not work well and yet could be changed only by another
Amendment.
I see only one argument which is worthy of being taken seriously against
Congress having the Iwr to act it this matter under the "necessary nud
proper" clause. That objection Is that this dellcote subject touches th, itependence of the Presidency, a matter close to the hearts of the bulk of the
frnitters nd of the utmltost itixirtnuce In our system as It hns dtvelotlld.
IDe\spite this argument, a strong case can be wimade for the Iower of ('ollgres's
to implement the constitutional provision under the "necessary and Iproler"
clause.
Our first neutrality act, approved June 5, 1704, changed the enacting clause
in all pertinent sections to "Be It enacted and declared, etc." I take this to
mean that Congress did not want to be pinned down to the assertion that what
it provided was a new enactment or was merely declaratory of the law of nations and In part of the command power of the President. Perhaps Congress
might now follow the resourcefulness of the men of that day and "enact and
declare" that, in case of a Presidential Inability, the Vice President Is to become
Acting President, and that he Is to cease to be such when the disability is
removed. It might then "enact" how and by whom both these things should
be determined.
Aye; there's the rub. For, here, men differ on legal points and on policy.
There are those who think the determination of Inability belongs to the Vice
President, and, certainly, if he is faced with a situation when the decision must

be made, he would have the responsibility of stepping in.
In this connection, I approve the Eisenhower.Nixon agreement, and consider
It a valid and useful step. Its only weakness is in not providing for the IsSsible case where the President thinks and determines that the disability has
been removed but is still not in shape to carry on his office.
I see no merit whatever in the criticisms of Speaker Rayburn and exPresident Truman. I see no reason why an Acting President could not take
the oath that he will faithfully exercise the office of President. Indeed, the
Constitution says that the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore In the

absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the office of President,
which he can do In an acting capacity. The President and Vice President have
not created the office of Acting President, but have merely given a name to what
they Interpret the Constitution as providing for In the event of inability.
There is the objection of policy to the Vice President's having the decision,
however, that he is the party in Interest, and, hence, would not decide without
criticism or embarrassment. It would be bad for him to push himself into
the office. It would also be bad for him to hesitate to act when action was
needed because he was leaning over backward to avoid the charge of
usurpation.
To the Celler subcommittee I first proposed that Congress provide that the
Supreme Court appoint as inferior officers private citizens of distinction to be
prepared to serve when an occasion arose as commissioners to make both
determinations.
I later modified this to make them private citizens in active life, to get around
the criticism that, between the time the men were appointed and the time a case
arose, they might become feebleminded and yet still be commissioners.
My purpose was to get men whose judgment and honesty the public would
respect, men who would make their decision In a quasi-judicial spirit. I assumed that Supreme Court members should not sit as commissioners themselves.
but that they might be given, by law. the power to appoint as technically Inferior officers, as per the constitutional provision, men of high standing from
active public life, and that these men would serve as commissloners vo long as
they were engaged in active life and were not removed by the Supre-ne Court
for cause.

239

JIl ESIDINTIAb INAJIITY

The Cabinet iA coiiosed of administrative sblordlinates of the I'resldeat
whose respet for and dependence for their offices upon him ought make them
reluctant to Ilct.
Congress Is a political body, and I look with disfavor upon the suggestion
(lint it be empowereml to dm.Irle a matter so clomwly related to the tenure of the
l'resient. Impeachment by the House and removal after conviction by the
Scnmte was almost abused in reconstruction it a manner which might Fave permniiently weakened the l'rtIdency. Fortunately, the Impeachment process has
not since been a serious threat to Presidential Independence. lut so vital do I
regard much Indel~iedelee to our system that I object to having this power given
to Congress by law or by conslitutional amendment.
I said at the beginning that every solution fins Its drawbacks, Including my
own. Yet I make one inore polea for serious
nsimmderatIou of siome form of my
proposal to the Celler committee. The objection that I want to set up w. o. c.'s
I regard as mileading.
I am not inclined to have the President notify the Vice Preident where that
is xosql~ble, as per the Elsenhower-Nixon agreement. But, where that Is not
possible, why not have distinguished eltliens chosen by the Supreme Court
standing by as commissioners for the purpose of deciding, with the proviso that
they retire as comrnlssioers when they retire from active private life, as suitably defined? And, slice the resumption of activity by the President Is an even
more delicate matter, why not have these men decide that In all cases?
I amahonored to be asked to comment upon this Important subject. If you
should wish me to amplify or clarify my summary statements, please let me
know.
Respectfully yours,
JAUES HART.
AMERICAN COLIOE OF C119sT PH YSICIANS,

hf ago, 1ll, March 6, 1958.
Ion. ESTE8 KEFAIVrEr,
Seunatc Oflcc IBuIldiuug, Washlnglon, D. 0.
i)EAR His: An Important Issue of current concern to the Congress Is the need
for legislation regarding procedure to protect the Interests of the country In the
event the Presildent should be unable to carry on the duties of his office. A
prolosed bill now before Congress suggests the catablisment of a 7-man
Coummiission on Presidential Disability. These 7 men, under. the proposed bill,
would be the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the House, the President pro
teuIlpre of the Senate, and the 4 party leaders of the 2 Houses.
Iusofar as this can go, It appears to be a reasonable and effective proposal;
however, the one, and perhaps most Important issue it does not seem to consider, Is just what qualified person or persons will determine the Presidentls
state of health.
It appears to me that this Is a medical rather than a legislative problem and
that the most difficult decision facing the Congress would be to determine when
the Chief Executive is physically or mentally Incapable of carrying out his
duties as President.
If this premise Is accepted as a basis for legislation, we would accordingly
propose that the Congress establish a medical commission comprised of 3
physicians: I to be selected by the Democratic leaders, a second by the Republican leaders, and the third to be designated by these 2 parties. Recognized
medical societies can be requested to submit a suggested panel of prominent
physicians from which the Congress could make its selection.
We further recommend that this medical commission be comprised of a
cardiologist, a specialist in pulmonary disease, and a neurologist, since It would
appear that disability, were It to occur, would fall within these 3 specialties.
The duty of this medical commission would be to consult with the President's
personal physician and periodically check the President's health. If. in the
opinion of these specialists, the President's health Is such that he should not
carry the heavy burden of the office of President, they could so advise the Presi.
dent -nd make proper recommendations. Should the President be incapacitated
and unable to make a decision on his own, the duty of the medical commission
would then be to report their findings to the 7-man Commission on Presidential
Disability. The Congress would then be obliged to take the necessary steps to
declare the President incapable of carrying on the ofliclaI duties and to elect
the Vice President to succeed him.
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8Iu'oe I' ".iditi i-Aiseiiiower 1mwt meiimestel thiat ( he Uvmingro& enact IeNIIntioim
lit oi xernttt' for mueli eg tiiIte' 1 ruwti that Ills-- for'cgoiig ishmim
will mmierit
celtierat ton N~ r ticmmitteo.
MURRAY Konsr:;,o, E:rceuIlre

Senator

lVr~

JJrIPot.

Rt:r.%t, P;n.

DFIAR -SFAA1UR KNFAVVER :I i1t(Aw oi youtr t~ivinid reor f~itii
life Hemite, yonr
amtoel t toil with thlt 411q:bili1ty amiitgmeit itiM wh.-t your followers limight hn%-v~
e0j1wcted. Out, 1, iivrlet.s oligriiito you (11 th8 isew basILic lseriii to)

b\ir mality yoArs it ttdentt of our eiustitutiomtai pyttem and txmmtiutlonni
IAW*,
I Alit C110t1ai1 thlit only byj atilen01tillug (to C01,4 tittiol Call n auleillntp finad
stable 'n~ito of tho iprovisiiii voit'eri-ing (te 411matity of time I'residemt
be achievci. Tiwrt, are obvious sibjeetiois (itit
mere eompavt between thle
President anld the Vie l'r't*dmIl
%lnd it statute liaied 111)011
tirticlo 11, Pectin 1, 1paragraph Ni and thoe m-esiry nd propesr clitupe of the ConaIilttutin
Would lwaviys be lil easy target for challenge of!11wN
centitutioniulilty.
Your draft tf anltinieudment. Nevits to tilt, liii' best thait hlu betin offered thuns
fitr. lint soimm. atidtionid prIth Inon-s seem tit mie desirtibki If not liupratirve.
Your* truly,
1, 1 ani wtntuaong tilt, ninny who~ would Ilk to have ns n flrutt schtioin It
Alrnatl to the OITXet th11t li (to case of ait enny lin tilt%office of 1'resulmit,
the Vice rlltent Fhll bee)m~e lPresident nti serve n4 match for the reinmiuder
tit thlt %we\pIrvAI term.
2. lloot unst 8 titte tin our history (thp olico of Vice Pre.sidenit lits hlil n vflcAnoer (T ti1ms becaku." the1\'icv Proenet loiecime President mnd attict" 1xviniae
the Vime Iresident retignedi), n Additional section. would sQen to be atitolutely
ttwitlal. with (lhe following suggexted ceontet "itntas of a vacaney In the
offlce oit Vice Plreotdeit, the functions, powers, andi duties vested by this artile
In the%Vico President sluill be perforinef by the officer desiOgnated by the Congross by law- ae, next In tiile to act as PresiAdent under the vontitiim4N specified
in this cnttio.Anil
thle Comgh'., shall by law adapt the irov"cdure herein
proscribc~d for usv lit the case of the disabhility of the President to the case of
the sinutanams disiblitty of both the P'resident and the Vice President."
lin thiq age%vrIous consideration. lils to ;) given niot only to the high death
ratw among the incumbents of the office of P'resident with its terrifle sttrains anid
ptv~ures.Q but also to the hazails of travel by air and to the ever-present
ithreat of atomlc wa-rfare.
NEW YORK, N. Y., March 13, 1958.
Bon. IFsras KFYAU'%R.
United States senate, W~ash ngton, DA 0.
Drai SEZIAToa KEFAUnvE: You hare been good enough to suggest that I sond
to you, as cirman of the Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendmenits of the Commnittee on the Judiciary of the Senate, my views on the question
ot presidential suceestslon.
1. The principal purpose of many of the current proposals on presidential disability Is to make clear that the Vice President succeeds only to the powers and
duties and not to the office In the event of a presidential disability.
It Is desirable that this point be clear. If necessary ire should have a constitutional amendment to make It clear. But I suggest that the history of article
2, section 1, clause 8, In fact makes It clear that It Is only to the powers and duties
to which the Vice Presidient would succeel In the event of the disability of the
President
The draft Consttution, before it went to the Committee on Style, provided
that, during periods of inability or vacancy in the Presidency, "the Vice President
sball exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or
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11011tile inni-lity or lb' lPresident he reiiioved." The Coiniffitto onl Mtyle Bubid itut.'il 1'thlHanlie" for "powers aidu duiiles.1" aIiid le volve" for ''exerrimi:"
Trhe
('oimmittee un Rtyle find no nutliority to manke ny nststntiive chringem arnd It
followsm I hut It (YOuld JIot hav b eeni tle( Inten'tin of thep (,omruiitteo to ('liinge
I lip N'ixie provision tim Iraifted toy Ifihe Co~nventilon, iriel~y, thait It waxM rilly to the(,
id t wNow I Miicc1P"l.
powers wi uuuulllem toJwhich (fie V'eice
If we wo're dealing with ni act of (COugregn andii not a coiuustittilonnt jorovIxlon
I would agree' tliut It would lie well to clarify tile mutiter onVe' anid for all. But
1 1t0 lieve that we Pliouhi be chary with conmtitutloniin nuinlnientm and should
liruoziose Iheuui only when there Is (fie clVearest kind of 11i-44. 1 suggest (fiat thinm
clear iteed doesCint exist In (li amue.
Tlheu l'iewNiDof l're?,idet l'U, .. itlnc, %*I(,( 1'reslii'it Nlx'iii, ,imil fte .dturivy
%%Iii
vtli w~hait I hie jimitsi lelI. 'litre ore
I Ii'iirul tipD lrwilly rIl
r'ii
itecirdani
Iff' well to hiave a coniicirreit rmoilion (if
,ithirtu wiuu' dlisaigree. Hit It mit
on flip
t his ('ollresli which would exir#'ss the linerlirettitloil of the' (ogr',.
soilijet-.
I would think the chatie lilgh tfiat nft-r thp e let whir'), wiuldl take
Ishivo'fbll IN- floor of Ilwi I louse, Menreilt winlol he, to liii I nI coneiirrviit ri'solli.
foIg IIV thu'sA I luiVe JUst XulK'KP1f(l ;
huhl exjireo.iiuiiC the*iijiliiiniii (Ofti'e (olgrVA 0011
allI If thism were' mo I lioliuld 111lu1k t hat wV(ibul emlollsh ui
ol vThi'lv' lIntu'rlretaIhilt (of thip (ulistttIII foil. If tfil iM wroiig and tile oplilion (Of Ibe fouge (Of IUIP.
resu'ulatlven wid Heiate we're lip the contrary, or even indeed4-i If there Were R
largo riuiority %Iekw to thip ("Dll rnry, Own'utli* matter f flip co(it ilutlonal anieiid
inwit moighti Inka ulp.
It would smi to follow that rio conl'
2. If (he fore'going vie'w wereC nlitiit,
Atitutlouial. atolelndiuot woliuld Is' nev'(u5i ry to jirovIde for (lie recaptlure by (lie
l'remidieit orfli eJowerg
p
11111
dilh' In the e'vent Df film recoDvery front tlip digalility. Th'imloouft liv covt'reui by (ile jirr'mnt jirovimlolis of artIfle 2, Pei-tion 1,
Oline (1.
3i. rhoii (hrr Imthe question na to tile coflsultatious which tile Vice I'rcstidnt

sihouli manke in [lhe came of a uhisabled Premident who will ihot or cannot 4(elare
film Iuialllty. ( ulo not think It ileesary (Dr th-Arabhle to elaborate (lie kind
of consuiltatioun or ntliority which (lip V~ice Pireident should have In order to
ie
this determiatIon. Olivioumly he iuhoiihl consult with many Ji~ieIn
and out of (Onveraiment, anii I doubt (lip wit'4onj of specifying In detail whon
lie should consult. If It Is sjsiKfl(-ul that lie mnuxt consult willh tile Cabinet thisl
would seemt to exc'ludeo IN remponstblilly to consult with others, an for example
leaders fi both Ilartlem anu even ineulival auhloritles. I think we must have
conflidenee that officials In such high poxitions will act with responsibility In a
matter of such grent national Importance.
R~espectfuilly yours,
TnoXAS K. F1swrrzu.
(S.J1. Wit. 8, Filth Conog., 1.1 sesX.J
JOINT )1E80I.TION To ainenti the Consitution to authorize governors to fill temporary
vacandes in the H~ouse of Itepresestatlves
Resolv'ed by the Rensato and H~owa of Repreacntatvea of the United States of
Atmcrtca ins (on uress asaembled (Itco-thlrde of ech IHouse concurring thereins),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, aind shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution only It ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years. from the date of its submission by the Con~gress:
"A RTIOL.r. -

"On any date that the total number of vacancies ili the house of Representatives exceeds half of the authorized membership thereof, and for a joerfod of
sixty days thereafter, the executive authority of each State shall have power
to make temporary appointments to fill any vacancies, Including those happening
during such period, In the representations from his State In the Ifouse of Representatives. Any person temporarily appointed to tIll any such vacancy shball.
serve until the people filit the vacancy by election as provided for by article 1.
section 2, of the Constitution."
Pas.%ed the Senate May 10 (legislative day, May 2), 1955.
Attest:
FELTONXM JOHJNISN
Secretary.

